Guardian<\/em> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n« The policy chaos has reached such a height that last week, when the secretary of state Colin Powell announced plans for a conference this summer, the White House quickly second-guessed his choice of words. \u00a0\u00bbConference\u00a0\u00bb was a \u00a0\u00bbmisnomer\u00a0\u00bb an official told a US newspaper. With the region in turmoil, and Ariel Sharon on the way to Washington, the Bush team had not only failed to agree on policy, they could not even agree on the vocabulary. In its indecision, the administration seems to have resorted to ambiguity. According to a senior official who briefed the press after Tuesday’s Bush-Sharon meeting, the two leaders hardly mentioned Mr Arafat, focusing instead on the need for reform in the Palestinian Authority. It is possible that the Israeli prime minister, looking to lever as much as possible from the encounter to bolster his own agenda, could have taken this delicate choice of words and subject matter as a green light.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n» Mr Powell, having been vilified countless times by pro-Israel hawks in the administration, also opted for bland ambivalence. He said he recognised \u00a0\u00bbhow difficult it is with some of the parties who are there, some of the leaders who are out there and with this kind of violence and with responses that will come and acts of self-defence\u00a0\u00bb. But he added: \u00a0\u00bbWe cannot lose sight of the reality that a political solution, ultimately, is what will be required to bring this long-running crisis to an end.\u00a0\u00bb On the other hand, he added to the confusion by promising: \u00a0\u00bbWe’ll be discussing this with the Palestinian leaders and various elements of the Palestinian Authority in the days ahead,\u00a0\u00bb using the plural and carefully avoiding the Arafat name.<\/em> »<\/p>\n<\/p>\nSur le fond, il n’y a rien de nouveau : il y a toujours eu une tendance \u00ab\u00a0dure\u00a0\u00bb et une tendance accommodante \u00e0 Washington sur \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s toutes les questions importantes de politique ext\u00e9rieure et de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale. Rien de nouveau non plus qu’on retrouve en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral la tendance dure au Pentagone, la tendance accommodante au State department. Rien de nouveau enfin dans le fait que ces deux tendances contradictoires exercent leurs pressions antagonistes de fa\u00e7on voyante sur le pouvoir de d\u00e9cision central. C’est dans la nature m\u00eame de ce syst\u00e8me am\u00e9ricain, qui n’a pas de perception r\u00e9galienne du bien public et par cons\u00e9quent aucune perception d’une politique \u00e9vidente, ce syst\u00e8me où les grandes bureaucraties fonctionnent comme autant de groupes de pression et affirment leurs engagements naturels sous forme d’exigences politiques. Le seul moyen de maîtriser cette forme tr\u00e8s particuli\u00e8re d’organisation est d’imposer une affirmation centrale, qui a le dernier mot et n’h\u00e9site jamais \u00e0 le dire, et devant lequel, lorsque le dernier mot est dit, les groupes de pression doivent s’incliner. Jamais autant qu’aujourd’hui, \u00e0 Washington, ce m\u00e9canisme fondamental n’a \u00e9t\u00e9 aussi inexistant. Les exemples historiques souvent rappel\u00e9s ces temps-ci, un peu pour se rassurer, comme l’exemple de l’administration Carter avec la tendance dure de Brzezinski (NSC) et la tendance accommodante de Vance et du d\u00e9partement d’État (cette fois, le Pentagone de Harold Brown \u00e9tait plut\u00f4t neutre), n’ont rien de commun avec la situation pr\u00e9sente. Carter avait mille fois plus de caract\u00e8re que GW et si sa vision politique pouvait \u00eatre critiqu\u00e9e et le fut souvent, et souvent \u00e0 tort d’ailleurs, dans tous les cas il y avait une vision politique avec la d\u00e9cision qui vient avec.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Il n’y a aucun pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent d’un tel d\u00e9sordre dans le m\u00e9canisme d’une administration, avec comme r\u00e9sultat l’\u00e9vidence d’une non-politique prenant la forme d’un d\u00e9sordre permanent, où les affirmations publiques \u00e9voluent au gr\u00e9 des pressions des groupes de pression, des pressions des alli\u00e9s, des pressions des \u00e9v\u00e9nements et ainsi de suite. Le fameux \u00ab\u00a0empire\u00a0\u00bb dont la force est si souvent c\u00e9l\u00e9br\u00e9e, \u00e0 Washington m\u00eame et ailleurs, est aujourd’hui comme un \u00e9norme bateau ivre. C’est, de loin et m\u00eame de tr\u00e8s loin, le probl\u00e8me le plus grave qui se pose \u00e0 l’organisation du monde et aux relations internationales. A c\u00f4t\u00e9 de cela, on devrait commencer \u00e0 comprendre ce qu’il faut penser de la grande Guerre contre le terrorisme qu’on nous promettait pour l’\u00e9ternit\u00e9 il y a encore quelques semaines. La crise est am\u00e9ricaine avant tout.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
D\u00e9sordre \u00e0 Washington, D.C. 11 mai 2002 — Le d\u00e9sordre au sein de l’administration GW atteint un paroxysme. Ce d\u00e9sordre concerne la politique au Moyen-Orient, où les deux factions, les ultra-durs, comme Cheney et Rumsfeld, et les mod\u00e9r\u00e9s autour de Colin Powell s’affrontent f\u00e9rocement. Le point central de la crise est que le pr\u00e9sident, GW,… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[868,1294,3356,1391,569,3248],"class_list":["post-65091","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-bush","tag-cheney","tag-desordre","tag-powell","tag-rumsfeld","tag-washington"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65091","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65091"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65091\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65091"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65091"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65091"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}