{"id":65358,"date":"2002-12-02T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-12-02T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/12\/02\/jsf-discretement-plus-cher\/"},"modified":"2002-12-02T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2002-12-02T00:00:00","slug":"jsf-discretement-plus-cher","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/12\/02\/jsf-discretement-plus-cher\/","title":{"rendered":"JSF discr\u00e8tement plus cher?<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

JSF discr\u00e8tement plus cher?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t2 d\u00e9cembre 2002 Il est absolument n\u00e9cessaire de suivre l’\u00e9volution du programme JSF \u00e0 la trace et \u00e0 la loupe, parce que ce programme est un facteur essentiel, directement et indirectement, pour le d\u00e9veloppement de la politique europ\u00e9enne de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et de d\u00e9fense. La bataille autour de ce programme s’exprime pour nous dans deux champs, :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• d’une part dans le domaine de la d\u00e9fense europ\u00e9enne et des diverses positions europ\u00e9ennes \u00e0 l’\u00e9gard de ce programme, \u00e0 cause de l’implication de cinq pays dans ce programme, avec les cons\u00e9quences potentielles qu’on conna\u00eet ;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• d’autre part dans le domaine luxuriant et fourni de la bureaucratie am\u00e9ricaine, o\u00f9 les \u00e9volutions, m\u00eame d\u00e9cisives, se font le plus souvent de mani\u00e8re feutr\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tC’est dans ce dernier domaine que la lettre d’information Inside the Air Force<\/em>, en date du 26 novembre, nous apporte la confirmation d’une possibilit\u00e9 \u00e9voqu\u00e9e pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment il y a plusieurs mois (le 21 mars)<\/a> et, depuis, laiss\u00e9e dans le vague des \u00e9volutions bureaucratiques souterraines. Il s’agit de la question de la r\u00e9duction de la commande de JSF de la Navy, qui semble d\u00e9sormais confirm\u00e9e, qui porte sur 420 exemplaires sur 1.100, qui est par cons\u00e9quent sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 ce qu’on annon\u00e7ait en mars dernier (37% au lieu de 30%).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The Navy has formalized plans to decrease its buy of the Joint Strike Fighter, according to Vice Adm. Michael Mullen, the service’s deputy chief of naval operations for resources, requirements and assessments.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb By integrating the Navy and Marine tactical air requirements, the services were able to decrease their total procurement number, Mullen said. Originally, the combined production buy was approximately 1,100 aircraft; however, the services will now purchase only 680 aircraft in total — a 37 percent reduction. The Lockheed Martin-built JSF will be produced in three variants. The Navy will procure the carrier variant, which is optimized for landing on a carrier deck, while the Marine Corps will buy the short-take-off-and-landing version, which will allow the service to operate out of austere locations that lack proper runways. The Air Force will buy the conventional version.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In the long run, we’ll have a smaller force, Mullen said at the 2002 Center for Naval Analyses Conference in Crystal City, VA. And when you do the math, which many of you do, it actually will be much more capable than the one we had just a few months ago, or anticipate a few months ago. . . . And we expect similar savings in training, logistics and range operations.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tLa r\u00e9duction de la commande de la Navy est toujours au stade de la proposition (\u00ab Mullen stressed the decrease is still a proposal awaiting final approval by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. OSD’s decision will be made known in the fiscal year 2004 budget proposal, scheduled for release early next year.<\/em> \u00bb). Mais il s’agit d’un stade avanc\u00e9 de la proposition et la Navy a poursuivi ces derniers mois le processus d’int\u00e9gration de cette r\u00e9duction dans sa planification sans interf\u00e9rences de OSD. Ces conditions conduisent \u00e0 appr\u00e9cier qu’il para\u00eet de plus en plus probable que l’approbation du m\u00eame OSD doive \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme une formalit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tInside The Air Force<\/em> ne cache pas que la probable d\u00e9cision de r\u00e9duction de l’U.S. Navy affectera le co\u00fbt de l’avion, aussi bien pour l’USAF que pour les partenaires \u00e9trangers. La position de l’Air Force vis-\u00e0-vis du JSF reste toujours incertaine et des d\u00e9placements budg\u00e9taires annonc\u00e9s en septembre, puis plus ou moins d\u00e9mentis, restent toujours possibles ; ils pourraient m\u00eame \u00eatre qualifi\u00e9s de probables \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de la crise \u00e9norme qui est en train de frapper le programme central de l’USAF, le F\/A-22. (Cette crise jette une hypoth\u00e8que sur le syst\u00e8me entier de gestion et de d\u00e9veloppement du Pentagone. Nous n’en sommes plus au stade o\u00f9 l’on peut dire qu’un bon programme pourrait rattraper un mauvais programme mais au stade o\u00f9 il faut envisager que c’est tout le pocessus de gestion du Pentagone qui est entr\u00e9 dans une crise peut-\u00eatre sans pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent. C’est imp\u00e9rativement dans le cadre de cette crise qui se g\u00e9n\u00e9ralise au sein du Pentagone qu’il faut appr\u00e9cier les perspectives de d\u00e9veloppement du JSF.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab While the decreased spending on JSF will help balance the Navy’s budget, falling procurement numbers could translate into increased unit costs for the eight international partners who have signed onto the system development and demonstration phase as well as the Air Force, which is buying the aircraft to replace its F-16s and A-10s.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb JSF may take another yet another hit if the Air Force is allowed to cut the program to pay for part of a $16 billion miscalculation officials made when the service submitted its program objective memorandum. In September, the Air Force proposed cutting JSF and other programs to make up for the shortfall in an a retiree health care account (ITAF, Sept. 27, p1).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Though officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense told the Air Force to re-examine the cuts, sources said the JSF, which costs between $40 and $50 million per copy depending on the variant, is not out of the woods until the FY-04 budget submission is finalized.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

JSF discr\u00e8tement plus cher? 2 d\u00e9cembre 2002 Il est absolument n\u00e9cessaire de suivre l’\u00e9volution du programme JSF \u00e0 la trace et \u00e0 la loupe, parce que ce programme est un facteur essentiel, directement et indirectement, pour le d\u00e9veloppement de la politique europ\u00e9enne de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et de d\u00e9fense. La bataille autour de ce programme s’exprime pour… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[629,464,250,3194],"class_list":["post-65358","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-a-22","tag-f","tag-jsf","tag-pentagone"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65358","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65358"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65358\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65358"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65358"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65358"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}