{"id":65689,"date":"2003-07-23T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-07-23T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/07\/23\/le-jsf-international-a-la-moulinette-du-gao\/"},"modified":"2003-07-23T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-07-23T00:00:00","slug":"le-jsf-international-a-la-moulinette-du-gao","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/07\/23\/le-jsf-international-a-la-moulinette-du-gao\/","title":{"rendered":"Le JSF international \u00e0 la moulinette du GAO<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Le JSF international \u00e0 la moulinette du GAO<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t23 juillet 2003 Le GAO (Government Accounting Office, Cour des Comptes US) a publi\u00e9 le 21 juillet 2003 un rapport sur le programme JSF. Ce texte est bas\u00e9 sur une inqui\u00e9tude fondamentale, qui concerne tout le programme, dans ses perspectives les plus larges, c’est-\u00e0-dire ses perspectives internationales. In fine<\/em>, la question qui est pos\u00e9e est celle-ci : le programme international du JSF n’est-il pas un danger mortel pour le programme JSF dans son ensemble ? (Le rapport envisage des probl\u00e8mes graves pour le programme, qu’il semble m\u00eame consid\u00e9rer comme in\u00e9luctables. En fait, ce rapport n’est pas autre chose qu’une r\u00e9flexion autour du th\u00e8me : le JSF va \u00e9videmment conna\u00eetre de graves probl\u00e8mes, notamment au niveau des co\u00fbts. Il faut en r\u00e9partir \u00e9quitablement les effets.) <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa question sur la coop\u00e9ration internationale n’est pas d\u00e9nu\u00e9e de sens. On a vu hier, \u00e0 propos de l’Eurofighter,<\/a> combien le difficile statut actuel de ce programme constitue le signe que les programmes de coop\u00e9ration internationale tels qu’on les con\u00e7oit en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, ou qu’on les concevait jusqu’alors (donc, le JSF y compris), sont des machines travaillant de fa\u00e7on destructrice contre l’\u00e9conomie de ces programmes. En effet, on rassemble en un seul programme des partenaires qui y apportent d’abord les exigences de leurs propres int\u00e9r\u00eats nationaux, et qui ont fort peu une vision concourant \u00e0 l’int\u00e9r\u00eat g\u00e9n\u00e9ral.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCe que dit le GAO est finalement assez paradoxal, si l’on consid\u00e8re les positions des uns et des autres (les coop\u00e9rants non US), se plaignant d’avoir des conditions tr\u00e8s difficiles qui sont faites par les USA. (Cas des Britanniques, cas des N\u00e9erlandais, cas des Norv\u00e9giens, etc.) Le GAO dit que les conditions actuelles du programme d\u00e9favorisent les Am\u00e9ricains (Lockheed Martin) et que cela doit changer, au profit des Am\u00e9ricains, certes. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCi-apr\u00e8s, extraits d’une synth\u00e8se du texte du GAO, qu’on peut trouver \u00e9galement au complet sur le site du m\u00eame GAO<\/a> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Yet international participation also presents a number of challenges. For example, while international partners can choose to share any future program cost increases, they are not required to do so under the terms of negotiated agreements. Therefore, the burden of any future increases may fall almost entirely on the United States. Technology transfer also presents challenges. The large number of export authorizations needed to share project information, solicit bids from partner suppliers, and execute contracts must be submitted and resolved in a timely manner to ensure that partner industry has the opportunity to compete for subcontracts and key contracts can be executed on schedule. Transfers of sensitive U.S. military technologies which are needed to achieve aircraft commonality goals will<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpush the boundaries of U.S. disclosure policy. While actions have been taken in an attempt to address these challenges, additional actions are needed to control costs and manage technology transfer.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Finally, if partners’ return-on-investment expectations are not met, support within their countries could deteriorate. To realize this return-on-investment, partners expect their industry to win JSF contracts through competition a departure from other cooperative programs, which directly link contract awards to financial contributions. If the prime contractor’s efforts to meet these expectations come into conflict with program cost, schedule, and performance goals, the program office will have to make decisions that balance these potentially competing interests.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tLe rapport du GAO demande au Pentagone de prendre des mesures. Celles-ci devraient n\u00e9cessairement aller dans le sens contraire que celui r\u00e9clam\u00e9 par les coop\u00e9rants non US, qui jugent que le programme ne leur a jusqu’ici pas apport\u00e9 ce qu’ils esp\u00e9raient. Il y a, bien entendu, dans cette exigence g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de garder et de replier le maximum d’\u00e9l\u00e9ments du programme aux USA une contradiction directe avec le sens m\u00eame, la philosophie du programme JSF.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe quotidien Financial Times<\/em> commentait hier :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The Pentagon should consider directing more of the contracts from the Dollars 200bn (Euros 154bn, Pounds 119bn) Joint Strike Fighter programme to US companies to reduce the number of complex technology export licences required for international subcontractors, Congress’s investigative arm recommended yesterday.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb According to a General Accounting Office report, Lockheed Martin, the project’s lead contractor, was forced to seek more than 400 export authorisations and amendments during the fighter jet’s demonstration phase; in the current development phase the number could exceed 1,000.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The volume of JSF export authorisations has taxed Lockheed Martin’s licensing resources, the report found, noting that normal risks such as cost overruns and schedule delays were likely to be worse because of the project’s global scale. International participation in the programme, while providing benefits, makes managing these challenges more difficult and places additional risk on (the Pentagon and Lockheed).<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tSi la critique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale du GAO est fond\u00e9e, comme on l’a vu, elle implique dans tous les cas une approche du dossier du JSF assez surprenante, ou bien, c’est une autre hypoth\u00e8se, qui annonce des pressions pour des changements fondamentaux dans les accords de coop\u00e9ration. C’est le cas lorsque le GAO \u00e9crit : \u00ab while international partners can choose to share any future program cost increases, they are not required to do so under the terms of negotiated agreements. Therefore, the burden of any future increases may fall almost entirely on the United States.<\/em> \u00bb Cette remarque pr\u00e9sage \u00e9videmment des pressions dans le sens de modifications des accords pass\u00e9s, dans tous les cas de la part du Congr\u00e8s, pour un partage plus \u00e9quitable des risques. Si, bien s\u00fbr, les observations du GAO ne sont en rien une obligation, si elles sont en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral ignor\u00e9es par l’ex\u00e9cutif, le l\u00e9gislatif, peut, au contraire, s’en servir pour renforcer ses exigences.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCela pourrait \u00eatre le cas aujourd’hui. Parall\u00e8lement \u00e0 cette \u00e9tude du GAO, il y a des indications, publi\u00e9es aujourd’hui dans un article alarmiste, sur les pressions du Congr\u00e8s pour un renforcement des conditions de transfert des technologies et d’acc\u00e8s des pays non US \u00e0 la coop\u00e9ration avec l’industrie d’armement. L’action du d\u00e9put\u00e9 Duncan Hunter, qu’on croyait devoir retraiter devant les pressions de l’ex\u00e9cutif, notamment du Pentagone, s’av\u00e8re extr\u00eamement solide<\/a>. Comme le signale l’article cit\u00e9 ici, qui refl\u00e8te bien l’inqui\u00e9tude des milieux du gouvernement et de la grande industrie de l’armement, l’action de Hunter semble ne pas pouvoir \u00eatre arr\u00eat\u00e9e, dans tous les cas en partie, et il y aura \u00e0 partir de 2004 des conditions encore plus difficiles (les actuelles le sont d\u00e9j\u00e0 suffisamment) pour l’acc\u00e8s des pays non US, y compris les plus fid\u00e8les alli\u00e9s, sur le march\u00e9 de la d\u00e9fense US. La seule solution, pour eux, devient celle des Britanniques, dans tous les cas qui est en train d’\u00eatre pr\u00e9par\u00e9e activement : l’abandon de toute souverainet\u00e9 et le bradage de BAE \u00e0 un des g\u00e9ants de la d\u00e9fense US.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Opposition to Hunter is so fierce that the defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, has said he will recommend that President George W. Bush veto the entire $400 billion 2004 Pentagon budget if Hunter does not back down. According to a White House statement, Hunter’s proposals are burdensome, counterproductive and have the potential to degrade U.S. military capabilities.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Such harsh words hardly faze Hunter, a 12-term California Republican and former army ranger, who is joined by other conservative House members and a number of small companies and unions that might benefit. In spite of the power and fury of his opponents, Washington analysts say Hunter will most likely get some of what he wants. If the American worker is going to pay for the defense of the free world, Hunter said in an interview, he should participate fully in the manufacture of military goods. This is a warning shot, a red flag. We need to have domestic sources for critical military components. No one argues with that. We just differ in the details. This Washington tale is rich in ironies. An administration that has been criticized for a go-it-alone attitude towards foreign affairs is now promoting more global military trade and claiming, in the White House statement, that Hunter’s efforts would undermine our efforts to promote cooperation with our allies.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tHunter a pour lui la logique de l’extr\u00e9misme, qui est celle qui triomphe aujourd’hui \u00e0 Washington. Cette logique qu’un Rumsfeld, qui d\u00e9nonce Hunter aujourd’hui, a port\u00e9 au niveau d’une fa\u00e7on d’\u00eatre ces derniers mois. Rumsfeld a fait des \u00e9mules ou, disons, il a trouv\u00e9 \u00e0 \u00eatre doubl\u00e9 sur sa droite, ou sur son extr\u00eame gauche, c’est selon, si on consid\u00e8re que l’actuel r\u00e9gime \u00e0 Washington aujourd’hui est plut\u00f4t d’essence r\u00e9volutionnaire.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Le JSF international \u00e0 la moulinette du GAO 23 juillet 2003 Le GAO (Government Accounting Office, Cour des Comptes US) a publi\u00e9 le 21 juillet 2003 un rapport sur le programme JSF. Ce texte est bas\u00e9 sur une inqui\u00e9tude fondamentale, qui concerne tout le programme, dans ses perspectives les plus larges, c’est-\u00e0-dire ses perspectives internationales.… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3285,826],"class_list":["post-65689","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-congres","tag-hunter"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65689","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65689"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65689\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65689"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65689"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65689"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}