{"id":65499,"date":"2003-03-06T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-03-06T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/03\/06\/jsf-strange-relationships\/"},"modified":"2003-03-06T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-03-06T00:00:00","slug":"jsf-strange-relationships","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/03\/06\/jsf-strange-relationships\/","title":{"rendered":"JSF, \u2014 strange relationships<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

JSF strange relationships<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t6 Mars 2003 Nous empruntons encore (voir un pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent F&C du 26 f\u00e9vrier<\/a>) quelques paragraphes \u00e0 notre confr\u00e8re Inside the Air Force<\/em> (IAF) pour parler du JSF, dont le destin semble de plus en plus reproduire le destin de la crise autour de la guerre contre l’Irak. (GW y verra-t-il un signe du Ciel ?)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl s’agit d’un symposium confidentiel USA-UK \u00e0 la fin du mois de f\u00e9vrier. On y venait c\u00e9l\u00e9brer les special relationships<\/em> en mati\u00e8re de coop\u00e9ration de d\u00e9fense. Le JSF devait \u00eatre la pi\u00e8ce de r\u00e9sistance. Il le fut. Le Defense Under Secretary of State and Procurement Minister du Ministry of Defence, Lord Bach, fut particuli\u00e8rement incisif et furieux. Le rapport de IAF parle de \u00ab a hefty dose of criticism for the Joint Strike Fighter program, citing impediments the British industry is facing despite the opportunities touted for vast international cooperation in the effort.<\/em> \u00bb Lord Bach nous r\u00e9suma sa f\u00e2cheuse impression de la fa\u00e7on suivante, qui ne devrait pas surprendre tout de m\u00eame personne, puisqu’il s’agit de l’Am\u00e9rique et de ses traditions industrielles face aux \u00e9trangers, fussent-ils cousins et indispensables alli\u00e9s : \u00ab Although Joint Strike Fighter presents a great opportunity . . . this is tempered by the difficulties that <\/em>[British contractors] are experiencing with market access.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette formulation assez g\u00e9n\u00e9rale est suivie par un d\u00e9tail des critiques exprim\u00e9es par Lord Bach. C’est sur ces questions que nous empruntons \u00e0 IAF :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Britain is the only Level I partner in the JSF program. Its contribution of about $2 billion to the effort accompanies the placement of 10 people in the program office. <\/em>(…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Although the sole Level I partner, Britain has been unrightfully stymied in their contribution efforts, Bach complained. He was critical of delays in issuing work permits for U.K. nationals as well as painfully slow technical assistance and manufacturing license agreements. And touching on procurement, Bach said, we do not get any performance or price guarantees and we are treated much like any other partner.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Bach also expressed frustration with the Global Project Authorization, originally completed to foster an environment of international industrial cooperation. A clause in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, the GPA is a blanket technical agreement authorization (TAA) that sets export controls for the transfer of sensitive technologies. Typically, a TAA can take anywhere from 50 days to 300 days to complete, holding up manpower and resources that could be working on other aspects of an industry program. Under the GPA, that process is shortened to five days, where on the final day, a document that describes the scope for the work package that will be competed is published.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In a December interview with Inside the Air Force, Air Force Col. Dwyer Dennis, deputy director of international programs for the JSF program office, said that approximately 75 percent of the work completed in the JSF effort would be covered by the GPA. For the remaining percentage, contractors will have to do a separate TAA for each company involved in each competition. Yet, Bach noted that the GPA seems to cover only about 50 percent of the JSF work, because the remaining technologies are classified and therefore subject to far greater export scrutiny.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb We feel we do have a long way to go before this can all be characterized as defense cooperation, Bach said.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb He concluded his talk by posing this question: How is it that [the United States and Britain] can cooperate to such a high degree at the operational level and yet at the supporting level, delivering capability, we have made comparatively little progress in cooperating?<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tOn reste confondu, \u00e0 la lecture de ces remarques, moins par ce qui nous est r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 de l’attitude des Am\u00e9ricains que par l’attitude des Britanniques, qui continuent \u00e0 s’interroger sur leurs partenaires, sur la conception am\u00e9ricaine de la coop\u00e9ration, etc. Les Britanniques exp\u00e9rimentent la m\u00eame chose depuis 50 ans ; avant le JSF, il y a eu la SDI ($2 milliards de contrats promis en 1985, $80 millions obtenus en finale, en 1989-90) ; avant la SDI , il y a eu le F-111 (commande UK annul\u00e9e, l’avion \u00e9tant pass\u00e9 de $4 millions en 1963 \u00e0 $15 millions l’exemplaire en 1966) ; et ainsi de suite. Au plus les exp\u00e9riences sont catastrophiques, au plus les Britanniques tentent de coop\u00e9rer plus profond\u00e9ment et plus massivement. Avec le JSF, ils ont mis la plupart de leurs oeufs cass\u00e9s dans le m\u00eame panier. Ils abandonnent progressivement un EFA2000 par ailleurs bien malade, en esp\u00e9rant se maintenir \u00e0 niveau technologique avec le JSF. On voit ce qu’il en est, \u00e0 lire l’intervention de Lord Bach, et en n’oubliant pas, \u00e9trange cerise sur le g\u00e2teau, que les Britanniques ont de surcro\u00eet sacrifi\u00e9 BAE en l’orientant vers le march\u00e9, les structures et les m\u00e9thodes am\u00e9ricaines, et, semble-t-il, vers la faillite am\u00e9ricaine et le rachat probable par un g\u00e9ant US comme Boeing.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPeu avant Lord Bach, Peter Aldridge, n\u00b03 du Pentagone et chef de l’acquisition (\u00e9quivalent US de Lord Bach), avait prononc\u00e9 son discours. Il y avait \u00e9t\u00e9 question du JSF. Pour lui, tout va de fa\u00e7on idyllique : \u00ab Aldridge painted a rosier picture of the JSF program and international partnering climate. I contend that the Joint Strike Fighter is the proof of the belief in the value that foreign partners can bring to a project, he said, adding that participation of international partners in the JSF program is limited only by their ability to contribute technologically or financially. Aldridge said he would like to see similar global partnering efforts in the development and integration of the U.S. missile defense system as well as in international improvements to fire power.<\/em> \u00bb Quand on compare avec ce que nous dit Lord Bach, on a une bonne mesure du foss\u00e9 quasi-oc\u00e9anique (atlantique ?) qui s\u00e9pare les conceptions, et les perceptions de la m\u00eame situation. Le JSF est une bonne et massive mesure de l’\u00e9tat des choses, aujourd’hui, dans le domaine transatlantique, que ce soit l’alliance en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral ou la coop\u00e9ration en particulier.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

JSF strange relationships 6 Mars 2003 Nous empruntons encore (voir un pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent F&C du 26 f\u00e9vrier) quelques paragraphes \u00e0 notre confr\u00e8re Inside the Air Force (IAF) pour parler du JSF, dont le destin semble de plus en plus reproduire le destin de la crise autour de la guerre contre l’Irak. (GW y verra-t-il un signe… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3481,3435,1205],"class_list":["post-65499","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-armements","tag-cooperation","tag-transatlantique"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65499","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65499"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65499\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65499"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65499"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65499"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}