North Korea steps up confrontation in anticipation of a US air strike<\/em> \u00bb, le texte s’attache \u00e0 donner une signification strat\u00e9gique \u00e0 l’interception d’un avion-espion US par des chasseurs nord-cor\u00e9ens, en fonction des possibilit\u00e9s de conflit dans la p\u00e9ninsule, ou de frappe (peut-\u00eatre nucl\u00e9aire) US contre la Cor\u00e9e du Nord.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tLe texte esquisse aussi d’autres hypoth\u00e8ses (attaques imm\u00e9diates de l’Iran ou de la Syrie apr\u00e8s l’Irak), lesquelles expliqueraient la raison d’une concentration de troupes US nettement sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 ce qui serait n\u00e9cessaire pour l’attaque de l’Irak. Cette \u00e9valuation-l\u00e0 (concentration sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 ce qui est n\u00e9cessaire), c’est la premi\u00e8re fois que nous la rencontrons. Constatons que cela ne fait que rendre plus \u00e9pais ce brouillard de la guerre r\u00e9gnant dans cet avant-guerre, dans ce cas pour ce qui concerne l’effectif US. (Le brouillard de guerre, comme la cat\u00e9gorie plus sp\u00e9cifique du brouillard d’avant-guerre, vaut pour tout le monde, y compris ceux qui l’alimentent.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tD’autre part, il est fait mention d’un groupe de super-super-hawks (\u00ab a militaristic pressure group<\/em> \u00bb) au sein de l’administration GW, qui renvoie probablement toujours aux m\u00eames (les n\u00e9o-conservateurs et autres extr\u00e9mistes) qui semblerait ainsi continuer r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement \u00e0 se radicaliser. L’\u00e9volution de l’administration poursuit sa course folle maximaliste, \u00e0 c\u00f4t\u00e9 des avatars rencontr\u00e9s dans la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 (ONU, Turquie, etc).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tNous sommes, pour notre compte, assez peu friands de ces \u00e9valuations qui nous semblent souvent tr\u00e8s sollicit\u00e9es, et faire la part belle \u00e0 une rationalit\u00e9 suppos\u00e9e presque sans faille des \u00e9tats-majors. C’est peut-\u00eatre le travers des analystes g\u00e9opoliticiens, ou la faiblesse inh\u00e9rente \u00e0 leur fonction, parce qu’ils se cantonnent n\u00e9cessairement, le plus souvent dans tous les cas, aux facteurs quantitatifs comptabilisables ; d’autre part, ils partent d’une donn\u00e9e qu’ils tiennent n\u00e9cessairement comme essentielle, la capacit\u00e9 initiale fondamentale des centres de puissance de contr\u00f4ler leur puissance, et par cons\u00e9quent de manipuler cette puissance selon les plans qu’ils ont d\u00e9velopp\u00e9s. Nous doutons beaucoup de toutes ces superbes qualit\u00e9s de contr\u00f4le et de pr\u00e9vision, d’autant que, jusqu’ici, pour le seul temps de paix, la bureaucratie US ne s’est pas couverte de gloire (elle n’a rien pr\u00e9vu des \u00e9v\u00e9nements de l’ONU ni de la volte-face de la Turquie, c’est-\u00e0-dire qu’elle ne s’\u00e9tait pr\u00e9par\u00e9e en rien \u00e0 la possibilit\u00e9 de ces divers \u00e9v\u00e9nements qui furent autant de revers pour elle).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tEn une occasion ou l’autre, nous avons pu constater la qualit\u00e9 du travail de Richard Bennett Media, dans les limites que nous avons indiqu\u00e9es ci-dessus. A l’int\u00e9rieur des contraintes de l’analyse g\u00e9opolitique, il nous semble meilleur que d’autres. Pour cette raison et en d\u00e9pit des r\u00e9serves en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral sur cette activit\u00e9, nous pr\u00e9sentons ci-dessous leur analyse.<\/p>\n
North Korea steps up confrontation in anticipation of a US air strike?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n
\tBy Richard M. Bennett and Marcus Cohen, 3 March, 2003<\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tIn an event reminiscent of the EP3A incident over the South China Sea in April 2001, a large United States Air Force RC-135 Electronic Warfare aircraft packed with the most sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, signals interception and long range photographic equipment was buzzed by four North Korean MiG fighters some 150miles (240km) off the coastline of the Communist state. The spy plane was closely tailed on Sunday 2nd March for some 22 minutes with one North Korean fighter moving in to within 50ft (15m) and this action will undoubtedly be labeled as ‘provocative’ when Washington lodges a formal protest with North Korea over the incident. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tNorth Korea considers that it has a right to protect both its territorial integrity and its military secrets from such overt intelligence gathering and particularly at a time of heightened crisis and just a few days before the US and South Korea were to begin ‘Foal Eagle’, a large-scale military exercises involving some 5,000 US personnel. An additional sign of how seriously the North Koreans take the regular United States surveillance flights can be seen in the ‘locking on’ of its missile fire control radar by one of the MiG’s, a distinct warning which was certainly heeded by the American crew who sensibly wished to defuse a dangerous situation and broke of the mission to return to their home base of Kadena on the Japanese island of Okinawa.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tPyongyang is acutely aware of the rumours deliberately being leaked from Washington concerning advanced planning for a large scale surgical USAF air strike on North Korea’s nuclear and missile facilities. While Pentagon officials say that so far these are no more than contingency plans, it seems likely that Washington is more than happy to discomfort the Communist regime with the prospect of significant damage being done to its advanced weapons program and perhaps even a limited nuclear strike on the hardened positions housing massed artillery and missiles that threaten the South Korean capital of Seoul. It has been calculated that the Northern army has at least 13,000 artillery pieces, many aimed at Seoul and could in theory fire some 400,000 shells in the first hour of any attack. Intelligence sources claim that many of these shells would carry Sarin nerve gas and biological weapons including a virulent weaponized strain of Anthrax.The targets are the 21 million civilians in the \u00a0\u00bbkill box\u00a0\u00bbas some in the US military describe the entire Seoul metropolitan area. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tIt would appear that all of this may not just be more ‘sabre rattling’ as there is a militaristic pressure group within the Bush administration that actively looks for a confrontation with North Korea. This same group will, it appears likely, have its own way over war with Iraq and the significant build up of US forces well beyond that required to simply defeat the Baghdad regime may indicate that Syria and Iran may soon be next. North Korea with a limited number of nuclear weapons, long range missiles and an a well developed chemical and biological warfare program is a far greater military challenge. Despite its antiquated armaments, the massive North Korean armed forces are potentially a formidable opponent and the United States, once it has determined that regime change or at worst the neutralization of Pyongyang’s military capability has become a pressing necessity, may well resort to a limited nuclear strike to avoid the inevitable large scale American casualties a conventional conflict with North Korea would undoubtedly bring. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Carnaval de sc\u00e9narios 5 mars 2003 Ci-dessous nous pr\u00e9sentons un texte d’un groupe d’analyse ind\u00e9pendant londonien, le groupe Richard Bennett Media, qu’on peut contacter \u00e0 l’adresse \u00e9lectronique suivante : rbmedia@supanet.com. Sous le titre \u00ab North Korea steps up confrontation in anticipation of a US air strike \u00bb, le texte s’attache \u00e0 donner une signification strat\u00e9gique… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3299,2651,857,2773,3349,3867],"class_list":["post-65497","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-coree","tag-du","tag-irak","tag-iran","tag-nord","tag-syrie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65497","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65497"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65497\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65497"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65497"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65497"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}