Une des constantes de l’\u00e9valuation du r\u00f4le des USA durant la Deuxi\u00e8me Guerre mondiale est de parler de \u00ab\u00a0miracle\u00a0\u00bb industriel. Les USA en guerre, c’est d’abord une capacit\u00e9 industrielle consid\u00e9rable, qui fournit une base mat\u00e9rielle consid\u00e9rable aux arm\u00e9es alli\u00e9es. Au-del\u00e0, lorsqu’on veut aborder le domaine du commentaire, cet effort de guerre suscite des consid\u00e9rations admiratives effectivement bas\u00e9es sur quatre appr\u00e9ciations miraculeuses :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
• Miracle du volume de la production. La production industrielle am\u00e9ricaine pendant la Deuxi\u00e8me Guerre mondiale (303.000 avions, plus d’une centaine de porte-avions, etc) est per\u00e7ue, dans son volume et dans son rythme d’expansion, comme un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne unique de l’histoire industrielle. C’est effectivement d\u00e9fini comme un \u00ab\u00a0miracle\u00a0\u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
• Miracle de la productivit\u00e9. Il est \u00e9galement entendu que la performance quantitative de la production am\u00e9ricaine pendant la Deuxi\u00e8me Guerre mondiale se double d’une performance quantitative, avec l’affirmation que l’industrie am\u00e9ricaine r\u00e9ussit \u00e0 \u00e9tablir une capacit\u00e9 de productivit\u00e9 \u00e9galement hors du commun, avec am\u00e9lioration constante des produits, rentabilisation,, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
• Miracle de la restructuration industrielle. L’image ambiante est \u00e9galement que l’industrie am\u00e9ricaine r\u00e9ussit \u00e0 passer, de mani\u00e8re massive et en un laps de temps extr\u00eamement court (1939-42 au plus, plus sûrement 1940-42), d’une industrie de consommation civile \u00e0 une industrie militaris\u00e9e, produisant l’ensemble des syst\u00e8mes n\u00e9cessit\u00e9s par une guerre moderne de la plus haute intensit\u00e9 concevable.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
• Miracle de la coordination et de la direction industrielle, enfin. Le quatri\u00e8me \u00ab\u00a0miracle\u00a0\u00bb\/clich\u00e9 est que tout cela fut dirig\u00e9 de main de maître, par un gouvernement am\u00e9ricain prenant soudain en mains toutes les commandes de l’\u00e9conomie du pays, dans un consensus g\u00e9n\u00e9ral figurant l’union sacr\u00e9e dont on raconte qu’elle est la cause principale de la victoire des alli\u00e9s en 1945.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Bien entendu, il s’agit de \u00ab\u00a0clich\u00e9s\u00a0\u00bb, comme on l’a d\u00e9j\u00e0 laiss\u00e9 entendre. L’intervention de la puissance industrielle am\u00e9ricaine pendant la guerre fut un facteur essentiel de cette guerre, sans doute l’un des facteurs d\u00e9terminants (il y en a d’autres). Mais ce n’est point le r\u00e9sultat d’une activit\u00e9 humaine hors du commun, activant des conditions exceptionnelles et les maîtrisant de bout en bout. Cette id\u00e9e permet de susciter de fa\u00e7on plus g\u00e9n\u00e9rale d’une part l’id\u00e9e de l’exceptionnalisme \u00e0 la fois du syst\u00e8me, de la population et de la direction am\u00e9ricaine, d’autre part l’id\u00e9e de la Deuxi\u00e8me Guerre mondiale comme une sorte de \u00ab\u00a0guerre sacr\u00e9e\u00a0\u00bb, l\u00e9gitimant l’entr\u00e9e de l’Am\u00e9rique dans le monde et son h\u00e9g\u00e9monie sur le monde par une vertu id\u00e9ologique et morale sans contestation possible. On voit l’avantage de l’entretien de ces clich\u00e9s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
L’explication des r\u00e9alisations am\u00e9ricaines pendant la guerre est plus simple. Elle tient simplement \u00e0 la puissance naturelle de l’Am\u00e9rique, un pays qui est aussi grand qu’un continent, qui poss\u00e8de \u00e0 la fois les ressources naturelles d’un continent, les ressources humaines d’une population largement aliment\u00e9e par une immigration sollicit\u00e9e dans le but explicite du renforcement de l’\u00e9conomie, et les ressources structurelles d’un syst\u00e8me qui est tr\u00e8s peu entrav\u00e9 par une intervention du gouvernement syst\u00e9matiquement favorable aux puissances \u00e9conomiques.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Nous vous recommandons la lecture d’un document qui se trouve accessible sur Internet, qui est diffus\u00e9 par l’Institut INSS (Institute for National Security Studies), de la National Defense University d\u00e9pendant du d\u00e9partement de la d\u00e9fense. Les r\u00e9f\u00e9rences sont donc impeccables. Le document est diffus\u00e9 dans la s\u00e9rie McNair Papers<\/em> et porte le num\u00e9ro 50 en date d’août 1996. Le titre de l’\u00e9tude est: «Mobilizing U.S. Industry in World War II<\/em>» et l’auteur est Alan L. Gropman. (Gropman, ancien colonel de l’USAF, ancien cadre dirigeant de la Syscon corporation, dipl\u00f4m\u00e9 de Boston University et de Tufts University, professeur d’histoire au National War College, a \u00e9t\u00e9 nomm\u00e9 pr\u00e9sident du Department of Grand Strategy, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, en juillet 1996.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n L’\u00e9tude est tr\u00e8s compl\u00e8te et permet d’avoir une r\u00e9f\u00e9rence pr\u00e9cise sur la p\u00e9riode consid\u00e9r\u00e9e, dans le domaine tr\u00e8s peu connu en Europe, — \u00e0 part les clich\u00e9s — de la mobilisation industrielle aux USA. On y d\u00e9couvre que la \u00ab\u00a0mobilisation\u00a0\u00bb pour 1941-45 repr\u00e9senta une activit\u00e9 industrielle certes soutenue mais nullement exceptionnelle ; que la productivit\u00e9 US ne fut pas non plus exceptionnelle, puisque d’autres pays bellig\u00e9rants la surpass\u00e8rent ; qu’il n’y eut pas de restructuration massive, une partie tr\u00e8s importante de l’industrie restant \u00e0 destination du secteur civil (le seul domaine de restructuration concerna une partie importante de l’industrie automobile, prenant en charge une production de guerre, notamment a\u00e9ronautique) ; que la production fut plut\u00f4t l’effet d’un processus industriel naturel et que les interventions gouvernementales furent souvent maladroites et improductives.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Nous vous donnons ci-dessous un extrait du chapitre 9 (U.S. Production in World War II<\/em>). On y trouve une comparaison entre la p\u00e9riode 1921-25 du d\u00e9but des Roaring Twenties<\/em>, p\u00e9riode de paix et de grande prosp\u00e9rit\u00e9, et la p\u00e9riode 19041-45.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n « It is equally true, however, that there was no production \u00a0\u00bbmiracle\u00a0\u00bb in the United States during World War II. Unquestionably, munitions production expanded greatly, but the base on which the expanded production was measured was a depressed one. Compare, for example, the period 1941 to 1945 with another period of rapid industrial expansion (and peacetime at that), 1921 to 1925. Wartime farm output increased about 25 percent in the former and peacetime output increased by more than 28 percent. In the case of total industrial production, the peacetime output increase was double that of wartime (53 percent versus 25 percent). If the period 1941 to 1944, when wartime production peaked and before it turned down, is compared with the period 1921 to 1924, the wartime figure is 7 percent higher (45 percent compared to 38 percent). How then did the United States produce the hundreds of thousands of airplanes, tens of thousands of tanks, tens of thousands of landing craft if the output increase in the early 1940s was no greater than it had been in the early 1920s?-through massive conversion of the industrial base and generous government funding for infrastructure construction.<\/em> »<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Ci-dessous, un autre extrait, cette fois du chapitre 14 de cette \u00e9tude (People mobilization, \u00ab\u00a0Rosie the Riveteer\u00a0\u00bb<\/em>).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «There should be no doubt, therefore, that United States industrial production in World War II was no miracle. United States production in World War II was about what one should have expected given the size of the prewar technological-industrial base, the population size (three times that of Britain, nearly twice that of Germany, and greater than that of the Soviet Union after Hitler’s conquests in 1941). In the face of allied bombing and sea blockade, and with her troops scattered from the north of Norway to the Pyrenees, and from the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean to the Caucasus, Germany increased its productivity by 25 percent between 1943 and 1944-a percentage that exceeded that in the United States. The Soviet Union lost 40 percent of its most productive territory and tens of millions of its people but still produced at a furious pace. Great Britain, while suffering bombing and rocket attacks, produced more tanks, ships (but not submarines), and airplanes than Germany, with about 60 percent of Germany’s population. Paul Koistinen argues that when viewed in terms of \u00ab\u00a0prewar potential and when compared with other belligerents, America’s World War II munitions production effort was not outstanding.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n » Koistinen assembles productivity statistics to make his case. The United States, even mired in the depression in the period 1936 to 1938, manufactured almost one-third of the world’s products (32.2 percent). The United States outproduced Germany about three times (10.7 percent) and Japan almost ten times (3.5 percent). Taking the United States prewar productivity in terms of production per man-hour as the standard and giving it a value of 100, the following chart indicates the relative productivity ranking of World War II foes<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n » Pre War War (’35-’38) (1944) All Manufacturing Munitions Country Industries Industries United States 100 100 Canada 71 57 United Kingdom 36 41 Soviet Union 36 39 Germany 41 48 Japan 25 17 One must not forget, however, that the United States was \u00ab\u00a0almost alone in increasing rather than diminishing consumer output during the war.\u00a0\u00bb To reiterate the point, all belligerents fiercely produced munitions during the war, not just the United States. America possessed advantages that none of the other warring states had. Its output, while noteworthy, was what a prewar analyst might have expected given the size of the country, its educated population, the status of its technology, the abundance of its raw materials, the quality of its transportation network. In short:, America’s munitions production in World War II was no \u00ab\u00a0miracle.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Could the United States have been more productive? Could it have produced more munitions more rapidly at a lower cost? Almost certainly, although it is difficult to determine what difference it might have made by August 1945. Robert Cuff, a generally friendly critic of the U.S. World War II mobilization effort, argues that U.S. Federal Government administrative machinery was not up to the task of managing the economy for war from a central position: \u00ab\u00a0administrative personnel and control coordinating machinery was rudimentary at best.\u00a0\u00bb More critically, \u00ab\u00a0A cadre of political appointments loyal to the President is not the same as a higher civil service\u00a0\u00bb and \u00ab\u00a0Wartime Washington was awash with competing centers of administrative decision-making.\u00a0\u00bb Where were the weaknesses? \u00ab\u00a0Those with governmental authority did not possess relevant knowledge and control in technical matters, while those with technical knowledge and industrial control did not possess governmental authority.\u00a0\u00bb In a war the objective was to \u00ab\u00a0bind them together, not drive them apart\u00a0\u00bb and to create cohesion when the country, before Pearl Harbor was attacked, \u00ab\u00a0divided on the very issue of war itself.\u00a0\u00bb The uneasy alliance between business executives and bureaucrats was patched together by Roosevelt and senior government officials (often from the worlds of business or finance) much as Bernard Baruch had pieced together a government\/business coalition in World War I. In World War II, as in World War I, the \u00ab\u00a0alliance\u00a0\u00bb was not designed to be permanent, and it did not last beyond the emergency. Given the structure of United States policy, it could not have lasted, and it was never cohesive.<\/em>»<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" 1941-1945 : quel \u00ab\u00a0miracle industriel\u00a0\u00bb US ? Une des constantes de l’\u00e9valuation du r\u00f4le des USA durant la Deuxi\u00e8me Guerre mondiale est de parler de \u00ab\u00a0miracle\u00a0\u00bb industriel. Les USA en guerre, c’est d’abord une capacit\u00e9 industrielle consid\u00e9rable, qui fournit une base mat\u00e9rielle consid\u00e9rable aux arm\u00e9es alli\u00e9es. Au-del\u00e0, lorsqu’on veut aborder le domaine du commentaire, cet… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8],"tags":[3532,2645,3537,3535,3536,3084,3533,3534,2671],"class_list":["post-65202","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-notre-bibliotheque","tag-deuxieme","tag-guerre","tag-industriel","tag-industrielle","tag-miracle","tag-mobilisation","tag-monbiale","tag-production","tag-us"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65202","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65202"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65202\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65202"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65202"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65202"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}Extrait du Chapitre 9<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n
Extrait du Chapitre 14<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n