{"id":65170,"date":"2002-07-13T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-07-13T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/07\/13\/sous-influence\/"},"modified":"2002-07-13T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2002-07-13T00:00:00","slug":"sous-influence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/07\/13\/sous-influence\/","title":{"rendered":"Sous influence<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Sous influence<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t13 juillet 2002 — Nous nous Arr\u00eatons \u00e0 la chronique de Martin Woollacott du 12 juillet, dans le Guardian<\/a>. La remarque g\u00e9n\u00e9rale qu’il propose est int\u00e9ressante : nous surestimons de fa\u00e7on syst\u00e9matique la puissance am\u00e9ricaine. Un int\u00e9r\u00eat suppl\u00e9mentaire est qu’il n’aborde pas la question finalement la plus int\u00e9ressante : pourquoi surestimons-nous syst\u00e9matiquement la puissance am\u00e9ricaine ?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWoollacott montre ais\u00e9ment cette surestimation syst\u00e9matique des capacit\u00e9s de l’Am\u00e9rique. Plusieurs domaines am\u00e9ricains, tels qu’ils sont observ\u00e9s par l’ext\u00e9rieur, t\u00e9moignent de cette surestimation. Woollacott a le m\u00e9rite de ne pas \u00e9carter les plus "sacr\u00e9s" d’entre eux. Par exemple, il montre ais\u00e9ment que, dans le domaine militaire, qui est un domaine o\u00f9 la puissance am\u00e9ricaine est consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme hors de la mesure courante et hors de toute exploration critique par cons\u00e9quent, il y a surestimation de l’Am\u00e9rique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab As to the American military, who could deny it is impressive? But it is not new, and it has not escaped the constraints obvious in the past. September 11 was supposed to have laid to rest the preoccupation with avoiding casualties which limited American military strength. It modified it but it did not end it, as was shown at Tora Bora, where US commanders hesitated and lost their quarry. Casualties are, rightly, a huge issue for those considering an Iraq campaign.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Big conventional forces might be a necessity for Iraq, as they might have been for Kosovo. But the general question remains of how relevant much of America’s military power is. As General Wesley Clark has noted, if you have a hammer, you tend to go around looking for nails, as a result perhaps neglecting more important tasks and more effective instruments.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Soldiers are among the smartest and most objective people in Washington, and their arguments about exactly what kinds of military force are relevant in the new situation are not over. But they are sufficiently developed to see that some of the present American array is already obsolete and some unnecessary, like missile defence. The related short termism of American foreign policy, the distaste for "nation building", is potentially counter-productive, as Afghanistan may be in the process of proving.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’explication de Woollacott est convaincante pour la situation d’aujourd’hui. Il expose qu’effectivement il y a dans le jugement g\u00e9n\u00e9ral sur l’Am\u00e9rique cette surestimation syst\u00e9matique qui ne renvoie pas \u00e0 la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 mais \u00e0 une image de puissance qui semble \u00e9chapper aux constats que la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 nous invite \u00e0 faire, et notamment au travail normal d’appr\u00e9ciation critique. Apr\u00e8s avoir d\u00e9taill\u00e9 effectivement combien l’Am\u00e9rique, \u00e0 c\u00f4t\u00e9 de sa puissance, montre de faiblesses et combien elle fait de fautes, Woollacott remarque avec justesse : \u00ab It is not that these faults are not constantly noted by both Americans and non-Americans. Rather, the exploration of America’s weaknesses does not seem to have the effect the same procedure does in other countries, where it results in some adjustment of the estimate of national strength.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWoollacott estime \u00e9galement que cette appr\u00e9ciation que nous avons de la puissance am\u00e9ricaine est relativement r\u00e9cente. En fait, il la date du 11 septembre 2001, \u00e9v\u00e9nement \u00e0 partir duquel, semble-t-il, tout aurait bascul\u00e9. \u00ab It is almost as if commentators were talking about a different country than the one of only a few months before. The old America had been much more powerful than other nations and indispensable in any big international undertaking. But now, suddenly, it was Rome in her prime and Britain at her peak combined. Not that such parallels had been absent from analysis before, but they had never been pushed so far. There even sprang up a small academic industry, almost therapeutic in its purposes, explaining how to dominate and how to live with domination.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCe dernier point de vue est plus contestable. Les ann\u00e9es 1990 n’ont pas \u00e9t\u00e9 exemptes de cette sur\u00e9valuation de l’Am\u00e9rique. Celle-ci existait d\u00e9j\u00e0 durant la guerre du Kosovo, o\u00f9 la puissance am\u00e9ricaine \u00e9tait partout comment\u00e9e comme \u00e9tant hors du domaine de la normalit\u00e9 ; durant les ann\u00e9es de soi-disant "nouvelle \u00e9conomie", lorsque certains th\u00e9oriciens, \u00e0 Wall Street, mais aussi en Europe et surtout en Europe, estimaient, selon les termes rapport\u00e9s par Alan Greenspan devant une Commission du Congr\u00e8s le 11 juin 1998, que l’\u00e9conomie am\u00e9ricaine, par ses performances, se trouvait \u00ab beyond history<\/em> \u00bb ; lors de l’intervention de la diplomatie am\u00e9ricaine dans les Balkans, \u00e0 partir du sommet de Dayton ; voire, durant la guerre du Golfe de 1991 …<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCe point n’est pas indiff\u00e9rent dans la mesure o\u00f9 il permet d’\u00e9largir le constat et de lui donner une autre substance. En lisant la chronique Woollacott, on est conduit \u00e0 la conclusion que notre surestimation de la puissance de l’Am\u00e9rique d\u00e9pend plus d’un \u00e9v\u00e9nement (le 11 septembre) et de ses effets qu’intrins\u00e8quement de l’objet de cette surestimation (l’Am\u00e9rique). Ainsi tend-on \u00e0 \u00e9chapper \u00e0 la question \u00e0 notre avis centrale, pourquoi cette surestimation ? puisque la r\u00e9ponse toute trouv\u00e9e serait l’\u00e9v\u00e9nement du 11 septembre. Par contre, si l’on accepte le constat que cette surestimation existait avant le 11 septembre, et m\u00eame avant la fin de la Guerre froide et ainsi de suite en remontant dans le XXe si\u00e8cle, la question concerne \u00e9videmment beaucoup plus l’objet de cette surestimation et par cons\u00e9quent la cause de cette attitude du jugement, c’est-\u00e0-dire finalement notre attitude psychologique (notamment et principalement \u00e0 nous, Europ\u00e9ens) qui nous am\u00e8ne \u00e0 cette fascination, puis \u00e0 la surestimation de l’Am\u00e9rique.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Sous influence 13 juillet 2002 — Nous nous Arr\u00eatons \u00e0 la chronique de Martin Woollacott du 12 juillet, dans le Guardian. La remarque g\u00e9n\u00e9rale qu’il propose est int\u00e9ressante : nous surestimons de fa\u00e7on syst\u00e9matique la puissance am\u00e9ricaine. Un int\u00e9r\u00eat suppl\u00e9mentaire est qu’il n’aborde pas la question finalement la plus int\u00e9ressante : pourquoi surestimons-nous syst\u00e9matiquement la… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[2947,3099,3479,2804],"class_list":["post-65170","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-amerique","tag-psychologie","tag-surestimation","tag-usa"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65170","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65170"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65170\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65170"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65170"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65170"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}