{"id":65750,"date":"2003-09-27T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-09-27T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/09\/27\/les-emplettes-europeennes-du-pentagone\/"},"modified":"2003-09-27T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-09-27T00:00:00","slug":"les-emplettes-europeennes-du-pentagone","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/09\/27\/les-emplettes-europeennes-du-pentagone\/","title":{"rendered":"Les emplettes europ\u00e9ennes du Pentagone<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Les emplettes europ\u00e9ennes du Pentagone<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t27 septembre 2003 Un \u00e9ditorial de Defense News<\/em> du 22 septembre ouvre des perspectives importantes et inattendues. Il s’appuie sur une tendance perceptible depuis quelques semaines \u00e0 Washington, et caract\u00e9ris\u00e9e notamment par le destin de plusieurs programmes :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Le missile de croisi\u00e8re europ\u00e9en Storm Shadow<\/em> (nom de la version anglaise) ou Scalp<\/em> (nom de la version fran\u00e7aise), un missile anglo-fran\u00e7ais tr\u00e8s avanc\u00e9 d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 \u00e0 partir de la technologie du missile anti-piste fran\u00e7ais Apache<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• L’Airbus dans une version de ravitaillement en vol, dans une affaire o\u00f9 le concurrent qui semblait choisi, Boeing et son 767, l’a \u00e9t\u00e9 dans des conditions si proches d’\u00eatre scandaleuses que le concurrent europ\u00e9en pourrait \u00e0 nouveau se trouver en situation d’\u00eatre s\u00e9lectionn\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Un h\u00e9licopt\u00e8re Agusta-Westland qui concourt pour un march\u00e9 du Pentagone.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes termes de l’\u00e9ditorial de Defense News<\/em> sont int\u00e9ressants. Ils nous disent plusieurs choses, dont on retrouve trace dans l’un ou l’autre texte que nous avons d\u00e9j\u00e0 publi\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Le simple int\u00e9r\u00eat du Pentagone pour ces syst\u00e8mes europ\u00e9ens, et c’est particuli\u00e8rement le cas du Storm Shadow<\/a>, montre que la th\u00e8se de propagande publicitaire du technological gap<\/em> aux d\u00e9pens de l’Europe est compl\u00e8tement fausse.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Il est bien possible que cet int\u00e9r\u00eat soit aussi la cons\u00e9quence du constat de plus en plus affirm\u00e9 que l’industrie US rencontre de graves difficult\u00e9s dans l’int\u00e9gration et la rationalisation de certains syst\u00e8mes de haute technologie. Il est par exemple surprenant, compte tenu des \u00e9normes sommes englouties dans la R&D, sup\u00e9rieures \u00e0 celles des Europ\u00e9ens ou des pays europ\u00e9ens dans un ordre de 1 \u00e0 10, que les USA n’aient pas un cruise missile du niveau du Storm Shadow<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Les circonstances de ces divers march\u00e9s potentiels montrent que le Pentagone est aujourd’hui tr\u00e8s embarrass\u00e9 devant une industrie US qui se structure tr\u00e8s rapidement pour occuper des positions de monopole dans divers domaines (les avions de transport lourds pour Boeing, les avions de combat pour Lockheed Martin). Le r\u00e9sultat est, comme dans le cas de tout monopole, que le fournisseur tend \u00e0 devenir le ma\u00eetre. C’est la d\u00e9monstration de la gigantesque erreur qu’a \u00e9t\u00e9 la restructuration, \u00e9galement gigantesque, effectu\u00e9e aux USA dans les ann\u00e9es 1990, et pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e comme une panac\u00e9e. Defense News<\/em> le reconna\u00eet au d\u00e9tour d’une phrase, comme il reconna\u00eet la puissance europ\u00e9enne : \u00ab A decade ago, U.S. officials could afford to dismiss European weapons. Not any more. U.S. industry has consolidated almost beyond competition, and the Pentagon needs another rival for its procurement contests. In more and more areas, European arms and defense equipment is offering sturdy options.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Contrairement \u00e0 la croyance (y compris de Defense News<\/em>), on ne voit pas que cette situation favorise la coop\u00e9ration transatlantique. Cela favorisera plut\u00f4t la volont\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne de se renforcer encore au niveau de son industrie, puisque c’est la solution pour p\u00e9n\u00e9trer le march\u00e9 US. Pas besoin pour cela de passer par l’industrie US, par laquelle on finit par \u00eatre d\u00e9vor\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDefense News<\/em> conclut : \u00ab When it comes to buying the equipment of national defense, politics should not be at the center of the debate. Performance and price should be.<\/em> \u00bb Peut-\u00eatre, mais il n’emp\u00eache que le jugement qu’on doit porter sur cette situation, doit \u00eatre, lui, compl\u00e8tement politique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCi-dessous, nous reproduisons (avec les r\u00e9serves d’usage sur l’utilisation de ce texte) l’\u00e9ditorial de Defense News<\/em>, qui n’est pas accessible par le site de l’hebdomadaire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Buying European?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tEditorial, Defense News, September 22, 2003<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tFor the first time in memory, the Pentagon is showing genuine interest in an assortment of European systems – from cruise missiles to helicopters to aerial tankers derived from Airbus jetliners.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe recognition by U.S. defense leaders that Europe has something meaningful to offer in the world of defense systems should come as welcome news to Europeans, who have spent the part decade consolidating firms, combining fragmented markets and producing effective products.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIt remains unclear whether the Pentagon’s interest will translate into actual orders. The U. S. military has tended to dismiss Europe’s products, sometimes with good reason.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAfter all, U.S. industry, supported by the world’s largest defense budget, could be counted upon to deliver cutting-edge technology in volumes that could offer attractive pricing.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNot so in Europe, where piecemeal markets, miniscule orders and meager defense spending generated products that often fell short. That forced Europeans to pitch their wares in political terms: \u00a0\u00bbWe boy a lot from you, so boy something from us.\u00a0\u00bb Unsurprisingly, U.S. officials were rarely convinced that political payback justified settling for second best.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBut the situation appears to be changing. The Pentagon’s interest in a handful of programs may be a. good first stop toward opening the U. S. market. If actual orders follow, European firms must seize the chance to prove they can deliver.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThis, in turn, will help overturn Buy-American laws and proposals, opening the door to more orders from European firms – which should help anti-protectionists in Europe, leading to freer markets for all.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNothing proves like performance, they say, which is why MBDA’s new cruise missile –<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tdubbed Storm Shadow in Britain, Scalp in France – is getting a fresh look in Washington after the Royal Air Force successfully used it in Iraq. For years, the Pentagon dismissed the European effort as the latest multinational program in which creating jobs was more important than delivering a payload. Now the U.S. Air Force, not an organization generally open to offshore ideas, wants to know if the missile – whose accuracy is measured in inches and whose novel penetrating warhead offers new capability – will fit its F-15 fighter.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMeanwhile, Europe’s firms have been aggressively teaming up with U.S. companies. MBDA helped Boeing win the contract for the U.S. Air Forces Small Diameter Bomb, a U. S. program that could dominate the global market for relatively small, highly precise, air-dropped munitions.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSimilarly, Agusta Westland has teamed with Bell Helicopter Textron and Lockheed Martin to sell its US101 to the Pentagon over Sikorsky’s S-92, while Europe’s Airbus seeks a U.S. partner to help get its aerial tankers into service with the Air Force. To that end, Airbus’ parent, EADS, plans to spend $80 million on refueling technologies to take on Boeing’s monopoly on the global tanker market.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tA decade ago, U.S. officials could afford to dismiss European weapons. Not any more. U.S. industry has consolidated almost beyond competition, and the Pentagon needs another rival for its procurement contests. In more and more areas, European arms and defense equipment is offering sturdy options.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWhen it comes to buying the equipment of national defense, politics should not be at the center of the debate. Performance and price should be.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Les emplettes europ\u00e9ennes du Pentagone 27 septembre 2003 Un \u00e9ditorial de Defense News du 22 septembre ouvre des perspectives importantes et inattendues. Il s’appuie sur une tendance perceptible depuis quelques semaines \u00e0 Washington, et caract\u00e9ris\u00e9e notamment par le destin de plusieurs programmes : • Le missile de croisi\u00e8re europ\u00e9en Storm Shadow (nom de la version… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3191,3192,4139,4138,4137],"class_list":["post-65750","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-airbus","tag-boeing","tag-concurrence","tag-shadow","tag-storm"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65750","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65750"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65750\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65750"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65750"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65750"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}