{"id":65369,"date":"2002-12-07T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-12-07T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/12\/07\/paralysie-guerriere\/"},"modified":"2002-12-07T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2002-12-07T00:00:00","slug":"paralysie-guerriere","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/12\/07\/paralysie-guerriere\/","title":{"rendered":"Paralysie guerri\u00e8re<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Paralysie guerri\u00e8re<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t7 d\u00e9cembre 2002 Ci-dessous, nous publions, avant de proposer quelques commentaires, un court texte de l’agence Associated Press datant du 6 d\u00e9cembre, qui nous est indisponible par le moyen habituellement utilis\u00e9 du lien. (Cette publication, et la lecture du texte qui sera faite, doivent \u00eatre comprises comme \u00e0 l’habitude, en ayant \u00e0 l’esprit l’avertissement classique : Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tStudy: Iraq War Could Cost $1.9 Trillion By Siobhan McDonough<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab In the worst case, a war with Iraq could cost the United States almost as much as the government spent in the last budget year nearly $2 trillion, according to new projections. Researchers concluded in a study released Thursday that war with Iraq could cost the United States from $99 billion to more than $1.9 trillion over a decade.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The lower figure assumes a successful military, diplomatic and nation-building campaign; the higher figure assumes a prolonged war with a disruption of oil markets and a U.S. recession, the authors say in a study by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Both figures assume a U.S. involvement in the country for 10 years.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe said it was premature to comment on cost estimates. War is the last resort, he said. We’re hoping for a peaceful solution.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The 1991 Persian Gulf War cost America an estimated $61 billion, but allies reimbursed all but about $7 billion. By some accounting methods, the United States may have even made a profit.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Direct military spending could range from $50 billion in a short campaign to $140 billion in a prolonged war with Iraq, said the study titled, War With Iraq: Costs, Consequences and Alternatives. The study was done by the academy’s Committee on International Security Studies. The report cautioned that aside from the estimates of direct military costs, all the numbers should be regarded as informed conjecture.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Occupation and peacekeeping costs could be $75 billion in the best case to $500 billion in the worst, the study said. Reconstruction and nation-building costs are estimated at $30 billion to $105 billion, and humanitarian aid at $1 billion to $10 billion.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Economic ripples of war with Iraq are likely to spread beyond budgetary costs, with the prospect of raising the cost of imported oil, slowing productivity growth and possibly triggering a recession, the report said. A prolonged disruption of world oil markets could cost the U.S. economy up to $778 billion, the researchers estimated. On the other hand, Iraq’s huge oil resources could satisfy U.S. needs for imported oil at current levels for almost a century and otherwise benefit the economy by $40 billion.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb A short war could actually benefit the United States in terms of its macroeconomic impact, which includes employment, by $17 billion. A long war, in contrast, could have a $391 billion negative effect.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Conclusion : le d\u00e9sordre est devenu hors de prix<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’\u00e9tude de l’ American Academy of Arts and Sciences (organisme s\u00e9rieux) poursuit une tendance prolif\u00e9rante autour de la guerre-future contre l’Irak. Cette prolif\u00e9ration de planification conduit \u00e9videmment \u00e0 l’\u00e9tude de tous les cas possibles et, au-del\u00e0, \u00e0 l’absurdit\u00e9 de l’hypoth\u00e8se, mais dans un syst\u00e8me dont l’existence est li\u00e9e \u00e0 l’existence de l’hypoth\u00e8se. Non seulement le conflit appara\u00eet absurde, non seulement les d\u00e9penses et les m\u00e9thodes de gestion am\u00e9ricaines apparaissent absurdes, mais le fait m\u00eame de la planification appara\u00eet d\u00e9sormais absurde.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tR\u00e9fl\u00e9chissons sur ce mod\u00e8le :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Envisager 10 ans d’occupation pour l’Irak, ce n’est pas exag\u00e9r\u00e9 (en Bosnie, en 1995, l’U.S. Army partait pour deux ans en Bosnie ; elle y est toujours ; elle y sera encore longtemps).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Les chiffres envisag\u00e9s (meilleur-pire cas) ne sont pas exag\u00e9r\u00e9s. Notamment, le pire cas n’est pas exag\u00e9r\u00e9, par d\u00e9finition dirait-on, puisque c’est le pire ; par m\u00e9thode \u00e9galement, puisqu’il explore toutes les cons\u00e9quences possibles dans une \u00e9conomie o\u00f9 tous les facteurs constitutifs sont de plus en plus imbriqu\u00e9s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Par habitude, par n\u00e9cessit\u00e9, par prudence, par esprit de planification justement (cet esprit o\u00f9 il faut toujours pr\u00e9voir le pire des cas), une politique dite-responsable doit envisager le pire des cas. Celui-ci implique la projection d’un fardeau de $170 milliards par ans sur le budget am\u00e9ricain, outre la situation \u00e9conomique de r\u00e9cession.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Conclusion : cette \u00e9tude constituera, avec d’autres qui vont suivre, qui iront dans le m\u00eame sens en surench\u00e9rissant car nul ne veut \u00eatre en reste dans la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 planificatrice de son avenir, une r\u00e9f\u00e9rence d\u00e9sormais pr\u00e9sente \u00e0 tous les esprits.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl faut placer ce petit fait de la publication de cette \u00e9tude \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de l’\u00e9v\u00e9nement qu’est le limogeage de l’\u00e9quipe dirigeante de l’\u00e9conomie US (le secr\u00e9taire O’Neill notamment). C’est le signe que l’administration GW est d\u00e9sormais oblig\u00e9e de tenir compte de la situation \u00e9conomique et des 6% de ch\u00f4meurs auxquels on arrive, si GW veut \u00eatre r\u00e9\u00e9lu, ce qui est \u00e9videmment l’argument final (et pas vraiment la situation \u00e9conomique US). Cette m\u00eame administration va donc commencer \u00e0 s’int\u00e9resser aux chiffres pr\u00e9visionnels de la guerre contre l’Irak, notamment ceux des pire des cas, encore plus lorsqu’ils pr\u00e9voient une r\u00e9cession. Un d\u00e9bat de plus, un \u00e9l\u00e9ment de prudence de plus, un facteur de paralysie de plus. L’administration US la plus guerri\u00e8re qu’on ait connue va encore plus s’inviter elle-m\u00eame \u00e0 s’interroger sur l’opportunit\u00e9 de faire cette guerre, \u00e0 laquelle elle lie pourtant son destin … (Interrogation ? C’est le moins qu’on puisse conclure lorsqu’on lit cette r\u00e9action de la Maison-Blanche qui ne voyait jusqu’il y a peu d’autre issue que la guerre : \u00ab White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe said it was premature to comment on cost estimates. War is the last resort, he said. We’re hoping for a peaceful solution.<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn n’imagine pas une situation plus \u00e9vidente de paralysie d’un gouvernement, d’une politique et, au-del\u00e0, un cas plus flagrant de blocage d’une soci\u00e9t\u00e9. En r\u00e9alit\u00e9, le blocage devient paralysie, accentu\u00e9e par le caract\u00e8re surr\u00e9aliste des chiffres. Aujourd’hui, le d\u00e9sordre lui-m\u00eame \u00e9tant devenu hors de prix, reste la paralysie.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Paralysie guerri\u00e8re 7 d\u00e9cembre 2002 Ci-dessous, nous publions, avant de proposer quelques commentaires, un court texte de l’agence Associated Press datant du 6 d\u00e9cembre, qui nous est indisponible par le moyen habituellement utilis\u00e9 du lien. (Cette publication, et la lecture du texte qui sera faite, doivent \u00eatre comprises comme \u00e0 l’habitude, en ayant \u00e0 l’esprit… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3127,857,3725],"class_list":["post-65369","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-budget","tag-irak","tag-recession"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65369","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65369"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65369\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65369"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65369"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65369"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}