{"id":65435,"date":"2003-01-22T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-01-22T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/01\/22\/demandez-le-programme\/"},"modified":"2003-01-22T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-01-22T00:00:00","slug":"demandez-le-programme","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/01\/22\/demandez-le-programme\/","title":{"rendered":"Demandez le programme<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Demandez le programme<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t22 janvier 2003 On commence \u00e0 avoir des pr\u00e9cisions sur les projets am\u00e9ricains pour le post-Saddam. Il ne s’agit pas de positions officielles, qui viendront apr\u00e8s-coup, si la chose se r\u00e9alise, si l’administration a elle-m\u00eame bien compris ce qu’elle a fait. Il s’agit de supputations et, si possible, de supputations de la part de l’opposition. Mais l’esprit y est, indubitable.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(On dirait qu’elle seule, l’opposition, peut appr\u00e9cier, en l’interpr\u00e9tant selon sa perception on le verra, les actes de l’administration. Les id\u00e9ologues en son sein, les neo-conservatives<\/em> pour les identifier pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, reconnaissent implicitement l’incapacit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me \u00e0 expliquer sa politique dans un r\u00e9cent document [de l’American Enterprise Institute (AEI), repaire des Perle, Wolfowitz et compagnie]. William Pfaff r\u00e9sume assez bien le propos dans une r\u00e9cente chronique<\/a>, de cette fa\u00e7on : \u00ab A policy paper issued by the influential American Enterprise Institute recently compared President George W. Bush’s opportunity in going to war with Iraq with Abraham Lincoln’s opportunity in the Civil War. What began for Lincoln as a simple military intervention to restore the Union became, the paper argued, a great undertaking to emancipate slaves and guarantee their liberty as freedmen. It concluded that Bush must today do the same thing: liberate the Iraqis and (paraphrasing what Bush has already promised) stabilize and democratize the greater Islamic world.<\/em> \u00bb On comprend bien de quoi il s’agit, comme dans le cas de Lincoln puisque l’AEI adopt\u00e9 la version contestatrice de l’histoire officielle : le but grandiose de la guerre, la Grande Cause, est n\u00e9e de la guerre elle-m\u00eame. On comprend alors que cette incompr\u00e9hension de l’administration \u00e0 d\u00e9finir sa politique, ou sa strat\u00e9gie, vient du fait qu’elle ignore elle-m\u00eame ce qu’est sa politique, ce qu’est sa strat\u00e9gie. Le poids du syst\u00e8me et de la puissance fait l’affaire, en entra\u00eenant le reste, bient\u00f4t en imposant les buts de guerre, puis la Grande Cause.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDans un article tr\u00e8s r\u00e9cent (17 janvier)<\/a>, John Tirman, program director au Social Science Research Council de Washington, explique ce qu’il per\u00e7oit des buts de guerre US en Irak, de la Grande Cause de cette guerre. Il s’appuie sur une autre r\u00e9f\u00e9rence \u00e0 laquelle on vient plus loin. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Of course, there are other reasons to talk our way out of the Korean mess and keep the tank engines warm for the run to Baghdad. Muslims may wonder at the double standard. Perry Anderson, writing in New Left Review, explains that the Middle East is \u00a0\u00bba region in which unlike Europe, Russia, China, Japan, or Latin America there are virtually no regimes with a credible base to offer effective transmission points for American cultural or economy hegemony.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Establishing a platform for American-led globalization in the center of the oil-producing world is a rather inviting project. It explains the White House rhetoric about establishing a \u00a0\u00bbmodel\u00a0\u00bb for Arab democracy in a post-Saddam Iraq. (No such new model is required for East Asia.) So, rightly, Bush says it’s not \u00a0\u00bbabout\u00a0\u00bb oil or finishing the job for Daddy Bush. It’s about finishing the job for Coke and Calvin Klein and MTV and Disneyland in the desert.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb This is the imperium that American elites deny, but is well understood everywhere else. That it will be a very tricky feat in a country that is 55 percent Shi’ite and teeming with blood feuds is putting it mildly. If the project fails, either because of military setbacks or post-Saddam chaos, then the American brand will be tarnished forever. Recruits for al Qaeda and other dissident movements, whether violent or merely bumptious, will surely rise in the coming decade, and many will even contend for political power in Muslim countries, regardless of the outcome in Iraq. How serious such challenges will be is very difficult to predict, because they will become increasingly isolated, American hegemony or not.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tEffectivement, John Tirman cite Perry Anderson, de New Left Review<\/em>. Il s’agit de la gauche am\u00e9ricaine marxiste, ou devrait-on dire plut\u00f4t n\u00e9o-marxiste ; un marxisme actualis\u00e9, modernis\u00e9, mais un marxisme qui reste tr\u00e8s am\u00e9ricain et dont le principal travail est d’offrir une critique scientifique du r\u00e9gime capitaliste US tournant \u00e0 plein pot. Voici un extrait de cet article de Anderson paru dans New Lefet Review,<\/a> qui concerne effectivement les grands buts de la guerre contre l’Irak, la fameuse Grande Cause.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab A third reason for seizing Baghdad is more directly political, rather than ideological or military. Here the risk is significantly greater. The Republican administration is as well aware as anyone on the Left that September 11 was not simply an act of unmotivated evil, but a response to the widely disliked role of the United States in the Middle East. This is a region in whichunlike Europe, Russia, China, Japan or Latin Americathere are virtually no regimes with a credible base to offer effective transmission points for American cultural or economic hegemony. The assorted Arab states are docile enough, but they lack any kind of popular support, resting on family networks and secret police which typically compensate for their factual servility to the US with a good deal of media hostility, not to speak of closure, towards America. Uniquely, indeed, Washington’s oldest dependency and most valuable client in the region, Saudi Arabia, is more barricaded against US cultural penetration than any country in the world after North Korea.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In practice, while thoroughly subject to the grip of American hard’ power (funds and arms), most of the Arab world thus forms a kind of exclusion zone for the normal operations of American soft power’, allowing all kinds of aberrant forces and sentiments to brew under the apparently tight lid of the local security services, as the origins of the assailants of 9.11 demonstrated. Viewed in this light, Al-Qaeda could be seen as a warning of the dangers of relying on too external and indirect a system of control in the Middle East, an area which also contains the bulk of the world’s oil reserves and so cannot be left to its own devices as an irrelevant marchland in the way that most of Sub-Saharan Africa can. On the other hand, any attempt to alter the struts of US command over the region by tampering with the existing regimes could easily lead to regime backlashes of the Madame Nhu type, which did the US no good in South-East Asia. Taking over Iraq, by contrast, would give Washington a large oil-rich platform in the centre of the Arab world, on which to build an enlarged version of Afghan-style democracy, designed to change the whole political landscape of the Middle East.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Of course, as many otherwise well-disposed commentators have hastened to point out, rebuilding Iraq might prove a taxing and hazardous business. But American resources are large, and Washington can hope for a Nicaraguan effect after a decade of mortality and despair under UN siegecounting on the end of sanctions and full resumption of oil exports, under a US occupation, to improve the living conditions of the majority of the Iraqi population so dramatically as to create the potential for a stable American protectorate, of the kind that already more or less exists in the Kurdish sector of the country. Unlike the Sandinista government, the Ba’ath regime is a pitiless dictatorship with few or no popular roots. The Bush administration could reckon that the chances of a Nicaraguan outcome, in which an exhausted population trades independence for material relief, are likely to be higher in Baghdad than they were in Managua.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In turn, the demonstration effect of a role-model parliamentary regime, under benevolent international tutelageperhaps another Loya Jirga of the ethnic mosaic in the countrywould be counted on to convince Arab elites of the need to modernize their ways, and Arab masses of the invincibility of America. In the Muslim world at large, Washington has already pocketed the connivance of the Iranian clerics (conservative and reformist) for a repeat of Enduring Freedom in Mesopotamia. In these conditions, so the strategic calculus goes, bandwagoning of the kind that originally brought the PLO to heel at Oslo after the Gulf War would once again become irresistible, allowing a final settlement of the Palestinian question along lines acceptable to Sharon.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Un programme de l’administration qui prend en compte toutes les erreurs d\u00e9j\u00e0 faites pour les reproduire identiquement (aussi pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment que possible), une critique qui ignore toutes les r\u00e9alit\u00e9s de ces erreurs sur lesquelles s’appuie le programme<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tCes supputations de la gauche radicale (marxiste dans ce cas) rencontrent en fait des r\u00e9alit\u00e9s de planification d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 admises, tant au niveau de l’administration que de la communaut\u00e9 des experts en strat\u00e9gie (think tanks notamment). C’est un secret de polichinelle, effectivement, que de formidables perspectives d’apr\u00e8s-guerre ont \u00e9t\u00e9 b\u00e2ties \u00e0 partir de l’\u00e9v\u00e9nement de la victoire sur l’Irak, \u00e9v\u00e9nement d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme acquis. Les d\u00e9tails de cette organisation sont \u00e9galement connues, avec une p\u00e9n\u00e9tration essentielle du march\u00e9 p\u00e9trolier irakien, un protectorat \u00e0 la fois militaire, politique et \u00e9conomique, qui implique \u00e9videmment l’introduction des pratiques \u00e9conomiques am\u00e9ricaines (march\u00e9 libre, ouverture des fronti\u00e8res, etc).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl s’agit sans aucun doute, comme l’envisagent les auteurs cit\u00e9s, de l’installation d’un centre de globalisation \u00e9conomique au coeur du Moyen-Orient. L’aspect th\u00e9orique du projet ne peut surprendre. Ce qui doit arr\u00eater, c’est la psychologie qui y conduit, la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 exp\u00e9riment\u00e9e sur laquelle s’appuie le projet, par cons\u00e9quent les \u00e9volutions probables.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Des op\u00e9rations pr\u00e9c\u00e9dentes ont \u00e9galement \u00e9t\u00e9 accompagn\u00e9es de projets de r\u00e9organisation structurelles du m\u00eame type. Ce fut le cas de la guerre humanitaire du Kosovo. Dans l’ultimatum de Rambouillet propos\u00e9 \u00e0 Milosevic figurait une clause sur l’instauration du march\u00e9 libre. Finalement, l’ultimatum fut repouss\u00e9, la guerre eut lieu, se termina comme l’on sait ; le march\u00e9 libre fut install\u00e9 au Kosovo. Il l’est aussi en Afghanistan. Bien entendu, il n’y a aucune \u00e9volution qui ressemble, de pr\u00e8s ou de loin, \u00e0 une restructuration coh\u00e9rente qui ferait esp\u00e9rer que ces pays deviennent des mod\u00e8les et des locomotives du syst\u00e8me globalis\u00e9 dans la r\u00e9gion. Au contraire, le march\u00e9 libre a permis le d\u00e9veloppement sur une grande \u00e9chelle de toutes les activit\u00e9s illicites qu’on conna\u00eet, corruption, trafic divers (drogue surtout), organisation mafieuse, prostitution, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Les bases sur lesquelles les critiques du programme voient s’installer celui-ci semblent sonner d’une mani\u00e8re grandiose, et l’appr\u00e9ciation complexe et tr\u00e8s sophistiqu\u00e9e de Anderson accentue encore cette appr\u00e9ciation, m\u00eame au travers de la critique. L\u00e0 aussi et malgr\u00e9 l’aspect critique, tout cela c\u00e8de compl\u00e8tement \u00e0 l’irr\u00e9alit\u00e9 compl\u00e8te des appr\u00e9ciations am\u00e9ricaines (dans ce cas, aussi bien celles du syst\u00e8me que celles des critiques du syst\u00e8me : le marxiste am\u00e9ricain Anderson est, largement, d’abord am\u00e9ricain avant d’\u00eatre marxiste).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• En effet, l’exp\u00e9dition sur Bagdad est justifi\u00e9, indirectement mais tr\u00e8s substantiellement et tr\u00e8s intellectuellement, par la recherche d’un centre o\u00f9 \u00e9tablir un r\u00e9gime solide, et \u00e0 partir duquel seront \u00e9tablis des r\u00e9gimes solides, \u00e0 la solde des USA ou sous l’influence des USA, pour faire basculer la ( ?) derni\u00e8re r\u00e9gion du monde r\u00e9tive \u00e0 la globalisation US. (R\u00e9nover une r\u00e9gion o\u00f9 \u00ab there are virtually no regimes with a credible base to offer effective transmission points for American cultural or economic hegemony<\/em> \u00bb, et, pour cela, aller, par exemple, vers une sorte de \u00ab Afghan-style democracy<\/em> \u00bb, ou \u00ab a role-model parliamentary regime, under benevolent international tutelage<\/em> \u00bb. Anderson s’est-il int\u00e9ress\u00e9 \u00e0 la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 de cette \u00ab Afghan-style democracy<\/em> \u00bb, effectivement pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e comme mod\u00e8le pour un n\u00e9o-Irak dans les milieux d’affaires US ? A-t-il observ\u00e9 ce que deviennent ces \u00ab role-model parliamentary regime<\/em> \u00bb ? Apr\u00e8s tout, la Cor\u00e9e du Sud n’est rien d’autre que l’exemple impeccable d’un \u00ab role-model parliamentary regime<\/em> \u00bb sous influence US, qui a r\u00e9ussi. Elle est aujourd’hui un centre de l’anti-am\u00e9ricanisme.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Les Am\u00e9ricains semblent pr\u00eats \u00e0 vouloir tenter, avec l’Irak, ce qu’ils ont d\u00e9j\u00e0 tent\u00e9, par exemple avec l’Iran du Shah, dont on sait que c’est justement la pouss\u00e9e par ailleurs estim\u00e9e n\u00e9cessaire de modernisation qui a conduit \u00e0 la r\u00e9volution de 1979, face \u00e0 laquelle les Am\u00e9ricains se sont montr\u00e9s totalement aveugles. Et cette tentative irakienne sera \u00e9videmment suivie par d’autres, tr\u00e8s rapidement, l’Arabie en premier.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• La seule certitude, c’est la d\u00e9stabilisation politique et culturelle (encore plus que militaire). Les Am\u00e9ricains n’ont toujours pas compris, et Anderson non plus, que les nouveaux r\u00e9gimes d\u00e9mocratiques qu’ils cr\u00e9ent \u00e0 la place des r\u00e9gimes archa\u00efques corrompus pour renouveler leur base d’influence (leur trouver \u00ab a credible base<\/em> \u00bb) sont, automatiquement, compl\u00e8tement corrompus par n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 dans le fait m\u00eame de leur formation (et, surtout, psychologiquement corrompus) ; ils sont donc n\u00e9cessairement incapables de r\u00e9unir une \u00ab credible base<\/em> \u00bb, m\u00eame si l’apparence d\u00e9mocratique satisfait l’oeil pour un temps. Ils ne peuvent acqu\u00e9rir une \u00ab credible base<\/em> \u00bb qu’en se d\u00e9tachant de l’Am\u00e9rique et ne peuvent se d\u00e9tacher de l’Am\u00e9rique qu’en se cr\u00e9ant une \u00ab credible base<\/em> \u00bb. (Cas \u00e9ventuellement en train de se faire de la Turquie et de la Cor\u00e9e du Sud.)<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Demandez le programme 22 janvier 2003 On commence \u00e0 avoir des pr\u00e9cisions sur les projets am\u00e9ricains pour le post-Saddam. Il ne s’agit pas de positions officielles, qui viendront apr\u00e8s-coup, si la chose se r\u00e9alise, si l’administration a elle-m\u00eame bien compris ce qu’elle a fait. Il s’agit de supputations et, si possible, de supputations de la… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[2632,857,2804],"class_list":["post-65435","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-globalisation","tag-irak","tag-usa"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65435","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65435"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65435\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65435"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65435"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65435"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}