{"id":65563,"date":"2003-04-11T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-04-11T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/04\/11\/la-ligne-trotskiste-de-lus-army\/"},"modified":"2003-04-11T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-04-11T00:00:00","slug":"la-ligne-trotskiste-de-lus-army","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/04\/11\/la-ligne-trotskiste-de-lus-army\/","title":{"rendered":"<strong><em>La ligne trotskiste de l&rsquo;U.S. Army<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article\">La ligne trotskiste de l&rsquo;U.S. Army<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t11 avril 2003  La guerre va vraiment tr\u00e8s vite. La premi\u00e8re phase \u00e0 peine achev\u00e9e sur un triomphe d&rsquo;une demi-journ\u00e9e, l&rsquo;accent est mis sur la nouvelle r\u00e9alit\u00e9 en plein d\u00e9veloppement : le d\u00e9veloppement de l&rsquo;anarchie et la compl\u00e8te passivit\u00e9 des forces US (les forces britanniques ont un comportement diff\u00e9rent mais des moyens d&rsquo;action limit\u00e9s : elles essaient de passer des accords locaux pour \u00e9tablir des pouvoirs qui r\u00e9tablissent l&rsquo;ordre.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCi-dessous, pour donner une indication de la situation, nous pr\u00e9sentons une courte appr\u00e9ciation de la situation par YellowTimes.org. (\u00ab <em>Factions Arising In Iraq<\/em> \u00bb, publi\u00e9 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.yellowtimes.org\/print.php?sid=1227\" class=\"gen\">sur le site YellowTimes le 10 avril 2003<\/a>). Elle confirme ce qu&rsquo;on a d\u00e9j\u00e0 vu par ailleurs <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/choix.php?comm=1&#038;link_id=2389\" class=\"gen\">en lisant le Financial Times et Thomas Friedman<\/a> : l&rsquo;Irak est livr\u00e9e au pillage et prend tr\u00e8s vite l&rsquo;orientation du d\u00e9sordre et de l&rsquo;anarchie, avec accessoirement le d\u00e9veloppement de gu\u00e9rillas diverses.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>The war in Iraq is now shifting phases into one of post-invasion factionalism featuring various forces of varying degrees of power, legitimacy, and influence arising almost spontaneously in different parts of the country.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>One such militia  backed by American special forces  began forcefully exerting itself in Hay Al Ansar this past week. The Iraqi Coalition of National Unity (ICNU), apparently an unknown group, has been accused of threatening and beating civilians and widespread looting by residents of the town.<\/em> [&#8230;]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Another incident occurred over the weekend when a militia several thousand strong took control of the town of Amara. Reuters reported that CIA operatives in the region informed the group&rsquo;s leader, Abu Hatem, that the U.S. was prepared to bomb the town if he did not relinquish his control immediately.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Such incidents are an indication of what U.S. forces throughout Iraq will be facing in the weeks and months to come if a smooth transition is not made by Washington.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe risque existe d\u00e9sormais que l&rsquo;Irak \u00e9volue vers le d\u00e9sordre et l&rsquo;instabilit\u00e9. La responsabilit\u00e9 de l&rsquo;U.S. Army (et du Marine Corps) dans cette situation est immense, peut-\u00eatre sans que ce soit une politique voulue de Washington,  selon l&rsquo;hypoth\u00e8se d&rsquo;ailleurs tr\u00e8s acceptable que Washington n&rsquo;a aucune politique \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard. (Washington a pr\u00e9par\u00e9 la prise en mains des p\u00e9troles, Washington a nomm\u00e9 divers repr\u00e9sentants martiaux, qui se gardent bien d&rsquo;intervenir pour l&rsquo;instant. La s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de la population irakienne est le dernier des soucis de Washington. C&rsquo;est aussi le dernier des soucis des militaires comme, par exemple, le signale <a href=\"http:\/\/www.theage.com.au\/articles\/2003\/04\/09\/1049567740403.html\" class=\"gen\">un reporteur australien, assign\u00e9 \u00e0 la 1\u00e8re division du Marine Corps<\/a>. Il observe : \u00ab <em>At marine headquarters, 20 kilometres east of central Baghdad, Major-General Jim Mattis, commander of the 20,000-strong 1st Division, talks to journalists for the first time since the war started, making it clear that looting is the least of his concerns.<\/em> \u00bb La Croix-Rouge \u00e0 Gen\u00e8ve est furieuse devant l&rsquo;inaction des forces US, alors que les pillages ont atteint les h\u00f4pitaux, obligeant \u00e0 la cessation des activit\u00e9s malgr\u00e9 leur surcharge en bless\u00e9s, pour la plupart effets des bombardements US.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLes militaires am\u00e9ricains ont deux priorit\u00e9s : battre l&rsquo;arm\u00e9e irakienne, en rase-campagne et avec l&rsquo;appui massif de l&rsquo;aviation et de l&rsquo;artillerie (c&rsquo;est fait, para\u00eet-il) ; prot\u00e9ger les forces US elles-m\u00eames. Cette derni\u00e8re priorit\u00e9 est devenue la premi\u00e8re et quasiment exclusive. Les forces US, suivant leur vieille habitude, ont d\u00e9sormais tendance \u00e0 se replier sur elles-m\u00eames, en tenant en respect les gu\u00e9rillas diverses et en vivant comme d&rsquo;habitude. Par exemple, on a pu entendre hier le quartier-g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de CENTCOM d\u00e9clarer que les forces US \u00e0 Bagdad ne pouvaient se charger de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de la ville par manque d&rsquo;effectifs alors que des reportages arrivaient sur un r\u00e9giment de Marines au repos pr\u00e8s de l&rsquo;a\u00e9roport de Bagdad, avec des Marines-clich\u00e9s nous faisant partager leur d\u00e9tresse : les <em>boys<\/em> s&rsquo;ennuient, ils ont le mal du pays,  ils voudraient bien rentrer chez eux. Nous compatissons.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tPar ailleurs, nous observons combien tout cela sied bien \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9tat d&rsquo;esprit courant \u00e0 Washington, qui se nourrit d&rsquo;images telles que la <em>creative destruction<\/em> de l&rsquo;\u00e9conomiste Joseph Schumpeter, et qui renvoie surtout, nous l&rsquo;avons \u00e9galement souvent observ\u00e9, \u00e0 la doctrine trotskiste de la r\u00e9volution permanente. Les n\u00e9o-conservateurs inspirent tout cela, venus pour bon nombre, directement ou par tradition, des rangs trotskistes des ann\u00e9es 1940-70 selon l&rsquo;\u00e2ge. Dans la m\u00e9diocrit\u00e9 washingtonienne g\u00e9n\u00e9ralis\u00e9e, tout cela vous a des allures de pens\u00e9e originale.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tD&rsquo;o\u00f9 l&rsquo;hypoth\u00e8se que l&rsquo;U.S. Army suit, au fond, une strat\u00e9gie trotskiste en Irak,  autre nom pour la bonne vieille trouille. William Pfaff \u00e9voquait cet aspect des choses dans <a href=\"http:\/\/www.iht.com\/articles\/92295.html\" class=\"gen\">une r\u00e9cente chronique, du 7 avril<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab [The] <em>chaos is the predictable consequence of the allied attack. Create a battlefield and destroy existing structures of government, and this is what happens. The allies did not seriously prepare for this development because the absurd ideological preconceptions of American planners, and listening to the dreams and illusions of Iraqi exile politicians, had convinced them that the invading army would be welcomed by happy crowds, civic structures still intact.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Officials were convinced that Saddam Hussein&rsquo;s regime would \u00a0\u00bbcollapse at the first whiff of gunpowder.\u00a0\u00bb Like the president himself, they believed their \u00a0\u00bbinstincts\u00a0\u00bb were better than actual knowledge about Iraq &#8211; or, for that matter, about battlefields.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Avowedly tough-minded, they might have consulted Carl von Clausewitz, who wrote that \u00a0\u00bbphilanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skillful method of disarming and overcoming an army without causing great bloodshed &#8230; (but this) is an error which must be extirpated; for in such dangerous things as war, the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The neoconservative leadership thinks of itself in \u00a0\u00bbphilanthropic\u00a0\u00bb terms and has convinced others in Washington and in the country to take it as such. It really believes that it is bringing democracy and enlightenment to Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Whatever the intentions, the immediate result of what Washington is doing is to produce chaos. The neoconservatives like to quote the economist Joseph Schumpeter on \u00a0\u00bbcreative destruction,\u00a0\u00bb as if this phrase, meant to describe a process in the development of capitalism, were a general statement of truth, guaranteeing that destruction produces creation. It does not.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>One of the many curious things President George W. Bush is quoted as saying, this time in Bob Woodward&rsquo;s book, \u00a0\u00bbBush at War,\u00a0\u00bb is that U.S. strategy in Afghanistan \u00a0\u00bbis to create chaos, to create a vacuum.\u00a0\u00bb Out of the chaos and vacuum, good would come. This echoes the Trotskyist belief in the constructive effect of \u00a0\u00bbpermanent revolution.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tBien, laissons l\u00e0 les th\u00e9ories, y compris la trotskiste. Observons cette \u00e9trange r\u00e9alit\u00e9 d&rsquo;une arm\u00e9e qui vient, dit-on et \u00e9crit-on, de remporter une victoire et qui observe, sans rien faire de s\u00e9rieux, le d\u00e9sordre gagner. Une autre fa\u00e7on de voir les choses est que l&rsquo;arm\u00e9e US, applaudie comme l&rsquo;arm\u00e9e la plus puissante du monde, est en train de faire la preuve de sa compl\u00e8te incomp\u00e9tence et de sa compl\u00e8te inadaptation aux normes de la guerre moderne, o\u00f9 le contr\u00f4le des populations est beaucoup plus important que des obus de 120mm tir\u00e9s contre les h\u00f4tels abritant des journalistes ind\u00e9pendants. C&rsquo;est le produit d&rsquo;un syst\u00e8me qui a \u00e9rig\u00e9 le conformisme en vertu cardinale, et l&rsquo;une des id\u00e9es du conformisme est cette aberrante conception que la premi\u00e8re t\u00e2che d&rsquo;une arm\u00e9e est de se prot\u00e9ger elle-m\u00eame pour limiter des pertes,  et esp\u00e9rer que le reste se fasse, et que du chaos naisse l&rsquo;ordre d\u00e9mocratique favorable aux \u00c9tats-unis d&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>La ligne trotskiste de l&rsquo;U.S. Army 11 avril 2003 La guerre va vraiment tr\u00e8s vite. La premi\u00e8re phase \u00e0 peine achev\u00e9e sur un triomphe d&rsquo;une demi-journ\u00e9e, l&rsquo;accent est mis sur la nouvelle r\u00e9alit\u00e9 en plein d\u00e9veloppement : le d\u00e9veloppement de l&rsquo;anarchie et la compl\u00e8te passivit\u00e9 des forces US (les forces britanniques ont un comportement diff\u00e9rent&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3934,3935,857,3831,1104,3933,3931,3932],"class_list":["post-65563","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-chaos","tag-createur","tag-irak","tag-neo-conservateurs","tag-neocons","tag-sesordre","tag-trotski","tag-trotskisme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65563","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65563"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65563\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65563"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65563"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65563"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}