{"id":65225,"date":"2002-08-22T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-08-22T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/08\/22\/lhomme-patient\/"},"modified":"2002-08-22T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2002-08-22T00:00:00","slug":"lhomme-patient","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/08\/22\/lhomme-patient\/","title":{"rendered":"L’homme patient<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

L’homme patient<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t22 ao\u00fbt 2002 \u00ab I am a patient man<\/em> \u00bb, voil\u00e0 qui pourrait \u00eatre le leit-motiv de GW. Il l’a redit hier, 21 ao\u00fbt, apr\u00e8s avoir re\u00e7u Rumsfeld et Cheney, Condoleeza Rice, le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Myers (pr\u00e9sident du JCS), pour un sommet dans son ranch du Texas. Le sommet n’\u00e9tait pas consacr\u00e9 \u00e0 la guerre contre l’Irak ; naturellement, on a tout de m\u00eame parl\u00e9 de la guerre contre l’Irak ; et c’est \u00e0 propos de la guerre contre l’Irak que GW a observ\u00e9, une fois de plus, qu’il est \u00ab a patient man<\/em> \u00bb, cette fois \u00e0 propos des perspectives (des d\u00e9lais) d’attaque. L’agence Associated Press notait hier :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tPresident Bush, confronting skittish allies overseas and naysayers at home, asserted Wednesday that ousting Iraq’s Saddam Hussein is in the interests of the world but indicated the United States is in no hurry. I’m a patient man, Bush told reporters on his Texas ranch.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb At nearby Fort Hood, Defense Secretary Donald. H. Rumsfeld, told soldiers that war with Iraq is not inevitable. The president has made no such decision that we should go into a war with Iraq. He’s thinking about it, along with economic and diplomatic measures for eliminating any threat from Saddam, Rumsfeld said.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tLes sp\u00e9culations \u00e0 propos de cette rencontre n’ont en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral pas trouv\u00e9 beaucoup de r\u00e9pondant dans les d\u00e9clarations et les confidences. Il reste qu’on peut avancer certains points \u00e0 partir d’observations ext\u00e9rieures :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Quoiqu’on en ait dit, ce fut un conseil de guerre sur la question de l’Irak, m\u00eame si une partie du temps de la r\u00e9union seulement y ait \u00e9t\u00e9 consacr\u00e9e. La question \u00e9tait bien de savoir o\u00f9 l’on en \u00e9tait apr\u00e8s le d\u00e9veloppement des critiques anti-guerres de ces deux derni\u00e8res semaines.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• L’absence de Powell est significative (mais, en un sens, celle de Wolfowitz aussi, impliquant qu’on n’a pas voulu rendre trop voyante l’influence des neo-cons<\/em> extr\u00e9mistes). On a pu voir, au ranch de GW, les seuls conseillers ou ministres qui ont aujourd’hui une influence directe sur lui : Rice, qui s’est totalement align\u00e9e sur la tendance dite des r\u00e9alistes durs (qui veulent la guerre mais avec certains am\u00e9nagements) ; Cheney, le vice-pr\u00e9sident ; Rumsfeld, le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Son absence de ce sommet fait de Powell le repr\u00e9sentant de facto<\/em> de l’opposition \u00e0 la guerre, \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur de l’administration, m\u00eame s’il h\u00e9site devant ce r\u00f4le.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Un mot dans une d\u00e9claration de GW montre que l’une des causes des d\u00e9lais pour une attaque est la capacit\u00e9 militaire inad\u00e9quate pour l’instant, le mot technologies<\/em> dans la phrase \u00ab We will consider all technologies available to us and diplomacy and intelligence<\/em> \u00bb. Cette remarque est renforc\u00e9e par des indications selon lesquelles, malgr\u00e9 un programme de production acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9e, les r\u00e9serves en munitions des forces arm\u00e9es US ne sont pas refaites apr\u00e8s la ponction de la campagne d’Afghanistan.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tA ce point de l’\u00e9volution des \u00e9v\u00e9nements, les possibilit\u00e9s de guerre restent extr\u00eamement \u00e9lev\u00e9es malgr\u00e9 l’apparition d’une opposition puissante, et compl\u00e8tement inattendue. Un long et int\u00e9ressant article du magazine Village Voice<\/a> d\u00e9veloppe l’argumentation selon laquelle la guerre aura lieu. L’article cite notamment Noam Chomsky.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab \u00a0\u00bbMy feeling is that the administration has staked so much in it that they’re going to have an awful hard time backing down,\u00a0\u00bb says Noam Chomsky, the MIT linguist and author of the anti-imperialist treatise 9-11. I suspect that they’re putting such a heavy stake in it to make it difficult to back down.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Chomsky says the current hawks are mostly recycled Reaganites, bullies who steamrolled dissent in the ’80s and can be expected to do the same now. Anytime they wanted to ram through some outrageous program, they would just start screaming and Congress would collapse, he says. I mean, it’s not just Congress; it’s the same in what’s called intellectual discussion. Very few people want to be subjected to endless vicious tirades and lies. It’s just unpleasant, so the question is, Why bother? So most people just back off.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Despite having our own equipment at his disposal, Saddam quite quickly went down to defeata lesson not lost on Hussein’s military commanders or on neighboring nations. Chomsky argues the Iraqi army would fare no better this time, but he warns against false confidence on the part of the White House. The last time around, Mideast leaders wanted Hussein out of Kuwait. This time, they want the U.S. out of their affairs. f I was in the Republican Guards, I’d just hide my rifle and run, Chomsky says. they’re just going to get devastated. And I also suspect that the guys in Washington may be right in their assumption that the rest of the region and the world will be so intimidated that they won’t do anything. That’s a possibility. On the other hand, the whole place might blow up. It’s just flipping a coin you’ve got no idea<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tUne autre appr\u00e9ciation est celle du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Wesley Clark, hier \u00e0 Londres. (Clark s’est d\u00e9clar\u00e9e adversaire de la guerre, notamment dans son aspect trop unilat\u00e9raliste avec l’absence de soutien des alli\u00e9s. Clark estime que le soutien du Royaume Uni en cas de guerre est tr\u00e8s loin d’\u00eatre assur\u00e9, contrairement \u00e0 ce que croit Washington. Pour Clark, l’engagement inconditionnel de Blair fait illusion, derri\u00e8re lui la situation au Royaume Uni est extr\u00eamement d\u00e9licate.) Clark estime les possibilit\u00e9s de guerre l’ann\u00e9e prochaine \u00e0 65%-70%. \u00ab La guerre est probable, elle n’est pas certaine \u00e0 100%. Mais le discours de Bush sur l’axis of evil et son appel \u00e0 un changement de r\u00e9gime lui laissent peu de place pour manoeuvrer.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCet argument (GW a \u00e9t\u00e9 trop loin pour reculer) est en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral celui qui est le plus souvent repris pour affirmer que GW ira jusqu’\u00e0 la guerre. C’est le principal argument de Richard Perle : \u00ab [F]ailure to take on Saddam after what the president said would produce such a collapse of confidence in the president that it would set back the war on terrorism.<\/em> \u00bb Un autre commentateur, Patrick J. Buchanan, adversaire de la guerre s’il en est, reconna\u00eet l’argument de Perle comme tr\u00e8s valable, et estime \u00e9galement que GW est bloqu\u00e9 dans sa logique de guerre : \u00ab But Perle has a point. The president and America will suffer a major loss of credibility in the Islamic world if he backs away from war, and it is the president’s own fault and that of his War Cabinet that he, and we, are now far out on this limb.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEn d’autres termes, le \u00ab patient man<\/em> \u00bb pourrait bien \u00eatre victime de sa patience, pris entre une rh\u00e9torique guerri\u00e8re d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e depuis des mois, engendrant la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de faire la guerre, et la perspective d’une guerre qui s’av\u00e8re de plus en plus difficile \u00e0 faire. Que cela ait \u00e9t\u00e9 voulu ou pas, la pr\u00e9sidence GW elle-m\u00eame, la politique unilat\u00e9raliste qui la caract\u00e9rise, ont leur sort commun engag\u00e9 dans la question de la guerre contre l’Irak. La chose est devenue un quitte ou double.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

L’homme patient 22 ao\u00fbt 2002 \u00ab I am a patient man \u00bb, voil\u00e0 qui pourrait \u00eatre le leit-motiv de GW. Il l’a redit hier, 21 ao\u00fbt, apr\u00e8s avoir re\u00e7u Rumsfeld et Cheney, Condoleeza Rice, le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Myers (pr\u00e9sident du JCS), pour un sommet dans son ranch du Texas. Le sommet n’\u00e9tait pas consacr\u00e9 \u00e0 la… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[868,857],"class_list":["post-65225","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-bush","tag-irak"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65225","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65225"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65225\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65225"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65225"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65225"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}