{"id":65584,"date":"2003-04-22T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-04-22T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/04\/22\/rumsfeld-ouvre-un-second-front\/"},"modified":"2003-04-22T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-04-22T00:00:00","slug":"rumsfeld-ouvre-un-second-front","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/04\/22\/rumsfeld-ouvre-un-second-front\/","title":{"rendered":"Rumsfeld ouvre un second front<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Rumsfeld ouvre un second front<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t22 avril 2003 Il faut reconna\u00eetre \u00e0 Donald Rumsfeld une ardente alacrit\u00e9. La guerre \u00e0 peine termin\u00e9e en Irak, il ouvre un deuxi\u00e8me front, et s\u00e9rieux celui-l\u00e0, au Pentagone, pour imposer de force sa r\u00e9forme, baptis\u00e9e transformation<\/em>. Une initiative inattendue et particuli\u00e8rement ambitieuse, qui a pris la bureaucratie du Pentagone compl\u00e8tement par surprise (c’\u00e9tait le but), comme la Garde R\u00e9publicaine irakienne. Le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense capitalise sur sa position de force, \u00e9tablie avec la guerre, dans le cabinet et au sein du Pentagone.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’hebdomadaire Defense News<\/a> pr\u00e9sente et d\u00e9veloppe cette information en expliquant que le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense a choisi d’utiliser l’opportunit\u00e9 de la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de reconstituer les stocks des forces arm\u00e9es apr\u00e8s la guerre, pour imposer cette r\u00e9forme (\u00ab Restock And Rethink – Next-Generation Arms Could Replace Those Fired in Iraq<\/em> \u00bb). La rapidit\u00e9 de la d\u00e9cision de Rumsfeld est \u00e9galement remarquable.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab As combat in Iraq winds down, the Pentagon’s attempts to learn from the brief campaign are quickly spooling up. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who has ordered a sweeping review of U.S. military programs and force structure, wants the results soon in fact, soon enough to influence the proposed 2004 defense budget now before Congress. The idea, as laid out by several senior U.S. acquisition officers, is to use the upcoming rebuilding period as a chance to accelerate the transformation of the military.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb We can either reconstitute the force that was or we can think about risk and think about opportunity and get a little bit of an edge on the future, said Lt. Gen. Robert Magnus, deputy commandant for Marine Corps programs and resources.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb At Rumsfeld’s direction, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff launched in mid-April the Post War Defense Assessment, one of a growing number of reviews looking into ways to prepare the newly victorious force for the next potential fights. The assessment’s objectives are now being defined with help from the services, but the scope will be broad: it will look at how the military’s force structure and weapons-buying needs will change in war’s wake.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb It will also be fast, getting under way as the services work to build their 2005 budget proposals this spring and finishing up by the time they submit them to the defense secretary this summer, a senior Navy official involved in the process said. The swift work will allow Rumsfeld and the Joint Chiefs to tailor the Pentagon’s 2005 budget request, and possibly its 2004 one, to emerging needs. We intend to have an impact on those budgets based on what we learned, Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Defense News in a brief April 16 interview.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tLe processus devrait \u00eatre rapidement men\u00e9 \u00e0 son terme, sous le contr\u00f4le d’hommes proches de Rumsfeld, avec les premiers r\u00e9sultats dans 60 \u00e0 90 jours. Le processus devrait aboutir \u00e0 l’examen et \u00e0 la mise en cause de tous les grands programmes actuellement d\u00e9velopp\u00e9s. La question budg\u00e9taire (les capacit\u00e9s budg\u00e9taires restreintes du Pentagone ces prochaines ann\u00e9es, par rapport aux besoins exprim\u00e9s par les forces) sera \u00e9galement prise en compte.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’initiative de Rumsfeld, remarquable en tous points, implique les remarques suivantes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense dispose \u00e0 nouveau d’une possibilit\u00e9 de parvenir \u00e0 lancer sa r\u00e9forme, au niveau des programmes, alors qu’on estimait cette possibilit\u00e9 interdite avec le bouclage du budget FY2004. Effectivement, le budget FY2004 lui-m\u00eame pourrait \u00eatre affect\u00e9. Rumsfeld argue du caract\u00e8re exceptionnel de l’\u00e9v\u00e9nement de la guerre, de sa rapidit\u00e9, des n\u00e9cessit\u00e9s de reconstitution des stocks, pour justifier sa proposition. Les bureaucraties ne peuvent r\u00e9pondre (et bloquer son projet) de fa\u00e7on satisfaisante.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Plus aucune programmation n’est s\u00fbre d\u00e9sormais, tout va \u00eatre remis sur la table. Ce sera le cas notamment des trois grands programmes de l’aviation tactique (TACAIR), le F\/A-18E de la Navy, le F\/A-22 de l’USAF, le JSF\/F-35 interarmes. L’un de ces programmes pourrait \u00eatre abandonn\u00e9. La place des engins sans pilote (UAV.UCAV) pourrait \u00eatre pour la premi\u00e8re fois d\u00e9termin\u00e9e, avec des perspectives importantes (un tiers de la flotte de l’aviation tactique compos\u00e9 d’UAV\/UCAV en 2010 ?) qui r\u00e9duiront d’autant la part des avions pilot\u00e9s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Politiquement, cette initiative signifie que Rumsfeld aura son attention largement r\u00e9orient\u00e9e vers Washington, et d’autant moins vers l’Irak et la guerre contre le terrorisme. C’est important dans la mesure o\u00f9 Rumsfeld est la force principale, dans le cabinet, derri\u00e8re cette guerre contre le terrorisme. On retrouve, pos\u00e9e sous une forme diff\u00e9rente, la question de l’int\u00e9r\u00eat fondamental de Rumsfeld pour les engagements ext\u00e9rieurs.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Rumsfeld ouvre un second front 22 avril 2003 Il faut reconna\u00eetre \u00e0 Donald Rumsfeld une ardente alacrit\u00e9. La guerre \u00e0 peine termin\u00e9e en Irak, il ouvre un deuxi\u00e8me front, et s\u00e9rieux celui-l\u00e0, au Pentagone, pour imposer de force sa r\u00e9forme, baptis\u00e9e transformation. Une initiative inattendue et particuli\u00e8rement ambitieuse, qui a pris la bureaucratie du Pentagone… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[629,568,464,250,3194],"class_list":["post-65584","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-a-22","tag-dod","tag-f","tag-jsf","tag-pentagone"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65584","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65584"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65584\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65584"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65584"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65584"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}