{"id":65329,"date":"2002-11-07T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-11-07T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/11\/07\/livresse\/"},"modified":"2002-11-07T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2002-11-07T00:00:00","slug":"livresse","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/11\/07\/livresse\/","title":{"rendered":"L’ivresse<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

L’ivresse <\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t7 novembre 2002 Au lendemain des r\u00e9sultats des \u00e9lections, voici les commentaires. Ils nous font part, pour la plupart, de l’ivresse triomphaliste qui doit colorer le sentiment de GW et de tous ses gens. Une d\u00e9p\u00eache de l’agence UPI<\/a> en rend compte de mani\u00e8re significative. En voici quelques extraits qui donnent le ton et disent \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s tout ce qu’il importe d’en savoir.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The world now faces President George W. Bush triumphant after the midterm elections. His Republican Party is in command of both Houses of Congress, and Bush can claim a potent new mandate for an assertive foreign policy whose unilateralist America First implications have disconcerted friends and foes alike.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb We are dealing with a power that has no limit in its dealing with foreign issues, said Mohammed Shaker, head of the Egyptian Council on Foreign Relations, whose wariness of a Bush administration unrestrained by any other branch of government was widely shared beyond U.S. shores.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Diplomats in Washington Wednesday, while noting that the executive branch was always in charge of foreign policy, suggested that the Republican majorities in Congress would give the Bush administration even more self-assurance in foreign policy, and adding weight to its more hawkish voices and weakening the doves.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb My guess is that one of the losers of this election campaign might be (Secretary of State) Colin Powell, who has been seen by most foreign governments as a voice of caution and of wisdom in an administration that otherwise seems largely filled with hawks, commented one senior NATO diplomat based in Washington.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tOn distingue dans certains des propos cit\u00e9s, qui se veulent froids et d\u00e9tach\u00e9s, ou plut\u00f4t derri\u00e8re ces propos froids et d\u00e9tach\u00e9s, l’\u00e9motion, voire l’exaltation qui aujourd’hui conduit le jugement. Il s’agit de l’effet d’annonce ; il y en a d\u00e9j\u00e0 eu (qu’on se rappelle l’enthousiasme, \u00e9videmment pro-US, qui suivit la chute de Kaboul ou le discours de GW \u00e0 l’ONU) et il y en aura encore ; c’est l’effet direct du vertige que procure ce qu’on juge \u00eatre une d\u00e9monstration par la force et qui n’est en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral qu’une d\u00e9monstration de force ; cet effet conforte \u00e9videmment ceux qui croient en la m\u00e9thode, dont manifestement font partie nombre d’analystes interrog\u00e9s ici, y compris celui qu’on nomme ici, \u00ab one senior NATO diplomat based in Washington\n<\/p>\n

\tCet effet est temporaire. La grande victoire du parti de GW sera oubli\u00e9e demain ; surtout, elle ne changera rien aux probl\u00e8mes que rencontre Washington pour lancer enfin sa guerre contre l’Irak. Elle accentuera la crainte g\u00e9n\u00e9rale qui, aujourd’hui, dicte les politiques \u00e9trang\u00e8res du reste du monde, avec l’alternative de la collaboration ou de la r\u00e9sistance. (Citons nous-m\u00eames nos sources : une source britannique, qui parle un excellent fran\u00e7ais, \u00e0 qui nous tenions ce propos, jugeait le choix des termes assez f\u00e2cheux et lui pr\u00e9f\u00e9rait \u00ab une alternative entre adaptation tactique et r\u00e9aliste d’une part, opposition spectaculaire mais risqu\u00e9e d’autre part<\/em> \u00bb. Nous comprenons ces r\u00e9ticences et ces corrections de langage ; sur le fond, la source partage l’analyse sur ce point.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tD’une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, on a pu relever ici et l\u00e0 les remarques suivantes :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• La d\u00e9faite des d\u00e9mocrates est un \u00e9v\u00e9nement politique important. Le site WSWS, avec son syst\u00e9matisme et sa pr\u00e9cision de type-trotskiste, a donn\u00e9 une analyse s\u00e9v\u00e8re mais enti\u00e8rement justifi\u00e9e<\/a> de la d\u00e9faite d’un parti d\u00e9mocrate qui s’est montr\u00e9 incapable, dans tous les domaines, de prendre ses responsabilit\u00e9s d’opposants. Notre analyse est que cette situation int\u00e9rieure am\u00e9ricaine est l’exact reflet de la situation ext\u00e9rieure : le refus de prendre nettement position, quitte \u00e0 s’opposer s’il le faut, conduit \u00e0 des d\u00e9sastres politiques. (Notre source britannique d\u00e9sapprouve cette partie de notre analyse en toussotant.) En trois paragraphes, WSWS ex\u00e9cute les d\u00e9mocrates. Comme nous le disons, s\u00e9v\u00e8re mais juste :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The Democrats rationalized their support for an unprovoked imperialist war by claiming that to do otherwise would be political suicide, adding that once the war question was out of the way, they could concentrate on opposing Bush’s domestic policies. They simply ignored a rash of public opinion polls revealing widespread disquiet over the war and declining support for Bush’s militaristic agenda.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In reality, in supporting the war they were supporting the entirety of the administration’s program. It is impossible to separate Bush’s predatory foreign policy from his policies of repression and social reaction at home. They are two sides of the same agendaone that is pursued in the interests not of the American people, but of the corporate and financial oligarchy.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In the end, the Democrats were neither able nor willing to propose any serious measures to deal with the growth of unemployment or the worsening crisis in education, health care and housing. They dared not challenge Bush’s tax handouts to the rich, his attacks on social programs, or his record military budget. It was capitulation all down the line.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t• Loin de renforcer une puissance am\u00e9ricaine qui n’a certainement pas besoin de poids<\/strong> suppl\u00e9mentaire, cette victoire du parti r\u00e9publicain enferme tragiquement l’Am\u00e9rique dans un extr\u00e9misme qui peut difficilement servir de politique exploitable. Il n’existe plus aucun frein, non dans les actes (car il y en beaucoup moins qu’il semblerait \u00e0 \u00e9couter les exclamations autour de la puissance US) mais dans la perception psychologique unilat\u00e9raliste de l’\u00e9quipe GW, c’est-\u00e0-dire dans le d\u00e9ploiement d’une rh\u00e9torique brutale, tout enti\u00e8re ax\u00e9e sur la menace de l’utilisation de la force (hard power<\/em>) de pr\u00e9f\u00e9rence \u00e0 l’utilisation de l’influence et de la persuasion (soft power<\/em>). La politique am\u00e9ricaine est de plus en plus orient\u00e9e vers l’exigence du tout ou rien (qui n’est pas avec nous est contre nous), avec l’obligation de gagner \u00e0 chaque coup, et le danger d’une profonde d\u00e9stabilisation en cas d’obstacle r\u00e9sistant.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• La victoire r\u00e9publicaine va \u00e9galement exercer, de fa\u00e7on indirecte, par le truchement de la politique de GW, une pression consid\u00e9rable sur les pays ext\u00e9rieurs pour les soumettre dans les conditions les plus humiliantes possibles. L’Allemagne est la premi\u00e8re sur la liste. Ces exigences seront d’une telle force que la capitulation sera de plus en plus difficile \u00e0 envisager, \u00e0 moins d’accepter un suicide politique int\u00e9rieur pour les dirigeants de ces pays. De cette fa\u00e7on, l’Am\u00e9rique de GW devrait \u00e0 terme faciliter les regroupements contre elle.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Cette id\u00e9e rencontre des analyses critiques actuellement d\u00e9velopp\u00e9es aux USA, et qui s’accordent particuli\u00e8rement \u00e0 la situation cr\u00e9\u00e9e par la victoire des r\u00e9publicains. C’est le cas dans un r\u00e9cent (4 novembre) s\u00e9minaire, au Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, \u00e0 Washington, o\u00f9 parlaient plusieurs analystes critiques de la strat\u00e9gie de l’administration GW, dont Michael Lind (directeur du Strategy Project, \u00e0 la New America Foundation). L’hebdomadaire Defense News<\/em> en rapporte un compte-rendu.<\/a> Parlant des nouvelles conditions de coop\u00e9ration offertes par l’administration GW, sous l’inspiration essentiellement de Paul Wolfowitz, il nous dit ceci :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Under these new partnerships, <\/em>[Lind] added, the administration essentially offers countries the same bargain its predecessors made with West Germany and Japan during the Cold War. It turns them into semi-satellites of U.S. foreign policy that are wholly dependent on U.S. military might for their survival. In so doing, the administration seeks to preserve U.S. military dominance over every corner of the globe, even if this means assuming responsibility for the security of every other nation, Lind said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Such a rationale undermines our best bet for achieving security, which is coalition-building, said Charlie Kupchan, senior fellow with the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations. Kupchan conceded that the neoconservative belief that if we lead strongly, other countries will get behind us, may have been true in Imperial Age. But he noted that such an unadorned use of power is no longer seen as legitimate in the eyes of most world leaders and encourages the very sort of counter-coalitions the U.S. leadership seeks to prevent.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

L’ivresse 7 novembre 2002 Au lendemain des r\u00e9sultats des \u00e9lections, voici les commentaires. Ils nous font part, pour la plupart, de l’ivresse triomphaliste qui doit colorer le sentiment de GW et de tous ses gens. Une d\u00e9p\u00eache de l’agence UPI en rend compte de mani\u00e8re significative. En voici quelques extraits qui donnent le ton et… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3198,3248,1448],"class_list":["post-65329","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-gw","tag-washington","tag-wolfowitz"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65329","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65329"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65329\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65329"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65329"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65329"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}