{"id":65531,"date":"2003-03-22T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-03-22T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/03\/22\/les-faussaires-derriere-les-barbares\/"},"modified":"2003-03-22T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-03-22T00:00:00","slug":"les-faussaires-derriere-les-barbares","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/03\/22\/les-faussaires-derriere-les-barbares\/","title":{"rendered":"Les faussaires derri\u00e8re les barbares<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Les faussaires derri\u00e8re les barbares<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t22 mars 2003 Parmi les possibilit\u00e9s qui sont des probabilit\u00e9s : que les Am\u00e9ricains mettent en place, une fois l’Irak conquis, des preuves de l’existence d’armes de destruction massive. D’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0, on doit consid\u00e9rer certains signes avant-coureurs de cette sorte de manoeuvres, qui prendra place dans l’Irak lib\u00e9r\u00e9 par les bombardements massifs am\u00e9ricains.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(Outre l’exemple d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 ici, des sources fran\u00e7aises nous indiquent que des articles r\u00e9cents de William Safire<\/a>, courroie de transmission habituelle des milieux neo-cons<\/em> et de l’entourage de Rumsfeld, pourraient pr\u00e9parer le terrain pour l’apparition bien coordonn\u00e9e d’indications d’une implication fran\u00e7aise dans certaines preuves de l’existence d’armes de destruction massive [chimiques], d\u00e9couvertes opportun\u00e9ment dans l’Irak lib\u00e9r\u00e9. Safire ne s’en cache pas, et tout doit \u00eatre pr\u00eat pour le show<\/em> : \u00ab What will the world discover, after the war is over, about which countries secretly helped Saddam obtain components for terror weapons? Last week, I wrote that French brokerage was involved in the illicit transfer of the chemical HTBP, a rubbery base for a rocket propellant, from a Chinese company through Syria to Iraq.<\/em> \u00bb Comme dans le cas de Cheney ci-apr\u00e8s, les Am\u00e9ricains d\u00e9veloppent la technique d’annoncer quasiment sans dissimuler le montage qui va \u00eatre effectu\u00e9. La technique est celle du bombardement massif : le pilonnage des m\u00eames affirmations, m\u00eame lorsque la fraude est \u00e9vidente, finit par acqu\u00e9rir un semblant de cr\u00e9dit par l’accumulation de la r\u00e9p\u00e9tition.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tImar Khadduri, scientifique irakien sp\u00e9cialis\u00e9 dans les questions nucl\u00e9aires install\u00e9 depuis 1998 au Canada, d\u00e9veloppe ici la th\u00e8se selon laquelle les Am\u00e9ricains voudraient planter en Irak, entre deux sites d\u00e9vast\u00e9s par leurs bombardements, des preuves de l’existence d’armes nucl\u00e9aires. Khadduri trouve des indications d’une telle possibilit\u00e9 dans des d\u00e9clarations du vice-pr\u00e9sident Cheney, lors d’un passage \u00e0 la t\u00e9l\u00e9vision le 16 mars. Les Anglo-Am\u00e9ricains avaient fourni, en d\u00e9cembre aux inspecteurs de l’ONU, \u00e0 l’insistance de ces derniers, des informations sur les sites o\u00f9 leurs agences de renseignement identifiaient du nucl\u00e9aire, mais rien de semblable n’avait \u00e9t\u00e9 trouv\u00e9 lors des fouilles ; cette fois, note Khadduri, Cheney laisse entendre que la CIA a des indications sur le nucl\u00e9aire irakien … Nous voil\u00e0 au moins avertis, Cheney ayant fameusement pr\u00e9par\u00e9 le terrain pour toutes les suspicions possibles si effectivement une preuve du nucl\u00e9aire irakien apparaissait miraculeusement. (Si cela se produit, \u00e9piloguera-t-on sur la maladresse de Cheney, ou en prendra-t-on pr\u00e9texte pour n’y voir qu’une co\u00efncidence et croire \u00e0 la version US de vraies preuves ? L’explication est, comme toujours, beaucoup plus simple, outre l’explication technique de l’affirmation-r\u00e9p\u00e9tition mise en \u00e9vidence plus haut \u00e0 propos de Safire : \u00e0 l’instant o\u00f9 il parle, Cheney s’adresse \u00e0 une audience US qui doit \u00eatre convaincue de soutenir la guerre. Le reste importe peu, et certainement pas les soup\u00e7ons non-US qui peuvent na\u00eetre.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCi-dessous, nous publions le texte de Khadduri, qui pr\u00e9sente cette possibilit\u00e9, texte diffus\u00e9 le 19 mars par le site YellowTimes.org<\/a><\/p>\n

Cheney’s bogus nuclear weapon<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tBy Imad Khadduri, Former Iraqi nuclear scientist, March 19, 2003<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn NBC’s Meet the Press last Sunday, March 16, 2003, Vice President Cheney audaciously reiterated an ominous note. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNBC: \u00a0\u00bbAnd even though the International Atomic Energy Agency said he does not have a nuclear program, we disagree?\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCheney: \u00a0\u00bbI disagree, yes. And you’ll find the CIA, for example, and other key parts of our intelligence community disagree. Let’s talk about the nuclear proposition for a minute. We know that based on intelligence, that [Saddam] has been very, very good at hiding these kinds of efforts. He’s had years to get good at it and we know he has been absolutely devoted to trying to acquire nuclear weapons. And we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons. I think Mr. ElBaradei, frankly, is wrong.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAfter 218 inspections of 141 sites over three months by the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei charged that the U.S. had used faked and erroneous evidence to support the claims that Iraq was importing enriched uranium and other material, notably the aluminum tubes and small magnets for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. \u00a0\u00bbAfter three months of intrusive inspections, we have, to date, found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq,\u00a0\u00bb the chief atomic weapons inspector had told the U.N. Security Council on Friday March 7, 2003. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn December 2002, the American and British intelligence communities did provide, under Blix’s insistence, a list of 25 sites garnered from Iraqi defectors and other intelligence sources. The inspectors visited all of these sites, including one site that intelligence communities had claimed would be a promising find. Tellingly, the inspectors found nothing and their \u00a0\u00bbhush hush\u00a0\u00bb information was referred to by one inspector as \u00a0\u00bbgarbage after garbage after garbage.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSo why is Cheney, after the total disrepute of all American misinformation about a rejuvenated Iraqi nuclear weapons program, still claiming that the U.S. has untold intelligence information about this program? <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tI now tend to believe there is a more sinister implication behind Cheney’s continued assertions so late in the misinformation campaign and so close to the war. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIraq claims it has no nuclear weapons related components left. Cheney claims that U.S. intelligence can prove that Iraq does have these components. What if the U.S. goes in and, after killing possibly hundreds of thousands, cannot find any components? <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWould they not want to reiterate up until the last minute, as Cheney seems to be doing, that their \u00a0\u00bbintelligence\u00a0\u00bb does confirm that Iraq has nuclear weapons components to justify their criminal war? <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tHowever, in the event that no such components are to be found in Iraq, would it not be past the American intelligence community’s bag of dirty tricks to place some bogus evidence (in places where the inspectors have not been so they can’t be refuted by them) to vindicate the tens of billions of dollars spent on this war crime and the devastation it will undoubtedly incur? <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIt would otherwise be hard to challenge the timing and triviality of Cheney’s claim on March 16, with Bush declaring war only one day later on March 17. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Imad Khadduri has a MSc in Physics from the University of Michigan (United States) and a PhD in Nuclear Reactor Technology from the University of Birmingham (United Kingdom). Khadduri worked with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission from 1968 until 1998. He was able to leave Iraq in late 1998 with his family. He now teaches and works as a network administrator in Toronto, Canada. He has been interviewed by the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, FOX, the Toronto Star, Reuters, and various other news agencies in regards to his knowledge of the Iraqi nuclear program. Imad Khadduri encourages your comments: imad.khadduri@rogers.com.]<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[YellowTimes.org is an international news and opinion publication. YellowTimes.org encourages its material to be reproduced, reprinted, or broadcast provided that any such reproduction identifies the original source, http:\/\/www.YellowTimes.org. Internet web links to http:\/\/www.YellowTimes.org are appreciated.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Les faussaires derri\u00e8re les barbares 22 mars 2003 Parmi les possibilit\u00e9s qui sont des probabilit\u00e9s : que les Am\u00e9ricains mettent en place, une fois l’Irak conquis, des preuves de l’existence d’armes de destruction massive. D’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0, on doit consid\u00e9rer certains signes avant-coureurs de cette sorte de manoeuvres, qui prendra place dans l’Irak lib\u00e9r\u00e9 par… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65531","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65531","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65531"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65531\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65531"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65531"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65531"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}