On connaît d\u00e9sormais les grandes lignes de la nouvelle strat\u00e9gie de \u00ab\u00a0guerre perp\u00e9tuelle\u00a0\u00bb, notamment et fortement ax\u00e9e sur le nucl\u00e9aire, que le Pentagone recommande \u00e0 l’administration GW Bush. Nous parlerons tr\u00e8s prochainement de l’analyse g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de ce plan, qui est d\u00e9taill\u00e9 par William M. Arkin, dans le Los Angeles Times<\/em> du 10 mars, sous le titre : Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable — A secret policy review of the nation’s nuclear policy puts forth chilling new contingencies for nuclear war.<\/em> (Arkin commente le plan en m\u00eame temps qu’il le pr\u00e9sente. Il est professeur \u00e0 la John’s Hopkins University de Washington, et professeur \u00e0 l’USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Nous nous attachons pour l’instant et rapidement \u00e0 un des aspects de ce plan, qui concerne la nucl\u00e9arisation acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9e de divers syst\u00e8mes conventionnels, comme au temps de la Guerre froide \u00e0 partir de l’adoption de la doctrine dite de \u00ab\u00a0la riposte gradu\u00e9e\u00a0\u00bb. Cet aspect nous int\u00e9resse particuli\u00e8rement parce qu’il concerne l’avion de combat Lockheed Martin JSF\/F-35, qui a r\u00e9cemment \u00e9t\u00e9 command\u00e9 par les Pays-Bas, et qui est nomm\u00e9ment d\u00e9sign\u00e9 dans les nouveaux plans du DoD. Voici le passage de l’article de Arkin auquel nous faisons allusion :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n « In addition to the new weapons systems, the review calls for incorporation of \u00a0\u00bbnuclear capability\u00a0\u00bb into many of the conventional systems now under development. An extended-range conventional cruise missile in the works for the U.S. Air Force \u00a0\u00bbwould have to be modified to carry nuclear warheads if necessary.\u00a0\u00bb Similarly, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter should be modified to carry nuclear weapons \u00a0\u00bbat an affordable price.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> »<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Cette indication est le premier signe clair que le projet JSF initial, celui sur lequel s’appuie l’argument g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de vente aux pays \u00e9trangers, notamment europ\u00e9ens, devrait connaître divers changements, ou \u00ab\u00a0am\u00e9liorations\u00a0\u00bb, dont le premier effet sera n\u00e9cessairement une augmentation de coût. C’est une situation que nous avons souvent \u00e9voqu\u00e9e depuis le changement des priorit\u00e9s aux USA (de l’\u00e9conomie vers la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale). Les indications de Arkin sont une confirmation de cette pr\u00e9vision de tendance, simplement cette tendance s’affirme encore plus rapidement que nous le pr\u00e9voyions.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Sur ce sujet, dans le dernier num\u00e9ro de notre Lette d’Analyse bimestrielle Context<\/em> (n°50, mars-avril 2002), nous envisageons notamment le probl\u00e8me des nouvelles orientations bureaucratiques du Pentagone dans les nouvelles conditions \u00e0 Washington. Concernant le JSF\/F-35, nous \u00e9crivons notamment ceci :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n « With a view to these changes within the DoD, one can envisage new problems for the JSF in two areas: the cost aspect, because of the operational and technological evolution; and the status aspect, the reflection of inter-service rivalries.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n » * Afghanistan will strengthen the trend, within the USAF and even the US Navy, toward the need for the strictest possible central command and communications, to control the flow of information. That means, in the case of the JSF, strengthening its dependence on central systems, with a concomitant reduction in its autonomy. On the other hand, the need to take action against targets on the ground which are proving increasingly more difficult to identify, will lead to a greater degree of sophistication for the aircraft in the terminal aspect of its mission: sensors to identify targets and to guide on-board ordnance onto target. In both cases, the outlook is for a heightened level of sophistication and the resultant higher costs.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n » This has become possible, because, as we have seen above, the DoD bureaucracy is no longer bound by economic considerations. The bureaucracy is expected to have carte blanche in pursuing JSF enhancements that will result in a greater degree of sophistication. This can be expected to culminate in an explosion of costs, typical for DoD in this type of situation, at the end of the development phase and during the pre-production phase (roughly between now and 2007). We believe that the JSF, currently offered at an average price of $35 million for the USAF version, can be expected to attain between $70 million and $90 million per copy shortly before the start of production. The final price will exceed even that. These predictions are in accord with the general tendency of major US programs: the F-16, when it was under development as a candidate for the Light Fighter Program in 1973, was priced at $6-$8 million; it is currently sold for $25 million, despite a production run in excess of 3,000 units.<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Bien entendu, un autre aspect important est mis en \u00e9vidence par la pr\u00e9cision de Atkin sur le F-35. Cette capacit\u00e9 nucl\u00e9aire du JSF\/F-35, si elle se r\u00e9alise, impliquera n\u00e9cessairement un contr\u00f4le encore accru des Am\u00e9ricains sur cet avion, y compris sur les F-35 destin\u00e9s \u00e0 l’exportation. D’autre part, elle impliquera la possibilit\u00e9 \u00e9galement plus forte que les possesseurs non-US du F-35 soient impliqu\u00e9s dans les plans de combat US avec des possibles composantes d’intervention nucl\u00e9aire.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Des capacit\u00e9s nucl\u00e9aires pour le JSF? On connaît d\u00e9sormais les grandes lignes de la nouvelle strat\u00e9gie de \u00ab\u00a0guerre perp\u00e9tuelle\u00a0\u00bb, notamment et fortement ax\u00e9e sur le nucl\u00e9aire, que le Pentagone recommande \u00e0 l’administration GW Bush. Nous parlerons tr\u00e8s prochainement de l’analyse g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de ce plan, qui est d\u00e9taill\u00e9 par William M. Arkin, dans le Los Angeles… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[3204,250,3200,3004],"class_list":["post-64964","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-analyse","tag-context","tag-jsf","tag-npr","tag-nucleaire"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/64964","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=64964"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/64964\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=64964"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=64964"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=64964"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}