{"id":65460,"date":"2003-02-06T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-02-06T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/02\/06\/les-relations-usa-israel-un-cas-unique-et-un-cas-uniquement-strategique-par-le-professeur-stephen-zunes\/"},"modified":"2003-02-06T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-02-06T00:00:00","slug":"les-relations-usa-israel-un-cas-unique-et-un-cas-uniquement-strategique-par-le-professeur-stephen-zunes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/02\/06\/les-relations-usa-israel-un-cas-unique-et-un-cas-uniquement-strategique-par-le-professeur-stephen-zunes\/","title":{"rendered":"Les relations USA-Isra\u00ebl : un cas unique et un cas uniquement strat\u00e9gique, \u2014 par le professeur Stephen Zunes<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Les relations USA-Isra\u00ebl : un cas unique et un cas uniquement strat\u00e9gique<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tIsra\u00ebl joue un r\u00f4le central, extr\u00eamement important, dans la politique ext\u00e9rieure et diplomatico-militaire des USA. On n’avancera pas pour autant que c’est un r\u00f4le substantiel et multiple. Il existe la possibilit\u00e9 que ces relations strat\u00e9giques qualifi\u00e9es en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de vitales soient aussi des relations de dupe. Cette possibilit\u00e9 vaut essentiellement pour Isra\u00ebl, alors que c’est d’habitude l’hypoth\u00e8se inverse qui est envisag\u00e9e, autrement dit : n’est-ce pas Isra\u00ebl qui est la dupe des relations strat\u00e9giques des USA avec Isra\u00ebl, alors que l’on a coutume d’affirmer que c’est Isra\u00ebl qui manipule les USA ?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous avons d\u00e9j\u00e0 souvent d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 l’id\u00e9e qu’Isra\u00ebl est devenu une sorte d’edxpansion ext\u00e9rieure du complexe militaro-industriel (CMI) am\u00e9ricain.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Nous citons notamment une s\u00e9rie de deux articles de Ran HaCohen parus sur le site Antiwar.com le 8 mai 2001<\/a> et le 22 juin 2001<\/a>. Il nous y \u00e9tait clairement montr\u00e9 combien la vie poliotique s’est militaris\u00e9e en Isra\u00ebl, avec des Premiers ministres successifs qui sont tous des militaires. Cette militarisation implique des liens privil\u00e9gi\u00e9s avec le CMI am\u00e9ricain.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Nous pouvons \u00e9galement renvoyer nos lecteurs \u00e0 l’excellent Flight of the Lavi<\/em>, de Dov Zackheim, actuellement ontr\u00f4leur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral du Pentagone. Zackheim est un juif orthodoxe et un nrabin assez inhabituel et original, puisque d’opinion assez lib\u00e9rale quannt aux questions religieuses (il l’est moins du point de vue politique am\u00e9ricaine, il est citoyen US puisque class\u00e9 r\u00e9publicain et consrervateur). Habitu\u00e9 des nominations au Pentagone, il dirigea l’\u00e9quipe du Pentagone qui avait pour mission, en 1984-86, de liquider le programme d’avion de combat isra\u00e9lien IAI Lavi<\/em>, un concurrent du F-16. Zackheim remplit sa mission avec efficacit\u00e9, avec l’aide de Rabin contre le ministre isra\u00e9lien de la d\u00e9fense d’alors Moshe Arens. La fin du Lavi<\/em>, c’est la fin du dernier espoir d’Isra\u00ebl de conserver la ma\u00eetrise de sa souverainet\u00e9 nationale, et c’est bien ainsi que Arens plaidait la poursuite du Lavi<\/em>. Mais le DoD ne voulait pas d’un concurrent pour le F-16, en plus d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 en partie avec des fonds povenant de l’aide US. Ensuite, Isra\u00ebl devint une v\u00e9ritable succursale des USA dans la r\u00e9gion du Moyen-Orient, mais non, une succursale du CMI plus que des USA. La messe \u00e9tait dite.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tC’est avec ce contexte \u00e0 l’esprit que nous vous pr\u00e9sentons le texte ci-dessous, qui doit apporter des \u00e9l\u00e9ments et des r\u00e9flexions suppl\u00e9mentaires \u00e0 cette analyse des liens entre les USA et Isra\u00ebl au niveau militaire, notamment industriel, et sur l’\u00e9tat du CMI (Isra\u00ebl). Ce texte reprend des \u00e9l\u00e9ments essentiels d’une intervention du professeur Stephen Zunes, notamment collaborateur du think tank Foreign Policy in focus<\/a>, et professeur \u00e0 l’universit\u00e9 de San Francisco.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

U.S. Aid to Israel: Interpreting the Strategic Relationship<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBy Stephen Zunes<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbThe U.S. aid relationship with Israel is unlike any other in the world,\u00a0\u00bb said Stephen Zunes during a January 26 CPAP presentation. \u00a0\u00bbIn sheer volume, the amount is the most generous foreign aid program ever between any two countries,\u00a0\u00bb added Zunes, associate professor of Politics and chair of the Peace and Justice Studies Program at the University of San Francisco. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tHe explored the strategic reasoning behind the aid, asserting that it parallels the \u00a0\u00bbneeds of American arms exporters\u00a0\u00bb and the role \u00a0\u00bbIsrael could play in advancing U.S. strategic interests in the region.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAlthough Israel is an \u00a0\u00bbadvanced, industrialized, technologically sophisticated country,\u00a0\u00bb it \u00a0\u00bbreceives more U.S. aid per capita annually than the total annual [Gross Domestic Product] per capita of several Arab states.\u00a0\u00bb Approximately a third of the entire U.S. foreign aid budget goes to Israel, \u00a0\u00bbeven though Israel comprises just . . . one-thousandth of the world’s total population, and already has one of the world’s higher per capita incomes.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tU.S. government officials argue that this money is necessary for \u00a0\u00bbmoral\u00a0\u00bb reasons-some even say that Israel is a \u00a0\u00bbdemocracy battling for its very survival.\u00a0\u00bb If that were the real reason, however, aid should have been highest during Israel’s early years, and would have declined as Israel grew stronger. Yet \u00a0\u00bbthe pattern . . . has been just the opposite.\u00a0\u00bb According to Zunes, \u00a0\u00bb99 percent of all U.S. aid to Israel took place after the June 1967 war, when Israel found itself more powerful than any combination of Arab armies . . .\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe U.S. supports Israel’s dominance so it can serve as \u00a0\u00bba surrogate for American interests in this vital strategic region.\u00a0\u00bb \u00a0\u00bbIsrael has helped defeat radical nationalist movements\u00a0\u00bb and has been a \u00a0\u00bbtesting ground for U.S. made weaponry.\u00a0\u00bb Moreover, the intelligence agencies of both countries have \u00a0\u00bbcollaborated,\u00a0\u00bb and \u00a0\u00bbIsrael has funneled U.S. arms to third countries that the U.S. [could] not send arms to directly, . . . Iike South Africa, like the Contras, Guatemala under the military junta, [and] Iran.\u00a0\u00bb Zunes cited an Israeli analyst who said: \u00a0\u00bb’It’s like Israel has just become another federal agency when it’s convenient to use and you want something done quietly.\u00a0\u00bb’ Although the strategic relationship between the United States and the Gulf Arab states in the region has been strengthening in recent years, these states \u00a0\u00bbdo not have the political stability, the technological sophistication, [or] the number of higher-trained armed forces personnel\u00a0\u00bb as does Israel.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMatti Peled, former Israeli major general and Knesset member, told Zunes that he and most Israeli generals believe this aid is \u00a0\u00bblittle more than an American subsidy to U.S. arms manufacturers,\u00a0\u00bb considering that the majority of military aid to Israel is used to buy weapons from the U.S. Moreover, arms to Israel create more demand for weaponry in Arab states. According to Zunes, \u00a0\u00bbthe Israelis announced back in 1991 that they supported the idea of a freeze in Middle East arms transfers, yet it was the United States that rejected it.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn the fall of 1993-when many had high hopes for peace-78 senators wrote to former President Bill Clinton insisting that aid to Israel remain \u00a0\u00bbat current levels.\u00a0\u00bb Their \u00a0\u00bbonly reason\u00a0\u00bb was the \u00a0\u00bbmassive procurement of sophisticated arms by Arab states.\u00a0\u00bb The letter neglected to mention that 80 percent of those arms to Arab countries came from the U.S.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbI’m not denying for a moment the power of AIPAC [the American Israel Public Affairs Committee], the pro-Israel lobby,\u00a0\u00bb and other similar groups, Zunes said. Yet the \u00a0\u00bbAerospace Industry Association which promotes these massive arms shipments . . . is even more influential.\u00a0\u00bb This association has given two times more money to campaigns than all of the pro-Israel groups combined. Its \u00a0\u00bbforce on Capitol Hill, in terms of lobbying, surpasses that of even AIPAC.\u00a0\u00bb Zunes asserted that the \u00a0\u00bbgeneral thrust of U.S. policy would be pretty much the same even if AIPAC didn’t exist. We didn’t need a pro-Indonesia lobby to support Indonesia in its savage repression of East Timor all these years.\u00a0\u00bb This is a complex issue, and Zunes said that he did not want to be \u00a0\u00bbconspiratorial,\u00a0\u00bb but he asked the audience to imagine what \u00a0\u00bbPalestinian industriousness, Israeli technology, and Arabian oil money . . . would do to transform the Middle East. . . . [W]hat would that mean to American arms manufacturers? Oil companies? Pentagon planners?\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbAn increasing number of Israelis are pointing out\u00a0\u00bb that these funds are not in Israel’s best interest. Quoting Peled, Zunes said, \u00a0\u00bbthis aid pushes Israel ‘toward a posture of callous intransigence’ in terms of the peace process.\u00a0\u00bb Moreover, for every dollar the U.S. sends in arms aid, Israel must spend two to three dollars to train people to use the weaponry, to buy parts, and in other ways make use of the aid. Even \u00a0\u00bbmain-stream Israeli economists are saying [it] is very harmful to the country’s future.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe Israeli paper Yediot Aharonot described Israel as \u00a0\u00bb’the godfather’s messenger’ since [Israel] undertake[s] the ‘dirty work’ of a godfather who ‘always tries to appear to be the owner of some large, respectable business.\u00a0\u00bb’ Israeli satirist B. Michael refers to U.S. aid this way: \u00a0\u00bb’My master gives me food to eat and I bite those whom he tells me to bite. It’s called strategic cooperation.\u00a0\u00bb ‘To challenge this strategic relationship, one cannot focus solely on the Israeli lobby but must also examine these \u00a0\u00bbbroader forces as well.\u00a0\u00bb \u00a0\u00bbUntil we tackle this issue head-on,\u00a0\u00bb it will be \u00a0\u00bbvery difficult to win\u00a0\u00bb in other areas relating to Palestine.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbThe results\u00a0\u00bb of the short-term thinking behind U.S. policy \u00a0\u00bbare tragic,\u00a0\u00bb not just for the \u00a0\u00bbimmediate victims\u00a0\u00bb but \u00a0\u00bbeventually [for] Israel itself\u00a0\u00bb and \u00a0\u00bbAmerican interests in the region.\u00a0\u00bb The U.S. is sending enormous amounts of aid to the Middle East, and yet \u00a0\u00bbwe are less secure than ever\u00a0\u00bb-both in terms of U.S. interests abroad and for individual Americans. Zunes referred to a \u00a0\u00bbgrowing and increasing hostility [of] the average Arab toward the United States.\u00a0\u00bb In the long term, said Zunes, \u00a0\u00bbpeace and stability and cooperation with the vast Arab world is far more important for U.S. interests than this alliance with Israel.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThis is not only an issue for those who are working for Palestinian rights, but it also \u00a0\u00bbjeopardizes the entire agenda of those of us concerned about human rights, concerned about arms control, concerned about international law.\u00a0\u00bb Zunes sees significant potential in \u00a0\u00bbbuilding a broad-based movement around it.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe above text is based on remarks, delivered on. 26 January, 2001 by Stephen . Zunes – Associate Professor of Politics and Chair of the Peace and Justice Studies Program at San Francisco University<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Les relations USA-Isra\u00ebl : un cas unique et un cas uniquement strat\u00e9gique Isra\u00ebl joue un r\u00f4le central, extr\u00eamement important, dans la politique ext\u00e9rieure et diplomatico-militaire des USA. On n’avancera pas pour autant que c’est un r\u00f4le substantiel et multiple. Il existe la possibilit\u00e9 que ces relations strat\u00e9giques qualifi\u00e9es en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de vitales soient aussi des… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[8],"tags":[3806,2774,3194,2804],"class_list":["post-65460","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-notre-bibliotheque","tag-cmi","tag-israel","tag-pentagone","tag-usa"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65460","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65460"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65460\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65460"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65460"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65460"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}