{"id":65439,"date":"2003-01-24T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-01-24T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/01\/24\/collapsus-annonce\/"},"modified":"2003-01-24T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-01-24T00:00:00","slug":"collapsus-annonce","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/01\/24\/collapsus-annonce\/","title":{"rendered":"Collapsus annonc\u00e9<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Collapsus annonc\u00e9<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t24 janvier 2003 Un des d\u00e9bats qui accompagne la crise irakienne est celui du sort de l’\u00e9conomie mondiale si cette crise aboutit \u00e0 la guerre. Des th\u00e8ses radicalement diff\u00e9rentes s’affrontent.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCi-dessous, le groupe Power and Interest News Report (PINR)<\/a> propose une analyse de cette prospective \u00e9conomique. L’analyse est pessimiste puisque le pronostic est bien qu’une tr\u00e8s forte crise \u00e9con,omique mondiale est possible, sinon probable.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Invasion of Iraq may collapse global economy<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tPINR, January 22, 2003 In the next few weeks, the struggling global economy may be put to the test if Washington chooses to invade Iraq. There are many risks involved in bombing Baghdad, the most important being a spike in oil prices. With oil prices already over $30.00 a barrel, increased pressure has been put on the global economy as more money is spent on importing oil. Should the United States attack Iraq, there is a real possibility that Middle East oil shipments will be disrupted. U.S. oil inventories are already running low due to the nearly two-month long PDVSA oil strike in Venezuela. While it takes only one week for Venezuelan oil exports to reach the United States, it takes four to five weeks for them to arrive from the Middle East.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDuring an American attack on Iraq, an errant bomb could destroy or <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tinterfere with oil operations, halting Iraq’s 1-2 million barrels per <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tday (bpd) in exports. Compounding the American threat, Iraqi leader <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSaddam Hussein could opt to damage his own oilfields, by ordering <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\ttroops to light them on fire, as was done to Kuwait in 1991.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn order to prevent a spike in oil prices, any reduction in Iraqi oil <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\texports will need to be compensated by an increase in oil exports from <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOPEC nations and non-OPEC nations alike. However, most OPEC nations are already producing at capacity, such as Indonesia and Qatar; the biggest oil producers outside of OPEC Russia, Norway and Mexico cannot increase their output since their pumps are already running at full capacity. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThis likely scenario has worried economists; it could result in oil <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tprices as high as $40.00 a barrel, possibly causing extensive damage <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tto the global economy. However, the Bush administration believes that the end result of the invasion will be economic growth rather than <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\teconomic recession. The fate of the economy will rest on how fast the <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUnited States can get oil flowing again after the war; once oil <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tproduction has stabilized again, the United States will likely be able <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tto increase capacity by updating Iraq’s oil infrastructure. While <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tbefore the Gulf War Iraq was exporting 3.5 million barrels per day, it <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tis predicted that Iraq may be able to increase production up to 5 <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tmillion bpd with U.S. assistance. Larry Lindsey, former top economic <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tadviser to President Bush, supported this prediction in a statement <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tlast fall: "When there is regime change in Iraq, you could add three <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tmillion to five million barrels [per day] of production to world <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tsupply. The successful prosecution of the war would be good for the <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\teconomy." Indeed, this scenario would provide a boon to the global <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\teconomy by increasing oil supply, dropping prices down to $15 to $20 a barrel.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBut successful "regime change" might not be as easy as it seems. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIraq’s oil infrastructure is already in bad shape and the prediction <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tis that it will take 5 to 10 years for Iraqi oil output to reach such <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tlevels, if at all; in addition, there is no guarantee that the new <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIraqi government will be willing to export such an inflated amount of <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\toil. However, any new administration will most likely be installed <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tand protected by U.S. troops, thus reducing the government’s actual <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tindependence from Washington.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe other most dangerous scenario is whether an invasion by Washington will heighten tensions in the Middle East in such a way that militant groups will attack oil interests when the U.S. and global economy are most vulnerable. Indeed, if militants inside Saudi Arabia attempted to sabotage major oil facilities within the country, limiting exports, oil prices would skyrocket since other nations would not be able to supplement the amount of oil Saudi Arabia exports.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThis would possibly send oil prices to over $50 a barrel, or cause <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tprices to become static at $40.00 a barrel for many months. Indeed, <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGary Hufbauer, of the Institute for International Economics, stated in <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tthe Baltimore Sun last October that a sustained rise in oil prices at <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\ta level of $45 or $50 a barrel could "turn [the economies of] the <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUnited States and Japan into a recession."<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tShould the two largest global economies — the United States and <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tJapan — enter a recession, or even suffer further economic setback <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tdue to increased oil prices, it would greatly add to the misery of <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tother suffering states and impact emerging market economies.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSouth American states, for instance, have had difficulty accessing <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tglobal capital markets due to the economic uncertainty in Brazil — <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\twhich has been flirting with economic disaster — and the recent <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\teconomic meltdown of Argentina. Paraguay and Uruguay too have been hit by their neighbors’ economic troubles, with the former suffering from low tax revenues and a stagnant economy. If the global economy were to deteriorate, it could create a scenario where Argentina would have to default on its debts to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). If Argentina were to default, and other countries soon followed, it would compromise the Fund’s own financial position and economic assistance to needy economies would falter, further spiraling the world economy toward a grave future.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAlong with South America, Asia will also be pushed into economic <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tdisaster should oil prices spike for a prolonged period. In addition <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tto putting Japan into recession, South Korea, fraught with its own <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\teconomic woes due to a rapid increase in real estate prices and <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tunemployment, is also vulnerable. Seoul cannot rely on domestic <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tspending to stimulate its economy due to ballooning household debt, a <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tsituation that increased oil prices would only exacerbate.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSingapore, too, is walking on the edge of economic demise. Narrowly <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tmissing a double-dip recession this last year, weak demand for the <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tcity-state’s key electronics exports and manufactured goods led to <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tfurther job losses, ballooning its unemployment level to a 15-year <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\thigh.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tTherefore, these concerns will be carefully weighed by the Bush <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tadministration as they consider whether or not to invade Iraq. With <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tthe global economy in such a precarious position, Washington will be <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\thedging its bets; a war will either provide great economic gains, or <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tcolossal economic ruin.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tglobe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tinvolved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. PINR seeks to <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tinform rather than persuade.]<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Collapsus annonc\u00e9 24 janvier 2003 Un des d\u00e9bats qui accompagne la crise irakienne est celui du sort de l’\u00e9conomie mondiale si cette crise aboutit \u00e0 la guerre. Des th\u00e8ses radicalement diff\u00e9rentes s’affrontent. Ci-dessous, le groupe Power and Interest News Report (PINR) propose une analyse de cette prospective \u00e9conomique. L’analyse est pessimiste puisque le pronostic est… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3228,857],"class_list":["post-65439","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-crise","tag-irak"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65439","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65439"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65439\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65439"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65439"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65439"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}