{"id":65423,"date":"2003-01-12T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-01-12T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/01\/12\/quelques-details-de-plus-sur-la-premiere-bombe-atomique-par-sir-joseph-rotblat-ancien-du-manhattan-project\/"},"modified":"2003-01-12T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-01-12T00:00:00","slug":"quelques-details-de-plus-sur-la-premiere-bombe-atomique-par-sir-joseph-rotblat-ancien-du-manhattan-project","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/01\/12\/quelques-details-de-plus-sur-la-premiere-bombe-atomique-par-sir-joseph-rotblat-ancien-du-manhattan-project\/","title":{"rendered":"Quelques d\u00e9tails de plus sur la premi\u00e8re bombe atomique, \u2014 par Sir Joseph Rotblat, ancien du Manhattan Project<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Quelques d\u00e9tails de plus sur la premi\u00e8re bombe atomique, par Sir Joseph Rotblat, ancien du Manhattan Project<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn a vu par ailleurs<\/a> quelques mots sur la conf\u00e9rence the Guardian<\/em>\/RUSI tenue \u00e0 Londres le 8 janvier, sur les questions nucl\u00e9aires post-9\/11. L’un des intervenants \u00e9tait le professeur Sir Joseph Rotblat, un physicien nucl\u00e9aire, Prix Nobel de la paix 1995, Britannique d’origine polonaise. Outre ses appr\u00e9ciations sur la situation nucl\u00e9aire actuelle, Rotblat a tenu \u00e7\u00e0 mettre la question nucl\u00e9aire dans son contexte originel et a donn\u00e9 quelques pr\u00e9cisions sur la naissance de l’arme atomique\/nucl\u00e9aire. Rotblat est orf\u00e8vre d’exp\u00e9rience en la mati\u00e8re puisqu’il fut partie de l’\u00e9quipe internationale du Manhattan Project<\/em> qui, aux USA, fabriqua la premi\u00e8re BA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCi-dessous, on trouve les extraits de son intervention qui concerne cette situation historique originelle de l’arme atomique nucl\u00e9aire, avec cette pr\u00e9cision capitale, que nous ne connaissions pas bien qu’elle ait \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9j\u00e0 rendue publique par Rotblat,; mais, nous semble-t-il, fort peu diffus\u00e9e : le 4 mars 1944, \u00ab … General Leslie Groves, the overall boss of the Manhattan Project, said in a private conversation: You realise, of course, that the main purpose of the project is to subdue the Russians.<\/em> \u00bb Rotblat rapporte encore qu’il fit une premi\u00e8re fois cette r\u00e9v\u00e9lation, dans les ann\u00e9es 1980, dans un s\u00e9minaire o\u00f9 George Bush-p\u00e8re, alors vice-pr\u00e9sident, parlait ; Rotblat fut violemment contredit par un conf\u00e9rencier qui n’\u00e9tait autre, le monde est petit, que Richard Perle ; Rotblat put ais\u00e9ment prouver ce qu’il avan\u00e7ait.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette pr\u00e9cision est absolument capitale, quand on a \u00e0 l’esprit la date o\u00f9 l’incident se d\u00e9roule (4 mars 1944). Comme le remarque Rotblat, \u00ab long before the bomb was made, and a time when the main burden of fighting the Germans was borne by our then allies, the Russian army.<\/em> \u00bb L’interpr\u00e9tation de Rotblat est compl\u00e8tement justifi\u00e9 : ce n’est pas avant le 6 juin 1944 que les Am\u00e9ricains jou\u00e8rent un r\u00f4le significatif dans la guerre contre l’Allemagne et leur attitude ne peut alors aucunement se justifier par quelque appr\u00e9ciation que ce soit d’une responsabilit\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique fondamentale. A ce moment, la strat\u00e9gie de la guerre contre l’Allemagne est principalement de la responsabilit\u00e9 des Sovi\u00e9tiques et des Britanniques.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t On comprend les protestations de Perle : la r\u00e9v\u00e9lation de Rotblat est g\u00eanante. Elle implique que les Am\u00e9ricains, ou disons certains dans la bureaucratrie US, avaient d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 comme but strat\u00e9gique la soumission de l’URSS bien avant que les avatars des relations est-ouest aient mis en \u00e9vidence l’\u00e9tat de confrontation et, du point de vue occidental, les vis\u00e9es agressives de l’URSS, c’est-\u00e0-dire, bien avant que les \u00e9v\u00e9nements disons objectifs justifiassent compl\u00e8tement l’hostilit\u00e9 des Am\u00e9ricains \u00e0 l’encontre des Sovi\u00e9tiques. Cela signifie encore que l’interpr\u00e9tation d\u00e9fensive conformiste am\u00e9ricaine sur les origines de la guerre froide (r\u00e9action de d\u00e9fense du monde libre) a beaucoup de mal \u00e0 \u00eatre ent\u00e9rin\u00e9e au regard de telles pr\u00e9cisions.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous proposons quelques remarques et pr\u00e9cisions :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• La pr\u00e9cision de Rotblat renforce l’un des arguments r\u00e9visionnistes de l’explication de la d\u00e9cision d’emploi de la bombe (utiliser la bombe pour impressionner les Russes et les engager \u00e0 accepter un leadership<\/em> US contraignant). Mais, bien entendu, elle n’annule pas les autres causes avanc\u00e9es pour l’utilisation de la Bombe, cette utilisant pouvant et devant \u00eatre le produit de plusieurs causes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Cette m\u00eame pr\u00e9cision, par contre, selon la chronologie que nous indique Rotblat, montre qu’il existait des forces importantes aux \u00c9tats-Unis qui avaient d\u00e9cid\u00e9 d’aller dans le sens de l’\u00e9tablissement d’une sup\u00e9riorit\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique am\u00e9ricaine sur le reste du monde, le principal obstacle \u00e9tant alors (en mars 1944) l’URSS, l’Allemagne et le Japon \u00e9tant d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 sur la voie de la d\u00e9faite. Groves \u00e9tait un personnage important et il repr\u00e9sentait sans aucun doute des milieux militaires et industriels, soutenus par certaines forces politiques, notamment r\u00e9publicaines. (L’administration Roosevelt, elle, se trouvait \u00e0 cette \u00e9poque engag\u00e9e dans une politique internationaliste et accordait toute sa confiance \u00e0 l’URSS, \u00e9videmment de fa\u00e7on exag\u00e9r\u00e9e et imprudente. On voit par cons\u00e9quent que Roosevelt \u00e9tait loin de contr\u00f4ler toutes les forces nationales, y compris au sein de son administration.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Une pr\u00e9cision qui n’est pas indiff\u00e9rente, donn\u00e9e il y a quelques ann\u00e9es, dans un documentaire t\u00e9l\u00e9vis\u00e9e, par un ancien officier de marine qui avait \u00e9t\u00e9 l’aide de camp de Truman. Selon ce t\u00e9moin, Truman avait pris la d\u00e9cision d’emploi de la Bombe \u00e9galement parce qu’il tenait comme in\u00e9vitable dans le cas contraire une proc\u00e9dure d’impeachment<\/em> du Congr\u00e8s. S’il n’avait pas employ\u00e9 la Bombe, le Congr\u00e8s aurait pu le mettre en accusation pour avoir gaspill\u00e9 l’argent du tr\u00e9sor public ($1 milliard d’alors) \u00e0 fabriquer une arme qui n’aurait finalement pas \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9e. Cette th\u00e8se est \u00e9galement convaincante : l’\u00e9normit\u00e9 prise \u00e0 Washington par les questions politiciennes internes explique qu’une telle d\u00e9cision, concernant le sort m\u00eame de l’esp\u00e8ce, soit effectivement prise, en partie, pour \u00e9viter une proc\u00e9dure du Congr\u00e8s. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Extrait de l’intervention de Sir Joseph Rotblat<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

\t(…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tI was involved in the earliest one might say prehistoric stage, and I have been able to see it developing. Some of you may have heard my tale before, but I see young people in the audience and, for this story, young is anybody under 60 and for their sake I will recall it briefly. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tFor the scientists in the UK who started the work on the atom bomb, the rationale was to deter Hitler from using his bomb against us, and thus winning the war. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tI developed the concept of nuclear deterrence even before the start of the second world war, and I was probably the first to carry out research on the feasibility of the bomb, with James Chadwick in Liverpool in November 1939, two months after the start of the war. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIt was not until much later that I realised the fallacy of the nuclear deterrence concept, but at that time I thought that only by possessing the bomb could we prevent a Nazi victory. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tI did not contemplate, and never condoned, the actual use of the bomb. This was the basis for my work in the UK and later on the Manhattan Project in the US. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWith this background, you can imagine my shock when General Leslie Groves, the overall boss of the Manhattan Project, said in a private conversation: \u00a0\u00bbYou realise, of course, that the main purpose of the project is to subdue the Russians.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe date is important March 4 1944, long before the bomb was made, and a time when the main burden of fighting the Germans was borne by our then allies, the Russian army. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tYears later, when I told this story at a conference in Geneva, at which George Bush senior – then a candidate for the presidency – was one of the speakers, Richard Perle, sitting on the platform, angrily denied it. Fortunately, I was able to prove its veracity. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn 1954, during the Oppenheimer hearings, General Groves made the following statement, and this is published: \u00a0\u00bbThere was never, from about two weeks from the time I took charge of this project, any illusion on my part but that Russia was our enemy and that the project was conducted on that basis.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSeveral versions are circulated in the literature of President Truman’s decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They are probably all true, to a lesser or greater decree.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe saving of American lives was undoubtedly a strong consideration. But so was the need to demonstrate to the Russians the newly-acquired and overwhelming military might of the US. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tJames Byrnes, the then secretary of state, said: \u00a0\u00bbOur possessing and demonstrating the bomb would make Russia more manageable. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbFrom the start, it was the intention of the hawks that the United States should maintain the monopoly, or at least predominance, in nuclear weapons and, in line with this, prevent unfriendly nations from acquiring them.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe aforementioned General Groves outlined this policy in October 1945, saying: \u00a0\u00bbIf we were truly realistic instead of idealistic, as we appear to be, we would not permit any foreign power with which we are not firmly allied, and in which we do not have absolute confidence, to make or possess nuclear weapons. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbIf such a country started to make atomic weapons, we would destroy its capacity to make them before it has progressed far enough to threaten us.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIt took nearly 60 years for these ravings of a bellicose general to become official US policy. In between, the combined endeavours of hawks and the military-industrial complex kept the US as the frontrunner in the nuclear arms race. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Quelques d\u00e9tails de plus sur la premi\u00e8re bombe atomique, par Sir Joseph Rotblat, ancien du Manhattan Project On a vu par ailleurs quelques mots sur la conf\u00e9rence the Guardian\/RUSI tenue \u00e0 Londres le 8 janvier, sur les questions nucl\u00e9aires post-9\/11. L’un des intervenants \u00e9tait le professeur Sir Joseph Rotblat, un physicien nucl\u00e9aire, Prix Nobel de… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8],"tags":[3782,3184,3786,3785,3783,3213,3784,3611],"class_list":["post-65423","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-notre-bibliotheque","tag-ba","tag-fdr","tag-groves","tag-hiroshiuma","tag-manhattan","tag-perle","tag-project","tag-truman"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65423","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65423"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65423\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65423"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65423"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65423"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}