{"id":65349,"date":"2002-11-22T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-11-22T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/11\/22\/en-revenant-de-prague\/"},"modified":"2002-11-22T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2002-11-22T00:00:00","slug":"en-revenant-de-prague","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/11\/22\/en-revenant-de-prague\/","title":{"rendered":"En revenant de Prague<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

En revenant de Prague<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t22 novembre 2002 De nombreux textes de commentaires sur le sommet de Prague tendent \u00e0 pr\u00e9senter cette r\u00e9union comme tr\u00e8s d\u00e9cevante par rapport aux attentes cr\u00e9\u00e9es par la pr\u00e9sentation m\u00e9diatique. On peut, par exemple, lire le compte-rendu du 22 novembre du Telegraph<\/a>. Il nous dit beaucoup du climat d\u00e9l\u00e9t\u00e8re qui a r\u00e9gn\u00e9 lors de cette r\u00e9union. Ce sommet pourrait rester comme une \u00e9tape importante dans l’effondrement du syst\u00e8me occidental apr\u00e8s la Guerre froide, non pas l’effondrement de l’Occident, mais l’effondrement du syst\u00e8me qui maintient artificiellement, par la force d’une pression permanente, une entit\u00e9 baptis\u00e9e Occident et r\u00e9unissant les deux continents am\u00e9ricain et europ\u00e9en.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe Telegraph<\/em> rapporte un incident entre les Fran\u00e7ais et les Am\u00e9ricains, qui illustre, par sa confusion, par la d\u00e9termination de certains des acteurs (les Fran\u00e7ais notamment) le climat de ce sommet.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Before the three-day summit began, President Jacques Chirac indicated that he was unwilling to move any further than he had during the furious debate over resolution 1441. That point was re-emphasised yesterday by French officials.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb On Wednesday, Mr Bush said Saddam should admit holding weapons of mass destruction by the UN deadline of Dec 8 or enter his final stage with a lie.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In a sign of the gulf between Washington and Paris, French officials at the summit yesterday chose to interpret Mr Bush’s words as a threat of military action if Saddam denied he was still pursuing weapons of mass destruction.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb That is his own interpretation and we do not share it, one said. On Dec 8, we will take note of what Iraq says it has and we will see if its behaviour is consistent with its statement.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Condoleezza Rice, the US national security adviser, stepped back from Mr Bush’s doomsday tone, when she said Dec 8 would merely be the start of a new stage of the disarmament process.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tUne excellente appr\u00e9ciation du sommet se trouve dans l’analyse qu’en fait Adrian Hamilton, dans the Independent<\/a>. Son titre est d\u00e9j\u00e0 tr\u00e8s significatif : \u00ab Nato suffers from a terminal illness, but no one dares kill it off just yet<\/em> \u00bb Voici quelques extraits significatifs du texte de Hamilton :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab There is a simple rule in politics. The more politicians talk of an institution as being \u00a0\u00bbrelevant\u00a0\u00bb and \u00a0\u00bbreborn\u00a0\u00bb, the more you know it’s on its last legs. Yesterday the air in Prague was positively tropical with the hot breath of 40 world leaders attending a summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation all saying how important this venerable alliance was. What they actually meant when you listened carefully was that they all had their individual reasons for finding the organisation useful at this particular moment.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The particular casus belli of Iraq can be smoothed over between the allies as it has been through a resort to the United Nations, although it still leaves open the question of what happens if the inspectors approve the Iraqi response and Bush still decides to go to war. But the divide cannot be bridged overall. The two sides, with the presence inbetween of Tony Blair, are just too far apart. And you cannot sustain a military alliance on that basis.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Still less can you regroup that alliance, as Donald Rumsfeld, the US Defence Secretary, is insisting, around a combination of vastly increased European military expenditures and the creation of a new super rapid reaction force for what is referred to as \u00a0\u00bbout-of-theatre operations\u00a0\u00bb.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb But this only makes the basic dilemma worse. The whole debate set by US politicians about comparative defence expenditures between the US and its allies is a facile one. It is perfectly true that US military spending amounts to double that of all its Nato allies put together. But that is because the US wishes to be a global superpower keeping foreign bases in over 40 countries, maintaining permanent fleets in every ocean and a bomber capacity to reach anywhere in the world. Europe has not seen its interest in doing that since it gave up its empires.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb It is true that Europe badly needs to upgrade its equipment and invest in more high-tech and carrying capacity. But it needs this quite aside from its membership of Nato. The problem of that organisation is that any decision on out-of-theatre action will only exacerbate internal tensions, not ease them.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The chief reason for opposing this desperate attempt to keep Nato on life-support, however, is that its continuation diverts attention from actually obstructs, indeed the development of its successors. In the end, the pattern of world defence, like the patterns of world politics, is likely to be regional. Europe, Asia and even perhaps the Arab Middle East will develop mutual support because they have to. Whether America acts as a nanny to these infants or as a broooding alternative presence has yet to be seen. But the present unipolar world leaves too great a vacuum for it not to be filled.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tDe ce que nous avons cit\u00e9, gardons ceci, qui nous para\u00eet d’une justesse \u00e9clairante : \u00ab The problem of that organisation is that any decision on out-of-theatre action will only exacerbate internal tensions, not ease them.<\/em> \u00bb. Hamilton fait cette remarque incidemment, il ne pousse pas son exploration \u00e0 son terme, jusqu’\u00e0 l’extr\u00eame de sa signification. Il s’agit sans aucun doute de la remarque la plus significative concernant l’\u00e9volution de l’OTAN :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Alors que tout le monde conna\u00eet, depuis des ann\u00e9es, des doutes multiples sur l’utilit\u00e9 de l’OTAN, une cause essentielle pour son existence a toujours \u00e9t\u00e9 avanc\u00e9e, sur laquelle un accord g\u00e9n\u00e9ral \u00e9tait r\u00e9uni : l’OTAN comme forum de consultation transatlantique, l\u00e0 o\u00f9 se retrouvent ceux qui sont finalement des alli\u00e9s, des amis, l\u00e0 o\u00f9 se font les consultations, o\u00f9 s’\u00e9bauchent les projets communs.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Surtout, depuis 1989-91 o\u00f9 les temps sont devenus difficiles pour l’Alliance : l’OTAN comme forum transatlantique, c’est-\u00e0-dire le lieu et le rendez-vous o\u00f9 les querelles ext\u00e9rieures finissent par se vider puis s’aplanir. Ce que nous montre Prague, c’est que cette fonction essentielle est finie par non-existence, ou par effet contre-productif.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• A Prague, on a pu constater que la division entre la plupart des Europ\u00e9ens et les Am\u00e9ricains sur l’Irak se confirmait et subsistait. Dans ce cas, qui n’avance pas recule : l’OTAN n’ayant pas r\u00e9ussi \u00e0 exercer sa soi-disant capacit\u00e9 de rassemblement, c’est la d\u00e9sunion qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 la marque du sommet et dont l’effet a \u00e9t\u00e9 grandi par le faste du sommet.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• L’exemple le plus d\u00e9monstratif de cette situation est le cas am\u00e9ricano-allemand : que les Am\u00e9ricains et les Allemands n’aient pas pu se r\u00e9concilier a conduit au constat qu’ils ont paru encore accentuer leur opposition. (Auriez-vous imagin\u00e9 hier encore, avant Prague, un Joska Fischer d\u00e9clarant [c’est le ton qui importe] : \u00ab We will not take part <\/em>[to a war against Iraq], full stop<\/em> \u00bb, apr\u00e8s que les participants au Sommet aient entendu les Allemands les avertir qu’une guerre serait \u00ab une catastrophe.<\/em> \u00bb) Le plus path\u00e9tique quant aux relations germano-am\u00e9ricaines et, en m\u00eame temps, le plus irr\u00e9sistiblement ironique, est sans doute cette affirmation venue d’une source allemande proche de Schr\u00f6der selon laquelle les choses ne vont pas trop mal entre Schr\u00f6der et GW puisque les deux hommes \u00ab se sont serr\u00e9s la main durant un temps normalement long pour deux hommes qui se serrent la main<\/em> \u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAu-del\u00e0 des \u00e9volutions tactiques (la politique britannique notamment, qui est de plus en plus pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e effectivement comme un d\u00e9veloppement tactique), d’une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale les relations entre les USA et l’Europe continuent \u00e0 se d\u00e9t\u00e9riorer substantiellement. C’est une m\u00e9canique que nul ne semble pouvoir, non seulement arr\u00eater, mais simplement contr\u00f4ler. Elle d\u00e9passe d\u00e9sormais les principaux acteurs et devrait tendre \u00e0 constituer le principal facteur de d\u00e9sordre dans les relations international.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

En revenant de Prague 22 novembre 2002 De nombreux textes de commentaires sur le sommet de Prague tendent \u00e0 pr\u00e9senter cette r\u00e9union comme tr\u00e8s d\u00e9cevante par rapport aux attentes cr\u00e9\u00e9es par la pr\u00e9sentation m\u00e9diatique. On peut, par exemple, lire le compte-rendu du 22 novembre du Telegraph. Il nous dit beaucoup du climat d\u00e9l\u00e9t\u00e8re qui a… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[584,3328,3045],"class_list":["post-65349","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-otan","tag-prague","tag-sommet"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65349","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65349"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65349\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65349"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65349"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65349"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}