{"id":65285,"date":"2002-10-11T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-10-11T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/10\/11\/la-cia-au-pas\/"},"modified":"2002-10-11T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2002-10-11T00:00:00","slug":"la-cia-au-pas","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/10\/11\/la-cia-au-pas\/","title":{"rendered":"La CIA au pas ?<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

La CIA au pas ?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t12 octobre 2002 La situation am\u00e9ricaine, en attendant l’attaque contre l’Irak qui nous est annonc\u00e9e en technicolor et sur grand \u00e9cran, rec\u00e8le des tr\u00e9sors de surr\u00e9alisme. La querelle CIA versus<\/em> la Maison-Blanche en est un.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn conna\u00eet la trame de d\u00e9part, dont on a donn\u00e9 quelques \u00e9l\u00e9ments dans notre F&C d’hier.<\/a> L’argument est simple : la CIA contredit le pr\u00e9sident sur le danger pos\u00e9 par l’Irak et, en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, l’essentiel de l’argument concoct\u00e9 par la machine de communication et les super-hawks<\/em> de l’administration. La querelle est \u00e0 ciel ouvert depuis la connaissance publique qu’on a de la lettre du directeur de la CIA George J. Tenet, adress\u00e9e au Congr\u00e8s. C’est d\u00e9j\u00e0 un \u00e9l\u00e9ment de poids de cette sc\u00e8ne surr\u00e9aliste dont nous parlons ci-dessus, de voir l’agence de renseignement et le pr\u00e9sident diverger si compl\u00e8tement sur une mati\u00e8re aussi essentielle, de fa\u00e7on si publique. Le reste ne d\u00e9pare pas cette ouverture.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tComme nous l’annonce notamment le Saint-Petersburg Times d’hier<\/a>, GW Bush fait dire simplement qu’il est en d\u00e9saccord avec son agence de renseignement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab President Bush disagrees with the CIA’s estimate that Iraq is more likely to unleash a terrorist attack on the United States if American forces are sent to Baghdad, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said Wednesday.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Fleischer told reporters that despite the CIA’s assessment, which was contained in a letter made public Tuesday by Sen. Bob Graham, D-Fla., Bush firmly believes that military action may prove to be the only way to deter the terrorist threat posed by Iraq. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has the means and he has the history, Fleischer said, and the president has the responsibility to protect the country.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tSous nos yeux se d\u00e9roule la partie la plus extraordinaire, extraordinaire parce que quasi compl\u00e8tement de fa\u00e7on publique de manipulation de l’information qu’on puisse imaginer. Le fait exceptionnel n’est certes pas que le pouvoir politique veuille imposer ses analyses \u00e0 la CIA ou interf\u00e8re dans les analyses de la CIA (Kissinger s’\u00e9tait rendu c\u00e9l\u00e8bre dans les ann\u00e9es 1972-73 en imposant \u00e0 la CIA ses analyses sur le Mirvage des ICBM sovi\u00e9tiques, de fa\u00e7on \u00e0 ce que les faits concordent avec la th\u00e9orie d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e pour justifier les accords SALT-II en n\u00e9gociations) ; le fait exceptionnel est que cela se d\u00e9roule de fa\u00e7on aussi publique, aussi directe, sur un sujet aussi br\u00fblant et pressant, d\u00e9battu en public, pour un enjeu aussi consid\u00e9rable que le d\u00e9clenchement d’une guerre pr\u00e9ventive qui nourrit une protestation consid\u00e9rable dans le reste du monde et aux USA m\u00eame (il suffit de lire entre les lignes ici et l\u00e0 et de consulter les sources qu’il faut), qui pourrait entra\u00eener avec les remous caus\u00e9s des modifications consid\u00e9rables dans les relations internationales.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUn autre aspect extr\u00eamement \u00e9tonnant de cet avatar, qu’on a d\u00e9j\u00e0 signal\u00e9 hier<\/a>, est \u00e9videmment cette intervention de la CIA \u00e0 ciel ouvert. C’est une bonne mesure du d\u00e9sordre qui r\u00e8gne \u00e0 Washington, o\u00f9 chaque partie prenante au pouvoir tient \u00e0 marquer ses positions, dans ce cas (celui de la CIA), nous semble-t-il, pour prendre date <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPeut-on parler de violations, de manipulations dans un sens \u00e9thique ? L’univers washingtonien est devenu si compl\u00e8tement virtualiste que les notions m\u00eame de mensonge et de v\u00e9rit\u00e9, sans parler de la simple r\u00e9alit\u00e9, semblent ne plus avoir de signification pr\u00e9cise. L’information est trait\u00e9e comme une marchandise et l’emporte celui qui met le prix le plus \u00e9lev\u00e9, qui montre le plus de puissance ; l’heureux vainqueur peut alors arranger son information dans le sens qui lui importe.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCi-dessous, nous reproduisons de longs extraits d’un article du Los Angeles Times,<\/a> dont nous craignons qu’il ne soit plus disponible par la voie normale avant longtemps. Il s’agit de l’article \u00ab CIA Feels Heat on Iraq Data<\/em> \u00bb, de Greg Miller et Bob Drogin, paru le 11 octobre. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Senior Bush administration officials are pressuring CIA analysts to tailor their assessments of the Iraqi threat to help build a case against Saddam Hussein, intelligence and congressional sources said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In what sources described as an escalating war, top officials at the Pentagon and elsewhere have bombarded CIA analysts with criticism and calls for revisions on such key questions as whether Iraq has ties to the Al Qaeda terrorist network, sources said. The sources stressed that CIA analystswho are supposed to be impartialare fighting to resist the pressure. But they said analysts are increasingly resentful of what they perceive as efforts to contaminate the intelligence process. Analysts feel more politicized and more pushed than many of them can ever remember, said an intelligence official, speaking on condition of anonymity. The guys at the Pentagon shriek on issues such as the link between Iraq and Al Qaeda. There has been a lot of pressure to write on this constantly, and to not let it drop.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The pressure has intensified in the weeks leading up to this week’s debate in Congress on a resolution granting President Bush permission to pursue a military invasion of Iraq. Evidence of the differences between the agency and the White House surfaced publicly this week when CIA Director George J. Tenet sent a letter to lawmakers saying the Iraqi president is unlikely to strike the United States unless provoked. That was at odds with statements from Bush and others that Iraq poses an immediate threat. In a speech Monday in Cincinnati, Bush said the danger that Iraq poses to the United States is already significant, and it only grows worse with time.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Several lawmakers voiced frustration with the way intelligence is being used in the debate on Iraq. I am concerned about the politicization of intelligence, said Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), who echoed complaints of other members that the administration has been selective in the intelligence it cites, overstating its case in many instances. Classified material provided recently by the CIA on Iraq’s capabilities and intentions does not track some of the public statements made by senior administration officials, Feinstein said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Outside experts say they too see growing cause for concern. The intelligence officials are responding to the political leadership, not the other way around, which is how it should be, said Joseph Cirincione, a nonproliferation expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The politics are driving our intelligence assessments at this point.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab [I]ntelligence sources say the pressure on CIA analysts has been unrelenting in recent months, much of it coming from Iraq hawks including Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and his top deputy, Paul D. Wolfowitz. CIA officials who brief Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz on Iraq routinely return to the agency with a long list of complaints and demands for new analysis or shifts in emphasis, sources said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb There is a lot of unhappiness with the analysis, usually because it is seen as not hard-line enough, one intelligence official said. Another government official said CIA briefers are constantly sent back by the senior people at Defense and other places to get more, get more, get more to make their case.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb A senior Pentagon official rejected claims that Rumsfeld would improperly influence intelligence analysts and said they might be misinterpreting remarks meant to test their convictions. He’s a guy who’s constantly challenging assertions and assumptions, the official said…<\/em> \u00bb<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

La CIA au pas ? 12 octobre 2002 La situation am\u00e9ricaine, en attendant l’attaque contre l’Irak qui nous est annonc\u00e9e en technicolor et sur grand \u00e9cran, rec\u00e8le des tr\u00e9sors de surr\u00e9alisme. La querelle CIA versus la Maison-Blanche en est un. On conna\u00eet la trame de d\u00e9part, dont on a donn\u00e9 quelques \u00e9l\u00e9ments dans notre F&C… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[868,3104,857,3194,569],"class_list":["post-65285","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-bush","tag-cia","tag-irak","tag-pentagone","tag-rumsfeld"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65285","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65285"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65285\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65285"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65285"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65285"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}