{"id":65367,"date":"2002-12-06T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-12-06T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/12\/06\/king-rove\/"},"modified":"2002-12-06T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2002-12-06T00:00:00","slug":"king-rove","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/12\/06\/king-rove\/","title":{"rendered":"King-Rove<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

King-Rove<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

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\t6 d\u00e9cembre 2002 Question : Karl Rove, secr\u00e9taire g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de la Maison Blanche (chef de cabinet de GW), est-il l’homme central du pouvoir \u00e0 Washington ? Deux affaires (terme g\u00e9n\u00e9riques pratique) nous poussent \u00e0 nous int\u00e9resser \u00e0 cette question.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• L’affaire John Dilulio<\/strong>, du nom d’un ancien fonctionnaire de la Maison-Blanche, d\u00e9mocrate mais qui a servi avec GW pendant pr\u00e8s d’un an. Dilulio a envoy\u00e9 une longue lettre (publi\u00e9 sur le site de Esquire)<\/a> au correspondant washingtonien de Esquire<\/em>, Ron Suskind, le 24 octobre. Il d\u00e9taille la situation \u00e0 la Maison Blanche (tr\u00e8s flatteur pour GW) et surtout l’influence et l’action extraordinairement puissante de Karl Rove \u00e0 la Maison-Blanche. Ces indications de Dilulio ont servi de base pour un article que Esquire<\/em> publiera dans son num\u00e9ro de janvier 2003. Dans cette lettre, Dilulio \u00e9crit notamment :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\t\u00ab Some are inclined to blame the high political-to-policy ratios of this administration on Karl Rove. Some in the press view Karl as some sort of prince of darkness; actually, he is basically a nice and good-humored man. And some staff members, senior and junior, are awed and cowed by Karl’s real or perceived powers. They self-censor lots for fear of upsetting him, and, in turn, few of the president’s top people routinely tell the president what they really think if they think that Karl will be brought up short in the bargain. Karl is enormously powerful, maybe the single most powerful person in the modern, post-Hoover era ever to occupy a political advisor post near the Oval Office.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb There is no precedent in any modern White House for what is going on in this one: complete lack of a policy apparatus. What you’ve got is everything, and I mean everything, being run by the political arm.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\t• Assez curieusement, ou au contraire de fa\u00e7on tr\u00e8s significative, d\u00e8s la parution de sa lettre sur le site de Esquire<\/em> et des remous qui ont suivi, et apr\u00e8s des mises en cause venues de la Maison-Blanche, Dilulio est revenu sur ses affirmations. Esquire<\/em> a r\u00e9agi avec fermet\u00e9, \u00e9crivant notamment sur son site : \u00ab On October 24, John DiIulio, a former high-level official in the Bush administration, sent the letter below to Esquire Washington correspondent Ron Suskind. The letter was a key source of Suskind’s story about Karl Rove, politics and policymaking in the Bush administration, \u00a0\u00bbWhy Are These Men Laughing,\u00a0\u00bb which appears in the January 2003 issue of Esquire. On Monday, December 3, White House press secretary Ari Fleischer said that the charges contained in the story were \u00a0\u00bbgroundless and baseless.\u00a0\u00bb After initially standing by his assertions, DiIulio himself later issued an \u00a0\u00bbapology.\u00a0\u00bb Esquire stands strongly behind Suskind and his important story.<\/em> \u00bb On appr\u00e9ciera, dans le contexte pol\u00e9mique, la pr\u00e9sence des guillemets dont Esquire<\/em> prend bien garde d’orner le mot apology<\/em> pour d\u00e9signer le comportement de Dilulio. Ce comportement est d\u00e9taill\u00e9 de la sorte \n<\/p>\n

\tdans le Guardian :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Mr Dilulio, a Democrat who now teaches politics and religion at the University of Pennsylvania, at first stood by his remarks, issuing a statement saying that the tone of the article had given the wrong impression by being \u00a0\u00bbover-the-top complimentary\u00a0\u00bb to himself while castigating Mr Rove.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb But he did not repudiate his remarks until Ari Fleischer, the president’s spokesman, called them \u00a0\u00bbbaseless and groundless\u00a0\u00bb and said the former aide had \u00a0\u00bbissued an apology\u00a0\u00bb – whereupon Prof Dilulio issued a second statement branding his words \u00a0\u00bbgroundless and baseless\u00a0\u00bb.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb His words had been \u00a0\u00bbpoorly chosen\u00a0\u00bb, he said, adding that he did not recall saying that what White House adviser Margaret LaMontagne \u00a0\u00bbknows about domestic policy could fit in a thimble\u00a0\u00bb – although he apologised to her in any case.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t• La deuxi\u00e8me affaire<\/strong> qui nous occupe est celle de l’article de Dan Plesch paru dans le Guardian<\/a>, qui nous annonce, selon l’\u00e9nonc\u00e9 du titre, que \u00ab war is now on the back burner, Bush is waiting until the 2004 elections are nearer to attack Iraq<\/em> \u00bb. Peu importe ici la th\u00e8se de Plesch, ce qui nous int\u00e9resse se trouve dans les circonstances qu’il d\u00e9taille, c’est-\u00e0-dire dans l’appr\u00e9ciation qu’il donne du r\u00f4le de Karl Rove dans la formulation de la politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re de GW. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Most observers focus on the perceived role of the Pentagon hawks versus State Department doves in the battle for influence over Bush. But his political advisers in the White House especially Karl Rove are far more influential. It was Rove who, in June, gave a presentation explaining that the war should be central to the Republicans’ successful campaign to win control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb But it was also Rove who saw that voters were as frightened by the go-it-alone war talk as they were enthusiastic for a tough line on terrorism. It was this reading of voter concern that provided the boost for talks at the UN and produced much milder language from Bush. In Britain, we were told that it was Blair’s September meeting with Bush and Cheney that changed things, however the need to win an election was far more influential in persuading Bush to be patient.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In Washington there are still some close to the Pentagon who see an invasion of Iraq coming soon. But a view shared by political strategists for the Democrats, veteran reporters and long-time Republican insiders was that all the signs are that the war is now on the back burner. Had the White House really wanted to, it would have used the victory in the midterm elections to force through a faster timeline on Iraq at the UN and would have increased the pay-offs needed to ensure its 15-0 approval by the security council. As it was, they agreed a process that can easily be spun out for a year.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Then, almost as soon as the resolution passed, Iraq again fired on US and British planes. What happened? Nothing. There was no speeches declaring that Iraq had once again flouted the will of the international community and that we now had to go to war. Rather, we were reminded that our planes enforcing the no-fly zones were not covered by these UN resolutions, something that had strangely been left out of briefings these last 10 years.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tIl y a dans ces deux cas assez d’indications pour nous faire penser qu’effectivement le r\u00f4le de Rove aupr\u00e8s de GW est fondamental, y compris pour la politique ext\u00e9rieure qui d\u00e9pend d’habitude (pour les conseils) essentiellement des secr\u00e9taires d’\u00c9tat et \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense (Powell et Rumsfeld), et du pr\u00e9sident du NSC (Rice), y compris \u00e9ventuellement pour la manipulation des individus (Dilulio) et leur influence sur eux.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa th\u00e8se de l’importance essentielle de Rover dans le dispositif washingtonien implique plusieurs donn\u00e9es, dont on peut envisager qu’elles soient justes au vu de l’\u00e9volution de la politique US et du comportement des uns et des autres. Si on accepte cette th\u00e8se, on doit \u00eatre conduit \u00e0 accepter au moins ces deux enseignements principaux :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Arriv\u00e9 \u00e0 la Maison-Blanche comme politicien provincial extr\u00eamement dou\u00e9 dans la pratique politicienne, GW est rest\u00e9 cela d’une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale. Il est int\u00e9ress\u00e9 par les seules cons\u00e9quences des actes de le politique ext\u00e9rieure, et non par cette politique fondamentalement ; il est aid\u00e9 en cela de fa\u00e7on d\u00e9cisive par Karl Rove qui est un ma\u00eetre dans l’art d’interpr\u00e9ter ces effets.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• La politique ext\u00e9rieure US est plus que jamais, plus qu’elle ne l’a jamais \u00e9t\u00e9, un compl\u00e9ment de la politique int\u00e9rieure. Elle est appr\u00e9ci\u00e9e, pes\u00e9e et d\u00e9cid\u00e9e en fonction de ses effets sur cette politique int\u00e9rieure. (*)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t__________<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(*) Dans notre \u00e9dition initiale, nous avions faussement \u00e9crit, pour terminer ce texte : en fonction de ses effets sur la politique ext\u00e9rieure. Un de nos amis nous a signal\u00e9 l’erreur dans le Forum li\u00e9 \u00e0 ce texte<\/a>. Nous l’en remercions et nous rectifions cette erreur : il fallait bien lire politique int\u00e9rieure.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

King-Rove 6 d\u00e9cembre 2002 Question : Karl Rove, secr\u00e9taire g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de la Maison Blanche (chef de cabinet de GW), est-il l’homme central du pouvoir \u00e0 Washington ? Deux affaires (terme g\u00e9n\u00e9riques pratique) nous poussent \u00e0 nous int\u00e9resser \u00e0 cette question. • L’affaire John Dilulio, du nom d’un ancien fonctionnaire de la Maison-Blanche, d\u00e9mocrate mais qui… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3722,3198,1480,3248],"class_list":["post-65367","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-esquire","tag-gw","tag-rove","tag-washington"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65367","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65367"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65367\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65367"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65367"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65367"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}