{"id":65636,"date":"2003-06-07T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-06-07T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/06\/07\/pourquoi-les-britanniques-se-sont-ils-trompes-en-janvier-mars-2003-iraq-post-mortem\/"},"modified":"2003-06-07T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-06-07T00:00:00","slug":"pourquoi-les-britanniques-se-sont-ils-trompes-en-janvier-mars-2003-iraq-post-mortem","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/06\/07\/pourquoi-les-britanniques-se-sont-ils-trompes-en-janvier-mars-2003-iraq-post-mortem\/","title":{"rendered":"Pourquoi les Britanniques se sont-ils tromp\u00e9s en janvier-mars 2003? \u2014 Iraq post mortem<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Pourquoi les Britanniques se sont-ils tromp\u00e9s en janvier-mars 2003?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tCi-dessous, nous pr\u00e9sentons une analyse de Charles Grant, publi\u00e9e dans Prospect Magazine,<\/a> sur un aspect bien particulier des \u00e9v\u00e9nements : l’attitude du Royaume-Uni en janvier-mars, pour faire voter une deuxi\u00e8me r\u00e9solution \u00e0 l’ONU autorisant l’attaque de l’Irak. Observ\u00e9 selon un oeil sympathique mais lucide (et m\u00eame d\u00e9sol\u00e9, si l’on peut dire \u00e7a d’un oeil), expos\u00e9 dans des termes mesur\u00e9s et amicaux, c’est l’expos\u00e9 d’un formidable \u00e9chec conceptuel d’un des plus brillants appareils diplomatiques du monde, celui du Royaume-Uni, bien entendu.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t[D’abord un mot de Charles Grant, Directeur du Center for European Reform. D’un certain point de vue, ou selon une certaine \u00e9poque, assez proche de Blair. C’est lui, Grant, ancien journaliste de The Economist<\/em> reconverti dans l’expertise, qui servit de relais et de poisson-pilote pour les premiers coups de sonde des Britanniques vers les autres Europ\u00e9ens (les Fran\u00e7ais) \u00e0 propos de ce qui allait devenir l’initiative de Saint-Malo (d\u00e9cembre 1998) sur la d\u00e9fense europ\u00e9enne. Grant est donc assez proche de Blair, mais du c\u00f4t\u00e9 europ\u00e9en de Blair.]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl faut lire avec attention ce document passionnant. Il nous explique in fine<\/em>, entre les lignes, peut-\u00eatre sans que l’auteur le veuille ou\/et n’en ait conscience, l’une des trag\u00e9dies de notre temps. Le Royaume-Uni est engag\u00e9 dans une politique dont il est oblig\u00e9 de se dissimuler \u00e0 lui-m\u00eame la profonde faiblesse, la r\u00e9elle fausset\u00e9, la tr\u00e8s grande incoh\u00e9rence et, ce qui n’est pas le moindre des maux pour un tel pays, la compl\u00e8te indignit\u00e9. Cette politique faible et fausse, incoh\u00e9rente et indigne, est appuy\u00e9e sur un exercice strat\u00e9gique quotidien caract\u00e9ris\u00e9 par la contradiction la plus compl\u00e8te.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Le lourd fardeau des insupportables incoh\u00e9rences et contradictions d’une politique si brillamment et glorieusement ex\u00e9cut\u00e9e<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tToute la politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re et de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du Royaume-Uni est fond\u00e9e en principe sur la protection et le renforcement de la souverainet\u00e9 et de l’ind\u00e9pendance nationales. L’axe essentiel de cette politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re et d’ind\u00e9pendance s’appuie sur une alliance qui en est l’antith\u00e8se puisqu’elle implique une compl\u00e8te soumission \u00e0 la politique am\u00e9ricaine, voire, bien souvent, aux caprices et \u00e0 la brutalit\u00e9 am\u00e9ricaine. Une alliance avec une puissance beaucoup plus forte que soi est d\u00e9j\u00e0 difficile \u00e0 assurer selon des notions d’\u00e9quilibre et de respect mutuel, mais que dire quand cette puissance est l’Am\u00e9rique, puissance unilat\u00e9raliste, isolationniste inward-looking<\/em>, exceptionnaliste, ne voyant le monde qu’\u00e0 travers sa propre position g\u00e9ographique, culturelle, donc selon une vision extraordinairement ethnocentrique ? Pour survivre dans cet imbroglio psychologique, la politique britannique s’invente des mythes qui sacrifient, comme c’est normal dans ce cas si marqu\u00e9 par la contradiction, aux contradictions les plus flagrantes. On r\u00e9sume, en en proposant deux, qui dominent les autres et nous offrent effectivement une contradiction consid\u00e9rable :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Le mythe de l’extraordinaire capacit\u00e9 du Royaume-Uni \u00e0 manoeuvrer les USA de fa\u00e7on subtile et efficace, de fa\u00e7on \u00e0 ce que les USA fassent la politique que le Royaume-Uni d\u00e9sire faire pour ses propres int\u00e9r\u00eats, jusqu’\u00e0 l’id\u00e9e extr\u00eame qu’on conna\u00eet que les USA, en faisant un empire, refont l’empire britannique perdu (c’est une sorte de puissance par d\u00e9l\u00e9gation ou d’empire par substitution). Ce point suppose de fa\u00e7on pressante et indiscutable que les USA sont une puissance consid\u00e9rable mais grossi\u00e8re, peu subtile, impressionnable et manipulable.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Le mythe de la proximit\u00e9, pratiquement jusqu’au cousinage, entre les USA et lui-m\u00eame (le Royaume-Uni), bas\u00e9 sur le mythe g\u00e9n\u00e9ral anglo-saxon et pas mal d’arrogance et de suffisance. Ce point suppose que les USA, tout en \u00e9tant d’une puissance consid\u00e9rable, ont les m\u00eames vertus que le Royaume-Uni qui sont les vertus anglo-saxonnes, \u00e0 savoir (et entre autres car les Anglo-Saxons sont g\u00e2t\u00e9s) la subtilit\u00e9, le r\u00e9alisme mesur\u00e9, le sang-froid et la souplesse.<\/p>\n

Une attitude psychologique complexe, presque un aveuglement volontaire pour se faire croire que leur politique est la bonne<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tLe r\u00e9sultat de cette pr\u00e9paration psychologique par rapport \u00e0 l’\u00e9pisode de cette p\u00e9riode cruciale de janvier-mars 2003 est un aveuglement constant des Britanniques sur les r\u00e9elles intentions des uns et des autres (Fran\u00e7ais, Allemands, Russes, les autres du Conseil de S\u00e9curit\u00e9) ; aveuglement port\u00e9 avec \u00e9l\u00e9gance, s\u00fbret\u00e9 de soi et, au bout du compte, ce que Grant d\u00e9signe comme un optimisme contagieux et qui pourrait \u00eatre aussi qualifi\u00e9, par une plume moins indulgente (la n\u00f4tre ?), de stup\u00e9fiante arrogance lorsqu’on consid\u00e8re les circonstances et l’enjeu. A c\u00f4t\u00e9 de cela, compl\u00e9ment indispensable ou cerise sur le g\u00e2teau, il y eut dans le chef de l’appareil diplomatique britannique une non moins extraordinaire cr\u00e9dulit\u00e9, voire de la na\u00efvet\u00e9, devant les affirmations am\u00e9ricaines.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab …Why did the government machine get things wrong? I am not sure of the answer, but part of it must be that Blair himself is so infectiously optimistic. He does tend to believe in his own very considerable powers of persuasion. His \u00a0\u00bbcan-do\u00a0\u00bb approach to problem solving often rubs off on those around him. Some of Blair’s officials seem in awe of his charisma.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Another part of the answer is that the machine is sometimes too willing to believe what the Americans say. The state department advised that the Africans and Latin Americans on the UN security council would back a second resolution-but they never did. The national security council, under the leadership of Condoleezza Rice-a noted Russia expert-stuck with the view that Putin would not oppose the US. And some of the Pentagon advice was that the fighting would be over in a week or so a prediction that turned out only a little over-optimistic.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tIl faudrait explorer l’inconscient britannique, en ayant \u00e0 l’esprit que ce comportement vis-\u00e0-vis des Am\u00e9ricains n’est pas nouveau. Il y a un tel sacrifice de l’\u00e9tat d’esprit national, une telle humiliation subie constamment par les Britanniques du fait des Am\u00e9ricains, qu’il serait normal que les Britanniques en arrivent inconsciemment \u00e0 vouloir interpr\u00e9ter faussement les situations, pour redresser leur avantage, et \u00e0 charger les Am\u00e9ricains de vertus qu’ils n’ont pas, justifiant ainsi les sacrifices de fiert\u00e9 nationale bafou\u00e9e qu’ils font r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement. De l\u00e0, pour leur compte, \u00e0 croire \u00e9galement tout ce que disent les Am\u00e9ricains, comme un vulgaire citoyen US devant la propagande de son gouvernement, il n’y a qu’un pas. Les Britanniques le franchissent de plus en plus souvent, ce qui est une bonne mesure de la crise. Dans le cas qui nous occupe, le pas est malheureusement franchi dans une circonstance extr\u00eamement co\u00fbteuse pour les Britanniques. Une telle attitude inconsciente aurait pour r\u00e9sultat de se faire croire \u00e0 soi-m\u00eame la justesse de cette politique rationnellement injustifiable. Mais l’on comprend que ces psychologies soumises \u00e0 de telles pressions sacrifient \u00e0 cet habillage de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t[Tout cela n’est pas une r\u00e9flexion gratuite, au regard des plus r\u00e9cents \u00e9v\u00e9nements. Dans cette affaire, l’enjeu \u00e9tait de taille. Si les Anglo-Am\u00e9ricains avaient pu faire voter une r\u00e9solution couvrant leur intervention, c’est toute la probl\u00e9matique des WMD introuvables depuis la mi-mai qui serait transform\u00e9e de fond en comble. Une telle r\u00e9solution eut impliqu\u00e9 que l’ONU elle-m\u00eame, et avec elle tous ceux qui auraient vot\u00e9 ou n’auraient pas oppos\u00e9 leur veto, acceptaient in fine<\/em> la th\u00e8se de l’existence de ces WMD. On n’aurait pas pu isoler si facilement les responsabilit\u00e9s, et provoquer les actuelles et pr\u00e9cises mises en question des r\u00f4les de Blair et de Bush.] <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Et encore : ont-ils vraiment chang\u00e9 ? Ont-ils retenu la le\u00e7on ? Le doute est permis<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tOn terminera sur un mot malheureux qui, malheureusement doit-on dire, tendrait \u00e0 montrer que les diplomates anglais n’ont toujours rien compris. Nous citons le passage : \u00ab We underestimated the dislike of the US around the world many small countries didn’t like being pushed around, said one senior Whitehall figure after the war was over. It did not go down well when the US said, we will go to the security council, but if there is no resolution, we shall go to war anyway’…we failed to pick up the warning signs of what was a kind of peasants’ revolt. <\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEffectivement, qualifier de r\u00e9volte des paysans le refus de s’abaisser de pays tels que le Mexique, le Chili, le Pakistan, etc, cela d\u00e9note une bien f\u00e2cheuse vision du monde et une arrogance que rien dans le traitement subi par les Britanniques de la part des Am\u00e9ricains ne saurait justifier. De tels mots impliquent de lourdes incompr\u00e9hensions. Apr\u00e8s cela (mais avant aussi), les Britanniques ne devraient pas \u00eatre \u00e9tonn\u00e9s d’\u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9s quasi-unanimement comme les cireurs de pompes des Am\u00e9ricains. A ce compte, on pr\u00e9f\u00e8re \u00eatre des paysans, qui plus est qui se r\u00e9voltent.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Iraq post mortem 1 <\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

\tThere are lessons to be learned from the mistakes made in the heart of government that led to Britain’s defeat at the UN<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tby Charles Grant, director of the Centre for European Reform, Prospect Magazine, June 2003<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAfter the victory of coalition forces in Iraq, many people forgot the diplomatic defeat which preceded the conflict. With the benefit of hindsight, the US and Britain would have been better advised never to try for that second UN resolution, but simply to say-as they ended up saying-that resolution 1441 and earlier resolutions provided sufficient cover for military action. The fact that they tried and failed to win further UN backing made the war seem less legitimate than if they had never tried. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBritain and the US should have listened more attentively to the French, who by the turn of the year were strongly advising them not to go for a second resolution. The thrust of the French message was: \u00a0\u00bbIf you must go to war, do it on the basis of 1441; we would criticise you, although moderately. However, if you seek another resolution to authorise war, we shall fight against it.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBush would have been happy not to return to the UN, but Blair wanted the resolution to secure Labour party support for the war. So it was important for Blair to go through the motions of being seen to try to get UN backing-and that would have been the case even if he had thought the effort would fail. But the government believed it would get the resolution. When it did not, Blair was saved by Chirac’s behaviour which was (in British eyes) so unreasonable that France could be blamed for the absence of UN cover. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThis is not a story of a particular department or individual making mistakes. Downing Street and the cabinet office, the foreign office and the ministry of defence are much more closely integrated than their equivalents in Washington, Berlin or Paris. And the individuals involved are mostly highly intelligent and committed people who work unbelievably long hours in the service of their country. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tHowever, the system as a whole got some things wrong. In the words of one senior Whitehall figure: \u00a0\u00bbSomething was moving between France and Germany which we did not understand, and the US did not try hard enough with Russia…We did not read the French right, and we got Russia wrong.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWhat is surprising is that so many people in London remained so optimistic for so long. When I visited Moscow in mid-February, many Russian officials told me that President Putin was prepared to use a veto to prevent a UN security council resolution. I did not believe them, thinking that Putin would not want to endanger his new friendship with Bush. But back in Britain, I relayed what I had heard to a senior figure in the government. He told me that what I had been told was rubbish. Putin would agree with the last person he spoke to, he said, and that person would be George W Bush. This figure then told me he was certain that the resolution would gain a minimum of nine or ten votes in favour. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe government also thought it unlikely that the French would dare to veto the resolution. Of course, it is easy to be wise after the event and if Germany and Russia had not remained firmly in the French camp, Chirac might have hesitated before threatening a veto. However, I made a trip to Paris at the end of January and I went to see several senior figures in the French administration who know me well enough to speak very frankly. They all assured me that Chirac was determined not to allow the passage of any UN resolution that gave diplomatic cover for war in Iraq. It was evident from these conversations that Chirac was not listening to the advice of some of his key officials, who were counselling a more cautious strategy. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tShocked by what I had heard, I wrote a short note to some of my Whitehall contacts, explaining that I could see no chance of Chirac softening his line on a second resolution. Some British diplomats shared my view, but the government as a whole continued to believe for at least another month that the French would become more flexible. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSome foreign office diplomats blame Downing Street for the excessive optimism-yet some overseas embassies shared that rosy view. Why did the government machine get things wrong? I am not sure of the answer, but part of it must be that Blair himself is so infectiously optimistic. He does tend to believe in his own very considerable powers of persuasion. His \u00a0\u00bbcan-do\u00a0\u00bb approach to problem solving often rubs off on those around him. Some of Blair’s officials seem in awe of his charisma. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAnother part of the answer is that the machine is sometimes too willing to believe what the Americans say. The state department advised that the Africans and Latin Americans on the UN security council would back a second resolution-but they never did. The national security council, under the leadership of Condoleezza Rice-a noted Russia expert-stuck with the view that Putin would not oppose the US. And some of the Pentagon advice was that the fighting would be over in \u00a0\u00bba week or so\u00a0\u00bb-a prediction that turned out only a little over-optimistic. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbWe underestimated the dislike of the US around the world-many small countries didn’t like being pushed around,\u00a0\u00bb said one senior Whitehall figure after the war was over. \u00a0\u00bbIt did not go down well when the US said, ‘we will go to the security council, but if there is no resolution, we shall go to war anyway’…..we failed to pick up the warning signs of what was a kind of peasants’ revolt.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThat honesty is impressive-but also alarming, given how much money Britain spends on embassies and intelligence services. Perhaps the people in Whitehall should make greater use of foreign correspondents, who sometimes have a good understanding of what is going on in their host countries. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThere are at least a couple of lessons to be learned from this affair. One is that the British government should not believe everything the Americans tell it. The other is that Blair might benefit from having a senior political figure close by, to question the advice of officials-and challenge his own judgements. In the words of one foreign office man, \u00a0\u00bbevery prime minister needs a Willy [Whitelaw].\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Pourquoi les Britanniques se sont-ils tromp\u00e9s en janvier-mars 2003? Ci-dessous, nous pr\u00e9sentons une analyse de Charles Grant, publi\u00e9e dans Prospect Magazine, sur un aspect bien particulier des \u00e9v\u00e9nements : l’attitude du Royaume-Uni en janvier-mars, pour faire voter une deuxi\u00e8me r\u00e9solution \u00e0 l’ONU autorisant l’attaque de l’Irak. Observ\u00e9 selon un oeil sympathique mais lucide (et m\u00eame… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[2863,3584,3774,3478,2758],"class_list":["post-65636","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-analyse","tag-foreign","tag-grant","tag-office","tag-onu","tag-uk"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65636","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65636"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65636\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65636"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65636"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65636"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}