{"id":65522,"date":"2003-03-19T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-03-19T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/03\/19\/le-jsf-est-trop-gras\/"},"modified":"2003-03-19T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-03-19T00:00:00","slug":"le-jsf-est-trop-gras","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/03\/19\/le-jsf-est-trop-gras\/","title":{"rendered":"<strong><em>Le JSF est trop gras<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article\">Le JSF est trop gras<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t19 mars 2003  Mauvaise surprise, nous annonce <em>Defense News<\/em>. Les gens de chez Lockheed Martin (LM) viennent de d\u00e9couvrir que le JSF, en cours de d\u00e9veloppement, est \u00e0 un poids qui pourrait d\u00e9passer jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 20% le poids pr\u00e9vu. Gail Kaufman, de <em>Defense News<\/em>, constate que ce d\u00e9passement \u00ab [is]<em>threatening schedules, budgets and, in particular, the Short Take-Off Vertical Landing (STOVL) version of the plane<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLes experts sont aussit\u00f4t appel\u00e9s au chevet de l&rsquo;avion glouton. Voici ce qu&rsquo;ils en disent,  successivement : <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; <em>Defense News<\/em> : \u00ab <em>Weight problems are not unusual in aircraft development programs, but could be crucial to the survival of JSF, the most expensive weapon program in Pentagon history. The U.S. Navy cut 400 planes from its planned purchase less than a year ago, and some Air Force officials have hinted that Block 70 F-16s could fulfill their needs.<\/em> \u00bb (Tiens, en passant, <em>Defense News<\/em> nous signale sur la pointe de la plume que \u00ab <em>some Air Force officials<\/em> \u00bb ont envisag\u00e9 et continuent \u00e0 envisager l&rsquo;abandon pour l&rsquo;USAF du JSF,  en fait d&rsquo;officiels, on sait qu&rsquo;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=620\" class=\"gen\">il s&rsquo;agit du ministre et du chef d&rsquo;\u00e9tat-major,<\/a>  cela pour aider \u00e0 la compr\u00e9hension de la remarque de l&rsquo;hebdomadaire.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; Que dit Lockheed Martin ? Devant la nouvelle que le JSF pourrait peser 30.700 livres, soit 6.000 de plus qu&rsquo;annonc\u00e9, Tom Burbage (Executive Vice President et General Manager du programme chez LM) dit que c&rsquo;est un parmi les \u00ab <em>worst-case scenario numbers<\/em> \u00bb. Burbage admet qu&rsquo;il y a des \u00ab <em>structural inefficiency in the design, and said officials are looking for fixes now, before designs are final. We first started getting an idea we might have an issue in this area in February.<\/em> \u00bb. Quel poids aura donc finalement le JSF ? La v\u00e9rit\u00e9 est que personne ne le sait. (Burbage \u00ab <em>said they don&rsquo;t know how much the plane will weigh because most of its subcomponents have not been built yet.<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; Le chef du programme JSF, un g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l&rsquo;USAF : \u00ab <em>We are really tightly focused on weight for all the variants, but particularly for the STOVL, said Air Force Maj. Gen. John Hudson, JSF&rsquo;s program executive officer. The Marines depend on STOVL for its whole force structure.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; Le Corps des Marines est mi-figue mi-raisin dans cette affaire. \u00ab <em>If they can&rsquo;t get the weight off the aircraft, STOVL is dead, said one Marine official with knowledge of the program. If STOVL is dead, so is TacAir Integration. Fortunately, there is time to fix this.<\/em> \u00bb Une d\u00e9claration officielle rend le m\u00eame son un peu contraint, selon un porte-parole : \u00ab <em>The Marine Corps is very much aware about the weight issue involving the STOVL, but we&rsquo;re confident it is going to be dealt with through the program office and the manufacturer.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; L&rsquo;expert des experts, Richard Aboulafia, du Teal Group : il parle \u00e9videmment de la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d&rsquo;une cure d&rsquo;amaigrissement. Le Corps des Marines ne peut accepter un JSF plus lourd. Mais au-del\u00e0, on sent chez Aboulafia, qui interpr\u00e8te le programme JSF comme le moyen d&rsquo;\u00e9liminer d\u00e9finitivement l&rsquo;industrie europ\u00e9enne, une certaine inqui\u00e9tude et un certain agacement devant ce qui pourrait \u00eatre l&rsquo;incons\u00e9quence du DoD et des services (principalement l&rsquo;USAF et la Navy, qui peuvent se passer du JSF) : \u00ab <em>Here they are at the point of victory with the international market  basically shutting out European competitors. But, if there is any serious weight growth, that might change things.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tVoici le premier avatar vraiment tr\u00e8s s\u00e9rieux pour le JSF. Une version (l&rsquo;ADAC\/V) est menac\u00e9e et les autres, par d\u00e9sint\u00e9r\u00eat et corporatisme des services, pourraient fort bien ne pas lui survivre ou \u00eatre fortement handicap\u00e9e. L&rsquo;effet pourrait \u00eatre d\u00e9vastateur au niveau international. Le plus singulier dans cet incident qui n&rsquo;est pas loin d&rsquo;\u00eatre un accident est que les constructeurs du JSF ignorent quel poids aura l&rsquo;avion, alors que les performances de cet avion ont \u00e9t\u00e9 calcul\u00e9es et offertes aux \u00e9ventuels acheteurs, \u00e9videmment en fonction du poids. Cela contribue \u00e0 accentuer de fa\u00e7on peut-\u00eatre d\u00e9cisive le caract\u00e8re de compl\u00e8te virtualit\u00e9 de cet appareil.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Le JSF est trop gras 19 mars 2003 Mauvaise surprise, nous annonce Defense News. Les gens de chez Lockheed Martin (LM) viennent de d\u00e9couvrir que le JSF, en cours de d\u00e9veloppement, est \u00e0 un poids qui pourrait d\u00e9passer jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 20% le poids pr\u00e9vu. Gail Kaufman, de Defense News, constate que ce d\u00e9passement \u00ab [is]threatening schedules,&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65522","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65522","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65522"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65522\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65522"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65522"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65522"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}