{"id":65417,"date":"2003-01-08T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-01-08T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/01\/08\/bombe-a-retardement\/"},"modified":"2003-01-08T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-01-08T00:00:00","slug":"bombe-a-retardement","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/01\/08\/bombe-a-retardement\/","title":{"rendered":"Bombe \u00e0 retardement<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Bombe \u00e0 retardement<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

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\t8 janvier 2003 Pour compl\u00e9ter l’autre F&C de ce m\u00eame jour consacr\u00e9 aux affaires britanniques,<\/a> un autre aspect du discours de Tony Blair devant ses ambassadeurs, le 7 janvier, est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 comme tr\u00e8s important. C’est un discours qui est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 (par le Guardian<\/em>, toujours) comme \u00ab a reality check over Iraq<\/em> \u00bb, dans un commentaire qui fait le constat d’une r\u00e9elle d\u00e9faite<\/a> essuy\u00e9e par le premier ministre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\t\u00ab Tony Blair may be winning some of his battles with the Bush administration over Iraq, but he is certainly losing the political war on the home front. The prime minister’s speech to British ambassadors in London yesterday was an implicit admission of this significant failure. The fact that Mr Blair was willing to break with his own precedent of not acknowledging his differences with Washington in public by making such a speech was proof enough on its own.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tEffectivement, le compte-rendu du discours<\/a> nous montre un Blair n’h\u00e9sitant plus \u00e0 mettre implicitement en accusation la politique am\u00e9ricaine. A c\u00f4t\u00e9 de la r\u00e9affirmation de la politique britannique suivant celle des USA, Blair s’est beaucoup \u00e9tendu sur une critique indirecte des USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl s’est agi d’un avertissement du Premier ministre aux Am\u00e9ricains de ne pas poursuivre dans une politique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale qui les isole du reste du monde. (Avec des d\u00e9tails \u00e9nigmatiques qu’on peut relever avec une certaine ironie : lorsque Blair avertit les Am\u00e9ricains que, s’ils poursuivent leur politique, le monde peut se trouver divis\u00e9 \u00ab into rival poles of power; the US in one corner; anti-US forces in another<\/em> \u00bb, o\u00f9 place-t-il le Royaume-Uni ?)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab In a major foreign policy speech, the prime minister made an ambitious bid to woo sceptics about the looming war with Iraq at the same time as he reminded Washington that global interdependence must work both ways if progress is not to be overwhelmed by "the common threat of chaos".<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb That chaos, threatening to replace reform with "change through disorder", could be triggered by rogue states or by terrorist acts that deliberately pit nations against each other, he predicted – a clear reference to al-Qaida’s hopes of fomenting a clash between Islam and the west.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Affirming the bridge-building role which Britain has tried to sustain since 1945, Mr Blair then delivered a warning to the US about what might happen if chaos engulfs the "shared agenda" that has emerged since the cold war ended. "It can come from the world splitting into rival poles of power; the US in one corner; anti-US forces in another. It can come from pent-up feelings of injustice and alienation, from divisions between the world’s richer and its poorer nations," he said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb He cited issues of global warming, poverty, the stalled Middle East peace process, in which Britain’s initiative has been blocked by Israel, and the status of the United Nations itself as areas where the US must show that "the desire to work with others" is in its own interest too.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tQuelles remarques tirer de ce discours et des commentaires qu’il suscite ? Trois, principalement :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Effectivement, Blair commence \u00e0 ressentir l’opposition tr\u00e8s forte, particuli\u00e8rement au Royaume-Uni, non seulement \u00e0 la guerre irakienne mais encore \u00e0 la politique am\u00e9ricaine en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral. Blair y est totalement identifi\u00e9, cela commence \u00e0 le g\u00eaner.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Il semble de plus en plus assur\u00e9 que cette \u00e9volution du premier ministre correspond aux pressions grandissantes, et particuli\u00e8rement inqui\u00e9tantes pour lui, \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur de sa bureaucratie gouvernementale, et notamment de la bureaucratie du Foreign Office<\/a>, pressions mises en \u00e9vidence par un article de Richard Norton-Taylor<\/a>. Ces probl\u00e8mes int\u00e9rieurs sont confirm\u00e9s par des divergences qui commencent \u00e0 \u00eatre voyantes entre le Foreign Office (Straw) et le MoD (Hoon). (\u00ab …the government is losing some of its previously united nerve for early military action against Saddam Hussein. This week alone, the foreign secretary, Jack Straw, has said the odds against war are lengthening, has insisted (not entirely in accordance with the published facts) that Britain has always wanted a second United Nations resolution on Iraq and, in a written statement yesterday, has now held out the prospect of UN weapons inspectors going back into Iraq on a long-term basis. <\/em>[…] Certainly the cabinet is not speaking with one voice any longer, a point that was underlined by Mr Hoon’s reluctance last night to back Mr Straw’s judgment that war is now less likely that before.<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• La troisi\u00e8me remarque est \u00e0 notre sens la plus importante, qui porte sur la substance et ouvre des horizons nouveaux sur le comportement britannique. M\u00eame si la critique oblique de Blair est parcellaire (il met en cause la m\u00e9thode de la politique US, pas son fondement), elle repr\u00e9sente pourtant une modification fondamentale : pour la premi\u00e8re fois, l’objet du d\u00e9bat et, par cons\u00e9quent, de la critique, n’est plus la question du terrorisme, l’Irak, les \u00c9tats-voyou, etc, mais la politique am\u00e9ricaine elle-m\u00eame. C’est-\u00e0-dire que Blair a, pour la premi\u00e8re fois, accept\u00e9 de changer de crise : nous passons de la crise du terrorisme \u00e0 la crise am\u00e9ricaine, ou crise occidentale, avec les questions \u00e0 propos de la politique am\u00e9ricaine, des rapports de l’Am\u00e9rique avec le reste du monde et ainsi de suite, et des mises en cause implicites. C’est cela, la bombe \u00e0 retardement. Nous tenons par cons\u00e9quent \u00e0 ce jugement d\u00e9j\u00e0 propos\u00e9 : la politique blairiste est si compl\u00e8tement align\u00e9e sur les USA, elle impose une telle tension sur les directions et les \u00e9lites britanniques, qu’\u00e0 la moindre anicroche, au moindre recul du PM, on pourrait se trouver aussit\u00f4t et radicalement plong\u00e9 dans le d\u00e9bat fondamental de la politique US et des liens des Britanniques avec les USA.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Bombe \u00e0 retardement 8 janvier 2003 Pour compl\u00e9ter l’autre F&C de ce m\u00eame jour consacr\u00e9 aux affaires britanniques, un autre aspect du discours de Tony Blair devant ses ambassadeurs, le 7 janvier, est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 comme tr\u00e8s important. C’est un discours qui est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 (par le Guardian, toujours) comme \u00ab a reality check over Iraq \u00bb,… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[705,2863,3198,3776,3774,3775],"class_list":["post-65417","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-blair","tag-foreign","tag-gw","tag-hoon","tag-office","tag-straw"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65417","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65417"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65417\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65417"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65417"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65417"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}