{"id":65410,"date":"2003-01-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-01-04T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/01\/04\/stratege-ossifie\/"},"modified":"2003-01-04T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-01-04T00:00:00","slug":"stratege-ossifie","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/01\/04\/stratege-ossifie\/","title":{"rendered":"Strat\u00e8ge \u201cossifi\u00e9\u201d<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Strat\u00e8ge ossifi\u00e9<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t4 janvier 2003 La Crise de la Cor\u00e9e du Nord pose un grave probl\u00e8me \u00e0 nombre d’experts intellectuels occidentaux (journalistes, strat\u00e8ges, etc, tous \u00e9galement personnages m\u00e9diatiques et virtualistes) : comment faire appara\u00eetre ce qui est une d\u00e9faite diplomatique et strat\u00e9gique majeure des USA en quelque chose qui, tous comptes faits, n’est pas loin d’\u00eatre une victoire. Voici une solution propos\u00e9e. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette analyse strat\u00e9gique de Marc Erikson, sur atimes.com,<\/a> (voir aussi le texte complet repris sur notre site<\/a>), nous expose pourquoi la crise du Cor\u00e9e du Nord est sans importance et pourquoi la crise de l’Irak est essentielle, donc pourquoi la politique (la strat\u00e9gie) US est compl\u00e8tement juste et la crise cor\u00e9enne, finalement, une chose avantageuse pour l’Am\u00e9rique. Cette d\u00e9marche constitue, si l’on veut, du complotisme dans sa version chic (s\u00e9rieuse ou autoris\u00e9e, ou politically correct<\/em>). Son objectif est de venir au secours de GW.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes complotistes expliquent apr\u00e8s-coup, par l’\u00e9vocation de plans machiav\u00e9liques et \u00e9labor\u00e9es dont nul ne saura jamais rien de s\u00fbr, des \u00e9v\u00e9nements, des incidents, des ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes qui sont inexplicables, sinon par le hasard du d\u00e9sordre et le d\u00e9sordre des faiblesses humaines. (Hasard du d\u00e9sordre et d\u00e9sordre des faiblesses humaines sont des domaines irrationnels d\u00e9plaisants pour notre jugement qui est appuy\u00e9 massivement sur la raison. D’o\u00f9 la r\u00e9action complotiste, qui y ajoute le charme du romantisme des entreprises dissimul\u00e9es.) Les strat\u00e8ges s\u00e9rieux, c’est-\u00e0-dire conformistes, reprennent la technique. Ils expliquent toutes les faiblesses et les erreurs politiques et strat\u00e9giques par des plans m\u00fbrement pens\u00e9s et par une interpr\u00e9tation apr\u00e8s-coup de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 qui s’adaptent \u00e0 cette explication. On comprend que cela profite quasi-exclusivement \u00e0 l’image des USA parce que les USA, dans ce cas comme dans la majorit\u00e9 des cas sont seuls engag\u00e9s dans des op\u00e9rations spectaculaires \u00e0 caract\u00e8re strat\u00e9gique ; on suppose m\u00eame que cela ne soit plus tr\u00e8s loin d’\u00eatre une technique de relations publiques aussi bien qu’une tendance de la rationalit\u00e9 conformiste.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVoici donc ce que nous dit Marc Erikson : <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab It’s odd, isn’t it? North Korea probably has at least a couple of nuclear warheads and the ballistic missiles to deliver them to the South and to Japan, perhaps even to Alaska. Iraq most likely doesn’t have nukes unless some bandits of a former Soviet republic sold it some. Why then, as none other than Saddam Hussein has noted, is the United States on Iraq’s case and threatening and preparing for military action against it while it wants to resolve the nuclear row with self-admitted nuke constructor North Korea by diplomatic means?<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In an article in this edition of Asia Times Online, Beijing correspondent Francesco Sisci provides part of the answer. \u00a0\u00bbNorth Korea was once strategically important because it had the Soviet Union and China behind it. Now this is no longer the case; moreover, China and South Korea, which fought against each other over North Korea half a century ago, have an idyllic relationship and both work in strong partnership for a peaceful transition in North Korea. The mainstay of the Cold War in East Asia, the confrontation between Beijing and Seoul, has disappeared since the two countries established diplomatic relations and even more so after the launch of South Korea’s Sunshine Policy toward the North. With China having possibly a better relation with the South than with the North, with Russia following suit and much weaker than it was 50 years ago, Pyongyang’s threat can no longer be the trigger for a global crisis, but is only a worrisome issue, strictly localized … the US can’t accept being pushed around by threats coming from a country wielding its missiles like a bully in a saloon in a spaghetti Western.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb But that’s not the whole story. The reasons the administration of US President George W Bush, in the words of a Washington insider, has adopted an attitude of \u00a0\u00bbif the fellow [North Korea’s ‘Dear Leader’ Kim Jong-il] wants to be clobbered, let him take a number and wait his turn; let the UN worry and deal with this\u00a0\u00bb are not limited to North Korea’s diminished strategic significance and clout or, for that matter, the inconvenience of dealing with two members-designate of the axis of evil at the same time. The Bush team rightly as I see it regards Kim Jong-il’s regime as an ossified ideological relic with no future potential for attracting adherents to its creed, while Saddam Hussein’s regime, while it lasts, in effect anchors Islamist fascism in the Middle East and the Muslim world beyond.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tCe type d’explication est en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral sans lendemain, c’est-\u00e0-dire sans perspective et\/ou indiff\u00e9rentes aux perspectives. Dans le cas expos\u00e9 ici, la perspective est celle-ci : \u00ab In a post-Saddam context defined by a new security regime, the North Korea problem can be dealt with in the fashion German unification was achieved peacefully in the post-Soviet context<\/em> \u00bb. Il semble totalement \u00e9chapper \u00e0 l’auteur que le processus de la r\u00e9unification a d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e9t\u00e9 lanc\u00e9, puis plus ou moins frein\u00e9 ; il a \u00e9t\u00e9 lanc\u00e9 par les Sud et les Nord Cor\u00e9ens et frein\u00e9 par les Am\u00e9ricains, craignant, \u00ab rightly as I see it<\/em> \u00bb, que cette r\u00e9unification conduise \u00e0 la mise en question radicale de l’alliance sud-cor\u00e9enne des \u00c9tats-Unis, c’est-\u00e0-dire la position d’\u00c9tat-client de la Cor\u00e9e du Sud par rapport aux USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tC’est effectivement d\u00e9sormais le principal enjeu de la crise : l’alliance sud-cor\u00e9enne des USA.<\/a> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCes m\u00eames strat\u00e8ges complotistes et conformistes doivent s’activer et tailler leur plume pour se pr\u00e9parer \u00e0 nous expliquer demain comment l’administration GW a pu obtenir comme r\u00e9sultat l’\u00e9ventuelle perte de l’alliance sud-cor\u00e9enne en se montrant si habile avec la crise de Cor\u00e9e du Nord. Cela qui a toutes les chances de s’accomplir si, effectivement, la r\u00e9solution de la crise conduit \u00e0 un rapprochement entre Sud et Nord, comme on peut faire l’hypoth\u00e8se. Les Sud-Cor\u00e9ens sont eux-m\u00eames compl\u00e8tement pr\u00eats \u00e0 entamer un processus les \u00e9loignant d\u00e9cisivement des USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDe fa\u00e7on tr\u00e8s significative, la question des rapports entre USA et Cor\u00e9e du Sud, avec cette rupture possible, n’appara\u00eet nulle part dans le raisonnement de l’auteur-strat\u00e8ge, Marc Erikson. La seule issue d\u00e9favorable [le risque] envisag\u00e9e est militaire (une \u00ab full-scale war against the South<\/em> \u00bb). On a un exemple de plus de la pr\u00e9sence, dans ce raisonnement conformiste, de la polarisation des relations internationales sur les seuls moyens de la violence et de la force arm\u00e9e, effectivement \u00e0 l’image des conceptions am\u00e9ricaines.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• En attendant, la Cor\u00e9e de Kim (le Grand Leader qui devait ne durer qu’une poign\u00e9e de matins calmes \u00e0 la mort de Kim Senior, et qui reste en place depuis plus d’une d\u00e9cennie) est caract\u00e9ris\u00e9 avec un m\u00e9pris exp\u00e9ditif comme un r\u00e9gime dit-ossifi\u00e9, \u00ab an ossified ideological relic<\/em> \u00bb. Demain, s’il lui prend l’id\u00e9e de lancer une bombe, on imagine que ce caract\u00e8re de bombe ossifi\u00e9e nous conduira \u00e0 en minimiser les effets, voire \u00e0 en ignorer m\u00eame la r\u00e9alit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Au contraire, le r\u00e9gime de Saddam, malgr\u00e9 le traitement subi depuis deux ans, malgr\u00e9 le d\u00e9labrement de ses moyens et de son influence, est d\u00e9crit dans des termes dont l’exag\u00e9ration ne cesse pas, l\u00e0 non plus, de faire mesurer la d\u00e9gradation de l’analyse critique \u00e0 laquelle conduit le conformisme de la pens\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• S’y ajoutent l’exag\u00e9ration et l’irr\u00e9alit\u00e9, tant dans la description des capacit\u00e9s organisationnelles et doctrinales de la soi-disant menace (irakienne), que dans la description des ambitions (US) de refondation qu’on ne peut qualifier que de civilisationnelles, en cas de guerre. Bien que ces divers analystes d\u00e9veloppant ces th\u00e8ses semblent \u00e9quilibr\u00e9s et raisonnables, il appara\u00eet alors que les sources auxquelles ils se conforment (plut\u00f4t que se r\u00e9f\u00e9rer), essentiellement dans les milieux strat\u00e9giques US, sont \u00e9videmment marqu\u00e9es par une pathologie de la psychologie.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Ci-dessous, la description du r\u00e9gime de Saddam pr\u00e9sentant des \u00e9l\u00e9ments des deux derniers points ci-dessus :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his Tikriti clique are not themselves the principal exponents of the Islamist fascism invented in its current form by Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid Qutb (see the AToL series Islamism, fascism and terrorism, November-December 2002) and practiced and promoted by Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda and the network’s chief theoretician and strategist al-Zawahiri. But by controlling a nation state with substantial resources, they backstop and support several Islamist terrorist (mainly Palestinian) outfits and, more important, function as a reference point for other corrupt and dictatorial Arab regimes. Disarming this clique and, if need be, expelling it from Iraq would send the strongest possible signal to the rest of the Arab world as well as the mullahs in Iran that in-depth political change can no longer be postponed. It would at the same time at least begin the process of and create the circumstances for undermining the ideological hold and initiative Islamist fascism now has as an admired protagonist force among Muslim youths worldwide.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In that sense, disarming Saddam is no end in itself of US foreign policy. It is envisaged as a catalyst for comprehensive political transformation in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, with democratic Kemalist Turkey as a model. It is envisaged as well as a critical stepping stone for constructing a global security consensus and system with the support of China and Russia in which proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorist action under whatever spurious guise is anathema and dealt with promptly and comprehensively. The United States could have gone it alone in Iraq and still could and might do so. Its choice of going to the United Nations Security Council and building a consensus there reflects the desire and determination that broader regional and global goals stay untainted (or at any rate least tainted) by the charge of self-serving unilateralism.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tEn conclusion, on dira que ce type de raisonnement appara\u00eet irr\u00e9m\u00e9diablement d\u00e9s\u00e9quilibr\u00e9, inconsistant et \u00e9tranger, voire presque hostile \u00e0 la r\u00e9alit\u00e9. Effectivement, la cause est qu’il est tout entier d\u00e9fini par la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de conformation \u00e0 une pens\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale en vogue, ce qu’on nomme conformisme. La d\u00e9marche que nous d\u00e9crivons ici de mani\u00e8re critique nous confirme indirectement dans la justesse de la th\u00e8se d\u00e9fendue par Neil Gabler, accessible sur notre site<\/a> : le probl\u00e8me du monde de la communications, des journalistes aux strat\u00e8ges comme Erikson, n’est pas id\u00e9ologique mais conformiste. Ce n’est pas la crise d’un jugement, d’un parti-pris, c’est la crise de l’esprit tout court.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Strat\u00e8ge ossifi\u00e9 4 janvier 2003 La Crise de la Cor\u00e9e du Nord pose un grave probl\u00e8me \u00e0 nombre d’experts intellectuels occidentaux (journalistes, strat\u00e8ges, etc, tous \u00e9galement personnages m\u00e9diatiques et virtualistes) : comment faire appara\u00eetre ce qui est une d\u00e9faite diplomatique et strat\u00e9gique majeure des USA en quelque chose qui, tous comptes faits, n’est pas loin… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[868,3299,3198,857],"class_list":["post-65410","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-bush","tag-coree","tag-gw","tag-irak"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65410","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65410"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65410\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65410"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65410"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65410"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}