{"id":65408,"date":"2003-01-01T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-01-01T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/01\/01\/guerre-en-solde\/"},"modified":"2003-01-01T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-01-01T00:00:00","slug":"guerre-en-solde","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/01\/01\/guerre-en-solde\/","title":{"rendered":"Guerre en solde<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Guerre en solde<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

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\t1er janvier 2003 Derni\u00e8re \u00e9volution en date dans les circonvolutions extraordinaires qui entourent la pr\u00e9paration \u00e0 la guerre contre l’Irak, la question du co\u00fbt. Ce qui \u00e9tait annonc\u00e9 comme devant co\u00fbter $200 milliards et plus<\/a>, et selon certaines \u00e9tudes jusqu’\u00e0 $1.500 milliards dans le pire des cas,<\/a> est ramen\u00e9 \u00e0 autour de $60 milliards, opportun\u00e9ment juste en-dessous du co\u00fbt de la guerre du Golfe-I, pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e aujourd’hui \u00e0 $80 milliards.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe Times de Londres du 1er janvier 2003<\/a> \u00e9crit ceci, pour nous r\u00e9sumer les bonnes nouvelles : \u00ab A war with Iraq would cost about $60 billion $20 billion less than the 1991 Gulf War, according to President Bush’s budget chief. The figure is considerably lower than the $100-$200 billion (\u00a364.5-\u00a3129 billion) previously estimated by the White House and reflects the Administration’s belief that a war can be fought and won swiftly.<\/em> \u00bb (Ces pr\u00e9cisions sont d’ailleurs elles-m\u00eames assez approximatives : les chiffres de $100-$200 milliards de la premi\u00e8re estimation avaient eux-m\u00eames \u00e9t\u00e9 contest\u00e9es ; le chiffre de $80 milliards [en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 $60 milliards, en dollars d’alors] pour la guerre du Golfe-I est \u00e9galement contest\u00e9, certaines sources ont \u00e9t\u00e9 jusqu’\u00e0 noter que les USA avaient collect\u00e9 $49 milliards de leurs alli\u00e9s et que cette somme leur avait permis de faire un b\u00e9n\u00e9fice de $4-$5milliards par rapport \u00e0 la somme r\u00e9ellement d\u00e9pens\u00e9e au cours du conflit, soit $44-$45 milliards.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes arguments avanc\u00e9s pour pr\u00e9senter une \u00e9valuation moindre de 2 \u00e0 3 fois au moins de ce qui avait \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 en septembre-octobre sont notamment les suivants :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Moins de force qu’en 1990-91 (100.000-250.000 au lieu de 600.000 alors que ce qui co\u00fbte cher, c’est l’entretien et le transport de ces forces.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The 43-day Gulf War cost $60 billion, or $80 billion in today’s money. The largest costs were for transporting, housing and feeding the 500,000-strong US force, and in munitions. US officials point to significant differences between the Gulf War and the present situation as elements that could mean another war costing less. An invasion of Iraq is likely to be started with far fewer troops than a decade ago. Fewer than 100,000 could be in theatre at the start of hostilities, building to 250,000 as reinforcements arrive.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\t• L’usage des armes \u00e0 guidage tr\u00e8s intelligent, qui permettent de toucher avec pr\u00e9cision un objectif, donc d’\u00e9viter du gaspillage. Ces armes sont r\u00e9duites, en co\u00fbt, \u00e0 un kit<\/em> \u00e0 $20.000 rajout\u00e9 \u00e0 une bombe conventionnelle. (Sur ce point, on sugg\u00e9rera quelques r\u00e9serves. Le kit<\/em> \u00e0 $20.000 \u00e0 rajouter est vraiment le bas de la gamme. Certains syst\u00e8mes tr\u00e8s intelligents peuvent monter tr\u00e8s haut dans les co\u00fbts, approcher ou d\u00e9passer le million de dollars. Quant \u00e0 la pr\u00e9cision de ces armes, elle est certes grande mais r\u00e9pond \u00e0 des renseignements souvent approximatifs, ce qui conduit \u00e0 un gaspillage d’objectifs, avec destructions, pertes civiles, mais peut-\u00eatre cela ne fait-il pas partie du co\u00fbt de la guerre ?)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The US Air Force increasingly uses precision-guided bombs conventional bombs modified with a $20,000 tail that allows them to be steered to their target. About 60 per cent of the American bombs dropped on Afghanistan were precision-guided, compared with 10 percent in the Gulf War. Military chiefs have suggested that the trend will mean that they are likely to use fewer bombs in a war with Iraq because they will be more successful at hitting targets.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t• D’une fa\u00e7on plus g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, la nouvelle \u00e9valuation repr\u00e9sente l’adoption d’une seule option, celle que la guerre sera courte, tr\u00e8s efficace avec un minimum de d\u00e9g\u00e2ts, de pertes, etc, bref une guerre peu co\u00fbteuse. Effectivement, une guerre peu co\u00fbteuse co\u00fbte moins cher qu’une guerre co\u00fbteuse, et la strat\u00e9gie \u00e9volue d\u00e9sormais de lapalissades en lapalissades.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’impression g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, tenant compte du climat tr\u00e8s morose de ces derni\u00e8res semaines, est que ces r\u00e9visions sont pure manipulation et pure opportunit\u00e9, et la relativit\u00e9 \u00e9vidente de cette sorte d’\u00e9valuation le permet. Ces opportunit\u00e9s d’\u00e9conomie qui nous sont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es aujourd’hui (volume des forces, armes tr\u00e8s intelligentes), existaient d\u00e9j\u00e0 en septembre-octobre 2002, et il para\u00eet bien surprenant qu’on ait pu les oublier. Par contre, la mise \u00e0 pied de la personne qui avait divulgu\u00e9 l’estimation initiale en dit \u00e9videmment beaucoup sur les diverses manoeuvres autour de cette estimation. (\u00ab Mitchell Daniels, director of the Office of Management and Budget, said that his estimate was no more than prudent contingency planning and emphasised that it did not mean that war was imminent or inevitable. However, it was significantly at odds with the bill of up to $200 billion suggested in September by Larry Lindsey, the President’s former economic adviser, who was dismissed recently. Mr Lindsey’s unguarded estimate, which suggested a protracted conflict, infuriated others in the White House and contributed to his dismissal.<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn verra difficilement dans cette p\u00e9rip\u00e9tie autre chose qu’une \u00e9tape de plus dans l’interpr\u00e9tation d’une guerre qui reste \u00e0 faire, et dont il reste \u00e0 m\u00eame \u00e0 se convaincre de la faire, au sein m\u00eame de tous les milieux concern\u00e9s de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale \u00e0 Washington. \u00c9videmment faite pour rassure, cette \u00e9valuation montre un peu plus le travail de propagande en cours et, derri\u00e8re, l’incertitude grandissant de l’\u00e9quipe GW.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Guerre en solde 1er janvier 2003 Derni\u00e8re \u00e9volution en date dans les circonvolutions extraordinaires qui entourent la pr\u00e9paration \u00e0 la guerre contre l’Irak, la question du co\u00fbt. Ce qui \u00e9tait annonc\u00e9 comme devant co\u00fbter $200 milliards et plus, et selon certaines \u00e9tudes jusqu’\u00e0 $1.500 milliards dans le pire des cas, est ramen\u00e9 \u00e0 autour de… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3767,2645,857],"class_list":["post-65408","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-cout","tag-guerre","tag-irak"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65408","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65408"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65408\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65408"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65408"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65408"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}