{"id":65323,"date":"2002-11-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-11-04T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/11\/04\/contre-revolution\/"},"modified":"2002-11-04T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2002-11-04T00:00:00","slug":"contre-revolution","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/11\/04\/contre-revolution\/","title":{"rendered":"<strong><em>Contre-r\u00e9volution<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article\">Contre-r\u00e9volution<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t4 novembre 2002  L&rsquo;ONU conna\u00eet une pause symbolique, m\u00eame si le travail y continue. Cette pause est due aux \u00e9lections qui ont lieu demain aux USA, qui constitueront une indication int\u00e9ressante sur la situation int\u00e9rieure US,  dans tous les cas, sur la situation du m\u00e9canisme politique int\u00e9rieur US. Les derni\u00e8res indications font craindre un r\u00e9sultat qui perp\u00e9tuerait, voire accentuerait cet \u00e9trange \u00e9tat de division presque parfaite r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 avec l&rsquo;\u00e9lection de GW en novembre-d\u00e9cembre 2000 (GW \u00e9lu avec moins de vois populaires que son adversaires, les totaux g\u00e9n\u00e9raux \u00e9tablissant n\u00e9anmoins le rapport \u00e0 50-50).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl semble maintenant acquis qu&rsquo;une r\u00e9solution de l&rsquo;ONU sur l&rsquo;Irak ne pourra pas \u00eatre \u00e9ventuellement adopt\u00e9e, au mieux avant la fin de cette semaine. <a href=\"http:\/\/story.news.yahoo.com\/news?tmpl=story2&#038;ncid=716&#038;e=4&#038;u=\/ap\/20021103\/ap_on_re_mi_ea\/un_iraq\" class=\"gen\"> Une d\u00e9p\u00eache Associated Press du 2 novembre<\/a> signalait par exemple : \u00ab <em> U.S. officials say a vote is unlikely until late next week because of the need to revise the resolution and have the council discuss the updated draft  which will delay U.N. action until after Tuesday&rsquo;s U.S. midterm elections.<\/em> \u00bb Il semble m\u00eame que des pr\u00e9visions plus r\u00e9alistes, mais n\u00e9anmoins optimistes puisqu&rsquo;elles impliquent que serait accept\u00e9e la r\u00e9solution qui circulerait actuellement (d&rsquo;origine am\u00e9ricaine et encore plus r\u00e9vis\u00e9e dans le sens voulu par la France et la Russie), indiquent qu&rsquo;il ne faut rien esp\u00e9rer de d\u00e9finitif avant la semaine prochaine. Cela fera alors deux mois que le d\u00e9bat est engag\u00e9, \u00e0 partir du discours de GW devant l&rsquo;Assembl\u00e9e, le 12 septembre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=448\" class=\"gen\">On sait par ailleurs que d\u00e9sormais le doute existe aux USA,<\/a> non seulement sur la situation \u00e0 l&rsquo;ONU, mais sur la perspective de la guerre elle-m\u00eame (aura-t-elle lieu ?). <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/articles\/A49219-2002Oct31.html\" class=\"gen\">La mauvaise humeur d&rsquo;un Krauthammer, neo-conservative notoire, est significative.<\/a> Il faut rappeler encore <a href=\"http:\/\/www.iht.com\/articles\/75608.html\" class=\"gen\">l&rsquo;article de David Ignatius,<\/a> dans l&rsquo;International <em>Herald Tribune<\/em> du 2 novembre, avec ce paragraphe, qui nous dit tout de la situation :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>Six months ago, when analysts such as Robert Kagan were celebrating America&rsquo;s cult of military strength, the common view was that the Europeans were powerless to stop Washington. It turns out that&rsquo;s not exactly true. The Europeans are discovering that they can use institutions such as the United Nations as a brake against what they consider America&rsquo;s hyper-power.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tEn d&rsquo;autres mots : sous nos yeux, c&rsquo;est une sorte de r\u00e9volution qui se met en place, une red\u00e9finition des relations internationales apr\u00e8s la tentative ultime des am\u00e9ricains, depuis le 11 septembre, de limiter la d\u00e9finition \u00e0 la seule puissance brute. C&rsquo;est un deuxi\u00e8me tournant apr\u00e8s le 11 septembre qui est en train d&rsquo;\u00eatre prise,  si l&rsquo;on veut parler en termes politiques symboliques, une contre-r\u00e9volution en train de se faire et de r\u00e9ussir, apr\u00e8s la r\u00e9volution du 11 septembre 2001.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; Il y a, avec les d\u00e9bats de l&rsquo;ONU, la r\u00e9alisation, apr\u00e8s la d\u00e9monstration, que la puissance am\u00e9ricaine n&rsquo;est ni omnipr\u00e9sente, ni omnipotente, qu&rsquo;elle a ses faiblesses et que celles-ci se trouvent paradoxalement au coeur de ce que l&rsquo;on a pris jusqu&rsquo;ici pour son principal instrument de puissance.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; Ce que montrent les d\u00e9bats \u00e0 l&rsquo;ONU, durant ces deux derniers mois, ce sont, par rapport aux places que les th\u00e8ses am\u00e9ricaines en vogue leur assignent, les limites tr\u00e8s contraignantes de la puissance brute (<em>hard power<\/em>) et la tr\u00e8s grande efficacit\u00e9 de la puissance d&rsquo;influence (<em>soft power<\/em>). C&rsquo;est ce que <a href=\"http:\/\/www.iht.com\/articles\/74614.html\" class=\"gen\">William Pfaff d\u00e9finit de la sorte,<\/a> dans un article paru le 24 octobre dans l&rsquo;International <em>>Herald Tribune<\/em> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em> &#8230;People are being forced to think about the nature of power, and to wonder if the United States is really as powerful as it claims to be. They note that since Bush was elected and began to assert military hard power, America&rsquo;s soft power has shrunk.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Soft power encompasses diplomatic influence and political persuasion, cultural influence and prestige, and additional factors that cause others to respect a country and wish to become associated with it and to accept its values and views. Joseph Nye of Harvard University has recently written about this in terms of the importance of soft power to the United States itself. But soft power can also be used against America, particularly when America is in its Bush administration hard-power operational mode. France has been using its soft power to block the American demand for a single UN Security Council resolution that would authorize the United States to attack Iraq whenever Washington judged this appropriate. The French maintain that international law requires that the Security Council authorize whatever retaliation follows Iraqi obstruction of inspections.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The American position was never popular with other governments, and in a low-key but persistent and unyielding way, the French mobilized that international opposition. France has UN veto power but does not threaten to use it, understanding that veto power, like nuclear power, is much more important unused than used. The United States now has provisionally agreed to return to the United Nations before any attack on Iraq, although at this writing negotiations (notably with Russia) continue on the wording of a resolution acceptable to the five permanent Security Council members. As for hard power, no other country imagines trying to construct as huge and versatile a military force as the United States possesses. What purpose would it serve? No government today imagines fighting a full-spectrum war against America. No other government except the American has the least interest in deploying its forces worldwide, with bases in scores of countries.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Contre-r\u00e9volution 4 novembre 2002 L&rsquo;ONU conna\u00eet une pause symbolique, m\u00eame si le travail y continue. Cette pause est due aux \u00e9lections qui ont lieu demain aux USA, qui constitueront une indication int\u00e9ressante sur la situation int\u00e9rieure US, dans tous les cas, sur la situation du m\u00e9canisme politique int\u00e9rieur US. Les derni\u00e8res indications font craindre un&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[354,370,3382,3478,3683],"class_list":["post-65323","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-354","tag-370","tag-kagan","tag-onu","tag-rebvolution"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65323","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65323"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65323\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65323"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65323"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65323"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}