{"id":65307,"date":"2002-10-26T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-10-26T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/10\/26\/leurope-de-la-defense-nous-lavons-vue-et-surtout-entendue-elle-est-americaine-remarques-par-vance-coffman-ceo-lockheed-martin\/"},"modified":"2002-10-26T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2002-10-26T00:00:00","slug":"leurope-de-la-defense-nous-lavons-vue-et-surtout-entendue-elle-est-americaine-remarques-par-vance-coffman-ceo-lockheed-martin","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/10\/26\/leurope-de-la-defense-nous-lavons-vue-et-surtout-entendue-elle-est-americaine-remarques-par-vance-coffman-ceo-lockheed-martin\/","title":{"rendered":"<strong><em>L&rsquo;\u201cEurope de la d\u00e9fense\u201d, nous l&rsquo;avons vue et, surtout, entendue: elle est am\u00e9ricaine \u2014 Remarques, par Vance Coffman, CEO Lockheed Martin<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h3>L&rsquo;Europe de la d\u00e9fense, nous l&rsquo;avons vue et, surtout, entendue : elle est am\u00e9ricaine<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tVoici un texte int\u00e9ressant, c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire instructif. C&rsquo;est le texte d&rsquo;une intervention de Vance D. Coffman, Chairman et Chief Executive Officer (CEO) de Lockheed Martin Corporation (LM quand on veut faire plus court). Cela se passe le 4 octobre, devant la Convention annuelle  de la Netherlands Aerospace Industries et la Convention 2002 de l&rsquo;AECMA (l&rsquo;association europ\u00e9enne des constructeurs a\u00e9ronautiques), \u00e0 l&rsquo;h\u00f4tel Steigeuherger Kurhaus de La Haye.<\/p>\n<h3>Le ton est mis : le patron est en visite<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe ton de cette intervention est assez peu ordinaire et, pour cela, il faut admirer la maestria avec laquelle le climat est cr\u00e9\u00e9. Coffman ne vient pas en Am\u00e9ricain,  c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire, certes, le CEO de Lockheed Martin et tout le diable et son train, mais, tout de m\u00eame, rien au-del\u00e0 de l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique. Au contraire, il p\u00e8se et soup\u00e8se, juge, mesure, f\u00e9licite et admoneste, il est \u00e0 la fois en Am\u00e9rique et en Europe, un pied ici et l&rsquo;autre l\u00e0 ; lorsqu&rsquo;il dit \u00ab <em>For our industry<\/em> \u00bb, on a l&rsquo;impression qu&rsquo;il parle de la sienne, LM et, par extension, l&rsquo;am\u00e9ricaine ; mais non, c&rsquo;est au-del\u00e0, puisqu&rsquo;il ajoute : \u00ab <em>&#8230;both here and in the U.S.<\/em> \u00bb, c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire que nous (Europ\u00e9ens) y sommes \u00e9galement ; pour que personne ne s&rsquo;y trompe, il termine sa phrase de cette fa\u00e7on : \u00ab <em>this lack of European defense funding means that excess capacity remains a major concern<\/em> \u00bb&#8230; Le ton est mis : la faiblesse des budgets europ\u00e9ens est une pr\u00e9occupation, aussi bien, de l&rsquo;administration US, du DoD, de LM et de Vance Coffman lui-m\u00eame. Nous sommes en continent conquis,  c&rsquo;est le n\u00f4tre et c&rsquo;est par lui.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl faut noter que ce n&rsquo;est pas loin d&rsquo;\u00eatre faux. Un participant \u00e0 cette r\u00e9union observait, le ton un brin sarcastique tout de m\u00eame, qu&rsquo;\u00ab <em>apr\u00e8s tout, l&rsquo;Europe de la d\u00e9fense derri\u00e8re laquelle tout le monde court est faite, elle est faite autour du JSF<\/em> \u00bb. Par cons\u00e9quent, Coffman, CEO de LM, constructeur du JSF, visitait effectivement ses terres en parlant devant les membres de l&rsquo;AECMA, dans ce riche h\u00f4tel de La Haye. L&rsquo;accueil y fut chaleureux, de la part de la plupart des participants (pas tous).<\/p>\n<h3>Le sch\u00e9ma globalisant, un tantinet trostkiste, d&rsquo;absorption de l&rsquo;Europe<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tQuelques extraits de l&rsquo;intervention du CEO de Lockheed Martin montrent combien, d\u00e9sormais, l&rsquo;industrie am\u00e9ricaine estime avoir son mot \u00e0 dire dans l&rsquo;\u00e9volution de l&rsquo;industrie europ\u00e9enne, combien d&rsquo;ailleurs cette expression d&rsquo;industrie europ\u00e9enne est \u00e0 la limite de la d\u00e9cence. Il suffit, comme il va de soi, de bien comprendre que l&rsquo;industrie globale, ou l&rsquo;industrie globalis\u00e9e dont parle Coffman, n&rsquo;est rien de moins que l&rsquo;industrie am\u00e9ricaine absorbant ROW (<em>the rest Of the World<\/em>). L&rsquo;Europe est une part de ROW dont nul ne disconvient qu&rsquo;elle est int\u00e9ressante, voire succulente. Nous avons l\u00e0 le constat de l&rsquo;efficacit\u00e9, notamment, de l&rsquo;effet-JSF (le choix de participer au programme JSF de certains pays europ\u00e9ens au printemps dernier), dans tous les cas dans les psychologies de nos dirigeants industriels.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tVoici quelques citations de Vance Coffman, celles qu&rsquo;il faut avoir \u00e0 l&rsquo;esprit :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00a0\u00ab<em>One thing is clear: It is not realistic for countries to retreat behind national borders.<\/em>\u00bb Ce constat, \u00e9vident de la part d&rsquo;un repr\u00e9sentant de la puissance am\u00e9ricaine et s&rsquo;accordant avec l&rsquo;activit\u00e9 de cette puissance, s&rsquo;accompagne de l&rsquo;argument d\u00e9sormais sempiternel du terrorisme global. (\u00ab <em>The new security environment is one in which allied action and cooperative efforts against terrorists are absolutely required.<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00a0\u00ab <em> We must now think of ourselves as part of the international security industry, not simply the aerospace or defense industry.<\/em> \u00bb On retrouve tout au long du discours de Coffman, court mais dense, cette pr\u00e9vention quasi-instinctive, \u00e0 la limite de la naus\u00e9e intellectuelle (\u00e0 la Sartre), contre tout ce qui pourrait avoir une signification sp\u00e9cifique, une existence propre, une r\u00e9alit\u00e9 identitaire et, bien entendu, tout ce qui est sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9, existence et identit\u00e9 europ\u00e9ennes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t \u00ab <em>Our industry &#8230;<\/em> \u00bb, ainsi Coffman a-t-il appris \u00e0 parler. Personne ne le contredit et l&rsquo;on a plus d&rsquo;une fois l&rsquo;impression qu&rsquo;il parle pour tous, pour nous tous, et que c&rsquo;est bien ainsi. (Voir plus haut : \u00ab <em>For our industry,  both here and in the U.S&#8230;<\/em> \u00bb) Il encourage donc les amis europ\u00e9ens \u00e0 surveiller l&rsquo;action des gouvernements, et notamment leurs politiques transatlantiques, \u00e9conomique et politique (\u00ab <em>Because of this close connection, transatlantic political and economic trends are of vital importance to our industry<\/em> \u00bb).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00a0\u00ab <em> Protected regions or protected industrial sectors are not consistent with an integrated and efficient marketplace.<\/em> \u00bb : plus de protection, plus d&rsquo;aide pour une industrie r\u00e9gionale (europ\u00e9enne), et ainsi de suite. Libert\u00e9 compl\u00e8te de fa\u00e7on \u00e0 ce que l&rsquo;osmose globalisante se fasse, dans le sens qu&rsquo;il faut, sous l&rsquo;impulsion qu&rsquo;il faut. Cela va sans dire, et encore bien mieux en le disant.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00a0L&rsquo;AECMA parlait du rapport STAR 21 de la Commission europ\u00e9enne, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=303\" class=\"gen\">dont nous avons nous-m\u00eames parl\u00e9.<\/a> Du coup, Coffman en a parl\u00e9, et avec l&rsquo;autorit\u00e9 qu&rsquo;on imagine, comme s&rsquo;il \u00e9tait effectivement partie prenante, et partie prenante majoritaire, dans l&rsquo;assembl\u00e9e qui en d\u00e9battait.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t &#8230; Cela pour nous dire, apr\u00e8s avoir abond\u00e9 dans le sens de certaines des propositions de STAR 21 (c&rsquo;est une indication int\u00e9ressante quant au cr\u00e9dit \u00e0 accorder \u00e0 ce rapport) : \u00ab <em>&#8230;But there is an aspect of the report with which I am not in complete agreement. I refer to a key part of the rationale in STAR 21 calling for strengthening Europe&rsquo;s industrial capabilities in defense and aerospace. I have no quarrel with that in itself, but I believe the emphasis on European capabilities or American capabilities misses a critical point about our industry : Namely, that it is increasingly globalized.<\/em> \u00bb STAR 21 est bon, s&rsquo;il ne pr\u00e9tend \u00e0 rien d&rsquo;autre qu&rsquo;\u00e0 \u00eatre un mode d&#8217;emploi ; pour l&rsquo;orientation de cet emploi, la r\u00e9ponse n&rsquo;est pas dans STAR 21.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00a0&#8230; La r\u00e9ponse se trouve trois paragraphes plus loin, dans ce qui est la phrase-cl\u00e9 du discours : \u00ab <em>I urge everyone here to think of strengthening European industry as a parta key part, yes, but just one partof the general increase in the capabilities of the global industry, and not as an end in itself.<\/em> \u00bb Voici comment le vin est tir\u00e9e : l&rsquo;Europe n&rsquo;a pas d&rsquo;existence propre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00a0Enfin, voici le plat de r\u00e9sistance : le JSF. Moyen pour moyen, celui-l\u00e0 en est un fameux puisqu&rsquo;\u00e0 lui seul, finalement, il justifie et conforte la rh\u00e9torique de Vance Coffman. Le JSF cr\u00e9e un monde \u00e0 lui tout seul, transatlantique, global, sans fronti\u00e8res. C&rsquo;est une \u00e9toile brillante dans le monde accompli de Vance Coffman : \u00ab <em>The JSF industrial model bas the potential to change the way we do transatlantic defense business and to set the tone for the next 50 years. We intend to make it a shining example of cooperation.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00a0Cela annonce l&rsquo;\u00e9vidence qui s&rsquo;impose aussit\u00f4t : les USA (LM) ne sont pas un probl\u00e8me pour l&rsquo;Europe,  ils sont la solution : \u00ab <em>&#8230;we at Lockheed Martin see the fundamental product of our industry as solutions.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00a0Nous ne sommes nullement dispens\u00e9s de la p\u00e9roraison qui nous apprend, sans r\u00e9elle surprise mais avec un certain soulagement, que tout cela est fait par des hommes amoureux de la paix, pour notre-s\u00e9curit\u00e9 \u00e0 tous.  : \u00ab <em> Most of all, it is a future where the benefits of open and transparent competition bring best value and best security to our government customers and to our ultimate customers: the peace loving people who count on our industry and our governments to protect them against the rapidly evolving threats to world security.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe discours de Coffman est \u00e0 la fois sans surprise et \u00e0 la fois surprenant. Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;une d\u00e9monstration convaincante de la profonde r\u00e9alit\u00e9 de la tendance totalement d\u00e9structurante de l&rsquo;action du syst\u00e8me de l&rsquo;am\u00e9ricanisme, ici l&rsquo;industrie, tout cela empaquet\u00e9 sous le nom de globalisation. On \u00e9tonnerait Vance Coffman en lui expliquant que sa logique, \u00e0 la fois d\u00e9structurante et \u00e9videmment pr\u00e9datrice, renvoie au sch\u00e9ma classique de l&rsquo;esprit trotskiste (la r\u00e9volution permanente : tout briser pour que s&rsquo;installe une organisation globale nouvelle, sous l&rsquo;inspiration de celui qui a bris\u00e9),  ce qui est une \u00e9vidence sans cesse constat\u00e9e, chaque jour, dans la politique am\u00e9ricaine. C&rsquo;est la partie somme toute sans surprise du discours de Coffman.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCe qui est surprenant, c&rsquo;est qu&rsquo;il fasse ce discours en 2002. On l&rsquo;attendait en 2004-2005. Les Am\u00e9ricains vont vite en besogne ; peut-\u00eatre un peu trop vite, c&rsquo;est leur seule faiblesse, la faiblesse du buffle dans le magasin de porcelaines. En d\u00e9voilant ainsi ses conceptions, Coffman montre combien ses intentions ne sont pas de simple transaction, de simple coop\u00e9ration, mais purement et, dirait-on, globalement politiques,  notamment avec l&rsquo;affaire JSF. (En plus de l&rsquo;action par le JSF, il y a l&rsquo;action US par l&rsquo;absorption de soci\u00e9t\u00e9s europ\u00e9ennes, comme ils sont en train de faire avec l&rsquo;allemand HDW.) Les Am\u00e9ricains ont emport\u00e9 la premi\u00e8re manche avec le JSF parce qu&rsquo;ils ont r\u00e9ussi, avec l&rsquo;aide active de leurs hommes en place, \u00e0 n&rsquo;en pas faire une affaire politique. Brusquement, parce qu&rsquo;ils jugent l&rsquo;affaire r\u00e9gl\u00e9e, ils (Coffman et les autres, car tout cela pense identique) politisent brutalement et bruyamment la question. Ils d\u00e9couvrent leurs intentions, qui est l&rsquo;absorption de l&rsquo;industrie europ\u00e9enne dans le conglom\u00e9rat US. C&rsquo;est un peu rapide. La patience manque \u00e0 la panoplie chatoyante et multiple des vertus am\u00e9ricaines.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL\u00e0-dessus et ci-dessous, le discours.<\/p>\n<h2 class=\"common-article\">The Future Transatlantic Defense Marketplace<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong>Remarks by Vance D. Coffman, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Lockheed Martin Corporation, \u00a0Before the  Annual Convention Netherlands Aerospace Industries, Steigeuherger Kurhaus Hotel, The Hague, The Netherlands  October 4, 2002<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tGood afternoon. It is a pleasure to be with you today. I appreciate the opportunity to share with you my personal views on some of the key issues affecting our industry,<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tWe in the aerospace industry currently face a number of very demanding challenges, from the near collapse of some of our key commercial aircraft markets to the rapidly changing requirements of our government customers. Prom CEO level interactions, to our respective Board meetings, to our various working groupsAECMA here in Europe and AIA in the United States have been actively involved in developing responses to these challenges. The Commission on the Future of the Aerospace Industry in the United States and the STAR 21 Report in Europe are current and positive examples of such activities.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tI know that this afternoon&rsquo;s discussion will focus on the STAR 21, recommendations. In a few moments I will offer you some of my observations on several of the recommendations made in the STAR 21 report Before doing that, I think it is useful to reflect on the current global environment for our defense and aerospace industry.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tWe are now living in what we might call the \u00a0\u00bbEra of Global Threats.\u00a0\u00bb The notions of national security that we held during the Cold War and post Cold War periods are undergoing a comprehensive reassessment. The global terrorist threat must be dealt with in addition to the traditional threats to security posed by hostile nation states.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tOne thing is clear:, It is not realistic for countries to retreat behind national borders. The new security environment is one in which allied action and cooperative efforts against terrorists are absolutely required. The threat is global   so must be the response. Governments must cooperate globally, and they must be able to coordinate their policies and their military and law enforcement actions.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tWhat do these new threats and changing government priorities have in common? They require the complex systems integration skills that those of us in the aerospace and defense industry have spent years perfecting. Now we are called upon to apply these skills in new ways to meet new threats.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tWe must now think of ourselves as part of the \u00a0\u00bbinternational security industry,\u00a0\u00bb not simply the, aerospace or defense industry. In that regard, I expect companies such as Lockheed Martin and others in our industry to take a leading role in providing the technologies and services necessary to meet the requirements for preserving what we in the U.S. call \u00a0\u00bbhomeland security.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<h3>Evolving Transatlantic Relationship<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tOur industry is, of course, highly dependent on the actions of governments. Governments are one of our most important customer groups Governments are one of the primary sources of our research and development funds. Governments regulate our industry closely. And governments set the requirements for many of the systems we provide. Because of this close connection, transatlantic political and economic trends are of vital importance to our industry, As I look at these trends today, I see both positives and negatives for transatlantic cooperation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCapabilities Gaps. The rapid advances in defense technology and capabilities continue. Each time our military forces are called upon to execute demanding operations, we witness the value of continued defense technology development, The current deployment of coalition forces. in Afghanistan shows that these trends are especially apparent in command and control, intelligence, remotely piloted vehicles, precision strike, and global logistics support. As is well known, however, there are vast disparities between the levels of investment in capabilities in the United States and in Europe.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThe consequences of the funding and capabilities gape within the NATO alliance becoming increasingly apparent. NATO has recognized this problem and is focusing on malting its defense capabilities initiatives more achievable.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tFor our industry .  both here and in the U.S.   this lack of European defense funding means that excess capacity remains a major concern. The European defense industry has traditionally relied upon export markets to support the scale necessary for efficient production. The continuing reductions in European defense spending emphasize the need of European industry for export markets, but global defense spending as a whole continues in decline, and the world market for traditional defense products is actually shrinking.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tAt the same time, as you know, the United States is experiencing one of its cyclical increases in defense spending that will expand the gap between the United States and Europe to an even greater degree. One danger of, this trend is that \u00a0\u00bbfortress mentalities\u00a0\u00bb will develop on both sides of the Atlantic, with consequences that would probably make the current capabilities gap even worse. Not only would there continue to be insufficient resources, but the resources that would be available would be spent inefficiently.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThe critical point is this: We cannot afford this type of fragmented resource allocation if we are to successfully meet the new security challenges we all face.<\/p>\n<h3>STAR 21<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThe STAR 21 report recognizes this problem explicitly. Its section on defense calls for more coherent allocation of resources, harmonized requirements, and an overall increase in spending. The report also advocates steps toward common and integrated European armaments policies.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tI welcome these recommendations, A European defense market that is more integrated, rationally organized, and adequately funded would benefit industry as a whole. But as those of us in this room understand well, markets that consolidate and rationalize also produce winners and losers. This cannot be avoided.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tProtected regions or protected industrial sectors are not consistent with an integrated and efficient marketplace. The political tradeoffs required to achieve such a marketplace are difficult   and let me add they are no less difficult in the United States.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThe STAR 21 report also argues for a more rational and coordinated approach to aerospace in Europe. An increase in resources devoted to civil and military space is also recommended. Again, these recommendations arc to be applauded. An industry with only a few large customers cannot thrive or even survive if those customers decide to take an extended procurement holiday.<\/p>\n<h3>An Integrated Transatlantic Marketplace<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tAs you can see, I find much in the STAR 21 report that is valuable and sensible, and I commend the efforts of many in this room who produced. the document and the necessary consensus that underlies it. But there is an aspect of the report with which I am not in complete agreement<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tI refer to a key part of the rationale in STAR 21 calling for strengthening \u00a0\u00bbEurope&rsquo;s\u00a0\u00bb industrial capabilities in defense and aerospace. I have no quarrel with that in itself, but I believe the emphasis on \u00a0\u00bbEuropean\u00a0\u00bb capabilities or \u00a0\u00bbAmerican\u00a0\u00bb capabilities misses a critical point about our industry : Namely, that it is increasingly globalized. It is an industry whose very characteristics   including the rapid transmission of information and data across borders   actually define and drive the global economy,<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tTo argue that we can be leaders in this industry and not participate in the global marketplace   or that we can protect a home market and still expect to be competitive globally   is, in my view, an argument that falls under its own weight. It does not hold up in the face of technological, economic, or even political trends. And I need hardly add that in the commercial side of our business, we are already in one of the most globalized marketplaces ever seen.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tBy the way, I fully expect the report of the National Commission on the Future of U_ S. Aerospace   which is due out next month   will support this view of our industry. To put the matter simply: Governments should set the framework and standards for the global aerospace marketplace. Companies can then compete and cooperate within that framework.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tFor that reason, I urge everyone here to think of strengthening European industry as a parta key part, yes, but just one partof the general increase in the capabilities of the global industry, and not as an end in itself.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLockheed Martin has consistently called for a Single Integrated Transatlantic Defense Marketplace. We continue to think this model is the right one for defense and for aerospace, and the reasons we have advocated it for several years remain valid today:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; An integrated marketplace would make it possible for governments to share the costs of developing future systems and to harmonize their requirements across the Atlantic.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; It would ensure competition through the formation of transatlantic industry teams.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; It would increase interoperability through the expanded sharing of industrial and technical knowledge.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; It would strengthen the health of the transatlantic industrial base.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; It would   and this is the bottom lineenable the European Union and the NATO alliance to meet security requirements more efficientlyto get better value for money.<\/p>\n<h3>Our Vision for the Future <\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tWe at Lockheed Martin are working hard to make our vision of ark integrated transatlantic marketplace a reality. I will say to you candidly that this is not an easy task or a straight path. But we believe it is the right path for our industry, for our shareholders, and, ultimately, for our key customers.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tWe are pursuing global opportunities with global partners. We rife bringing international partners into major programs earlier than ever, and offering high value advanced technology work for the duration of those programs.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThe F 35 Joint Strike Fighter contract, awarded to the Lockheed Martin Northrop Grumman BAE SYSTEMS team, is already rewriting the possibilities for global cooperation. The JSF program will soon have eight nations participating in addition to the United States  the United Kingdom, Italy, The Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Denmark, Norway and, in the very near future, Australia. These governments are making significant investments, and their industries will contribute   as well as share inworld class technology. The JSF industrial model bas the potential to change the way we do transatlantic defense business and to set the tone for the next 50 years. We intend to make it a shining example of cooperation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tTo return to the theme I mentioned at the beginning, we at Lockheed Martin see the fundamental product of our industry as solutions. We are called upon to face some of the most dangerous challenges in the world today, and our job is to provide affordable and effective solutions to our customers.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tWe are not simply selling products and services. We are developing highly integrated solutions for the most complex security problems that our customers face. We bang world class technology and long term, high quality jobs for our global industrial partners. We will continue to team globally with partners to develop and deliver these solutions. We will continue to bring world class breadth and depth of systems integration skills to the transatlantic marketplace, And we will continue to create examples of transatlantic success.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThe future I envision is one of new partnerships among allies and friends. It is a future where cooperation and partnership will, over time, replace industrial offset and economic dependency. Most of all, it is a future where the benefits of open and transparent competition bring best value and best security to our government customers and to our ultimate customers: the peace loving people who count on our industry and our governments to protect them against the rapidly evolving threats to world security.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>L&rsquo;Europe de la d\u00e9fense, nous l&rsquo;avons vue et, surtout, entendue : elle est am\u00e9ricaine Voici un texte int\u00e9ressant, c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire instructif. C&rsquo;est le texte d&rsquo;une intervention de Vance D. Coffman, Chairman et Chief Executive Officer (CEO) de Lockheed Martin Corporation (LM quand on veut faire plus court). Cela se passe le 4 octobre, devant la Convention&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[397,395,396,398,250,3501,3502],"class_list":["post-65307","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-analyse","tag-aecma","tag-ceo","tag-coffman","tag-europe","tag-jsf","tag-lockheed","tag-martin"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65307","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65307"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65307\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65307"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65307"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65307"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}