{"id":65396,"date":"2002-12-23T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-12-23T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/12\/23\/now-im-confused\/"},"modified":"2002-12-23T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2002-12-23T00:00:00","slug":"now-im-confused","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/12\/23\/now-im-confused\/","title":{"rendered":"\u00abNow I’m confused\u00bb<\/em>"},"content":{"rendered":"

«Now I’m confused<\/em>»<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

23 d\u00e9cembre 2002 — Nous nous r\u00e9f\u00e9rons \u00e0 un excellent article de Brendon O’Neill, sur le site Spiked<\/em>, publi\u00e9 le 20 d\u00e9cembre.<\/a> Nous nous r\u00e9f\u00e9rons aussi \u00e0 l’article de Matthew Engel, publi\u00e9 dans the Guardian du 17 d\u00e9cembre<\/a>, cit\u00e9 par O’Neill, par qui nous l’avons d\u00e9couvert : « Ready for battle<\/em> ». Enfin, nous nous r\u00e9f\u00e9rons \u00e0 notre r\u00e9cent F&C<\/em>, citant lui-m\u00eame un texte de Timothy Garton Ash que O’Neill et Engel mentionnent, F&C que nous avons publi\u00e9 le 13 d\u00e9cembre.<\/a> Nous ne voulons rien dire de d\u00e9cisif, mais faire progresser cette sensation de plus en plus forte que l’actuelle crise irajienne est d’abord une crise washingtonienne, qu’elle est d’abord une affection consid\u00e9rable de la psychologie washingtonienne, un m\u00e9lange d’emportement collectif et de cr\u00e9ation d’une r\u00e9alit\u00e9 totalement artificielle (ce que nous d\u00e9signons sous le n\u00e9ologisme de \u00ab\u00a0virtualisme\u00a0\u00bb).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

[Note au 28 d\u00e9cembre 2002<\/strong> : nous venons de publier un texte dans la rubrique \u00ab\u00a0Analyse\u00a0\u00bb sur ce sujet<\/a>, \u00e0 partir de la comparaison faite de plus en plus souvent, cit\u00e9e par Engel ci-dessous, que l’actuelle \u00ab\u00a0marche vers la guerre\u00a0\u00bb ressemble \u00e0 l’enchaînement de 1914. C’est d\u00e9cid\u00e9ment le plus passionnant des sujets, le plus important, et c’est m\u00eame \u00e0 notre sens le sujet d\u00e9cisif. Nous sommes de plus en plus persuad\u00e9s que la crise actuelle est d’abord psychologique et qu’elle affecte la psychologie collective de la direction de la puissance am\u00e9ricaine, plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment de Washington.]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Citons ici deux paragraphes de l’article de Engel pour fixer dans quel domaine \u00e9volue la r\u00e9flexion :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

« The energy behind this enterprise has such power that it has long been difficult to imagine the circumstances in which it wouldn’t happen. Behind the Bushies’ enthusiasm for war, the political timetable is creating the same sense of inevitability as the railway timetable in 1914. If the US lost the winter window of climatic opportunity and waited another year, it would allow a new post-Gore Democratic frontrun ner (irrelevant whether it’s a hawk like Lieberman or a dove like Kerry) to paint Bush as indecisive. Round here, that is the unthinkable.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» The government’s relish for war suffuses the whole city, yet I have caught no sign of it anywhere outside Washington. Other observers, like Tim Garton Ash, report the same phenomenon. Living here, one begins to feel, after a while, the way hostages do: the Stockholm syndrome sets in. Deep down, one may know the cause is ludicrous, but it so dominates the whole of one’s life that after a while the victim gets sucked in and starts thinking these people have a point (I speak as someone who caught himself using the word \u00ab\u00a0gotten\u00a0\u00bb in conversation the other day, which suggests total brainwashing).<\/em> »<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

O’Neill d\u00e9veloppe sa r\u00e9flexion \u00e0 partir de l’amoncellement extraordinaire de d\u00e9clarations, d’affirmations, de fuites, de plans, et tout cela plus ou moins d\u00e9menti \u00e0 mesure par des d\u00e9clarations de prudence, de r\u00e9ticence, de critique, etc, que nous subissons depuis un nombre respectable de mois d\u00e9j\u00e0. Nous parlons ici de ces pr\u00e9paratifs de guerre qui battent leur plein depuis pr\u00e8s d’un an, de ces plans consid\u00e9rables, de ces d\u00e9placements d’unit\u00e9s annonc\u00e9s depuis neuf \u00e0 dix mois, — et qui n’aboutissent pour l’instant qu’au d\u00e9ploiement de 60.000 hommes dans la r\u00e9gion. (Voir le New York Times du 8 d\u00e9cembre<\/a>, avec cette citation : « About 60,000 soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen, as well as about 200 warplanes, are in or near the region. The Army alone has 9,000 soldiers, 24 Apache helicopter gunships and heavy equipment for two armored brigades in Kuwait. Equipment for a third brigade is steadily arriving on ships usually based in the Indian Ocean, and some mat\u00e9riel will be stored at a new $200 million logistics base, Camp Arifjan, south of Kuwait City.<\/em> » Se rappelle-t-on encore qu’en moins de temps (6 mois), les USA avaient d\u00e9ploy\u00e9 600.000 hommes en 1990 autour de l’Irak ? Qu’en un an \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s, en 1943-44, ils avaient d\u00e9ploy\u00e9 un million d’hommes en Angleterre pour le d\u00e9barquement de Normandie, avec bien moins de moyen de transport et bien plus d’obstacles que l’un ou l’autre r\u00e9gime arabe r\u00e9calcitrant, — la flotte sous-marine d’Hitler, ce n’\u00e9tait pas rien ?)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Tout cela finit par cr\u00e9er un climat extraordinaire dont O’Neill rend compte dans son article, et qui est bien mesur\u00e9 par sa phrase d’introduction : « Now I’m confused.<\/em> » Nous le citons abondamment, car il m\u00e9rite une lecture attentive. Notre recommandation est moins de le lire en fonction des faits qu’il mentionne, ou plut\u00f4t de l’interpr\u00e9tation de faits qu’il avance, qu’en fonction de la conclusion implicite mais tr\u00e8s puissante qui se d\u00e9gage de cet \u00e9crit, l\u00e0 aussi. Cette conclusion porte sur le climat de Washington (et Washington seulement, comme le pr\u00e9cise de fa\u00e7on tr\u00e8s pr\u00e9cise Matthew Engel : « …the whole city, yet I have caught no sign of it anywhere outside Washington<\/em> »). Cette hypoth\u00e8se sur l’importance centrale de la psychologie collective washingtonienne, qui serait une cr\u00e9ation extraordinaire du virtualisme qui domine cette ville, est bouleversante pour l’appr\u00e9ciation de la crise. Elle rend incertain toute analyse prospective sur les \u00e9v\u00e9nements \u00e0 venir, d’autant que la situation rend compte chaque jour, de plus en plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, de cette contradiction qui apparaît formidable entre l’emportement belliciste, l’appr\u00e9ciation que tout ce qui n’est pas la guerre comme perspective est « unthinkable<\/em> », et d’autre part une pusillanimit\u00e9 de plus en plus visible, avec notamment la poursuite des querelles fratricides internes, dans la pr\u00e9paration de cette guerre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Voici la deuxi\u00e8me partie de l’article de O’Neill, avec la recommandation d’usage (\u00ab\u00a0Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only.\u00a0\u00bb).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

« The US stance against Iraq has demonstrated America’s global dominance today, its unchallenged unipolar position in the post-Cold War world. There may be little enthusiasm among some European politicians and Arab states for a war on Iraq, but none has seriously opposed the Bush administration’s plans. Even Germany, whose leader Gerhard Schroeder won re-election in September 2002 largely on a ticket of opposing an invasion of Iraq, has capitulated — agreeing to US\/UN action against Iraq if necessary, and even offering German troops for the mission.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» But at the same time, the Iraq issue has exposed the US elite’s fear of going it alone in international affairs — as reflected in its toing and froing with the UN over Iraq. America may be the unipolar power, but it increasingly sees its power as more of a burden than an opportunity; it holds world power, but it seems uncertain about what to do with it. Ignore the widespread claims about US leaders using Iraq to assert their ambitions for Empire — in truth, there is little appetite for unilateral initiative today, even within the mighty America.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» The contradiction between America’s unchallenged power and its fear and uncertainty is best captured in the National Security Strategy document, published at the height of the Iraqi war talk in September 2002. The document declares America’s absolute power today, claiming that \u00ab\u00a0the United States possesses unprecedented and unequalled strength and influence in the world\u00a0\u00bb.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» But in the next breath the document says that America is threatened, not by other powers, but by handfuls of isolated and dangerous individuals around the world. \u00ab\u00a0America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones\u00a0\u00bb, it says. \u00ab\u00a0We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» Even as the USA declares its ultimate power it flags up the risks it apparently faces from handfuls of people around the world, from \u00ab\u00a0failing states\u00a0\u00bb like Saddam’s. This inverted notion of America vs the \u00ab\u00a0embittered few\u00a0\u00bb reveals far more about the US elite’s state of mind than it does about the real balance of power in international relations. It captures the clash between America’s unquestioned power and its uncertainty about how to wield that power — a contradiction that has been writ large in Mighty America’s dithering over what to do about Failing Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» The Iraqi stand-off also reveals the gap between the USA’s military might and prowess, and its caution about putting that military might to use. In recent weeks, the US has positioned 60,000 troops, 200 planes and 24 Apache helicopters in or around the Gulf, and has launched practice invasions and operations in the Gulf state of Qatar — demonstrating its massive military capability not only to the Middle East, but also to the world.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» But US officials have expressed caution about sending such forces into action. US military leaders worry that \u00ab\u00a0political leaders do not understand the commitment involved in such an invasion\u00a0\u00bb. Gulf War syndrome has reared its ugly head again, with transatlantic debates about whether a new Gulf War will \u00ab\u00a0cause serious illness in a new generation of Western troops\u00a0\u00bb. And then there’s the weather. Some military officials claim that an invasion would be impossible during Iraq’s biting winter, while others claim it would be difficult to pull off during Iraq’s sweltering summer.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» US forces are happy to show off their might in Qatar and in announcements about a 250,000-strong invasion to destroy Saddam’s regime, but when it comes to making such threats a reality, other things get in the way. America may have the military means to destroy Iraq, but it seems devoid of the willpower or the convincing case for doing so.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» The Iraq crisis has also exposed the contradiction between US claims of unity and the reality of disunity. US national security adviser Condoleezza Rice claims that \u00ab\u00a0the administration is united on [the question] of Saddam\u00a0\u00bb — but the facts tell a different story. Far from uniting America around a common sense of purpose and mission, the Iraq war talk seems only to have exposed differences and brought deep divisions to the fore.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» According to the UK Telegraph, \u00ab\u00a0With war appearing more likely by the day there are still bitter divisions between uniformed officers and civilian officials in the Pentagon over how it should be waged\u00a0\u00bb. Another report claims that \u00ab\u00a0divisions in the White House are intensifying by the day, as officials disagree profoundly over the Iraqi crisis\u00a0\u00bb.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» Such deep disagreements are often depicted as personality clashes. For the London Times, \u00ab\u00a0Personality clashes…have frustrated the war planning\u00a0\u00bb. No doubt there’s a personal element to many of the disagreements, particularly those between dove Colin Powell and hawk Donald Rumsfeld, who are described by one US journalist as the \u00ab\u00a0chalk and cheese\u00a0\u00bb of the administration.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» But there is much more to these clashes than personality. They reflect far bigger disagreements about the meaning of America today: about America’s role in the world, whether it should be more interventionist or more isolationist; about what kind of image America should project for itself, whether as old-fashioned conqueror or new-fangled nation-builder; about how America should cultivate relationships with people in the third world, whose apparent hatred of the USA has sent shockwaves through the Bush administration; and about the use of military force, and whether American casualties can justify the overthrow of Saddam.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» Beneath the debates about Iraq are deeper divisions within the post-Culture Wars USA about what kind of nation America is, and how it should assert its power in the modern era — the very disagreements that something like the war talk over Iraq attempted to overcome, by giving the US elite a cohering mission.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» But the fact that the clashes over Iraq have gone so public reflects the American elite’s lack of a cohering mission today. As the New York Times points out, US leaders often have private squabbles about foreign ventures, but for such squabbles to go public is \u00ab\u00a0exceptional\u00a0\u00bb: \u00ab\u00a0This dispute is being played out publicly, through official statements and surreptitious leaks — a common practice when it comes to tax policy but extremely rare with military strategy.\u00a0\u00bb When US leaders have little sense of what ties them together, of what values and ideas they all agree on, there is little to stop their deep divisions spilling from inside the White House on to the front page of our morning papers.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» The American elite cannot resolve its internal divisions by trying to look impressive in Iraq — and indeed, domestic uncertainty about America’s role only seems to have followed US leaders from Washington to the Gulf. Maybe Bush and co should turn their attention to the real problems besetting the American elite — and leave the Iraqi people alone to resolve theirs.<\/em> »<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

«Now I’m confused» 23 d\u00e9cembre 2002 — Nous nous r\u00e9f\u00e9rons \u00e0 un excellent article de Brendon O’Neill, sur le site Spiked, publi\u00e9 le 20 d\u00e9cembre. Nous nous r\u00e9f\u00e9rons aussi \u00e0 l’article de Matthew Engel, publi\u00e9 dans the Guardian du 17 d\u00e9cembre, cit\u00e9 par O’Neill, par qui nous l’avons d\u00e9couvert : « Ready for battle ».… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[2669,3754,857,3753,3741,610,3248],"class_list":["post-65396","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-bulle","tag-engel","tag-irak","tag-oneill","tag-psychologique","tag-virtualisme","tag-washington"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65396","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65396"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65396\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65396"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65396"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65396"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}