{"id":65469,"date":"2003-02-12T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-02-12T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/02\/12\/absence-de-scepticisme\/"},"modified":"2003-02-12T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-02-12T00:00:00","slug":"absence-de-scepticisme","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/02\/12\/absence-de-scepticisme\/","title":{"rendered":"<strong><em>Absence de scepticisme<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article\">Absence de scepticisme<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t12 f\u00e9vrier 2003  Les analystes du groupe FAIR (Fairness &#038; Accuracy In Reporting), qui travaille sur l&rsquo;appr\u00e9ciation critique du comportement des m\u00e9dias US, ont relev\u00e9 le comportement de ces m\u00e9dias \u00e0 la suite de la pr\u00e9sentation de Colin Powell \u00e0 l&rsquo;ONU, le 5 f\u00e9vrier. Le diagnostic pourrait \u00eatre : absence de scepticisme. Tout ce qu&rsquo;affirme le secr\u00e9taire d&rsquo;\u00c9tat est accept\u00e9 comme l&rsquo;\u00e9nonc\u00e9 de faits admis, et non comme hypoth\u00e8ses et affirmations d&rsquo;une plaidoirie.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl est int\u00e9ressant que, parmi les exemples choisis, figure celui de Dan Rather, de CBS, qui se comporte comme un journaliste d&rsquo;une presse officielle citant comme des faits les points de l&rsquo;argumentation de Powell. Dan Rather avait eu un comportement \u00e9tonnant apr\u00e8s le 11 septembre d&rsquo;all\u00e9geance publique au pr\u00e9sident, puis, quelques mois plus tard, il avait d\u00e9nonc\u00e9 ce comportement ainsi que celui de ses confr\u00e8res. Nous avions, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=223\" class=\"gen\">\u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9poque (18 mai 2002),<\/a> signal\u00e9 ce retournement de Rather et de la presse US, que nous jugions comme un grand tournant ; jugement extr\u00eamement optimiste et qui s&rsquo;av\u00e8re erron\u00e9. Nous \u00e9crivions \u00e0 propos de Rather :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab (&#8230;) <em>Le retournement incroyable de Dan Rather, 70 ans, l&rsquo;homme-phare des m\u00e9dias US. Le pr\u00e9sentateur de CBS avait marqu\u00e9 la crise du 9\/11 d&rsquo;un num\u00e9ro grotesque le 17 septembre, lorsqu&rsquo;il \u00e9tait venu, larmes aux yeux, dire \u00e0 un talk-show de CBS qu&rsquo;il ferait tout ce que lui dirait de faire le pr\u00e9sident, qu&rsquo;il se consid\u00e9rait comme mobilis\u00e9,  ce qui laissait \u00e0 penser sur ce qu&rsquo;allaient devenir la libert\u00e9 de la presse et l&rsquo;esprit critique. En un tournemain, Rather a compl\u00e8tement chang\u00e9. Les m\u00e9dias britanniques ont largement rapport\u00e9 ce virage de Dan Rather, notamment le Guardian et, la BBC dans ses \u00e9ditions sur site. Il ne s&rsquo;agit pas ici de se montrer critique, voire sarcastique devant le virage de Rather. Quoiqu&rsquo;il en soit, il y a sans aucun doute une r\u00e9elle sinc\u00e9rit\u00e9, aussi bien dans la position grotesque du 17 septembre de Rather que dans son revirement (et c&rsquo;est bien l\u00e0 qu&rsquo;est le probl\u00e8me,  qu&rsquo;il y ait de la sinc\u00e9rit\u00e9 dans tout cela). Ce qu&rsquo;il nous int\u00e9resse de signaler ici, c&rsquo;est l&rsquo;impact de cette prise de position.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl n&rsquo;y a pas plus de raison de douter de la sinc\u00e9rit\u00e9 de Rather aujourd&rsquo;hui, pas plus qu&rsquo;hier, et qu&rsquo;avant-hier. C&rsquo;est ce qui est le plus pr\u00e9occupant. Aujourd&rsquo;hui, comme dans l&rsquo;imm\u00e9diat post-9\/11, c&rsquo;est le temps de la mobilisation. Force est de constater que le comportement des journalistes am\u00e9ricains est aujourd&rsquo;hui compl\u00e8tement gouvern\u00e9 par l&rsquo;\u00e9motion, et, bien entendu, il s&rsquo;agit de l&rsquo;\u00e9motion patriotique ; c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire qu&rsquo;il est gouvern\u00e9 par la perception \u00e9motionnelle d&rsquo;une situation et non par le jugement de cette situation. C&rsquo;est ce qu&rsquo;une appr\u00e9ciation ext\u00e9rieure conduit \u00e0 conclure. Dans leur chef, sans aucun doute, il n&rsquo;est question que de jugements objectifs, lequel ne saurait souffrir le devoir de scepticisme dont FAIR d\u00e9plore l&rsquo;absence.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCes divers constats ont d&rsquo;autant plus d&rsquo;int\u00e9r\u00eat que, deux jours apr\u00e8s sa pr\u00e9sentation de New York prise pour argent comptant par l&rsquo;essentiel de la presse US, l&rsquo;une des all\u00e9gations de Powell (sa citation \u00e9logieuse du rapport britannique du 31 janvier) a \u00e9t\u00e9 tourn\u00e9e en ridicule par les faits,  les r\u00e9v\u00e9lations concernant la r\u00e9alisation de ce rapport : plagiat grossier.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<h2 class=\"common-article\">A Failure of Skepticism in Powell Coverage<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDisproof of previous claims underlines need for scrutiny<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong>Fairness &#038; Accuracy In Reporting, February 10, 2003<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIn reporting on Secretary of State Colin Powell&rsquo;s February presentation to the United Nations Security Council, many journalists treated allegations made by Powell as though they were facts.  Reporters at several major outlets neglected to observe the journalistic rule of prefacing unverified assertions with words like &quot;claimed&quot; or &quot;alleged.&quot;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThis is of particular concern given that over the last several months, many Bush administration claims about alleged Iraqi weapons facilities have failed to hold up to inspection.  In many cases, the failed claims  like Powell&rsquo;s claims at the U.N. have cited U.S. and British intelligence sources and have included satellite photos as evidence.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIn its report on Powell&rsquo;s presentation, the New York Daily News (2\/6\/03) accepted his evidence at face value: &quot;To buttress his arguments, Powell showed satellite photos of Iraqi weapons sites and played several audiotapes intercepted by U.S. electronic eavesdroppers. The most dramatic featured an Iraqi Army colonel in the 2nd Republican Guards Corps ordering a captain to sanitize communications.&quot; The Daily News gave no indication that it had independent confirmation that the photos were indeed of weapons sites, or that individuals on the tapes were in fact who Powell said they were.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIn Andrea Mitchell&rsquo;s report on NBC Nightly News (2\/5\/03), Powell&rsquo;s allegations became actual capabilities of the Iraqi military: &quot;Powell played a tape of a Mirage jet retrofitted to spray simulated anthrax, and a model of Iraq&rsquo;s unmanned drones, capable of spraying chemical or germ weapons within a radius of at least 550 miles.&quot;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDan Rather, introducing an interview with Powell (60 Minutes II, 2\/5\/03), shifted from reporting allegations to describing allegations as facts: &quot;Holding a vial of anthrax-like powder, Powell said Saddam might have tens of thousands of liters of anthrax.  He showed how Iraqi jets could spray that anthrax and how mobile laboratories are being used to concoct new weapons.&quot;  The anthrax supply is appropriately attributed as a claim by Powell, but the mobile laboratories were something that Powell &quot;showed&quot; to be actually operating.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCommentator William Schneider on CNN Live Today (2\/6\/03) dismissed the possibility that Powell could be doubted: &quot;No one disputes the findings Powell presented at the U.N. that Iraq is essentially guilty of failing to disarm.&quot;  When CNN&rsquo;s Paula Zahn (2\/5\/03) interviewed Jamie Rubin, former State Department spokesperson, she prefaced a discussion of Iraq&rsquo;s response to Powell&rsquo;s speech thusly: &quot;You&rsquo;ve got to understand that most Americans watching this were either probably laughing out loud or got sick to their stomach. Which was it for you?&quot;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tJournalists should always be wary of implying unquestioning faith in official assertions; recent history is full of official claims based on satellite and other intelligence data that later turned out to be false or dubious. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the first Bush administration rallied support for sending troops to Saudi Arabia by asserting that classified satellite photos showed the Iraqi army mobilizing on the Saudi border.  This claim was later discredited when the St. Petersburg Times obtained commercial satellite photos showing no such build-up (Second Front, John R. MacArthur).  The Clinton administration justified a cruise missile attack on the Sudan by saying that intelligence showed that the target was a chemical weapons factory; later investigation showed it to be a pharmaceutical factory (London Independent, 5\/4\/99).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIn the present instance, journalists have a responsibility to put U.S. intelligence claims in context by pointing out that a number of allegations recently made by the current administration have already been debunked.  Among them:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; Following a CIA warning in October that commercial satellite photos showed Iraq was &quot;reconstituting&quot; its clandestine nuclear weapons program at Al Tuwaitha, a former nuclear weapons complex, George W. Bush told a Cincinnati audience on October 7 (New York Times, 10\/8\/02): &quot;Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of his nuclear program in the past.&quot; When inspectors returned to Iraq, however, they visited the Al Tuwaitha site and found no evidence to support Bush&rsquo;s claim.  &quot;Since December 4 inspectors from [Mohamed] ElBaradei&rsquo;s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have scrutinized that vast complex almost a dozen times, and reported no violations,&quot; according to an Associated Press report (1\/18\/03).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; In September and October U.S. officials charged that conclusive evidence existed that Iraq was preparing to resume manufacturing banned ballistic missiles at several sites.  In one such report the CIA said &quot;the only plausible explanation&quot; for a new structure at the Al Rafah missile test site was that Iraqis were developing banned long-range missiles (Associated Press, 1\/18\/03).  But CIA suggestions that facilities at Al Rafah, in addition to sites at Al Mutasim and Al Mamoun, were being used to build prohibited missile systems were found to be baseless when U.N. inspectors repeatedly visited each site (Los Angeles Times, 1\/26\/03).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<195 British and U.S. intelligence officials said new building at Al-Qaim, a former uranium refinery in Iraq's western desert, suggested renewed Iraqi development of nuclear weapons.  But an extensive survey by U.N. inspectors in December reported no violations (Associated Press, 1\/18\/03).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; Last fall the CIA warned that &quot;key aspects of Iraq&rsquo;s offensive [biological weapons] program are active and most elements are more advanced and larger&quot; than they were pre-1990, citing as evidence renewed building at several facilities such as the Al Dawrah Vaccine Facility, the Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, and the Fallujah III Castor Oil Production Plant.  By mid-January, inspectors had visited all the sites many times over. No evidence was found that the facilities were being used to manufacture banned weapons (Los Angeles Times, 1\/26\/03).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; The Associated Press concluded in its January 18 analysis: &quot;In almost two months of surprise visits across Iraq, U.N. arms monitors have inspected 13 sites identified by U.S. and British intelligence agencies as major &lsquo;facilities of concern,&rsquo; and reported no signs of revived weapons building.&quot;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; Regarding the number of allegations made by the Bush and Blair governments that have washed out on inspection, former U.N. weapons inspector Hans von Sponeck told the British newspaper The Mirror (2\/6\/03) following Powell&rsquo;s U.N. presentation: &quot;The inspectors have found nothing which was in the Bush and Blair dossiers of last September.  What happened to them?  They are totally embarrassed by them.  I have seen facilities in pieces in Iraq which U.S. intelligence reports say are dangerous. The Institute of Strategic Studies referred to the Al Fallujah Three castor oil production unit and the Al Dora foot and mouth center as facilities of concern.&rsquo;  In 2002 I saw them and they were destroyed, there was nothing.  All that was left were shells of buildings. This is a classic example of manipulating allegations, allegations being converted into facts.&quot;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong><em>[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l&rsquo;esprit,  Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Absence de scepticisme 12 f\u00e9vrier 2003 Les analystes du groupe FAIR (Fairness &#038; Accuracy In Reporting), qui travaille sur l&rsquo;appr\u00e9ciation critique du comportement des m\u00e9dias US, ont relev\u00e9 le comportement de ces m\u00e9dias \u00e0 la suite de la pr\u00e9sentation de Colin Powell \u00e0 l&rsquo;ONU, le 5 f\u00e9vrier. Le diagnostic pourrait \u00eatre : absence de scepticisme.&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[1391,3364,3363,2671],"class_list":["post-65469","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-powell","tag-presse","tag-rather","tag-us"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65469","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65469"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65469\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65469"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65469"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65469"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}