{"id":65293,"date":"2002-10-16T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-10-16T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/10\/16\/panique-a-bord\/"},"modified":"2002-10-16T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2002-10-16T00:00:00","slug":"panique-a-bord","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/10\/16\/panique-a-bord\/","title":{"rendered":"Panique \u00e0 bord ?<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Panique \u00e0 bord ?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t17 octobre 2002 Il y a, dans la lecture du Weekly Standard<\/em>, qui est l’organe de presse des neo-conservatives>D>, des signes puissants d’une r\u00e9elle inqui\u00e9tude quant \u00e0 la bonne r\u00e9alisation des projets de guerre contre l’Irak, dans tous les cas du point de vue des Neo-conservatives<\/em>. Ces signes concernent deux domaines de cette incertitude nouvelle :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• La r\u00e9solution belliciste de GW ;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• les effets du d\u00e9bat \u00e0 l’ONU, notamment avec l’action de la France. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe premier cas appara\u00eet dans l’\u00e9ditorial de William Kristol, \u00ab From Truth to Deception<\/em> \u00bb, publi\u00e9 sur le site de l’hebdomadaire le 12 octobre.<\/a> (Cela est inhabituel, montrant combien le Weekly Standard<\/em> entend accorder d’importance \u00e0 cette interpr\u00e9tation ; la r\u00e8gle est que les textes publi\u00e9s dans l’hebdomadaire restent inaccessible directement, leur acc\u00e8s passant par une prise d’abonnement ; sa mise en ligne sans restriction indique l’importance qu’on lui accorde par la diffusion qu’on voudrait qu’il ait.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tKristol explique le cas qu’il entend d\u00e9fendre de la fa\u00e7on suivante : jusqu’ici, GW a dit la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 parce qu’il entendait rassembler le peuple am\u00e9ricain et le Congr\u00e8s derri\u00e8re lui. Cela \u00e9tant fait, il se transforme en chef de guerre et a pour fonction d\u00e9sormais de chercher \u00e0 tromper l’ennemi, donc ce qu’il dit devient tactique, dissimulation, d\u00e9sinformation, etc. L’explication vient \u00e0 point pour expliquer qu’aujourd’hui, GW nuance son propos, semble dire que la guerre n’est pas in\u00e9luctable, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab So the president has succeeded in explaining why Hussein must go, why time is not on our side, why deterrence can’t be counted on, and why war is necessary. But now the president has to move from building support for a war to fighting a war. (The coming U.N. Security Council machinations are better understood as a prelude to war than as a real effort at persuasion.) The president now becomes a war leader, not merely though the "merely" is unfair a war mobilizer. He will have to demonstrate the skills described in his summer reading: Eliot Cohen’s "Supreme Command" the ability to shape grand strategy and execute precise tactics in the fog of war.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb This will require a change in the president’s manner of speaking. He has benefited, in making the case for war, from an impressive clarity of presentation and lucidity of argument. But now his task is not to educate or persuade us. It is to defeat Saddam Hussein. And that will require the president, at times, to mislead rather than to clarify, to deceive rather than to explain.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The president’s audience is no longer the American public, or even our allies. It is Hussein. Deceiving him as to the timing of the war and the manner of attack is crucial to success. We obviously cannot achieve real strategic surprise; Hussein knows an attack is likely. But tactical surprise remains possible and, especially given Hussein’s arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, very much desirable, if we are to minimize casualties and risks.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb So when the president seems to equivocate about whether war is inevitable, when he holds out hope for inspections, when he talks about giving peace one last chance, when he seems to invite coups and rebellions while implying this might prevent an American occupation, supporters of the president’s policy shouldn’t worry that he is losing focus or retreating from the moral and strategic clarity of the past six weeks.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tLe deuxi\u00e8me aspect se d\u00e9gage d’un texte de Reuel Marc Gerecht,<\/a> intitul\u00e9 \u00ab A Necessary War, Unless Saddam Hussein is removed, the war on terror will fail<\/em> \u00bb. La th\u00e8se est pressante, apr\u00e8s l’attentat de Bali : tenter de montrer qu’au contraire de l’analyse g\u00e9n\u00e9rale qui en a \u00e9t\u00e9 faite (c’est parce que les USA se concentrent sur l’Irak que Al Qa\u00efda et les autres terroristes prolif\u00e8rent sans entraves et frappent comme \u00e0 Bali), la chute de Saddam aurait un effet tr\u00e8s b\u00e9n\u00e9fique dans la lutte g\u00e9n\u00e9ral contre le terrorisme.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCe qui est int\u00e9ressant dans ce texte, c’est les allusions indirectes plut\u00f4t laudatives qui sont faites \u00e0 la France (par exemple, cette phrase qui, en passant, rend hommage au juge Brugui\u00e8re comme \u00e0 un des meilleurs sp\u00e9cialistes de la lutte anti-terroriste). Les pratiques des neo-conservatives<\/em> dans cette sorte d’appr\u00e9ciation critique se font effectivement toujours de fa\u00e7on indirecte, par allusion, que ce soit les critiques n\u00e9gatives (comme lorsqu’il y eut quelques incidents antis\u00e9mites en France, au printemps dernier), que ce soit une appr\u00e9ciation positive, comme ici. On prendra donc effectivement se passage du texte comme un signe que les neo-cons<\/em> font aujourd’hui patte de velours vis-\u00e0-vis de la France. Gerecht parle de la France comme d’un pays qui fait partie de la communaut\u00e9 occidentale (ce qui est \u00e9vident mais qui l’est encore plus lorsqu’on l’\u00e9crit), comme d’un pays frapp\u00e9 par le terrorisme, qui a su y r\u00e9pondre, qui coop\u00e8re parfaitement aux niveaux qu’il faut avec les US dans la lutte anti-terroriste et ainsi de suite. Bref, la France toute belle, presque un alli\u00e9 privil\u00e9gi\u00e9. Dans le Weekly Standard<\/em>, ce n’est pas courant.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Islamic radical networks, in various states of organization and health, have crisscrossed Western Europe for years. If only a minuscule fraction of the growing Muslim fundamentalist population of Europe were to join bin Laden’s holy warriors and aim their terrorism against their neighbors, internal-security officers would confront nightmare scenarios. In the mid-1990s, a somewhat ragtag group of militants, inspired primarily by the troubles in war-torn Algeria, the frustrations of being Muslim in France, and a violent anti-Western brand of Islamic preaching, robbed banks, bombed Paris metro stations, and tried to derail a super-fast "TGV" passenger train. Less ragtag and far more suicidal, al Qaeda could certainly do better. Which is why European security services by and large have responded with alacrity to September 11, questioning, arresting, and incarcerating hundreds of fundamentalists. With the possible exceptions of the Belgians and the Dutch, the West Europeans have reacted as vigorously as the Americans, if not more so. The French and the British, both less agitated than Americans about civil liberties in times of stress, aggressively use temporary imprisonment as an investigative counterterrorist tool. France’s famous counterterrorist judge Jean-Louis Brugui\u00e8re could teach Attorney General John Ashcroft and the Federal Bureau of Investigation many things about using randomness in arrests and detention to sow anxiety amongst the enemy and give the (perhaps justified) impression of effective state power.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tAdditionnons les deux textes, nos deux rapides analyses, et concluons :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Quoiqu’il en soit de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 du suppos\u00e9-machiav\u00e9lisme de GW, le sch\u00e9ma offert par Kristol para\u00eet un peu simpliste (v\u00e9rit\u00e9 jusqu’ici, mensonges d\u00e9sormais), d’autant que GW a d\u00e9j\u00e0 parl\u00e9 de la possibilit\u00e9 d’une issue non-guerri\u00e8re alors qu’il \u00e9tait en p\u00e9riode soi-disant de v\u00e9rit\u00e9. Une autre explication nous para\u00eet plus plausible et par cons\u00e9quent plus probable : les neo-cons<\/em> sentent effectivement un flottement, une h\u00e9sitation tr\u00e8s s\u00e9rieuse de GW dans ses projets de guerre, et ils commencent \u00e0 s’inqui\u00e9ter s\u00e9rieusement. L’explication de Kristol est aussi bien une mesure pour dissimuler les conclusions que d’autres pourraient tirer, et une sorte de proposition dialectique faite \u00e0 la Maison-Blanche pour effectivement retrouver une ligne plus belliciste sans trop se compromettre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Le texte de Gerecht, lui, confirme indirectement que l’affaire de l’ONU et la position fran\u00e7aise font souffrir les Am\u00e9ricains. D’o\u00f9 un rappel indirect, affable et amical, plein du th\u00e8me la solidarit\u00e9 dans l’\u00e9galit\u00e9, en rappelant qu’il existe un ennemi commun et en plaidant que sa chute passe par celle de Saddam. Aucune dialectique venant des US (affabilit\u00e9, amiti\u00e9, surtout solidarit\u00e9 dans l’\u00e9galit\u00e9) ne pourrait faire plus plaisir aux Fran\u00e7ais en temps normal. Sauf que les Fran\u00e7ais sont aujourd’hui ancr\u00e9s \u00e0 un principe qu’ils ont pris l’habitude de croire juste, et qu’ils ne croient en aucune fa\u00e7on anti-am\u00e9ricain bien s\u00fbr ; leur cart\u00e9sianisme bien connu autant que la structure de leur diplomatie b\u00e2tie autour de principes solides les conduisent \u00e0 ne pas c\u00e9der. Les r\u00e9sultats jusqu’ici plut\u00f4t positifs de leur attitude les renforcent dans leur d\u00e9termination.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Panique \u00e0 bord ? 17 octobre 2002 Il y a, dans la lecture du Weekly Standard, qui est l’organe de presse des neo-conservatives>D>, des signes puissants d’une r\u00e9elle inqui\u00e9tude quant \u00e0 la bonne r\u00e9alisation des projets de guerre contre l’Irak, dans tous les cas du point de vue des Neo-conservatives. Ces signes concernent deux domaines… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[2687,3653,3381,3333,3332],"class_list":["post-65293","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-france","tag-kristol","tag-neo-cons","tag-standard","tag-weekly"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65293","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65293"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65293\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65293"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65293"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65293"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}