{"id":65361,"date":"2002-12-03T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-12-03T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/12\/03\/rumsfeld-ko\/"},"modified":"2002-12-03T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2002-12-03T00:00:00","slug":"rumsfeld-ko","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/12\/03\/rumsfeld-ko\/","title":{"rendered":"Rumsfeld KO<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Rumsfeld KO<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t2 d\u00e9cembre 2002 La grande ambition de Donald Rumsfeld en arrivant au Pentagone, en janvier 2001, \u00e9tait de lancer une r\u00e9forme fondamentale, tr\u00e8s vite d\u00e9sign\u00e9e sous le terme de transformation<\/em>. Le 10 septembre 2001, comme nous l’avons souvent rappel\u00e9,<\/a> Rumsfeld fit un discours qui aurait m\u00e9rit\u00e9 la notori\u00e9t\u00e9, un discours exceptionnel qui est une d\u00e9claration de guerre \u00e0 la bureaucratie du Pentagone. A partir du 11 septembre, Rumsfeld acquit des dimensions, c’est-\u00e0-dire une image de quasi-homme d’\u00c9tat, en devenant le grand chef de la guerre contre la Terreur. La question se pose d\u00e9sormais de fa\u00e7on directe de savoir si, en gagnant cette notori\u00e9t\u00e9 m\u00e9diatique du lendemain, Rumsfeld n’a pas perdu cette bataille annonc\u00e9e le jour d’avant.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes premiers d\u00e9tails du budget du Pentagone pour 2004, le budget FY2004, viennent d’\u00eatre publi\u00e9s par le Washington Times<\/a>. Le constat est \u00e9vident : pas trop de changement, les choses se poursuivent \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s comme du business as usual<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Major weapon systems that will shape the armed forces for decades have survived an extensive budget review by senior aides to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Pentagon and military officials said in interviews that the upcoming fiscal 2004 defense budget, if the White House agrees, will fund the Air Force’s F-22 stealth fighter, the Army’s Comanche helicopter, the Navy’s CVNX aircraft carrier, the Marine Corps’ V-22 Osprey transport aircraft and the tri-service Joint Strike Fighter.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb These multibillion-dollar programs all received scrutiny this past summer and fall in a review spearheaded by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Stephen Cambone, Mr. Rumsfeld’s top adviser on weapons and budget issues. The 2004 budget goes to Congress in early 2003 and takes effect Oct. 1.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tSi la nouvelle concernant cette \u00e9volution du budget DoD pour FY2004 se confirme, c’est une grave d\u00e9faite pour Rumsfeld, peut-\u00eatre sa d\u00e9faite d\u00e9cisive. Partout, on annon\u00e7ait ce budget FY04 comme d\u00e9cisif :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• C’est l\u00e0 que seraient engag\u00e9es les d\u00e9cisions importantes portant jusqu’\u00e0 la fin de ce qui est consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme la dur\u00e9e de l’\u00e9quipe GW, le terme des deux mandats jusqu’en 2008 (\u00e9tant acquis dans ces calculs que la r\u00e9\u00e9lection est, justement, acquise). Il faut au moins quatre ans pour contr\u00f4ler et mettre en place de nouveaux programmes et de nouvelles structures, le genre de choses n\u00e9cessaires pour une transformation radicale.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Dans FY04 devait donc figurer des d\u00e9cisions radicales : abandon de l’un ou l’autre programme important, lancement de tel ou tel autre programme important, beaucoup d’autres d\u00e9cisions. Cela devait \u00eatre visible, car l’\u00e9tat d’esprit, le choc psychologique comptent aussi, et beaucoup. Comme on le comprend, il semble n’en \u00eatre rien.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Au reste, quelques remarques plut\u00f4t embarrass\u00e9es, livr\u00e9es en fin d’article, nous confirment que ceux qui ont inform\u00e9 le Washington Times<\/em> sont conscients de cette d\u00e9monstration tr\u00e8s n\u00e9gative. Ils tentent de sauver la face par des explications plut\u00f4t sp\u00e9cieuses et poussives, sur des demi-mesures, sur des demi-avertissements, etc. (la crise du F\/A-22 est ainsi trait\u00e9e dans le budget FY04 : \u00ab Not all surviving programs are assured of a long life. The Air Force must stop continued price overruns for the F-22 Raptor. The Pentagon has put in place a $43 billion procurement cap.<\/em> \u00bb Quand on conna\u00eet l’historique du syst\u00e8me et l’\u00e9tat actuel de la crise, ces quelques phrases sont pitoyables.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Pentagon officials say that although major systems survived, the plan will contain a number of transformation aspects, such as a larger investment in unmanned vehicles. This includes the missile-firing Predator drone that has killed some top al Qaeda leaders. There are also blueprints for remaking Navy air wings and for changing the way the Air Force and Army interact in battle. You have to look at transformation as cultural change, not just weapons, one Pentagon official said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Although the budget review did not produce major cancellations, Mr. Rumsfeld has nixed two key programs. He ended development of the Army’s Crusader artillery system as too wedded to Cold War battle doctrine. A lighter, more accurate artillery system will be developed. He also ordered the Navy to redesign its next-generation destroyer.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tD’ailleurs, un autre passage semble bien nous dire tout \u00e0 propos des illusions qui furent entretenues sur la possibilit\u00e9 d’une r\u00e9forme du Pentagone, ce qui conduit \u00e0 conclure que la grande victime du budget FY2004 n’est pas un programme ni un service, mais sans doute cet homme : le populaire et flamboyant Donald Rumsfeld, avec ses id\u00e9es de r\u00e9forme fondamentale du Pentagone.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab President Bush campaigned in 2000 on a promise to transform the post-Cold War military by canceling some weapons and developing more advanced ones for future armies and navies.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb But several realities limited his planned \u00a0\u00bbtechnology leap\u00a0\u00bb as the military services launched agressive selling campaigns inside the Pentagon to save their prized systems.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In some cases, the services argued that their weapons met Mr. Bush’s demand for transformational programs that could meet 21st-century threats.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Rumsfeld KO 2 d\u00e9cembre 2002 La grande ambition de Donald Rumsfeld en arrivant au Pentagone, en janvier 2001, \u00e9tait de lancer une r\u00e9forme fondamentale, tr\u00e8s vite d\u00e9sign\u00e9e sous le terme de transformation. Le 10 septembre 2001, comme nous l’avons souvent rappel\u00e9, Rumsfeld fit un discours qui aurait m\u00e9rit\u00e9 la notori\u00e9t\u00e9, un discours exceptionnel qui est… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3194,3320,569],"class_list":["post-65361","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-pentagone","tag-reforme","tag-rumsfeld"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65361","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65361"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65361\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65361"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65361"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65361"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}