{"id":65631,"date":"2003-06-02T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-06-02T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/06\/02\/le-gop-devient-il-un-parti-unique\/"},"modified":"2003-06-02T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-06-02T00:00:00","slug":"le-gop-devient-il-un-parti-unique","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/06\/02\/le-gop-devient-il-un-parti-unique\/","title":{"rendered":"Le GOP devient-il un \u201cparti unique\u201d?<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Le GOP devient-il un parti unique?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t2 juin 2003 On revient ici sur un texte d’analyse du c\u00e9l\u00e8bre commentateur de tendance lib\u00e9rale E.J. Dionne, publi\u00e9, de fa\u00e7on assez anodine, le 30 mai dans le Seattle Times<\/a>. Sous le titre \u00ab Bush-GOP ferocity alters American politics<\/em> \u00bb (GOP pour Great Old Party<\/em>, surnom du parti r\u00e9publicain), E.J. Dionne observe la fin d’une \u00e9poque, ce qui pourrait s’av\u00e9rer \u00e9galement comme la fin d’un syst\u00e8me, ou, disons avec un semblant d’arri\u00e8re-pens\u00e9e, la fin de la couverture vertueuse d’un syst\u00e8me.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’\u00e9quipe GW a balay\u00e9 les anciennes conceptions, fond\u00e9es sur la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 du compromis, le syst\u00e8me bipartisan, la coop\u00e9ration entre d\u00e9mocrates et r\u00e9publicains, et, surtout, tout ce qui faisait l’autonomie du Congr\u00e8s face au pouvoir ex\u00e9cutif. C’\u00e9tait le fondement de l’\u00e9quilibre des pouvoirs et ce qui faisait la vertu d\u00e9mocratique du syst\u00e8me, ce qui pourrait \u00eatre interpr\u00e9t\u00e9 aujourd’hui, \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de l’analyse de Dionne et en acceptant ses perspectives les plus radicales comme ceci : tout ce qui faisait l’apparence<\/strong> de la vertu d\u00e9mocratique du syst\u00e8me.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Until now, Congress was a forcefully independent branch of government. Presidents as diverse as Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, Carter, Clinton and even Reagan could not count on automatic support from members of their own party in the House and Senate.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Only President Lyndon B. Johnson had the power to see his programs to passage largely unscathed. And he had that power for only two years, 1965 and 1966, when Democrats enjoyed 2-1 majorities in both houses.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb With a very slim congressional majority, Bush would have been expected to seek genuine compromise under the old rules. But Washington has become so partisan and Bush is so determined to push through a domestic program based almost entirely on tax cuts for the wealthy that a remarkably radical program is winning despite the odds against it and lukewarm public support.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb This is a shock to congressional Democrats, most of whom came to political maturity under the old arrangements that placed a heavy emphasis on comity and the search for the political center. In all the years when progressive interest groups and foundations were attacking partisanship as a dismal force in politics, conservatives such as presidential adviser Karl Rove, antitax activist Grover Norquist, Tom DeLay and, yes, Newt Gingrich, were building a great Republican machine. The new tax bill is a monument to their success.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tQue peuvent faire les d\u00e9mocrates ? Dionne observe qu’ils r\u00e9agissent par un resserrement de leurs rangs, une unit\u00e9 politique sans faille. Mais ils ne font l\u00e0 que r\u00e9pondre \u00e0 la nouvelle situation impos\u00e9e par l’\u00e9quipe Bush. Ils r\u00e9sistent \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur d’un nouveau syst\u00e8me impos\u00e9 par l’administration et, ce faisant, paradoxalement ils renforcent ce nouveau syst\u00e8me qui signifie pour l’instant leur mise \u00e0 l’\u00e9cart. Ils jouent le jeu d’un parti r\u00e9publicain qui est en train d’imposer des lois de fonctionnement nouvelles.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Faced with an administration intent on moving the political center to the right, Democrats are torn between old impulses and a recognition of the new order. This week, Democrats were by turn patting themselves on the back for their own unity and acknowledging the new world Rove, Norquist and Co. have created.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Democratic unity was impressive, especially by past standards. In the Senate, only two Democrats Zell Miller of Georgia and Ben Nelson of Nebraska supported Bush’s tax bill on final passage. Sen. Evan Bayh of Indiana mystified his Democratic colleagues by voting for one version of the Bush plan and then voting against the final bill worked out by Republican leaders. One Democrat suggested that given the current mood, Bayh’s two-step may have succeeded only in alienating base voters in both parties. In the House, only seven of 205 Democrats voted for final passage of the tax bill.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb But in holding together, said one Democratic senator, his colleagues were only responding to a dynamic Bush himself created. Unlike his predecessors, Bush has boldly tied his own fate to the fate of his party. Bush’s intense campaigning for Republicans in the 2002 elections convinced them to stand with him and convinced Democrats that Bush would oppose them no matter how they voted.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tIl s’agit d’une \u00e9volution inattendue et compl\u00e8tement remarquable, et cela pourrait constituer \u00e0 terme une r\u00e9volution pour la vie politique am\u00e9ricaine : \u00ab Bush promised to change the ways of Washington. He has succeeded brilliantly, but not by creating the new tone of respect and bipartisanship he promised in 2000. The new tone in Washington is not bipartisan, but hyperpartisan.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’Am\u00e9rique est un pays sans \u00c9tat au sens r\u00e9galien du terme. Du point de vue politique, on pourrait la d\u00e9finir comme une particratie absolue. En France, quand un parti domine la vie politique (l’\u00c9tat-UDR), ou m\u00eame en Belgique (l’\u00c9tat-CVP, pour marquer la domination pendant 40 ans du parti social-chr\u00e9tien flamand), il reste des valeurs qui \u00e9chappent \u00e0 cette situation : l’esprit de l’\u00c9tat r\u00e9galien en France, la royaut\u00e9 en Belgique ; ces valeurs sont assez fortes pour \u00e9carter l’aspect dictatorial de cette domination et permettre la transition avec d’autres situations. Il n’existe rien de semblable en Am\u00e9rique. Jusqu’ici, la relative autonomie du Congr\u00e8s, le bipartisanship<\/em> dans d’autres circonstances, servaient \u00e0 \u00e9carter la dictature d’un parti. Dans la nouvelle situation que d\u00e9crit E.J. Dionne, ces r\u00e9f\u00e9rences n’existent plus.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa situation se rapproche aujourd’hui d’une sorte de situation de parti unique avec un deuxi\u00e8me parti qui ne sait plus tr\u00e8s bien \u00e0 quoi il sert, et s’il sert encore \u00e0 quelque chose. Le probl\u00e8me n\u00b01, chronologiquement, est que ce deuxi\u00e8me parti qui ne repr\u00e9sente plus rien, repr\u00e9sente, en r\u00e9alit\u00e9, 50% des votants ; le probl\u00e8me n\u00b02 est de savoir ce qui se passera lorsqu’une \u00e9lection pr\u00e9sidentielle d\u00e9bouchera sur la victoire du candidat de ce deuxi\u00e8me parti, du parti marginalis\u00e9. Comment le parti qui d\u00e9tient tous les pouvoirs acceptera-t-il une situation nouvelle o\u00f9, sans perdre beaucoup de sa puissance de repr\u00e9sentation, il serait conduit \u00e0 perdre l’essentiel de ses pouvoirs ? Au mieux, la transition sera g\u00e9n\u00e9ratrice de tensions et d’un certain d\u00e9sordre politique.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Le GOP devient-il un parti unique? 2 juin 2003 On revient ici sur un texte d’analyse du c\u00e9l\u00e8bre commentateur de tendance lib\u00e9rale E.J. Dionne, publi\u00e9, de fa\u00e7on assez anodine, le 30 mai dans le Seattle Times. Sous le titre \u00ab Bush-GOP ferocity alters American politics \u00bb (GOP pour Great Old Party, surnom du parti r\u00e9publicain),… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[4027,4028,3248],"class_list":["post-65631","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-dionne","tag-particratie","tag-washington"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65631","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65631"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65631\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65631"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65631"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65631"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}