{"id":65467,"date":"2003-02-10T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-02-10T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/02\/10\/usa-versus-europe\/"},"modified":"2003-02-10T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-02-10T00:00:00","slug":"usa-versus-europe","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/02\/10\/usa-versus-europe\/","title":{"rendered":"USA versus Europe<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

USA versus Europe<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t9 f\u00e9vrier 2003 Voici une analyse int\u00e9ressante de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 d’analyse am\u00e9ricaine PINR<\/a> (PINR, pour Power and Interest News Report). Il s’agit des relations entre les USA et l’Europe.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Avant de pr\u00e9senter cette analyse, nous publions \u00e0 nouveau (nous avons d\u00e9j\u00e0 utilis\u00e9 du mat\u00e9riel PINR et publi\u00e9 cette pr\u00e9sentation) la pr\u00e9sentation que cette soci\u00e9t\u00e9 fait d’elle-m\u00eame :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tinvolved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. PINR seeks to inform rather than persuade. <\/em> \u00bb]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tL’int\u00e9r\u00eat de l’analyse de PINR est qu’elle se d\u00e9marque du courant, notamment en \u00e9cartant les consignes virtualistes des centres de pouvoir. C’est notamment sur les points suivants que cette attitude est notable :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• PINR ne se laisse pas influencer par les positions convenues, par des lettres de chefs d’\u00c9tat ou de gouvernement sans l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9, ne repr\u00e9sentant qu’eux-m\u00eames. L’analyse mais bien en \u00e9vidence que les USA \u00ab continues to distance and isolate itself from key European nations and indeed much of the world…<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• PINR constate que la position du Royaume-Uni marginalise cette puissance en Europe, plus qu’elle n’entra\u00eene l’Europe dans l’orbite US. PINR ne se laisse pas impressionner par des pantalonnades grotesques comme sont, aujourd’hui, les votes \u00e0 l’OTAN, sauf lorsqu’ils sont n\u00e9gatifs, bien entendu. (Ce parti-pris affich\u00e9, qui est le n\u00f4tre, vis-\u00e0-vis des proc\u00e9dures de l’OTAN, est la condition sine qua non<\/em> d’une compr\u00e9hension saine et juste du caract\u00e8re fondamentalement subversif de cette organisation.) Tout au plus pourrait-on reprocher \u00e0 PINR de d\u00e9finir de fa\u00e7on trop tranch\u00e9e la position du Royaume-Uni, \u00e9tant admis qu’il ne serait pas \u00e9tonnant, ni impossible d’ailleurs, de voir un jour le Royaume-Uni proposer un r\u00f4le europ\u00e9en beaucoup plus constructif, en prenant ses distances des USA et en donnant des gages aux Europ\u00e9ens. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Enfin, PINR met bien en \u00e9vidence l’incoh\u00e9rence de la politique US vis-\u00e0-vis de l’Europe, laquelle cherche \u00e0 d\u00e9stabiliser l’UE avec la manipulation \u00e0 peine dissimul\u00e9e de pays marginaux contre les pays centraux, avec toute la libert\u00e9 de s’exprimer donn\u00e9e \u00e0 une diplomatie qui fait beaucoup de d\u00e9g\u00e2ts par son ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 et sa brutalit\u00e9 (diplomatie-Rumsfeld), au bout du compte, une politique risquant d’obtenir le contraire de ce que cherchent les USA. (Mais les USA cherchent-ils quelque chose ? Grave question.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Divide and conquer<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tDrafted by Matthew Riemer on February 09, 2003<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAs the United States continues to distance and isolate itself from key European nations and indeed much of the world the question should be asked whether or not this is intentional on the part of Washington or whether it is an unintended, and to many insiders an undesirable, result of a fractured foreign policy. Though the effects of this policy are global, they are felt most significantly in the arena of Greater Europe, meaning the current European Union (E.U.) and all the prospective, surrounding clients the Baltic nations, Ukraine, Poland, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe United States has deep ties with much of Europe in the form of a common Christian heritage, and, in the case of Great Britain and Ireland, language. Obviously, such commonalities are non-existent when considering the Middle East and Asia. It is because of this that a trans-Atlantic political alliance was always thought to be of the soundest construction. Yet this seems to no longer be the case amidst the groundswell of loaded rhetoric being issued by all sides in the protracted build-up to an invasion of Iraq by the United States.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSeveral U.S. officials, most notably Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, have made disparaging comments about various members of the European community. Rumsfeld recently referred to France and Germany as "old Europe." Such comments are left to interpretation, which then only further adds to their ambiguity and highlights their lack of <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tconstructive diplomacy.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOne can probably safely assume that Rumsfeld meant that France and Germany are part of an influential and established Europe in which they are now the leaders of a larger union that occasionally challenges the hegemonic aspirations of the United States, and that a theoretical "new Europe" would be comprised of states only now reaching respectable levels of economic and social development who advertise these trends in their interest in either E.U. and\/or NATO membership. These "newer" countries are presumably then more agreeable <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\twhen it comes to U.S. policy initiatives.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSuch an outlook, whether or not this is what Rumsfeld was actually implying, is a dangerous one as it seeks to divide the European continent rather than unite it; this is essentially the Cold War model. By seeking to polarize the European nations, the Bush administration is modifying U.S. policy towards a strengthened and evolved E.U.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tInherent in this approach must also be the acceptance of the prominent role of both France and Germany. As analysts have stated for years, these two countries form the axis of a broad and highly integrated Greater Europe. Yet now it is these two countries that seem to be <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\traising the ire of Washington the most with their refusal to unquestioningly support a war in Iraq. But it is exactly these countries that are needed as part of any U.S. coalition if it is to <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\thave a sense of legitimacy.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGreat Britain could be considered as important as France and Germany for coalition building purposes, but they are marginalized in the context of a Greater Europe. Great Britain, in addition to being physically separated from the European mainland, has always strived to <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tmaintain an exceptionally distinct national identity manifested in such policies as the decision not to switch to the Euro as the new currency.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSo at the very least there is the feeling that London seeks to integrate itself as little as possible and is perhaps even resistant to integration in general within the E.U. London has no designs for increased power within the framework of an empowered E.U. Their security and sense of place as a nation is not found within a Greater Europe but under the protective umbrella dutifully provided by the United States in one of the closest political alliances in the world <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\ttoday.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tHowever, this is a point of debate among analysts: Which countries are the most important in the formation of a coalition to invade Iraq? How many countries are truly required to achieve "multi-lateralism"? Many look to the permanent members of the United Nations Security <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCouncil as being indicative of global moods. One could also look to the world’s regional powers as well, which in many cases duplicates states found in the Security Council.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn Southeast Asia, China is the growing regional power with Japan as the regionally uninvolved, economically powerful "international" country. Representing the nebulous entity known as Eurasia, Russia ad Turkey are other regional powers; Iran is also a regional power but is too marginalized as a "rogue state" to be truly valued in any kind of Western-led coalition. In Western Europe, France and Germany are the regional powers of significance. It’s worth noting that France is still capable of dispatching troops to former colonies in Africa like Ivory Coast. Not many players can do this anymore.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tA poll of these countries — China, Japan, Russia, Turkey, France and Germany — is a good starting point for the creation of a truly "global" coalition. But the problem is that the U.S. has <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\trepeatedly underscored the fact, most recently in President George W. Bush’s State of the Union Address, that they will launch preemptive war on Iraq even unilaterally if necessary.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tTo wage a preemptive and unilateral war is probably the most hazardous precedent the U.S. could establish. With much of the world as yet unconvinced of the need for an invasion at all, any pronouncement that such an invasion must not only happen but happen immediately can only be seen as questionable, and even inflammatory, diplomacy on Washington’s part.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIt sets an even more dangerous precedent when countries that resist the U.S. war drive are harshly criticized even to the point of being accused of sympathizing with "the terrorists." The most shocking part of all is when such countries are France and Germany, ostensibly <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\trepresenting the cornerstone of the E.U.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMany countries in Europe may feel that Washington is attempting to politically destabilize the European Union by publicly and confrontationally challenging European nations rhetorically, such as Rumsfeld’s "old Europe" comment. In fact, United Press International (UPI) recently quoted Richard Perle, chairman of the Pentagon’s Policy Advisory Board, as saying, "France is no longer the ally it once was." The report stated later that "[Perle] went on to accuse French President Jacques Chirac of believing ‘deep in his soul’ that Saddam Hussein is preferable to any likely successor."<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAgain, whether this effect is calculated or not, it reveals a common affliction felt by nearly every single power or empire that has ever exerted itself in an imperial manner: the habit of fostering behavior that one also dedicates itself to eradicating.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[This report may be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast provided that any such reproduction identifies the original source,<\/em> http:\/\/www.pinr.com<\/a> All comments should be directed <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tto<\/em>content@pinr.com<\/a>.]<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

USA versus Europe 9 f\u00e9vrier 2003 Voici une analyse int\u00e9ressante de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 d’analyse am\u00e9ricaine PINR (PINR, pour Power and Interest News Report). Il s’agit des relations entre les USA et l’Europe. [Avant de pr\u00e9senter cette analyse, nous publions \u00e0 nouveau (nous avons d\u00e9j\u00e0 utilis\u00e9 du mat\u00e9riel PINR et publi\u00e9 cette pr\u00e9sentation) la pr\u00e9sentation que… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65467","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65467","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65467"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65467\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65467"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65467"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65467"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}