{"id":65644,"date":"2003-06-12T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-06-12T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/06\/12\/la-doctrine-de-la-guerre-preventive-pulverisee\/"},"modified":"2003-06-12T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-06-12T00:00:00","slug":"la-doctrine-de-la-guerre-preventive-pulverisee","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/06\/12\/la-doctrine-de-la-guerre-preventive-pulverisee\/","title":{"rendered":"La doctrine de la guerre pr\u00e9ventive pulv\u00e9ris\u00e9e<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

La doctrine de la guerre pr\u00e9ventive pulv\u00e9ris\u00e9e<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t12 juin 2003 Cette analyse du r\u00e9seau PINR<\/a> pose le constat tr\u00e8s int\u00e9ressant qu’avec la crise d’apr\u00e8s-guerre des WMD irakiens qu’on n’arrive pas \u00e0 retrouver, c’est toute la strat\u00e9gie d’attaque pr\u00e9ventive qui est mise en question, avant m\u00eame d’exister, en un sens, puisque l’attaque contre l’Irak est la premi\u00e8re application de cette strat\u00e9gie.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’attaque contre l’Irak s’est faite selon la th\u00e8se que les Irakiens pouvaient \u00eatre sur le point de se servir d’un arsenal de WMD, qu’on d\u00e9crivait par ailleurs comme consid\u00e9rable. Cette description \u00e9tait bas\u00e9e sur les donn\u00e9es du renseignement am\u00e9ricain, le plus puissant du monde et, d’une certaine fa\u00e7on, le plus puissant qu’on puisse imaginer. Si ce renseignement s’av\u00e8re aussi mauvais et trompeur qu’il puisse annoncer des quantit\u00e9s consid\u00e9rables de WMD qui n’existent pas et autoriser de fa\u00e7on trompeuse de lancer une telle guerre, c’est toute la possibilit\u00e9 d’une guerre pr\u00e9ventive qui s’effondre. Une guerre pr\u00e9ventive n’est concevable que si les informations qu’on a sur la cible potentielle sont justes, et justifient effectivement que le pays consid\u00e9r\u00e9 devienne une cible. L’Irak d\u00e9ment tout cela.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe paradoxe de cette affaire, on le comprend bien, c’est que ce raisonnement qui est en train de faire une strat\u00e9gie mort-n\u00e9e de la strat\u00e9gie d’attaque pr\u00e9ventive est bas\u00e9 sur une manipulation consid\u00e9rable, qui ne met pas n\u00e9cessairement en cause le renseignement. Celui-ci, dans la r\u00e9alit\u00e9, avant la manipulation, laissait effectivement appara\u00eetre que le danger d’armes de destruction massive en Irak \u00e9tait r\u00e9duit, sinon nul. Ce serait alors que les cr\u00e9ateurs de la guerre pr\u00e9ventive, dans leur h\u00e2te d’appliquer cette strat\u00e9gie, l’auraient irr\u00e9m\u00e9diablement compromise.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Credibility and Pre-emptive War Doctrine<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tDrafted by Matthew Riemer on June 12, 2003, PINR<\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWith the invasion of Iraq and overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the United States has introduced the world to the doctrine and practice of preemptive war: when one country attacks another due to that other country’s latent power or likelihood of doing the attacking country harm. Preemptive war must have a definitive and compelling reason to warrant this kind of military <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tintercourse; moreover, this reason must be universal enough to garner global sympathy. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSince the public discourse on preemption with regard to Iraq began well over a year ago, Washington and London’s official reason advanced not only to the American and British people, but to the governments and residents of the world, was that of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); other less politically significant but generally accepted reasons were also featured, such as Saddam’s crimes against humanity, but WMD remained the cornerstone on which the case was built. It was a favorite topic of both U.S. President George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, as well as most of their subordinates. And though, before the U.S.’ preemptive invasion of Iraq even began, people around the world had gathered in unprecedented numbers to protest such an action, many others felt this reason convincing. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe existence of WMD was the point of greatest contention during the pre-war debate and even though the war has come and gone has remained so. The focus in both cases, however, is not necessarily WMD but the intelligence and information that led London and Washington to apparently believe, and then pass that conviction onto the general public, that WMD existed in dangerous quantities in Iraq and represented an imminent danger to global <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tsecurity. It is this data presented by the Bush and Blair governments that has been and is continuing to be challenged, refuted, and even proved fraudulent. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn an address to the United Nations, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell presented forged documents as key evidence while making the United States’ defining statement for preemptive war in Iraq. Parts of a British dossier, highly touted by Tony Blair, were fraudulent and taken from a California college student’s research. The U.S. also allegedly possessed information <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tdescribing hundreds of WMD sites in Iraq, detailing kinds and quantities of chemicals stored there. But now that the main fighting in the war has concluded and the U.S. is ostensibly controlling Iraq, no traces of WMD have been discovered anywhere in the country for several weeks. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe groundswell of controversy caused by this most awkward of situations for Washington and London has now resulted in inquiries and much clamor in both capitals. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn England, Tony Blair has been coming under increased pressure as accusations of doctored intelligence and exaggerated information are creating headlines. There are now two separate investigations underway into the matter; one of these focused on a document claiming that Iraq could launch an attack in 45 minutes, which Blair then famously cited. In the <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUnited States, the CIA will now give lawmakers the information used by Colin Powell in his United Nations address containing the bogus intelligence about shipments of uranium from Africa.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe evolution of this situation will prove most important for the history of preemptive war as it illustrates one of the inherent flaws of decisions based entirely upon intelligence data. The fact that intelligence used to support preemptive action in Iraq is, in fact, a finite amount of data from a significantly larger pool, combined with the number of different sources <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tof information ranging from the CIA to the Pentagon to foreign intelligence agencies it is highly doubtful, critics say, that no manipulation or even favorable presentation ever takes place. And this is the very criticism now being laid on Washington’s doorstep by an array of <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tcritics who are increasingly finding a voice in the mainstream media in the U.S. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThis controversy has now given rise to the question: Can preemptive war be legitimately waged knowing that the data on which the preemptive element relies could be completely inaccurate?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIf the WMD issue becomes scandalous and represents a large percentage of headlines for weeks, the chances of either Washington or London being able to convince the world that another country such as Iran, Syria, or even North Korea is an imminent threat are low. In the long run, this situation may lead to a significant loss of credibility for not only George <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBush and Tony Blair as leading international statesmen but for their respective countries as well. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe Bush and Blair governments may have weakened their positions by forcing the invasion of Iraq. Barring some massive discovery revealing large stockpiles of WMD, the global forces opposed to the imperialist nature of the U.S.\/U.K. invasion of Iraq, will only be strengthened by this contentious atmosphere that even has those who typically support government <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpolicy crying foul about the unfolding WMD\/cooked intelligence drama. This could lead to grave political fall-outs for both leaders. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tA nightmare situation for the U.S. would be a continuing lack of WMD along with an increasingly unstable and unresolved Iraq. Not only would this put undue strains on a U.S. possibly in the position of striking another country, but it would also provide an example of what happens when the U.S. induces regime change. Such a situation may very well lead to a strategic advantage and diplomatic edge for countries such as Iran when dealing with <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tU.S. advances. U.S. threats will ring more hollow when backed by the faltering example of a festering Iraq. This is the last thing Washington wants on the world geopolitical stage as it goes ahead with its policy of active engagement in the Middle East.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

La doctrine de la guerre pr\u00e9ventive pulv\u00e9ris\u00e9e 12 juin 2003 Cette analyse du r\u00e9seau PINR pose le constat tr\u00e8s int\u00e9ressant qu’avec la crise d’apr\u00e8s-guerre des WMD irakiens qu’on n’arrive pas \u00e0 retrouver, c’est toute la strat\u00e9gie d’attaque pr\u00e9ventive qui est mise en question, avant m\u00eame d’exister, en un sens, puisque l’attaque contre l’Irak est la… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65644","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65644","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65644"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65644\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65644"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65644"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65644"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}