{"id":65289,"date":"2002-10-14T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-10-14T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/10\/14\/du-vague-a-lame-au-coeur-de-lempire\/"},"modified":"2002-10-14T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2002-10-14T00:00:00","slug":"du-vague-a-lame-au-coeur-de-lempire","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/10\/14\/du-vague-a-lame-au-coeur-de-lempire\/","title":{"rendered":"Du vague-\u00e0-l’\u00e2me au coeur de l’\u201cempire\u201d<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Du vague-\u00e0-l’\u00e2me au coeur de l’empire<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tAu fur et \u00e0 mesure qu’approche l’\u00e9ch\u00e9ance possible\/probable de la guerre contre l’Irak, l’\u00e9tat d’esprit g\u00e9n\u00e9ral se nuance de plus en plus, m\u00eame aux \u00c9tats-Unis, m\u00eame parmi les experts et observateurs am\u00e9ricains. Nous parlons ici, autant de l’\u00e9volution de l’opinion publique, des premi\u00e8res manifestations de rue importantes<\/a> \u00e0 une certaine agitation sur les campus<\/a>, que de nouvelles r\u00e9flexions de fond, ouvertement pessimistes sur le sorte de l’empire. Un autre \u00e9l\u00e9ment, plus r\u00e9cent, est le vote du Congr\u00e8s, et surtout de la chambre, o\u00f9, malgr\u00e9 des pressions formidables, les prises de position des leaders d\u00e9mocrates (Gephardt) en faveur de GW, la pression m\u00e9diatique et ainsi de suite, une majorit\u00e9 de d\u00e9mocrates (127) a vot\u00e9 contre la r\u00e9solution donnant ses pouvoirs de guerre \u00e0 GW. Le paradoxe de l’\u00e9volution de ce climat est qu’elle se fait comme parall\u00e8lement \u00e0 l’\u00e9volution vers la guerre, celle-ci \u00e9tant per\u00e7ue comme une m\u00e9canique inexorable, quelque chose d’in\u00e9vitable. Un autre point remarquable est que cette \u00e9volution au USA est contraire \u00e0 celle observ\u00e9e pendant la premi\u00e8re guerre du Golfe (1990-91), o\u00f9 l’on partit d’une r\u00e9sistance ferme \u00e0 la guerre pour aboutir, \u00e0 la veille des hostilit\u00e9s, \u00e0 un soutien \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s assur\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCe qui est en cause imm\u00e9diatement, c’est le profond illogisme de l’aventure irakienne, sa futilit\u00e9 en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 et ses \u00e9ventuels effets catastrophiques en m\u00eame temps, les conditions extraordinairement contestables o\u00f9 elle est engag\u00e9e (exemple r\u00e9cent, les analyses de la CIA contredisant celle du pr\u00e9sident<\/a>), les extraordinaires interf\u00e9rences id\u00e9ologiques et personnelles (le \u00ab this guy wanted to kill my dad<\/em> \u00bb de GW parlant de Saddam n’a pas fini de faire des d\u00e9g\u00e2ts dans le secrets de l’intellect o\u00f9 il est encore permis de r\u00e9fl\u00e9chir), cet amoncellement de contradictions et de positions tactiques jusqu’\u00e0 l’absurde, dont certains observateurs savent encore saisir le caract\u00e8re surr\u00e9aliste et d\u00e9concertant<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAu-del\u00e0, les conditions elles-m\u00eames sont observ\u00e9es avec inqui\u00e9tude : les difficult\u00e9s de la d\u00e9cision malgr\u00e9 les affirmations incendiaires, les contradictions et les variations d’une politique affirm\u00e9e pourtant comme radicale, les lenteurs de la mise en place des moyens, les querelles internes de l’administration, les h\u00e9sitations des militaires, etc : le dynamisme du soi-disant empire, tel qu’il semblant lanc\u00e9 il y a un an lors de l’attaque en Afghanistan, n’est plus qu’un souvenir. Toutes ces incertitudes et ces situations insaisissables jouent \u00e9videmment un grand r\u00f4le dans l’\u00e9volution qu’on signale ici.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tC’est dans ces conditions qu’une nouvelle \u00e9cole de pens\u00e9e appara\u00eet. Mais peut-on parler d’\u00e9cole ? La vitesse \u00e0 laquelle d\u00e9filent ces courants d’appr\u00e9ciations diff\u00e9rentes, voire oppos\u00e9es, font plus penser d\u00e9sormais au d\u00e9sarroi, au d\u00e9boussolage, au d\u00e9sordre, qu’\u00e0 une saine et tr\u00e8s rapide circulation de la r\u00e9flexion. Il faut pourtant observer que cette agitation de d\u00e9sordre de la pens\u00e9e pseudo-strat\u00e9gique est \u00e9galement un indice qui nous sugg\u00e8re que la derni\u00e8re \u00e9cole en train d’appara\u00eetre, et qu’on signale ici, est peut-\u00eatre la plus proche de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 \u00e0 cause de l’appr\u00e9ciation qu’elle nous pr\u00e9sente.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn ne sera pas compl\u00e8tement surpris. On a d\u00e9j\u00e0 signal\u00e9 sur ce site la th\u00e8se de Immanuel Wallerstein,<\/a> certainement le plus connus de ces nouveaux pessimistes, qui avance l’argument que les \u00e9v\u00e9nements actuels, loin d’\u00eatre l’affirmation de la toute-puissance am\u00e9ricaine (\u00e0 la fa\u00e7on que plaident les Kagan et autres<\/a>), sont les signes de son d\u00e9clin.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn signale ici trois textes qui nous documentent sur cette appr\u00e9ciation pessimiste de la situation am\u00e9ricaine. <\/p>\n

Le n\u00e9o-d\u00e9clinisme par d\u00e9structuration interne de William S. Lind<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe premier est un texte de William S. Lind, de la Free Congress Foundation<\/em>. Lind est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 par NewsMax.com<\/a> comme argumentant que \u00ab the U.S. is attempting to confront terrorism by applying \u00a0\u00bbSecond Generation warfare essentially the application of firepower to targets to a \u00a0\u00bbFourth Generation conflict<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’int\u00e9r\u00eat de l’\u00e9tude de Lind est qu’elle a une tr\u00e8s forte connotation culturelle et nous d\u00e9gage des habituelles et lourdes affirmations sur la puissance militaire US. Lind laisse entendre que cette puissance militaire est compl\u00e8tement anachronique, relevant d’un autre temps et d’autres moeurs, l’explication centrale de cette erreur \u00e9tant l’extraordinaire incomp\u00e9tence de l’\u00e9lite washingtonienne, emport\u00e9e par son hubris<\/em>, par son arrogance tournant \u00e0 l’ivresse de la soi-disant puissance \u00e9tal\u00e9e par la structure militaire US. Parall\u00e8lement, les mesures prises pour lutter contre le terrorisme sont jug\u00e9es par Lind compl\u00e8tement insuffisantes au niveau policier et administratif, alors que des mesures massives sont prises pour soutenir une guerre ext\u00e9rieures qui n’a pas lieu, avec l’effet pervers d’attaquer directement les structures de loyalisme de la nation et de faire cro\u00eetre monstrueusement un gouvernement central inefficace et dangereux.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Lind further notes that the American state itself may be beginning to come apart. Cultural Marxists have successfully used multiculturalism and a de facto open immigration policy to create minority and ethnic loyalties that are stronger than those felt toward the American state. By adversely impacting our constitutional liberties, the various internal measures being implemented to counter terrorism can undermine even patriotic elements loyalty to the American state, he says.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Lind argues that our government’s strategy for dealing with resurgent Islam rests on little more than hubris. He cites the belief that the whole world wants to be like us (and would be if it weren’t for tyrants preventing them) and the belief that the U.S. is the only superpower and, thereby, the world’s policeman, if not an empire.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The extraordinary confidence with which neo-conservatives urge the American government to reconstruct the entire Middle East [socially, politically, and religiously] contrasts with the political correctness that makes airport security a joke, Lind says.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Lind adds, The same government that wants to invade Iraq is too intimidated by political correctness to provide homeland security by profiling terrorists. The government’s feeble efforts to protect our own perimeter spreads fear and erodes loyalties by telling patriotic citizens that their own government does not or cannot differentiate between patriots and terrorists.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Regardless of the motives and intentions of the Bush administration, Lind notes that its policies are resulting in a vast increase in the power of government. He writes: The combination of a strategy that incites non-state entities all over the world to launch attacks on America with tactics that make our defenses against such attacks only marginally effective is tremendously powerful as a force multiplier of government power, resources and intrusion.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Government does not grow when it succeeds; it grows when it fails. Each new attack on American soil will bring demands that government must do more, to which government will happily respond by doing more of what does not work. We will find ourselves soon enough with 1984’s permanent state of war, and perhaps with other elements of [George Orwell’s] 1984 as well. In older days, kings would kill the messenger. In Washington, messengers are not permitted.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n

Le n\u00e9o-d\u00e9clinisme classique, par affaiblissement interne, de Michael Layne<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe 6 octobre 2002, le Los Angeles Times a publi\u00e9 un commentaire de Michael Layne.<\/a> Ce texte constitue une attaque classique mais f\u00e9roce de la tendance imp\u00e9rialiste et h\u00e9g\u00e9moniste actuelle, sous le titre de \u00ab Paradox of Power<\/em> \u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa th\u00e8se de Layne se retrouve de fa\u00e7on plus g\u00e9n\u00e9rale chez les libertariens du Cato Institute (dont Layne fait partie), malgr\u00e9 que Cato ait soutenu l’attaque contre l’Afghanistan (mais ce soutien s’arr\u00eate l\u00e0 : Cato est oppos\u00e9e \u00e0 l’attaque de l’Irak). Elle se retrouve aussi dans la droite conservatrice classique, dite paleo, et l’on retrouve des \u00e9l\u00e9ments de la th\u00e8se dans l’essai de Chambers, Blowback<\/em>, autant que chez un Buchanan. Il y a notamment l’affirmation, assez forte par les temps qui courent aux USA : \u00ab Terrorist attacks like Sept. 11 are also, in themselves, a form of blowback against American geopolitical preeminence.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn pourrait croire simplement \u00e0 une resuc\u00e9e de la th\u00e8se d\u00e9cliniste de Kennedy (que Layne cite) mais il nous semble qu’il s’agit d’une \u00e9volution vers le diagnostic de l’accroissement acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9 des faiblesses internes. Il y a la perception d’une actualit\u00e9 pressante, qui marque d’ailleurs toutes ces th\u00e8ses, ou diagnostics pessimistes. Autant les optimistes h\u00e9g\u00e9moniques voient l’empire am\u00e9ricain pour demain matin (avec certaines raisons apparentes, dirions-nous), autant les pessimistes n\u00e9o-d\u00e9clinistes, qui sugg\u00e8re un aspect tr\u00e8s catastrophique d’effondrement possible dans leurs appr\u00e9ciations, voient l’issue qu’ils craignent pour \u00e0 peine plus tard dans la matin\u00e9e de demain (d’une fa\u00e7on plus paradoxale, pour leur compte). Nous assistons \u00e0 cet \u00e9trange ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne de voir des th\u00e8ses de tr\u00e8s grande amplitude historique s’\u00e9laborer comme si elles \u00e9taient un commentaire rapide pour l’actualit\u00e9 la plus imm\u00e9diate. 9\/11 produit un effet \u00e9tonnant d’acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration, au moins de la perception.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab American strategists may think that U.S. hegemony is consolidated firmly and is beyond challenge. But this surely is strategic myopia. It is a pretty safe bet that in the first few decades of the 21st century, U.S. primacy will prompt the same response that previous hegemonic aspirants provoked: New great powers will emerge to offset U.S. power, and they will coalesce to check America’s ambitions.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Terrorist attacks like Sept. 11 are also, in themselves, a form of blowback against American geopolitical preeminence. Despicable and brutal though they were, Al Qaeda’s actions were coolly calculated to achieve well-defined geopolitical objectives: the removal of the U.S. military presence from the Persian Gulf (and in particular from Saudi Arabia) and an alteration of the U.S. stance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In other words, Al Qaeda’s goal was to undermine U.S. hegemony.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb And at the end of the day, hegemons are defeated not just by the counter-hegemonic behavior of other states and organizations, but by mounting internal weaknesses economic, political, and social caused by the burdens of hegemony, which are a consequence of their own geopolitical and ideological ambitions. That is, hegemons fall victim to what the historian Paul Kennedy famously called imperial overstretch.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Events since Sept. 11 have underlined America’s dominant role in the international system, and talk of a new American empire echoes inside the Beltway. Flushed with triumph and the awesome display of American might, U.S. policymakers have succumbed to hubris in the false belief that American hegemony is an unchallengeable fact of international life. They believe the U.S. can use its muscle to bring about regime changes and compel others to embrace American-style democracy and free markets. They believe America can impose its will on the world and stabilize endemically turbulent regions like the Persian Gulf and Central Asia.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb It is only a short step, however, from the celebration of imperial glory to the recessional of imperial power. The United States must be careful not to overreach and fall victim to the hegemon’s temptation by overextending itself strategically. Today, it is imperative that we look beyond the immediate exigencies of the war on terrorism, and Iraq, and consider the broader geopolitical context of American grand strategy. U.S. policymakers are deceiving themselves if they ignore the likely boomerang consequences of U.S. hegemony. That is why now, more than ever, it is imperative to have a great debate about America’s future grand strategy.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

La th\u00e8se de Wallerstein, ou le d\u00e9clin d\u00e9j\u00e0 commenc\u00e9 il y a quelques ann\u00e9es <\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn conna\u00eet les th\u00e8ses de Immanuel Wallerstein et l’analyse pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e ici pourrait \u00eatre vue comme la suite de celle du 14 juillet<\/a>, consacr\u00e9e \u00e0 ce m\u00eame Wallerstein. Celui-ci va publier prochainement un livre qui nous permettra d’avoir une id\u00e9e plus pr\u00e9cise de ses conceptions. Ce qu’on doit noter avec cette analyse que nous pr\u00e9sentons, c’est combien la situation de Wallerstein a \u00e9volu\u00e9 : solitaire il y a trois-quatre mois (en mai-juin) lorsqu’il publiait d\u00e9j\u00e0 dans le sens du d\u00e9clin, il est n’est plus du tout seul aujourd’hui. Cela est un signe g\u00e9n\u00e9ral qui donne \u00e0 penser.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCi-dessous, nous reprenons un texte du journal canadien Globe & Mail du 5 octobre<\/a>, qui pr\u00e9sente Wallerstein et le climat et les milieux qui l’accompagnent et\/ou vont dans le m\u00eame sens que lui-m\u00eame. Il faut noter que cet article, en pr\u00e9sentant la th\u00e8se de Wallerstein, ne reprend pas un de ses aspects importants, en ne mentionnant que l’issue d’un d\u00e9clin progressif et presque discret de la puissance am\u00e9ricaine ; Wallerstein pr\u00e9voit aussi l’alternative d’un d\u00e9clin brutal, presque un effondrement, si la direction US ne sait pas contr\u00f4ler la situation am\u00e9ricaine. On admettra que cette possibilit\u00e9 est loin d’\u00eatre \u00e0 \u00e9carter.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(Cet article doit \u00eatre lu avec la d\u00e9sormais classique mention \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only.<\/em>)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Is the American empire already over?<\/strong><\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

\tBy Doug Saunders, Globe and mail, Saturday, October 5, 2002<\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAll we seem to do these days is argue about the United States. And the arguments are awfully sparse, aren’t they? Either our neighbour is the most powerful nation on Earth, a menacing imperialist intruder that we must resist, or it’s the most powerful nation on Earth, a beneficial force of democracy and peace that we must join and support.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLet me offer you a new way of thinking about America: Over.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUnder this school of thought, the United States stopped being the world’s dominant nation years ago, and has quietly collapsed into being Just Another Country. We haven’t really noticed this, the theory goes, because most other countries still act as if the United States has its old military and financial power, an assumption that could be stripped of its invisible clothes in the event of a protracted Iraq war.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThis is not a fringe theory. It comes from within the United States, from respected political scientists on the Ivy League campuses. Why does it get such little play? Both the left and the right have their entire houses built on the notion of a fixed and immutable American hegemony, pro- or anti-. Somewhere between these poles is this small community of thinkers, declaring that the end has already occurred.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbThe United States has been fading as a global power since the 1970s, and the U.S. response to the terrorist attacks has merely accelerated this decline.\u00a0\u00bb So says Immanuel Wallerstein, the Yale University political scientist who is by far the most outspoken member of this camp. A gravelly old contrarian with little time for the orthodoxies of the left or the right, he may have gained his remove by teaching at McGill University in the 1970s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn a forthcoming book, to be titled Decline of American Power, he describes his country as \u00a0\u00bba lone superpower that lacks true power, a world leader nobody follows and few respect, and a nation drifting dangerously amidst a global chaos it cannot control.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn his view, America gave up the ghost in 1974, when it admitted defeat in Vietnam and discovered that the conflict had more or less exhausted the gold reserves, crippling its ability to remain a major economic power. It has remained the focus of the world’s attention partly for lack of any serious challenger to the greenback for the world’s savings, and because it has kept attracting foreign investments at a rate of $1.2-billion (U.S.) per day.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBut if it comes to a crunch, the United States can no longer prevail either economically or — here is the most controversial statement — militarily. In Mr. Wallerstein’s calculus, of the three major wars the United States has fought since the Second World War, one was a defeat and two (Korea and the Gulf War) were draws.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIraq, he told me recently, would be an end game. \u00a0\u00bbThe policy of the U.S. government, which all administrations have been following since the seventies, has been to slow down the decline by pushing on all fronts. The hawks currently in power have to work very, very hard twisting arms very, very tightly to get the minimal legal justification for Iraq that they want now. This kind of thing, they used to get with a snap of the fingers.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tYou don’t have to agree with Mr. Wallerstein’s hyperbolic view to be a member of the Over camp — and many do disagree: When he first brought it up in the journal Foreign Policy this summer, half a dozen editorial writers in the United States attacked him. But more moderate thinkers have joined the club, including Charles Kupchan at Georgetown University, whose forthcoming book The End of the American Era makes a similar point in more subtle terms.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tJoseph Nye at Harvard, a friend of Henry Kissinger’s, argues in his new book The Paradox of American Power that \u00a0\u00bbworld politics is changing in a way that means Americans cannot achieve all their international goals acting alone\u00a0\u00bb — a tacit acknowledgment of Mr. Wallerstein’s thesis.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThis is how great powers end: Not by suddenly collapsing, but by quietly becoming Just Another Country. This happened to England around 1873, but it wasn’t until 1945 that anyone there noticed.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOutsiders do notice. Spend some time talking to a currency trader or a foreign financier, and you’ll glimpse the end of the almighty dollar: Right now, about 70 per cent of the world’s savings are in greenbacks, while America contributes about 30 per cent of the world’s production — an imbalance that has been maintained for the past 30 years only because Japan collapsed and Europe took too long to get its house together.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tA Japanese CEO told me this in blunt terms the other day: \u00a0\u00bbIt was Clinton’s sole great success that he kept the world economy in dollars for 10 years longer than anyone thought he would. But nobody’s staying in dollars any more.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThere are other signs: The middling liberals, who in the 1960s would have sided with the left in opposing U.S. imperialism, are today begging for an empire. Michael Ignatieff, the liberal scholar, argued at length recently that the United States ought to become an imperial force — on humanitarian grounds. Would this argument be necessary if the United States actually dominated the world?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tI’m not sure whether to fully believe the refreshing arguments of Mr. Wallerstein and his friends, but they do have history on their side. In their times, Portugal, Holland, Spain, France and England all woke up to discover, far after the fact, that they were no longer the big global powers, but Just Another Country.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLike the bewildered Englishmen in Robert Altman’s Gosford Park, they struggled to maintain their dignity while wondering just what those strange visitors from abroad were talking about. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tCopyright \u00a9 2002 Bell Globemedia Interactive Inc. All Rights Reserved.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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