{"id":65457,"date":"2003-02-05T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-02-05T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/02\/05\/preuves-etc\/"},"modified":"2003-02-05T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-02-05T00:00:00","slug":"preuves-etc","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/02\/05\/preuves-etc\/","title":{"rendered":"Preuves, etc<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Preuves, etc <\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t5 f\u00e9vrier 2003 Colin Powell pr\u00e9sente ses preuves, ou bien ses preuves c’est selon, aujourd’hui, ce soir pour nous. Il y a un \u00e9trange aspect dramatique, th\u00e9\u00e2tral, dans cette pr\u00e9sentation annonc\u00e9e, comment\u00e9e, pes\u00e9e, \u00e9tiquet\u00e9e, etc, avant m\u00eame d’avoir eu lieu ; et, d’autre part, un aspect manufacturier, lorsqu’on apprend (JT de la deuxi\u00e8me cha\u00eene fran\u00e7aise de t\u00e9l\u00e9vision, le 4 f\u00e9vrier \u00e0 20H00) qu’on d\u00e9battait encore hier \u00e0 la Maison-Blanche pour savoir quelles preuves seraient les bonnes, comment il faudrait les pr\u00e9senter, quel aspect leur donner, etc., bref, quelles preuves choisir pour quel effet obtenir, comme s’il s’agit, finalement, de fabriquer cette chose qu’on appelle preuve selon les circonstances. Tout cela, reflet \u00e9vident du temps historique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEn attendant Colin Powell, nous pr\u00e9sentons quelques remarques in\u00e9dites et\/ou rappels de d\u00e9clarations, et une analyse du groupe FAIR. De fa\u00e7on sch\u00e9matique :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• D’une part, quelques extraits de r\u00e9centes d\u00e9clarations (GW, Powell) sur les preuves.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• D’autre part, une analyse du groupe FAIR (Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting) sur l’emploi de certains termes \u00e0 propos de l’Irak, comme celui de Weapons of Mass Destruction<\/em> (WMD).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

D\u00e9clarations r\u00e9centes sur les preuves de la culpabilit\u00e9 irakienne<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes extraits pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s ici ont \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9unis par un de nos lecteurs. Ils \u00e9taient accompagn\u00e9s du commentaire suivant, fait au lendemain du discours sur l’\u00e9tat de l’Union du 28 janvier :<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa presse internationale dans son enti\u00e8ret\u00e9 pr\u00e9sente les \u00e9v\u00e9nements, et notamment le discours sur l’\u00e9tat de l’Union, comme un engagement de Bush \u00e0 fournir des preuves en f\u00e9vrier (le 5). Il ne s’agit en fait que d’un accord pour que des donn\u00e9es soient d\u00e9classifi\u00e9es. Ces donn\u00e9es sont des informations ou des renseignements des services US. Il n’y a nulle part, que ce soit dans le discours de Bush ou dans la conf\u00e9rence de presse de Powell \u00e0 Davos (deux jours avant le discours sur l’ \u00e9tat de l’Union) le mot\/l’expression preuve, va prouver…, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn s’enferre dans l’approximation la plus invraisemblable compte tenu de l’enjeu. Il est m\u00eame \u00e9trange de voir la presse la plus engag\u00e9e aux c\u00f4t\u00e9 des faucons favorables \u00e0 une invasion de l’Irak ne pas r\u00e9aliser qu’elle cr\u00e9e une exigence de preuves pour le 5 f\u00e9vrier. Si celles-ci sont inexistantes ou insuffisantes, c’est l’ensemble de cette politique et ceux qui la promeuvent au premier rang Bush lui-m\u00eame qui verront leur cr\u00e9dibilit\u00e9 (encore) entam\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPratiquement rien dans le discours Bush sur l’\u00e9tat de l’Union. Uniquement ce passage :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab (…) Secretary of State Powell will present information and intelligence about Iraqi’s legal Iraq’s illegal weapons programs, its attempt to hide those weapons from inspectors, and its links to terrorist groups.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tPowell maintenant, dont l’intervention durant sa conf\u00e9rence de presse est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e de cette fa\u00e7on par les services officiels : \u00ab Secretary of State Colin Powell said on January 26 that the United States has a number of intelligence products on Iraqi programs to develop weapons of mass destruction, and we hope in the next week or so to make as much of this available in public as possible.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVoici les extraits concernant les preuves, de la conf\u00e9rence de presse Powell \u00e0 Davos le 26 janvier :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab QUESTION:<\/em><\/strong> (…) And when I say put it on the table\u00a0\u00bb I’m thinking of the 26 photographs Adlai Stevenson showed at the Security Council back in ’62.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb SECRETARY POWELL:<\/em><\/strong> Yeah.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb QUESTION:<\/em><\/strong> Is there any such thing? Can we expect anything like that? Or is it just conclusions and inferences?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb SECRETARY POWELL:<\/em><\/strong> I think some of them are hard conclusions. I touched on a few of them. But they really don’t satisfy the public yet because we say there’s a gap, but you can’t see the gap, and it doesn’t have the same power as if I was able to suddenly produce a building and inside the building are the missing chemicals. So I very much understand what you mean by a \u00a0\u00bbStevenson moment.\u00a0\u00bb We talk about it a lot.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb We do have a number of intelligence products that convince us that what we are saying is correct, convince us that they are doing these things, and we hope in the next week or so to make as much of this available in public as possible. Whether there will be a \u00a0\u00bbStevenson\u00a0\u00bb photo or \u00a0\u00bbStevenson\u00a0\u00bb presentation that would be as persuasive as Adlai Stevenson was in 1962, that I can’t answer.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Stevenson had a much easier task, I think. I mean, all he had to prove was that there were Russian missiles in Cuba, et voila! There were Russian missiles in Cuba. And we all remember the famous exchange when the Russian Ambassador responded, \u00a0\u00bbI am not in an American court, Mr. Stevenson.\u00a0\u00bb But the fact of the matter is he was in something worse than an American court; he was in the court of public opinion and everybody could see it. I would love to have that kind of material to present, and we are seeing what we can do, what we might find in the next couple of weeks.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb QUESTION:<\/em><\/strong> But in a sense, you were saying that, in your speech that that kind of material is, in a sense, irrelevant because what you seemed to be saying was that we know that there were weapons there, and everybody agrees on that, and it is now up to Iraq actively to demonstrate what it has done with those weapons which undeniably were there. So you’re saying that, really, he has got to produce the evidence to justify himself, which seemed a very reasonable statement when you expressed it.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb SECRETARY POWELL:<\/em><\/strong> I think it’s very reasonable, yeah.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb QUESTION:<\/em><\/strong> But do you think that is the kind of position that…<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb SECRETARY POWELL:<\/em><\/strong> I would…<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Now, what I would also love to see, love to have, but do not at the moment have, are some concrete things. You know, I’d like to have Exhibit A on the ground. Shall we say, a CNN moment? But perhaps that will…<\/em> (Powell sic) \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Iraq’s Hidden Weapons: From Allegation to Fact<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tBy FAIR (Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting), February 4, 2003<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWhile teams of U.N. experts scouring Iraq have yet to find any hidden caches of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, some U.S. journalists seem to have already turned up their own smoking guns. Whether out of excess zeal or simple carelessness, the media’s intensive coverage of the U.N. inspections has repeatedly glided from reporting the allegation that Iraq is hiding banned weapons materials to repeating it as a statement of fact.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbThe Bush administration is seeking to derail plans by the chief U.N. weapons inspector to issue another report,\u00a0\u00bb wrote the Washington Post’s Colum Lynch (1\/16\/03), \u00a0\u00bbfearing it could delay the U.S. timetable for an early confrontation over Iraq’s banned weapons programs.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbToday Mr. Bush left it to his spokesman to answer critics who asked what precise threat Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction pose to America,\u00a0\u00bb reported NBC White House correspondent David Gregory (NBC Nightly News, 1\/27\/03).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tTony Blair, wrote Time’s Michael Elliot (2\/3\/03), has declared that \u00a0\u00bbBritain’s troops will fight alongside their American counterparts if Washington judges that Saddam Hussein is not making a good-faith effort to disarm Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tClearly, however, it has not been demonstrated that Iraq continues to hold unconventional weapons, such as the chemical munitions it used in its war against Iran. (Iraq is barred from possessing or developing such weapons under the ceasefire agreement that ended the 1991 Gulf War.) On the contrary, the 1999 U.N. report that led to the establishment of UNMOVIC summarized the state of Iraq’s disarmament this way: \u00a0\u00bbAlthough important elements still have to be resolved, the bulk of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes has been eliminated.\u00a0\u00bb (The report was issued by the U.N.Security Council’s disarmament panel, whose members included senior UNSCOM officials, such as its American deputy executive director, Charles Duelfer.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tRolf Ekeus, who led UNSCOM from 1991 to 1997, agrees with that assessment: \u00a0\u00bbI would say that we felt that in all areas we have eliminated Iraq’s capabilities fundamentally,\u00a0\u00bb he told a May 2000 Harvard seminar (AP, 8\/16\/00), adding that \u00a0\u00bbthere are some question marks left.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIraq’s failure to document its answers to those remaining \u00a0\u00bbquestion marks\u00a0\u00bb formed the basis of Hans Blix’s critical January 27 progress report to the U.N.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBut while Blix said he could not certify that all of the proscribed materials Iraq once possessed had been destroyed, neither did he find evidence that any remain. In private, some inspectors do not rule out the possibility that Iraq truly is free of banned weapons: \u00a0\u00bbWe haven’t found an iota of concealed material yet,\u00a0\u00bb one unnamed UNMOVIC official told Los Angeles Times Baghdad correspondent Sergei Loiko (12\/31\/02), who added: \u00a0\u00bbThe inspector said his colleagues think it possible that Iraq really has eliminated its banned materials.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tYet some major news outlets seem to have made up their minds to thecontrary. The Bush administration, according to CBS’s John Roberts (CBS Evening News, 12\/29\/02), is \u00a0\u00bbthreatening war against Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction,\u00a0\u00bb while Dan Rather (CBS Evening News, 1\/6\/03) announced that \u00a0\u00bbthe CIA is being urged to make public more of its intelligence about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn a piece about how the United States is winning the debate at the U.N. over Iraq, the New York Times (2\/2\/03) claimed that \u00a0\u00bbnobody seriously expected Mr. Hussein to lead inspectors to his stash of illegal poisons or rockets, or to let his scientists tell all.\u00a0\u00bb On January 27, CNN host Paula Zahn teased the network’s upcoming live coverage of the inspectors’ \u00a0\u00bbhighly anticipated progress report on the search for Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThrough constant repetition of phrases like \u00a0\u00bbthe search for Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction,\u00a0\u00bb the media convey to the public the impression that the alleged banned weapons on which the Bush administration rests its case for war are known to exist and that the question is simply whether inspectors are skillful enough to find them. In fact, whether or not Iraq possesses banned weapons is very much an open question, one which no publicly available evidence can answer one way or the other. As they routinely do in other cases, journalists should make a habit of using the modifier \u00a0\u00bballeged\u00a0\u00bb when referring to Iraq’s alleged hidden weapons.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Preuves, etc 5 f\u00e9vrier 2003 Colin Powell pr\u00e9sente ses preuves, ou bien ses preuves c’est selon, aujourd’hui, ce soir pour nous. Il y a un \u00e9trange aspect dramatique, th\u00e9\u00e2tral, dans cette pr\u00e9sentation annonc\u00e9e, comment\u00e9e, pes\u00e9e, \u00e9tiquet\u00e9e, etc, avant m\u00eame d’avoir eu lieu ; et, d’autre part, un aspect manufacturier, lorsqu’on apprend (JT de la deuxi\u00e8me… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[857,3478,1391],"class_list":["post-65457","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-irak","tag-onu","tag-powell"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65457","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65457"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65457\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65457"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65457"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65457"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}