{"id":65588,"date":"2003-04-26T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-04-26T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/04\/26\/la-litanie-des-erreurs-americaines\/"},"modified":"2003-04-26T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-04-26T00:00:00","slug":"la-litanie-des-erreurs-americaines","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/04\/26\/la-litanie-des-erreurs-americaines\/","title":{"rendered":"<strong><em>La litanie des erreurs am\u00e9ricaines<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article\">La litanie des erreurs am\u00e9ricaines<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t26 avril 2003  Les planificateurs am\u00e9ricains commencent \u00e0 se douter de quelque chose. L&rsquo;agitation chiite en Irak commence \u00e0 faire na\u00eetre quelque doute sur l&rsquo;aisance avec laquelle on attend que la situation en Irak se r\u00e9solve (d&rsquo;elle-m\u00eame, quasiment). L&rsquo;article publi\u00e9 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/articles\/A17886-2003Apr22.html\" class=\"gen\">le 23 avril par le Washington Post<\/a> est un concentr\u00e9 saisissant de la situation psychologique des planificateurs am\u00e9ricains. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tQue s&rsquo;est-il pass\u00e9 ? Comme d&rsquo;habitude,  l&rsquo;arrogance et l&rsquo;aveuglement, l&rsquo;ignorance absolue, syst\u00e9matique, de tout ce qui n&rsquo;est pas am\u00e9ricain, dans tous les cas <em>American-style<\/em>, toutes ces attitudes constituant le comportement habituellement et typiquement washingtonien. L&rsquo;impr\u00e9paration US devant ce qui se passe est due \u00e0 l&rsquo;erreur d&rsquo;appr\u00e9ciation syst\u00e9matique, \u00e0 la croyance aux d\u00e9clarations de quelques \u00e9migr\u00e9s grassement r\u00e9tribu\u00e9s, \u00e0 la fraude syst\u00e9matique ou \u00e0 la suppression pure et simple des informations diffus\u00e9es par les services de renseignement am\u00e9ricains (CIA principalement), etc. Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;un monde virtuel, virtualisme oblige, que Washington a construit autour du projet d&rsquo;attaque de l&rsquo;Irak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tPour comprendre en une seule formule la trame de cette aventure, il suffit de rappeler une phrase de l&rsquo;amiral Stansfield Turner en avril 1979. Directeur de la CIA, Turner voulait expliquer \u00e0 des \u00e9tudiants d&rsquo;une universit\u00e9 US pourquoi les Am\u00e9ricains avaient laiss\u00e9 faire la r\u00e9volution khomeniste en Iran sans comprendre ce qui se passait, en donnant les mauvais conseils au Shah, etc : \u00ab <em>Nous n&rsquo;avons jamais pens\u00e9 qu&rsquo;un vieillard de 80 ans <\/em>(l&rsquo;ayatollah Khomeini) <em>pourrait provoquer de tels \u00e9v\u00e9nements.<\/em> \u00bb C&rsquo;est une resuc\u00e9e \u00e0 l&rsquo;am\u00e9ricaine du fameux \u00ab <em>Le pape, combien de divisions ?<\/em> \u00bb, de Staline.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tPour le reste, pour l&rsquo;avenir, on peut \u00eatre assur\u00e9 de ceci : aucune le\u00e7on utile ne sera tir\u00e9e de ce qui se passe en Iran, l&rsquo;analyse continuant \u00e0 se faire au Pentagone et \u00e0 la Maison-Blanche, en fonction d&rsquo;\u00e9l\u00e9ments \u00e9manant de ces seuls organismes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tVoici quelques extraits de l&rsquo;article, illustrant les conditions psychologiques g\u00e9n\u00e9rales qui, du c\u00f4t\u00e9 US, pr\u00e9sid\u00e8rent \u00e0 la pr\u00e9paration de cette invasion de l&rsquo;Irak, et \u00e0 son investissement. On a peu d&rsquo;exemples d&rsquo;un tel \u00e9tat d&rsquo;impr\u00e9paration, non par manque de moyens, non par refus de se pr\u00e9parer, mais par une sorte d&rsquo;assurance irrationnelle qu&rsquo;il n&rsquo;y a aucune n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de se pr\u00e9parer, qu&rsquo;il suffira aux Am\u00e9ricains de se pr\u00e9senter pour que les choses entrent dans l&rsquo;ordre,  simplement parce qu&rsquo;ils sont Am\u00e9ricains.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; Sur l&rsquo;\u00e9tat d&rsquo;esprit pr\u00e9sidant \u00e0 la pr\u00e9paration, avec l&rsquo;accent obsessionnel mis sur le renversement de Saddam,   <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>As the administration plotted to overthrow Hussein&rsquo;s government, U.S. officials said this week, it failed to fully appreciate the force of Shiite aspirations and is now concerned that those sentiments could coalesce into a fundamentalist government. Some administration officials were dazzled by Ahmed Chalabi, the prominent Iraqi exile who is a Shiite and an advocate of a secular democracy. Others were more focused on the overriding goal of defeating Hussein and paid little attention to the dynamics of religion and politics in the region.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>It is a complex equation, and the U.S. government is ill-equipped to figure out how this is going to shake out, a State Department official said. I don&rsquo;t think anyone took a step backward and asked, What are we looking for?&rsquo; The focus was on the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Complicating matters is that the United States has virtually no diplomatic relationship with Iran, leaving U.S. officials in the dark about the goals and intentions of the government in Tehran. The Iranian government is the patron of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the leading Iraqi Shiite group.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; Sur ce qu&rsquo;on attend de l&rsquo;\u00e9volution de la situation en Irak, dans la logique de la pr\u00e9paration am\u00e9ricaine, <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>U.S. intelligence reports reaching top officials throughout the government this week said the Shiites appear to be much more organized than was thought. On Monday, one meeting of generals and admirals at the Pentagon evolved into a spontaneous teach-in on Iraq&rsquo;s Shiites and the U.S. strategy for containing Islamic fundamentalism in Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The administration hopes the U.S.-led war in Iraq will lead to a crescent of democracies in Iraq, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, the Israeli-occupied territories and Saudi Arabia. But it could just as easily spark a renewed fervor for Islamic rule in the crescent, officials said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>This is a 25-year project, one three-star general officer said. Everyone agreed it was a huge risk, and the outcome was not at all clear.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; La situation a \u00e9volu\u00e9 de fa\u00e7on telle,  en quelques jours,  qu&rsquo;on en vient d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e0 regretter Saddam Hussein ou, dans tous les cas, son syst\u00e8me, <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>U.S. officials are hoping to combat fundamentalism by helping the Iraqis build a secular education system. Before 1991, Iraq had what was regarded as one of the finest education systems in the region, but years of economic sanctions have devastated it.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The most radical aspects of Islam are in places with no education at all but the Koran, an official said. There is no math, no culture. You counter that [fundamentalism] by doing something with the education system.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; Enfin, pour tout dire, voici ce qui s&rsquo;est pass\u00e9 : les Am\u00e9ricains ont fait un formidable montage pour emporter la bataille menant \u00e0 la d\u00e9cision d&rsquo;attaquer, ils ont accept\u00e9 des inventions, des constructions, des pr\u00e9visions heureuses,  et, au bout du compte, ils y ont cru eux-m\u00eames, dur comme fer&#8230; <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>They expected a much warmer reception, and as a result it would be unnecessary for them to deal with some of these issues, said Kenneth M. Pollack, a Brookings Institution scholar, who was one of President Bill Clinton&rsquo;s top Iraq specialists. That flawed assumption is at the heart of some of the reasons they are scrambling now.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t&#8230; Le probl\u00e8me est certes : \u00ab <em>scrambling<\/em> \u00bb pour quoi ? Puisqu&rsquo;ils font les m\u00eames erreurs depuis qu&rsquo;ils s&rsquo;int\u00e9ressent \u00e0 l&rsquo;ext\u00e9rieur, puisqu&rsquo;ils n&rsquo;apprennent rien, il n&rsquo;existe aucune raison au monde pour que cela change. L&rsquo;Irak sera un d\u00e9sastre am\u00e9ricain de plus.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEn attendant, l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique washingtonienne a d\u00e9cid\u00e9 de se lancer dans sa politique habituelle : elle avertit l&rsquo;Iran (menace implicite d&rsquo;usage de la force) et elle annonce qu&rsquo;il n&rsquo;y aura pas de gouvernement de tendance islamiste, <a href=\"http:\/\/news.independent.co.uk\/world\/middle_east\/story.jsp?story=400441\" class=\"gen\">rendant ainsi furieux les chiites d&rsquo;Irak.<\/a><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>La litanie des erreurs am\u00e9ricaines 26 avril 2003 Les planificateurs am\u00e9ricains commencent \u00e0 se douter de quelque chose. L&rsquo;agitation chiite en Irak commence \u00e0 faire na\u00eetre quelque doute sur l&rsquo;aisance avec laquelle on attend que la situation en Irak se r\u00e9solve (d&rsquo;elle-m\u00eame, quasiment). L&rsquo;article publi\u00e9 le 23 avril par le Washington Post est un concentr\u00e9&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3104,857],"class_list":["post-65588","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-cia","tag-irak"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65588","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65588"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65588\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65588"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65588"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65588"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}