{"id":65338,"date":"2002-11-14T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-11-14T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/11\/14\/jsf-israel-et-europe\/"},"modified":"2002-11-14T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2002-11-14T00:00:00","slug":"jsf-israel-et-europe","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/11\/14\/jsf-israel-et-europe\/","title":{"rendered":"JSF, Isra\u00ebl et Europe"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article\">JSF, Isra\u00ebl et Europe<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t14 novembre 2002  Il se confirme qu&rsquo;il existe au sein du programme JSF une source de m\u00e9sentente majeure, qui concerne l&rsquo;\u00e9ventuelle entr\u00e9e d&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl dans ce programme. Des informations diffus\u00e9es le 11 novembre par <em>Asia Africa Intelligence Wire<\/em> donnent quelques pr\u00e9cisions sur cette question.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tOn a la confirmation \u00e9galement que la m\u00e9sentente concerne les pays europ\u00e9ens face \u00e0 Isra\u00ebl, surtout \u00e0 la demande implicite d&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl d&rsquo;entrer dans le programme. Les arguments pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s par l&rsquo;article sont de deux ordres : technologique et politique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe deuxi\u00e8me point est int\u00e9ressant et relativement nouveau, contrairement au premier ; il est, peut-\u00eatre, porteur de tensions d\u00e9stabilisantes au sein du programme, parce que d\u00e9pendant de facteurs ext\u00e9rieurs (politiques) tr\u00e8s volatils. Cette opposition europ\u00e9enne est bas\u00e9e sur la volont\u00e9 de ne pas voir un programme o\u00f9 se trouvent des Europ\u00e9ens fournir aux Isra\u00e9liens un syst\u00e8me d&rsquo;arme offensif qui, comme le F-16, pourrait servir contre les Palestiniens. C&rsquo;est une mati\u00e8re hautement politique, hautement pol\u00e9mique \u00e9galement et d\u00e9nonc\u00e9e par certains comme d\u00e9magogique. C&rsquo;est finalement une situation d\u00e9licate dans la mesure o\u00f9 elle risque d&rsquo;\u00eatre constamment relanc\u00e9e par les \u00e9v\u00e9nements du Moyen-Orient. (Enfin, reste le fait que, dans le cas extr\u00eame o\u00f9 Isra\u00ebl ne participerait pas au programme, ce qui serait bien \u00e9tonnant, ce pays deviendrait de toutes les fa\u00e7ons un acheteur du JSF sur \u00e9tag\u00e8re ; cela pose aux Europ\u00e9ens le m\u00eame probl\u00e8me de conscience,  mais bien plus loin, d&rsquo;ici 2005 ou 2006, ce qui permet de voir venir.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl n&rsquo;est pas impossible que ces r\u00e9ticences soient \u00e9galement li\u00e9es \u00e0 une actualit\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne. Elles pourraient venir notamment des N\u00e9erlandais, en plus des Danois, et r\u00e9pondraient au d\u00e9sir des N\u00e9erlandais partisans du programme de tenter de contenir l&rsquo;hostilit\u00e9 de certains partis n\u00e9erlandais au JSF, qui ont inscrit dans leur programme \u00e9lectoral (\u00e9lection d\u00e9but 2003) l&rsquo;abandon de la participation de leur pays dans le programme JSF (<a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=454\" class=\"gen\">notamment les Verts et le parti D66<\/a>). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>A senior Washington source <\/em>[said] <em>that European Union countries, some of whom will play a major role in financing the project, oppose Israel&rsquo;s participation, for both business and political reasons.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The main reason is Europe fears that the technological capabilities of Israeli companies are greater than those of its own.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>European opposition may also stem from political motives, based on attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the source said. The Europeans say that Israel should not be given help in obtaining another offensive weapon, after F16s were used against the Palestinians.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tD&rsquo;autre part, la m\u00eame information, sans relever la contradiction \u00e9ventuelle, laisse \u00e0 penser que la participation d&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl au programme JSF aurait une chance assez s\u00e9rieuse de se faire (cela nous para\u00eet manifeste, notamment en raison des liens entre Washington et Tel Aviv). Comme on le lit ci-dessous, le sujet est d&rsquo;ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 au centre des relations militaro-politiques entre Isra\u00e9liens et Am\u00e9ricains.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>Israel&rsquo;s participation in the project will be one of the key issues discussed by US and Israeli delegations in their biannual bilateral strategic talks on Wednesday in Washington. Ministry of Defense director general Amos Yaron and US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz will head the respective delegations.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Israel&rsquo;s request to participate in the project is liable to constitute a bone of contention in the talks between Yaron and Wolfowitz, because of lobbying by Israel to be included in the R&#038;D for the world&rsquo;s most advanced fighter plane.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The US may condition Israel&rsquo;s participation in the project on restraint in the event of an Iraqi attack on Israel, once the US offensive begins.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t[Ci-dessous, nous donnons un extrait de notre texte <em>The Babelization of the JSF<\/em> (extrait du num\u00e9ro 55 de <em>Context<\/em>, \u00e9dition d&rsquo;octobre 2002), <LIEN=http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=459disponible par ailleurs sur notre site.<D> Cet extrait concerne la question des rapports d&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl avec le programme JSF.]  <\/p>\n<h3>The Central Problem for the JSF<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tOther signs of Babelization of the JSF program have emerged, like the Australian request for a reconnaissance version of the JSF (or to have recon capabilities integrated into the JSF), or the likelihood that Israel will join the program. Various indicia have shown that the European countries, or, in any case, certain European countries, are very hostile to Israel&rsquo;s joining the JSF program. The explanation is simple and can be summarized under two heads: <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Israel is a very advanced military power and has a very specific idea of the type of aircraft that it needs, requirements that do not at all match European requirements. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Israel has an enormous influence on the Americans and could plausibly impose some of its conditions under certain circumstances. As a result, the European countries are very apprehensive of being confronted with a particularly insistent involvement by the Israelis, who might succeed in imposing their own design priorities. This prospect is taken quite seriously, and a Belgian industry source, who was involved in the F-16 program, who follows the development of the JSF program and who also knows the Israelis well, holds the view that \u00ab <em>it is potentially a very serious problem. The Israelis want very special aircraft, which do not correspond to our requirements, and that was one of the reasons for which the idea of producing F-16s here for Israel was discarded. It comes as no surprise to me that the prospect of Israeli participation in the JSF program is creating very strong tensions among the Europeans.<\/em> \u00bb This point is critical. It boils down to the question of whether a single aircraft can be produced for such a diverse range of customers and for such demanding customers. At best, the prospect opened by this particular case promises serious confrontations, as well as untold bureaucratic and political difficulties  so much so that politics are destined to play a major role. The prospects are, according to our source, so complex and so constricting that it is possible to envisage the case where it would be necessary to have different versions, depending upon the participant, in order to avoid program gridlock and confrontations capable of seriously interfering with the program timetable. The same Belgian source expresses the view that the JSF will end up with \u00ab <em>four or five different versions. There will surely be an English JSF and an Israeli JSF  specific versions  perhaps an Australian JSF, and a JSF for the others<\/em> \u00bb This may be a valid forecast. If so, what will become of the costs and the delivery schedule?<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>JSF, Isra\u00ebl et Europe 14 novembre 2002 Il se confirme qu&rsquo;il existe au sein du programme JSF une source de m\u00e9sentente majeure, qui concerne l&rsquo;\u00e9ventuelle entr\u00e9e d&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl dans ce programme. Des informations diffus\u00e9es le 11 novembre par Asia Africa Intelligence Wire donnent quelques pr\u00e9cisions sur cette question. On a la confirmation \u00e9galement que la m\u00e9sentente&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[2774,250,3246,3445],"class_list":["post-65338","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-israel","tag-jsf","tag-moyen-orient","tag-pays-bas"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65338","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65338"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65338\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65338"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65338"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65338"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}