{"id":65322,"date":"2002-11-02T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-11-02T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/11\/02\/une-question-revolutionnaire-posee-a-tony-blair-why-cant-the-english-be-more-like-the-french-de-daniel-hannan-mep\/"},"modified":"2002-11-02T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2002-11-02T00:00:00","slug":"une-question-revolutionnaire-posee-a-tony-blair-why-cant-the-english-be-more-like-the-french-de-daniel-hannan-mep","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/11\/02\/une-question-revolutionnaire-posee-a-tony-blair-why-cant-the-english-be-more-like-the-french-de-daniel-hannan-mep\/","title":{"rendered":"Une question r\u00e9volutionnaire pos\u00e9e \u00e0 Tony Blair, \u2014\u00abWhy can’t the English be more like the French?\u00bb, de Daniel Hannan, MEP<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Un d\u00e9put\u00e9 conservateur britannique pose une question r\u00e9volutionnaire \u00e0 Tony Blair, \u00ab Why can’t the English be more like the French?<\/em> \u00bb, de Daniel Hannan<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tLes quelques derniers jours de Tony Blair ont \u00e9t\u00e9 rudes. A Bruxelles, ce fut le row<\/em> avec Chirac, qui est peut-\u00eatre un montage, peu importe, mais qui marquait aussi bien combien le PM britannique avait \u00e9t\u00e9 roul\u00e9 dans la farine dans l’affaire de la PAC. A New York, \u00e0 l’ONU, c’est le bourbier o\u00f9 s’enfoncent les Am\u00e9ricains et, avec eux, le m\u00eame PM britannique qui a mari\u00e9 son destin \u00e0 celui de GW. A c\u00f4t\u00e9 de cela, les feux de la pr\u00e9sence et de l’activisme fran\u00e7ais brillent de tous leur \u00e9clat. C’est d’ailleurs face aux m\u00eames Fran\u00e7ais que, sur l’Europe et sur l’Irak, le PM ne cesse de se briser les dents.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette situation est essentiellement la cause d’une chronique qui fait la couverture du dernier num\u00e9ro (2 novembre) de The Spectator<\/a>, hebdomadaire de tendance conservatrice dure, pro-am\u00e9ricain (mais avec suffisamment de libert\u00e9) et anti-europ\u00e9en. Cette chronique est remarquable \u00e0 plus d’un \u00e9gard, et m\u00eame par certains c\u00f4t\u00e9s proche d’\u00eatre extraordinaire. Le titre annonce la couleur quant \u00e0 ce caract\u00e8re extraordinaire, quand on sait qu’il introduit un texte d’un d\u00e9put\u00e9 conservateur britannique (Member of European Parliament, ou MEP), avec cette question bien \u00e9tonnante : \u00ab Why can’t the English be more like the French?<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tContinuons avec notre \u00e9tonnement, avec une \u00e9tonnante le\u00e7on, \u00e9tonnante, \u00e0 nouveau, parce qu’elle vient d’un d\u00e9put\u00e9 britannique, MEP, conservateur, et qu’elle s’adresse \u00e0 un Premier ministre travailliste ; \u00e9tonnante, surtout, parce que, \u00e0 la suite d’un argument plein d’une mauvaise foi \u00e0 la britannique (sans doute, comme les Britanniques parlent d’une mauvaise foi \u00e0 la fran\u00e7aise), avec des faux lieux communs, une solide incompr\u00e9hension de la politique ext\u00e9rieure fran\u00e7aise, avec les habituelles protestations d’all\u00e9geance en contrepartie (\u00e0 l’Alliance, \u00e9videmment) qui pr\u00e9parent \u00e0 la suite, on parvient \u00e0 une conclusion \u00e9tonnamment d\u00e9stabilisatrice et bien inhabituelle dans les salons politiques britanniques : il faut faire comme les Fran\u00e7ais. (Cette mauvaise foi, ce traitement peu aimable des Fran\u00e7ais, doivent nous assurer de l’importance de l’article : Hannan ne plaide pas contre la politique am\u00e9ricaine de Blair pour pouvoir mieux lui recommander une politique europ\u00e9enne qui serait plut\u00f4t tourn\u00e9e vers les Fran\u00e7ais, puisqu’on lui voit tous ces solides pr\u00e9jug\u00e9s anti-fran\u00e7ais. Il s’agit d’un conservateurs eurosceptiques, normal pour un MEP et son jugement de la politique US de Blair porte sur les pi\u00e8ces du dossier et rien d’autres.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tFaire comme les Fran\u00e7ais, est-ce \u00e0 dire : avoir une politique ind\u00e9pendante ? Effectivement puisqu’on en arrive \u00e0 ce constat \u00e9tonnant : \u00ab In Washington, as in Brussels, we have come dangerously close to contracting out our foreign policy to someone else.<\/em> \u00bb (Ce qui nous importe n’est pas Bruxelles, l’usual suspect<\/em> quand un conservateur britannique doit faire une sortie pour d\u00e9noncer une perte de souverainet\u00e9 nationale, ou une menace de cela ; ce qui nous importe, c’est Washington, car voici Mr. Hannan qui nous dit qu’avec leur politique US, les Britanniques sont \u00ab dangerously close to contracting out our foreign policy to someone else<\/em> \u00bb. Cela, c’est compl\u00e8tement nouveau.) <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tHannan fait le constat que la m\u00e9sentente Chirac-Blair est inattendue, parce que les deux hommes \u00e9taient faits pour s’entendre et s’entendaient bien. Hannan consid\u00e9re que cette m\u00e9sentente porte sur un sujet tr\u00e8s important pour avoir s\u00e9par\u00e9 deux hommes si faits pour s’entendre, qu’elle porte sur l’aspect fondamental des relations anglo-fran\u00e7aises et surtout ce qu’il y a d’oppos\u00e9 \u00e0 elles dans ce fondamental, et qu’elle a \u00e9clat\u00e9 \u00e0 cause de cela :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab In the background, though, is the perennial question of the United Kingdom’s place in Europe. De Gaulle vetoed two British applications to the EEC because he believed that we would never be able to turn our faces away from what he liked to call le grand large’: the open main. The issue has never really gone away; it keeps being reborn in new shapes. Its current incarnation is France’s opposition to unilateral’ Anglo-American action against Saddam Hussein.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t• A partir de ce constat, Hannan analyse les deux approches politiques des deux hommes, Blair et Chirac. De Blair, de la m\u00e9thode Blair, et notamment \u00e0 propos de la question irakienne qu’il consid\u00e8re comme le coeur de la crise mais aussi concernant l’UE, il fait une analyse tr\u00e8s critique mais qui reste extr\u00eamement anglo-britannique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(Par exemple, mais l’exemple est essentiel, on trouvera assez peu de Fran\u00e7ais pour consid\u00e9rer le sommet de Saint-Malo comme une concession majeure faite par les Britanniques \u00e0 la France. Le tournant britannique d\u00e9voil\u00e9 \u00e0 ce sommet a \u00e9t\u00e9 vu, soit comme une manoeuvre britannique pour s\u00e9duire l’Europe et mieux la ramener vers le giron transatlantique (US), soit comme une r\u00e9alisation des Britanniques que leur int\u00e9r\u00eat, devant une Am\u00e9rique de plus en plus unilat\u00e9raliste, car elle l’\u00e9tait d\u00e9j\u00e0 du temps de Clinton est de se rapprocher de l’Europe, et ils ne peuvent le faire \u00e0 leur avantage que sur les questions de d\u00e9fense, et avec les Fran\u00e7ais.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVoici la critique de Hannan de l’approche politique de Blair, en m\u00eame temps que sa d\u00e9finition de cette approche politique :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab And here, for all their superficial similarities, Blair’s approach could hardly be more different from that of his French homologue. The Prime Minister, at heart, believes in influence. Throughout the Iraq crisis, and at considerable domestic cost, he has gone along with President Bush, calculating that unquestioning support in public will win him a hearing in private.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb This, mutatis mutandis, is also his policy towards the EU. Since he came to office, he has done everything he can to placate his fellow heads of government, signing the Social Chapter, going along enthusiastically with the Amsterdam and Nice treaties, even sounding positive about the federal constitution unveiled earlier this week by Val\u00e9ry Giscard d’Estaing. He has been especially solicitous of French goodwill. Cast your mind back to the early days of his leadership: the Canary Wharf summit, his address (in French) to the National Assembly, the St Malo agreement setting up joint Anglo-French military forces.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb And what does he have to show for it? Five years on, Chirac treats him with the same disregard that all British prime ministers encounter when the EU sets about truly important business. When it comes to enlargement, or the budget, or above all farm subsidies, the deal is largely done before the Brits turn up.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The fact is that arguing from within, the strategy so cherished by British diplomats, is about as clear a failure as anything in international relations can be. Diplomatic trade-offs are made on the basis of present interest, not past gratitude. Chirac was no doubt genuinely appreciative of Blair’s willingness to countenance European armed forces outside Nato; but it would never cross his mind that this should lead him to make concessions over the CAP. George W. Bush is visibly touched by Britain’s support over Iraq. But does anyone imagine that he will offer Blair a veto over a unilateral US attack?<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t• Maintenant, une appr\u00e9ciation de la politique fran\u00e7aise et chiraquienne, par Hannan toujours. Elle est compl\u00e8tement, totalement nimb\u00e9e dans une perception machiav\u00e9lique, voire cynique, dans tous les cas qui fait cr\u00e9dit (?) \u00e0 la France d’un r\u00e9alisme de fer (l\u00e0 aussi, on jugera sans aucun doute que les arguments peuvent tr\u00e8s largement \u00eatre discut\u00e9s, voire refus\u00e9s). C’est une appr\u00e9ciation \u00e9tonnante, que, d’ailleurs, certains (Fran\u00e7ais) trouveraient flatteuse et qui correspond presque exactement \u00e0 ce que les Fran\u00e7ais pensent \u00e0 propos de la politique britannique en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, soit pour en d\u00e9noncer les intentions cach\u00e9es, soit pour l’admirer secr\u00e8tement, et, souvent, les deux en m\u00eame temps. (Mais peut-\u00eatre la politique de Blair a-t-elle perdu certaines de ces vertus britanniques traditionnelles, et c’est l\u00e0 qu’il y aurait un probl\u00e8me.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Now compare this with Chirac’s approach. Under his leadership, France, perhaps more than any other state, is dictating the pace and nature of the military build-up. The Quai d’Orsay takes the view that there is no point in having a seat on the UN Security Council if you do not use it. Even now, it is by no means impossible that France will eventually agree to join a military coalition in the Gulf; but not before it has squeezed every ounce of advantage from the situation.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Many commentators explain France’s opposition to US policy as mere reflexive anti-Americanism. And it is true that there is something splendidly outrageous about the French foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, demanding collective, rather than unilateral’ action. This, after all, from the country that sank the Rainbow Warrior in a friendly port, that pushed ahead with nuclear tests in the South Pacific despite global outrage, and that, more recently, invaded C\u00f4te d’Ivoire without pausing to ask anyone’s permission.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Yet we should be wary of oversimplification. Remember that President Mitterrand ended up supplying a hefty contingent to the coalition that fought the Gulf war. France is not quite the arrogant loner that British and American conservatives like to think. She often comes round in the end but only on her own terms.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb To take two recent examples, the French have finally agreed to close the refugee camp at Sangatte and to accept the import of British beef. On both issues, they have belatedly complied with international law or, depending on your point of view, caved in to British pressure. But not without first exploiting the situation to the full. The closure of Sangatte, symbolically important though it is, does nothing to address the main British concern: that France will not readmit illicit migrants who have passed through her territory before entering the United Kingdom. As for beef, the six-year-long ban, combined with new rules on labelling, will make it almost impossible for British exporters to penetrate what used to be their single largest market. In both cases, France acts as though she expects to be rewarded for ceasing to do something that she ought never to have done in the first place.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t• Enfin vient le plus important, la conclusion que Hannan tire de tout cela, des deux politiques compar\u00e9es, Chirac et Blair, sur la question essentielle de la crise irakienne. Cette conclusion retrouve le titre, et elle est dite simplement comme ceci : Blair a perdu, il aurait du agir comme les Fran\u00e7ais. La messe est dite. C’est alors que les complications vont commencer…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab My guess is that something similar will happen this time. Once again, the French will hold off for as long as they can, making a virtue of obstreperousness. They will present themselves to the Muslim world as the most reasonable and friendly of all the Western powers, while simultaneously waiting for Bush to make them an offer they can’t refuse.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb And, in so doing, they will greatly advance their national interest. Certainly the French press is in no doubt. As far as it is concerned, Chirac has cast off the constraints of cohabitation and taken France back to its rightful place at the top table. For all his faults, he can play the world statesman convincingly, forcing France into everyone else’s calculations.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Blair, by contrast, showed his cards at the outset. With the approval, no doubt, of his mandarins, he decided that the key thing was his relationship with Bush. This is, in many ways, admirable. But, for all the spin, it is difficult to see how it has made him a bigger player than Chirac.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb No buyer would go into a transaction having first informed the salesman that, whatever the terms of their negotiations, he was determined to deal. The same precept should hold true in diplomacy. In Washington, as in Brussels, we have come dangerously close to contracting out our foreign policy to someone else.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Don’t get me wrong: I am a great believer in the Atlantic alliance. On almost every vital question of the 20th century, our interests have coincided with those of the United States. I see no reason why this should cease to be the case. All I am saying is that we should be prepared, where necessary, to assert specifically British interests to behave, in short, more like the French.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb France is often a mercurial and infuriating ally. But she is so precisely because she approaches international co-operation on the basis of national interest. That is one of the reasons that France has done so well out of the EU, while Britain has done so badly.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tCette conclusion est remarquable, de la part d’un MEP conservateur britannique. Elle repr\u00e9sente une logique compl\u00e8tement nouvelle, logique consistant \u00e0 exposer qu’\u00e0 trop suivre la politique ext\u00e9rieure am\u00e9ricaine, le Royaume-Uni perd de son autonomie et le contr\u00f4le de sa politique ext\u00e9rieure. Bien s\u00fbr, c’est compl\u00e8tement vrai depuis longtemps (depuis 1941), mais il s’agit d’un tabou jusqu’ici compl\u00e8tement intouchable. Une telle \u00e9vidence ne pouvait seulement \u00eatre envisag\u00e9e comme argument dans le parti conservateur de Maggy Thatcher, \u00e0 cause de la consid\u00e9ration compl\u00e8tement sp\u00e9cifique qui \u00e9tait faite aux relations avec les USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMalgr\u00e9 toutes ses pr\u00e9cautions de langage, Hannan sugg\u00e8re implicitement que ces relations sont du m\u00eame domaine que celui des relations internationales normales ; \u00e0 choisir cette r\u00e9f\u00e9rence, la v\u00e9rit\u00e9, du type le roi est nu, finira pas devenir un poids insupportable pour la diplomatie britannique : la politique am\u00e9ricaine du Royaume-Uni constitue un abandon intol\u00e9rable de souverainet\u00e9, pour une politique ext\u00e9rieure qui est des int\u00e9r\u00eats des USA et de moins en moins des int\u00e9r\u00eats du Royaume-Uni. Cette sorte d’\u00e9volution intellectuelle est due bien entendu aux derniers seize mois de politique am\u00e9ricaine exacerb\u00e9e de Tony Blair, qui pourraient appara\u00eetre comme une d\u00e9monstration par l’absurde du caract\u00e8re inacceptable pour les int\u00e9r\u00eats britanniques de cette politique.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Un d\u00e9put\u00e9 conservateur britannique pose une question r\u00e9volutionnaire \u00e0 Tony Blair, \u00ab Why can’t the English be more like the French? \u00bb, de Daniel Hannan Les quelques derniers jours de Tony Blair ont \u00e9t\u00e9 rudes. A Bruxelles, ce fut le row avec Chirac, qui est peut-\u00eatre un montage, peu importe, mais qui marquait aussi bien… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[705,3682,3345,3344],"class_list":["post-65322","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-notes-de-lectures","tag-blair","tag-conservateur","tag-relationships","tag-special"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65322","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65322"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65322\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65322"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65322"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65322"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}