{"id":65536,"date":"2003-03-26T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-03-26T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/03\/26\/les-hyper-faucons-separes\/"},"modified":"2003-03-26T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-03-26T00:00:00","slug":"les-hyper-faucons-separes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/03\/26\/les-hyper-faucons-separes\/","title":{"rendered":"Les hyper-faucons s\u00e9par\u00e9s ?<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Les hyper-faucons s\u00e9par\u00e9s ?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t26 mars 2003 Jim Lobe, excellent analyste du Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF), a publi\u00e9 deux articles o\u00f9 il analyse les perspectives de la situation politique \u00e0 Washington, au sein de cette droite dure qui tient les pouvoirs d’influence et qui est \u00e0 la base de l’attaque contre l’Irak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Le premier article<\/a>, sur atimes.com<\/em> le 22 mars, analyse les divergences tr\u00e8s grandes qui devraient appara\u00eetre apr\u00e8s la guerre d’Irak entre les n\u00e9o-conservateurs regroup\u00e9s autour de Perle, de Wolfowitz et du Weekly Standard<\/em> ; et d’autre part, les ultra-nationalistes, essentiellement la droite du parti r\u00e9publicain, regroup\u00e9s autour de Rumsfeld et de Cheney. Les premiers veulent des engagements prolong\u00e9s et de nouvelles avanc\u00e9es bellicistes, les seconds seraient plut\u00f4t partisans d’un repli.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Le second article<\/a>, en date du 24 mars sur le site Foreign Policy In Focus, observe qu’une lettre commune vient d’\u00eatre diffus\u00e9e par une organisation-courroie de transmission des n\u00e9o-conservateurs, le Project for a New American Century (PNAC), o\u00f9 des d\u00e9mocrates de l’ancienne administration Clinton figurent \u00e0 c\u00f4t\u00e9 de n\u00e9o-conservateurs patent\u00e9s. (Cette lettre demande une implication maximale des USA en Irak et au Moyen-Orient apr\u00e8s la guerre, pour veiller \u00e0 l’extension du mod\u00e8le d\u00e9mocratique am\u00e9ricaniste.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe second article de Jim Lobe \u00e9largit le champ de l’analyse en y incluant les d\u00e9mocrates et les lib\u00e9raux bellicistes, ces milieux qui, en 1999, soutinrent l’attaque contre la Serbie, tout comme l’intervention en Bosnie ou l’intervention en Ha\u00efti. L’id\u00e9e qu’on retrouve est que l’attaque contre l’Irak peut parfaitement retrouver cette logique internationaliste clintonienne, si on la poursuit par une mission \u00e0 la fois humanitaire et d’interventionnisme am\u00e9ricaniste, appuy\u00e9e sur l’extension de la d\u00e9mocratie et du mod\u00e8le am\u00e9ricain. On retrouve alors les grandes lignes de la politique d’expansion n\u00e9o-wilsonienne de l’administration Clinton, principalement dans son deuxi\u00e8me terme, \u00e0 partir de l’accord de Dayton (automne 1995).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette \u00e9volution est essentielle, car elle porte des troubles fondamentaux dans la vie politique de l’administration, en conduisant \u00e0 la possibilit\u00e9 d’une opposition des deux grands courants extr\u00e9mistes qui influencent GW. Cela signifierait que les ultra-nationalistes comme Rumsfeld seraient tent\u00e9s de se replier apr\u00e8s l’Irak, de retrouver comme n\u00e9o-isolationnistes, tandis que les n\u00e9o-conservateurs seraient plus que jamais interventionnistes, en se tournant vers les d\u00e9mocrates n\u00e9o-wilsoniens. Dans tous les cas, on aurait la mise en \u00e9vidence que l’actuelle politique, loin d’\u00eatre accidentelle, r\u00e9pond au contraire \u00e0 une \u00e9volution logique du monde washingtonien. C’est ainsi que les Europ\u00e9ens retrouveraient leurs interlocuteurs am\u00e9ricains favoris, les clintoniens des ann\u00e9es 1990, aux c\u00f4t\u00e9s des bellicistes n\u00e9o-conservateurs, sans bouleversement politique notable.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCi-dessous, un passage de l’article du 24 mars de Jim Lobe permettant de mieux saisir ce tournant potentiel. On notera, pour mieux comprendre ces tendances, que Jim Lobe ne manque pas de pr\u00e9ciser combien on trouve, chez les n\u00e9o-conservateurs, d’anciens d\u00e9mocrates et, surtout, d’anciens trotskistes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Wile Rumsfeld, Cheney, and Bolton are traditional right-wing Republicans, most of PNAC’s backers are neoconservatives–mostly former Democrats, or even Trotskyites, who moved to the right in reaction to the anti-Vietnam War movement and the UN’s denunciations of Israel in the late 1960s and 1970s. While they share the unilateralism of Republican right-wingers, they tend to be much more committed to the idea that the United States has a global mission to fulfill, and that the U.S. political and economic \u00a0\u00bbmodel\u00a0\u00bb should be exported to the rest of the world, by force if necessary.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb During the 1990s, for example, they excoriated right-wing Republican lawmakers who opposed Clinton’s interventions in the Balkans and even in Haiti for neo-isolationism and for betraying Washington’s mission to export democracy and protect vulnerable minorities. And, despite their influence within the Bush administration, they have loudly criticized it for failing to devote more resources–particularly in security and reconstruction aid–to Afghanistan after ousting the Taliban regime in late 2001.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Those same criticisms have been voiced by Democrats in Congress who continue to complain that the administration’s reliance on military power in the conduct of foreign affairs has been far too narrow. The failure to provide more economic or security support, according to this view, could result in Afghanistan returning to its previous status as a \u00a0\u00bbfailed state\u00a0\u00bb in which terrorists could flourish. Within the administration, however, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice have rejected these arguments, insisting that the United States should not be in the business of \u00a0\u00bbnation-building\u00a0\u00bb or \u00a0\u00bbsocial work.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Split appears to be developing over Iraq. \u00a0\u00bbFor the hard (Republican) right, this is really about getting Saddam Hussein and these weapons of mass destruction and taking out what they see as a threat to American security, and then they’re really going to want to come home,\u00a0\u00bb says Charles Kupchan of the Council on Foreign Relations. \u00a0\u00bbI think Rumsfeld just doesn’t want to re-make the Middle East; he probably approaches that task with revulsion.\u00a0\u00bb Liberals, on the other hand, \u00a0\u00bbmight back a kind of Good Samaritan, let’s-occupy-and-change-or-pacify-Islam (project),\u00a0\u00bb Kupchan says.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Les hyper-faucons s\u00e9par\u00e9s ? 26 mars 2003 Jim Lobe, excellent analyste du Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF), a publi\u00e9 deux articles o\u00f9 il analyse les perspectives de la situation politique \u00e0 Washington, au sein de cette droite dure qui tient les pouvoirs d’influence et qui est \u00e0 la base de l’attaque contre l’Irak. • Le… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65536","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65536","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65536"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65536\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65536"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65536"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65536"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}