{"id":65402,"date":"2002-12-28T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-12-28T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/12\/28\/lenigme-antiwar\/"},"modified":"2002-12-28T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2002-12-28T00:00:00","slug":"lenigme-antiwar","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2002\/12\/28\/lenigme-antiwar\/","title":{"rendered":"L&rsquo;\u00e9nigme<em> antiwar<\/em>"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article\">L&rsquo;\u00e9nigme <em>antiwar<\/em><\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t28 d\u00e9cembre 2002  nous publions un extrait d&rsquo;une interview de Leslie Gelb, pr\u00e9sident du Council of Foreign Relations (CFR), <a href=\"http:\/\/www.cfr.org\/publication.php?id=5326\" class=\"gen\">publi\u00e9 initialement sur le site du CFR<\/a>. Leslie Gelb parle essentiellement du sentiment des Am\u00e9ricains vis-\u00e0-vis de la guerre contre l&rsquo;Irak. Ses remarques sont surprenantes dans la mesure o\u00f9 elles nous donnent une image d&rsquo;incertitude de la situation US, et surtout une image d&rsquo;opposition tr\u00e8s forte du public \u00e0 cette guerre. L&rsquo;habitude, le conformisme, le poids de la propagande, et aussi des r\u00e9sultats de sondages qu&rsquo;on serait alors fond\u00e9s \u00e0 mettre s\u00e9rieusement en doute, nous poussent d&rsquo;habitude \u00e0 classer les Am\u00e9ricains comme partisans de cette guerre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tPourquoi attacher de l&rsquo;int\u00e9r\u00eat \u00e0 Gelb ? C&rsquo;est un t\u00e9moin au-dessus de tout soup\u00e7on. Ancien journaliste \u00e9ditorialiste au New York <em>Times<\/em>, aujourd&rsquo;hui pr\u00e9sident du CFR, un organisme ultra-repr\u00e9sentatif de l&rsquo;<em>establishment<\/em>, Gelb est lui-m\u00eame repr\u00e9sentatif de cet <em>establishment<\/em>. Il est partisan de la guerre contre l&rsquo;Irak. C&rsquo;est un t\u00e9moin compl\u00e8tement impartial, et m\u00eame plut\u00f4t pouss\u00e9 \u00e0 rechercher les signes d&rsquo;encouragement et de soutien \u00e0 cette guerre. Il vient de faire une tourn\u00e9e de conf\u00e9rences dans 6 villes importantes des USA et a eu des d\u00e9bats intensifs avec le public. Les impressions qu&rsquo;il en rapporte valent un sondage sur le vif, sans l&rsquo;interf\u00e9rence d&rsquo;interpr\u00e9tations int\u00e9ress\u00e9es. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tSon t\u00e9moignage contribue \u00e0 rendre plus \u00e9paisse encore l&rsquo;\u00e9nigme que constitue l&rsquo;attitude \u00e9ventuelle du public vis-\u00e0-vis de la guerre. Indirectement il renforce l&rsquo;impression de se trouver devant une situation o\u00f9 le mouvement antiwar aux USA <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=488\" class=\"gen\">pourrait avoir des aspects in\u00e9dits, inattendus<\/a> ; il renforce la perception que nous avons de <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=510\" class=\"gen\">la rupture entre Washington (pro-guerre \u00e0 150%) et le reste des USA (et du monde)<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h3>Interview de Leslie Gelb, r\u00e9alis\u00e9 le 19 d\u00e9cembre 2002 par Bernard Gwertzman, consulting editor pour cfr.org, (Council of Foreign Relations)<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong>Q. As the administration gears up for a probable war in Iraq, has it sold its case to the American public well enough?<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tA. I don&rsquo;t think so. I have been around the country speaking in six different cities in the last few weeks. In those meetings, I argued in favor of the administration&rsquo;s position. I said I thought Saddam represents a very serious national security threat that we had better deal with now rather than later. If we enter Iraq and make it a better and safer place, it will also immeasurably improve our position in the Muslim world. As I have made this case in all these different cities, I have encountered enormous opposition to my terribly persuasive arguments (laughs).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThis isn&rsquo;t an exaggeration. Upwards of 80 to 90 percent of the audiences disagree.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong>Q. Why is that?<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tA. They disagree with the administration&rsquo;s policy and my own position on several grounds. First, some believe the administration simply has not made the case that Saddam is a serious threat. They want that \u00a0\u00bbsmoking gun\u00a0\u00bb revealed. It has not been revealed.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong>Q. By smoking gun, you mean pictures of nuclear facilities that make weapons, for instance?<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tA. Something that everyone would recognize as concrete proof that Saddam has chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Not just allegations, but the kind of proof that most nations in the world would accept as true.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong>Q. The other reasons?<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tA. The second reason is that a lot of people worry about the day after  what happens after Saddam is gone. Will it set off a blood lust in Iraq? Will it set off terrorism against the United States? Are we ready to deal with it? Most people feel they have heard nothing from the administration to give them confidence that we&rsquo;re prepared to deal with the aftermath of war.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThe third area of concern is dealing with the consequences of war here in the United States. Many of these people feel we are going to be increasingly at risk to terrorist attacks if we go after Iraq; that our cities and borders are unprepared for this, that the administration and Congress have done far too little in this last year to get us ready to deal with chemical, biological, or a dirty nuclear bomb attack.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong>Q. What would be your prescription to get people in a different frame of mind?<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tA. I think President Bush has got to produce more evidence of Iraqi cheating and Iraq&rsquo;s threats to the United States than he has. It is not sufficient to take the documents that the Iraqis have given us and say the Iraqis have not told us enough about the disposition of the weapons of mass destruction that we knew they had in the 1990s. And it isn&rsquo;t sufficient to say that the Iraqis haven&rsquo;t proved to us with these documents that these weapons have been destroyed. These allegations are not enough to convince a lot of these Americans who want to be convinced.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong>Q. And the same with foreign countries?<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tA. I think the task of persuasion is even more difficult abroad. We see leaders from abroad coming to the Council all the time, and they are even more skeptical about using military force against Iraq.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIt&rsquo;s not only my own impressions from speaking around the country. I have spoken to a number of congressional staffers and told them the same story I told you. They said to me that when their bosses &#8211; the senators and congressmen &#8211; return from their districts, they tell pretty much the same story.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong>Q. This is bizarre. Everyone hates Saddam Hussein, but people are uncertain about trying to oust him.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tA. The question is why Saddam Hussein? Not Iran? Not North Korea, which in terms of weapons of mass destruction represents more of a clear and present danger than Saddam does.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong>Q. Do you think there will be a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq by the spring?<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tA. Unless all this pressure we are putting on Saddam results in Iraqis overthrowing him in the next six to eight weeks, the chances are very, very high the U.S. will be at war with Iraq by March.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong>Q. On our own?<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tA. I don&rsquo;t think we will be on our own. I think in the end we will have Britain with us, Qatar, probably Kuwait, and maybe even Turkey. These are the essential countries to carry out military operations.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong>Q. The fact that the public may not be enthusiastic won&rsquo;t play a big role?<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tA. It won&rsquo;t play a big role in whether or not to go to war. It will play a big role if the war is not won quickly and decisively. A quick, decisive win will convince people that Bush made the right gamble. But if it ends up with great bloodshed in Iraq, Iraqis being killed by each other, Americans being killed by chemical and biological weapons, terrorist attacks here in the United States, Bush will have gambled and lost the presidency.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t(&#8230;)<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>L&rsquo;\u00e9nigme antiwar 28 d\u00e9cembre 2002 nous publions un extrait d&rsquo;une interview de Leslie Gelb, pr\u00e9sident du Council of Foreign Relations (CFR), publi\u00e9 initialement sur le site du CFR. Leslie Gelb parle essentiellement du sentiment des Am\u00e9ricains vis-\u00e0-vis de la guerre contre l&rsquo;Irak. Ses remarques sont surprenantes dans la mesure o\u00f9 elles nous donnent une image&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3554,3764,3763,2804],"class_list":["post-65402","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-anti-guerre","tag-cfr","tag-gelb","tag-usa"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65402","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65402"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65402\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65402"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65402"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65402"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}