{"id":65701,"date":"2003-08-05T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-08-05T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/08\/05\/suicide-dune-nation-par-lassitude-apres-tout-explication-de-texte-bae-turns-west\/"},"modified":"2003-08-05T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-08-05T00:00:00","slug":"suicide-dune-nation-par-lassitude-apres-tout-explication-de-texte-bae-turns-west","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/08\/05\/suicide-dune-nation-par-lassitude-apres-tout-explication-de-texte-bae-turns-west\/","title":{"rendered":"Suicide d’une nation, par lassitude apr\u00e8s tout, \u2014 Explication de texte, \u201cBAE turns west\u201d<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Suicide d’une nation, par lassitude apr\u00e8s tout, Explication de texte, BAE turns west <\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tAvant la rencontre Blair-GW Bush de la mi-juillet (19 juillet), on a beaucoup parl\u00e9 de la question des transferts de technologies entre USA et UK (les Britanniques tr\u00e8s m\u00e9contents par ce qu’ils obtiennent, ou plut\u00f4t ce qu’ils n’obtiennent pas ; les Am\u00e9ricains, immuables, qui laissent r\u00e9criminer et ne changent rien \u00e0 leur politique). A la veille de cette rencontre (le 15 juillet), le Financial Times<\/em> (FT) a publi\u00e9 un tr\u00e8s long article sur la question, et sur son aspect le plus dramatique qui est l’\u00e9ventuelle fusion de BAE avec un partenaire US.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’acc\u00e8s du quotidien britannique \u00e9tant limit\u00e9 dans le temps, nous reprenons, avec les r\u00e9serves d’usage, ce texte paru le 15 juillet 2003 dans le FT, sur la question des grandes fusions transatlantiques dans le domaine a\u00e9rospatial et de d\u00e9fense, pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment le britannique BAE avec un g\u00e9ant US. Le titre complet de l’article est : \u00ab BAE looks west: why Britain’s leading defence company believes the moment is ripe for a transatlantic link-up<\/em> \u00bb ; avec le sous-titre suivant : \u00ab The UK’s national champion’ is desperate to find a US partner to keep pace in a global technology race and Tony Blair’s government may no longer want to stand in its way<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNotez l’emploi du terme desperate<\/em>. On en retrouve d’autres, dans le texte, qui indiquent des \u00e9tats psychologiques extr\u00eames, qui en disent beaucoup plus sur le cas britannique que les arguments divers, qui sont souvent caract\u00e9ris\u00e9s par des contradictions ou des explications tordues qui en disent long. Nous avons rarement lu, sur un sujet d’habitude tr\u00e8s s\u00e9v\u00e8re et soumis aux seuls arguments \u00e9conomiques, surtout dans le FT, un texte illustrant implicitement un tel d\u00e9sarroi, une incertitude si grande. Ce texte illustre, selon nous, un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne \u00e9tonnant, qui est celui du suicide d’une nation, et d’une tr\u00e8s grande nation, qui se fait sous nos yeux stup\u00e9faits. Il est somme toute rassurant que, m\u00eame chez ceux qui plaident le plus fortement pour suivre cette voie, il y ait un soup\u00e7on, et m\u00eame plus qu’un soup\u00e7on d’incertitude, voire de tristesse, peut-\u00eatre de d\u00e9sespoir. (Ce texte est sans doute une variante plus lucide, plus d\u00e9senchant\u00e9e, moins joyeusement suicidaire, de la d\u00e9marche de Tony Blair que nous avons qualifi\u00e9e de servilit\u00e9 volontariste,<\/a> variante postmoderniste et n\u00e9cessairement sophistiqu\u00e9e de la th\u00e8se de ce cher \u00c9tienne de La Bo\u00e9tie<\/a>. On relira aussi avec int\u00e9r\u00eat un commentaire fulgurant de l’excellent historien William Pfaff<\/a> sur le sujet de ce suicide d’une nation.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tD’ailleurs, arr\u00eatez-vous \u00e0 cette contradiction du titre et du sous-titre, du point de vue \u00e9conomique et rationnel qui est celui que privil\u00e9gie le FT, et que doit privil\u00e9gier BAE (on le suppose) ; cette contradiction entre le moment qui est ripe<\/em> (m\u00fbr) pour une fusion avec les US, selon BAE, et ce m\u00eame BAE d\u00e9crit comme desperate to find a US partner<\/em>, entre un jugement qui voudrait se parer de la vertu de l’analyse rationnelle et un \u00e9tat d’esprit (le d\u00e9sespoir) qui m\u00e8ne \u00e0 ce jugement, qui est en substance, quel que soit son fondement, compl\u00e8tement irrationnel. C’est cette sorte de contraste si r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur qu’on rel\u00e8ve dans le texte de FT. Voyons voir.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• L’argument fondamental pour que BAE recherche une fusion avec un g\u00e9ant US, dans tous les cas l’argument RP (de relations publiques), c’est le sempiternel technological gap<\/em> avec les USA. On n’y va pas de main morte dans le commentaire : \u00ab Worse still, the widening technology gap could leave them a generation behind their US rivals when it comes to selling future equipment.<\/em> \u00bb Plus loin dans le texte, les deux auteurs pr\u00e9cisent tout de m\u00eame, et sans une seconde mettre en cause la vision compl\u00e8tement inverse qu’ils rapportent : \u00ab Thales, a purely French defence contractor, also believes that with a decent increase in research and development spending, Europe can keep up with the US companies. In some fields, such as sensor technology and Europe’s new, jointly produced cruise missile, Storm-<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tShadow, the French believe they are even ahead of US technology.<\/em> \u00bb Cette observation est extraordinaire et montre, \u00e0 la fois l’hypocrisie instinctive du propos et la terreur que quelque phrase d’affirmation britannique puisse faire froncer des sourcils am\u00e9ricains ; en effet, les Storm Shadow<\/em>, d\u00e9velopp\u00e9s par les Britanniques et les Fran\u00e7ais \u00e0 partir du Scalp<\/em> fran\u00e7ais, ont \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9s en Irak par la RAF. Les Britanniques ont \u00e9t\u00e9 les premiers \u00e0 constater l’efficacit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me, \u00e0 voir que les Am\u00e9ricains \u00e9taient tr\u00e8s impressionn\u00e9s par ces performances qui d\u00e9passent leurs propres cruise missiles, \u00e0 voir les Am\u00e9ricains s’int\u00e9resser au Storm Shadow<\/em> jusqu’\u00e0 envisager d’en acheter. Ils n’osent m\u00eame plus tirer la moindre gloire d’une prouesse technologique o\u00f9 ils sont partie prenante. (\u00c9trange ou significatif : ils en oublient d’accabler les Fran\u00e7ais, comme ils font d’habitude, et il y a dans l’\u00e9nonc\u00e9 de la phrase qui suit comme une admiration cach\u00e9e, une envie secr\u00e8te pour ces Fran\u00e7ais qui ne se sentent pas li\u00e9s par un devoir d’acquiescement \u00e0 toutes les billeves\u00e9es am\u00e9ricanistes : \u00ab Such brave talk from the French defence establishment…<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(On ne s’y trompera pas : la sup\u00e9riorit\u00e9 du Scalp<\/em>\/Storm Shadow<\/em> sur les cruise US ne peut \u00eatre tenue pour un accident, ou une exception. Un syst\u00e8me si complexe requiert une base technologique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale \u00e0 mesure, c’est-\u00e0-dire au moins \u00e9quivalente \u00e0 celle des USA. Apr\u00e8s cela, et apr\u00e8s bien d’autres exemples du m\u00eame tonneau, parlons du technological gap<\/em>)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Il y a un \u00e9trange m\u00e9lange dans ce texte. D’une part, il semble qu’on adopte par instants des arguments politiques. D’autre part, on sait que le FT, aussi bien que les dirigeants de BAE, et ceux des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s US, jugent en termes \u00e9conomiques, de masse financi\u00e8re, de profit, etc. D’o\u00f9 des contradictions qui semblent, \u00e0 certains moments, d\u00e9truire l’essentiel de l’argument, voire le tourner en compl\u00e8te d\u00e9rision. Ainsi nous est-il annonc\u00e9 d’abord que le moment est d\u00e9cisif, qu’il y a aujourd’hui une opportunit\u00e9 extraordinaire, \u00e0 saisir certes, pour BAE, aux USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab …the British defence establishment and its biggest contractor, BAE Systems, sense an opportunity that they cannot afford to miss.There will never be a better moment to press home this issue [of technology transfert, says Alex Nicoll, assistant director of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. We are at a peculiar juncture in history with the US and UK relationship so strong because of Iraq and continental European companies unable to build their US businesses for political reasons.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t… A c\u00f4t\u00e9 de cela, ou, plut\u00f4t, au contraire de cela, on nous annonce, quelques colonnes plus tard, que les conditions de fusion de BAE avec un Am\u00e9ricain sont tr\u00e8s mauvaises, parce qu’aucun Am\u00e9ricain n’est int\u00e9ress\u00e9 par BAE. Du coup, ce qui nous est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 comme un trait de g\u00e9nie, comme une strat\u00e9gie de superbe ampleur, peut appara\u00eetre aussi comme une tentative de la derni\u00e8re chance, comme une sorte de bradage… D\u00e8s lors, ce qui est d’abord pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 comme une opportunit\u00e9 extraordinaire qui doit irr\u00e9sistiblement renforcer la grande soci\u00e9t\u00e9 britannique, s’av\u00e8re \u00eatre une triste op\u00e9ration de sauvegarde d’une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 en train de couler irr\u00e9sistiblement, et bient\u00f4t l’on ne serait pas \u00e9tonn\u00e9 d’apprendre que BAE a \u00e9t\u00e9 propos\u00e9 \u00e0 Boeing pour le penny symbolique. De qui se moque-t-on ou, plut\u00f4t, de qui se moquent-ils sinon d’eux-m\u00eames ?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab A report drawn up by government appointed financial advisers also argues that BAE’s chances of pulling off a deal with one of the big five US contractors could deteriorate as its share price languishes and the technology gap grows ever wider. Already BAE’s market capitalisation is far short of the level needed for any of the US contractors to consider a true 50-50 merger.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The problem is likely to get worse before it gets better, says one banker to have studied the prospects of a deal. BAE will only fall further behind and the valuation gap is likely to grow rather than diminish over time.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb But it is far from being a done deal. Many observers doubt whether BAE can pull off such an ambitious transatlantic deal in the next year. One problem is that the company holds few attractions for a prospective US buyer.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t• Certainement, le plus impressionnant dans ce texte est la l\u00e9g\u00e8ret\u00e9 avec laquelle est trait\u00e9 l’argument de la souverainet\u00e9 et de l’ind\u00e9pendance nationale. Nul n’ignore qu’une vente de BAE \u00e0 un grand groupe am\u00e9ricain (m\u00eame si le terme fusion est employ\u00e9) signifierait en fait la cession de quelques-uns des domaines les plus essentiels de l’ind\u00e9pendance technologique du Royaume-Uni, c’est-\u00e0-dire sa souverainet\u00e9 et son ind\u00e9pendance nationale. On reste stup\u00e9fait devant l’esp\u00e8ce de fatalisme qui semble accompagner le constat de la chose, comme s’il y avait dans ce renoncement quelque chose d’in\u00e9luctable.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Britain’s dominant defence company believes it will probably have to give up independence entirely and merge with a larger US rival in order to gain full access to new military technology.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In different circumstances, BAE’s quest for a US partner would be expected to hit a political brick wall. Few governments have been willing to give up strategic control of their defence industries; BAE’s dramatic turn to the west threatens to undermine a series of European partnerships that Whitehall has been nurturing for decades.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The post-Iraq mood in Downing Street has produced a surprising degree of support for BAE’s ambitions. Some advisers believe that once the issue of technology transfer was resolved it might not be such a disaster to relinquish control of BAE, if it meant that the company’s British factories could continue to make modern equipment at competitive prices.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb …BAE has also resorted to tough tactics when negotiating contracts for new Hawk trainer jets, even sending forward-dated redundancy notices to factory workers to show the government the consequences of awarding the contract elsewhere.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Fed up with such behaviour, none in Whitehall worry much less than they used to about protecting a national champion from foreign takeover. Some in the Treasury even question whether things could get any worse under new management.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t• Le mot le plus terrible, ce sera le mot de la fin de ce commentaire qui n’a abord\u00e9 que les parties les plus visibles de cet article si significatif d’un \u00e9tat d’esprit, on le trouve dans l’extrait imm\u00e9diatement ci-dessus, qui semble contenir l’explication centrale de cette position de complet abandon, comme devant une fatalit\u00e9 du renoncement. C’est le mot (l’expression) Fed up<\/em> employ\u00e9 dans cette phrase terrible o\u00f9 il nous est dit qu’apr\u00e8s tout, il n’importe plus gu\u00e8re \u00e0 la bureaucratie du minist\u00e8re de la d\u00e9fense de prot\u00e9ger BAE (\u00ab Fed up with such behaviour, none in Whitehall worry much less than they used to about protecting a national champion from foreign takeover<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tComme on s’en doute, Blair est rentr\u00e9 de sa rencontre avec GW Bush sans beaucoup de gibier dans sa besace ; une promesse de mettre sur pied une commission anglo-am\u00e9ricaine o\u00f9 l’on parlerait de ces probl\u00e8mes de transfert de technologies. Entre-temps, le cirque Blair-Campbell & l’Irak avait repris \u00e0 Londres, avec la mort du professeur Kelly… Aux derni\u00e8res nouvelles, BAE attend toujours, avec sa s\u00e9bile tendue. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

BAE looks west: why Britain’s leading defence company believes the moment is ripe for a transatlantic link-up<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tThe UK’s national champion’ is desperate to find a US partner to keep pace in a global technology race and Tony Blair’s government may no longer want to stand in its way, write Dan Roberts and Peter Spiegel<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tAmong the list of diplomatic requests Tony Blair will take with him to Washington this week, one item will be watched with special interest by arms manufacturers and governments on both sides of the Atlantic. For Mr Blair’s trip has the potential to reshape the defence industry more dramatically than at any time since the end of the cold war.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe British prime minister is expected to press President George W. Bush for shared access to some of the Pentagon’s hottest military secrets: technology ranging from the software source <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tcodes at the heart of the latent fighter jets to electronic systems for controlling the digital battlefield.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDespite some encouragement from the White House The United Kingdom has earned the lasting gratitude of the American people for the enormous sacrifices it made, Mr Bush said last week Mr Blair’s mission would test the charm of James Bond. The UK govermnent is asking for access to the kind of information that would instil panic among US spy chiefs if it were pursued with such vigour by any other figure. Republican hawks in Congress remain opposed to the idea of sharing military technology at a time of international insecurity. Recriminations between US and British intelligence communities following reports about Iraqi attempts to secure uranium supplies do not augur for closer ties.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tElsewhere in Europe, the prospect of closely military ties between the US and Britain is viewed with suspicion and envy. ln part, continental defence manufacturers fear being frozen out of the giant US market entirely just at the moment it is growing fastest. Worse still, the widening technology gap could leave them a generation behind their US rivals when it comes to selling future equipment.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNo event signalled this risk more clearly than last month’s Paris air show, when many US defence contractors were happy to follow Pentagon requests for senior executives to stay <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\taway, as relatively little business was expected to take place in Paris anyway.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPolitically, if Britain and the US do integrate defence industries, further doubts would be raised about London’s commitment to an European defense. Yet the British defence establishment and its biggest contractor, BAE Systems, sense an opportunity that they cannot afford to miss. There will never be a better moment to press home this issue [of technology transfert, says Alex Nicoll, assistant director of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. We are at a peculiar juncture in history with the US and UK relationship so strong because of Iraq and continental European companies unable to build their US businesses for political reasons.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBAE is convinced that Mr Blair will have to use this window of opportunity to encourage even greater cooperation. Britain’s dominant defence company believes it will probably have to give up independence entirely and merge with a larger US rival in order to gain full access to new military technology.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWithout such a change of control, Mike Turner, BAE’s chief executive, believes the US will never be persuaded to hand over all the secrets and Britain’s defence industry risks falling <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpermanently behind. Somehow we’ve got to get that technology across the Atlantic, he argues. If you go back a few years, it was possible, even though Europe spent less money on technology, to stay relatively level with the US.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBut just prior to 9-11 and certainly after 9-11, it became clear the US was willing to spend a significant amount of money on defence technology, equipment systems and network centric <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\twarfare, and Europe wasn’t. The technology gap, which is so important to sustain our capability in the UK for the long term, became intolerable.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn different circumstances, BAE’s quest for a US partner would be expected to hit a political brick wall. Few governments have been willing to give up strategic control of their defence <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tindustries; BAE’s dramatic turn to the west threatens to undermine a series of European partnerships that Whitehall has been nurturing for decades.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe post-Iraq mood in Downing Street has produced a surprising degree of support for BAE’s ambitions. Some advisers believe that once the issue of technology transfer was resolved it might not be such a disaster to relinquish control of BAE, if it meant that the company’s British factories could continue to make modern equipment at competitive prices.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGrowing frustration with BAE’s management has also played a part. In the post year, the company’s share price bas fallen sharply after a series of clashes with the government over cost overruns and delays on big projects. BAE blames the problems on an older style of contracts that promised a fixed price and left much of the risk, in the event of programme snags, with the private sector.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSubsequent attempts to shore more of the risk with the Ministry of Defence threaten to sour the relationship even further. The latent negotiations over the cost of two new aircraft carriers for the Royal Navy are likely to go on until March, amid mounting estimates for the final price. BAE has also resorted to tough tactics when negotiating contracts for new Hawk trainer jets, even sending forward-dated redundancy notices to factory workers to show the government the consequences of awarding the contract elsewhere.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tFed up with such behaviour, none in Whitehall worry much less than they used to about protecting a national champion from foreign takeover. Some in the Treasury even question <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\twhether things could get any worse under new management.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tA report drawn up by government appointed financial advisers also argues that BAE’s chances of pulling off a deal with one of the big five US contractors could deteriorate as its <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tshare price languishes and the technology gap grows ever wider. Already BAE’s market capitalisation is far short of the level needed for any of the US contractors to consider a true 50-50 merger.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe problem is likely to get worse before it gets better, says one banker to have studied the prospects of a deal. BAE will only fall further behind and the valuation gap is likely to grow rather than diminish over time.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBut it is far from being a done deal. Many observers doubt whether BAE can pull off such an ambitious transatlantic deal in the next year. One problem is that the company holds few attractions for a prospective US buyer. All the time Europe’s defence spending continues to fall behind the US, greater access to the European market looks distinctly unalluring.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEuropean competitors also suggest that BAE is seeking to rush into a deal to disguise its weaknesses. Asked why he appears to have a different view on the ability of European companies to compete with American counterparts than BAE does, Rainer Hetrich, co-chief executive of Europeau Aeronautic, Defence and Space (EADS), the Franco.German joint owner of Airbus, laughs: Maybe each company is in different shape.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEADS maintains that Airbus’s great success in competing with the US in the civil aerospace market shows that European. cooperation can work. Further partnerships between defence contractors such as Thales, EADS and Dassault could allow the technological gap to be closed with the help of greater economies of scale. We must get better value for money, and that means stop the fragmentation, the parallel development, Mr Hetrich says. That does not mean one single European institution, but I think you could gain a lot.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThales, a purely French defence contractor, also believes that with a decent increase in research and development spending, Europe can keep up with the US companies. In some fields, such as sensor technology and Europe’s new, jointly produced cruise missile, Storm-Shadow, the French believe they are even ahead of US technology.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDenis Ranque, Thales’ chief executive, insists there are likely to be three main European defence companies (Thaler, EADS, BAE) for the foreseeable future, and does not believe in any more mega-mergers. At the most, he predicts football-style swaps of players, implying small parts of companies may go back and forth.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSuch brave talk from the French defence establishment may succeed in casting doubt on BAE’s motives for rushing into a deal but it cannot disguise the fact that a successful Anglo-American tie-up would leave Europe with enormous strategic challenges.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAlmost regardless of whether BAE does a deal, the French industry needs to consolidate; but especially if there is a deal there will have to be a reaction, predicts Ben Fidler, an analyst at Deutsche Bank.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tJust as Europe failed to present a united front to America during the diplomatic dispute before the Iraq war, there are already signs of traditional fault lines opening up. Yesterday, Finnmeccanica, the Italian defence manufacturer, said it was looking for US acquisitions to step on to the international stage.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLast month, Carlyle Group, the US private equity company, reciprocated the italian interest by buying FiatAvio, Fiat’s military and space arm, for l.5bn ($1.7bn).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSuch deals are small by comparison with BAE’s plans but hint at a return to normality in US relations with other parts of Europe.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBesides, some experts point to continued cooperation between Thales and Raytheon of the US as evidence that all is not lost in defence relations between the US and France. Augusta-Westland, an Anglo-Italian aerospace joint venture, even hopes to supply the US presidential helicopter. EADS has won orders to supply maritime patrol aircraft for the US coastguard.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEventually, the dust will settle, says Mr Nicoll at the IISS. It would be a mistake to make long-term strategic decisions on the basis of short-term peculiarities in the political climate.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNevertheless, the realities of US political anger towards much of Europe suggests that BAE’s best chance of transatlantic consolidation lies with Mr Bush and Mr Blair when they meet this Thursday. If the political hurdles can be overcome, it will face only one remaining snag, persuading one of the leading US defence manufacturers that the company is worth buying.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tJames Albaugh, president and chief executive of Boeing’s Integrated Defense Systems division, sums up the challenge: I believe everyone understands [transatlantic deals] will take place at some point. What we don’t understand is what they might look like. We have priorities to be global but global by itself is not a strategy. The strategy is to make money.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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Suicide d’une nation, par lassitude apr\u00e8s tout, Explication de texte, BAE turns west Avant la rencontre Blair-GW Bush de la mi-juillet (19 juillet), on a beaucoup parl\u00e9 de la question des transferts de technologies entre USA et UK (les Britanniques tr\u00e8s m\u00e9contents par ce qu’ils obtiennent, ou plut\u00f4t ce qu’ils n’obtiennent pas ; les Am\u00e9ricains,… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65701","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-notes-de-lectures"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65701","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65701"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65701\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65701"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65701"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65701"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}