{"id":65768,"date":"2003-10-15T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-10-15T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/10\/15\/ils-brulent-ce-quils-ont-adore-la-victoire-de-bagdad-mise-en-question\/"},"modified":"2003-10-15T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-10-15T00:00:00","slug":"ils-brulent-ce-quils-ont-adore-la-victoire-de-bagdad-mise-en-question","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/10\/15\/ils-brulent-ce-quils-ont-adore-la-victoire-de-bagdad-mise-en-question\/","title":{"rendered":"Ils br\u00fblent ce qu’ils ont ador\u00e9 : la victoire de Bagdad mise en question<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Ils br\u00fblent ce qu’ils ont ador\u00e9 : la victoire de Bagdad mise en doute<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t15 octobre 2003 Toujours la rapidit\u00e9 des \u00e9v\u00e9nements, surtout dans le domaine de la perception. Un article bien document\u00e9 du Baltimore Sun<\/a> met en cause la victoire-\u00e9clair am\u00e9ricaine en Irak, en mars-avril. L’id\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale qui appara\u00eet est celle-ci : il s’agit plus d’une d\u00e9faite des Irakiens que d’une victoire des Am\u00e9ricains. Cet avis, \u00e9mis par Loren Thomson (cit\u00e9 dans l’article) donne le ton : \u00ab The important lesson is, if you want to win quickly and decisively, go fight an incompetent enemy.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(Nous insistons sur ce jugement, dont on appr\u00e9ciera qu’il est caract\u00e9ris\u00e9 par une ironie peut-\u00eatre involontaire, \u00e0 cause de la personnalit\u00e9 de Loren Thompson. Cet analyste de d\u00e9fense du Lexington Institute s’est toujours montr\u00e9 impeccablement politiquement correct sur toutes les mati\u00e8res concernant le Pentagone. Qu’il se d\u00e9partisse tant soit peu de cette r\u00e9serve prudente et avis\u00e9e est une indication, anecdotique mais n\u00e9anmoins significative, de l’\u00e9volution du sentiment g\u00e9n\u00e9ral sur la campagne irakienne.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’article s’appuie essentiellement sur une \u00e9tude faite par une \u00e9quipe d’analystes travaillant dans une institution li\u00e9e au DoD, mais disposant d’une certaine ind\u00e9pendance vis-\u00e0-vis de la pens\u00e9e centrale du minist\u00e8re : le Army War College. N\u00e9anmoins, cette \u00e9tude devrait \u00eatre pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e comme celle de l’U.S. Army. Les principaux r\u00e9sultats sont les suivants :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0L’utilisation de la technologie, mais surtout le comportement inepte des Irakiens sont les principales causes de la victoire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0L’aspect jointness<\/em> (la coordination op\u00e9rationnelle des diff\u00e9rents services engag\u00e9s) a jou\u00e9 un r\u00f4le beaucoup moindre que ce que nous dit l’avis officiel du DoD. (L’\u00e9tude officielle, conduite par l’amiral Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., commandant of the U.S. Joint Forces Command \u00e0 Norfolk, en Virginie, mettait l’accent sur l’aspect jointness<\/em>, qui est d’ailleurs, effectivement, la sp\u00e9cialit\u00e9 du m\u00eame amiral Giambastiani. Devant la commission des forces arm\u00e9es de la Chambre, Giambastiani d\u00e9clarait : \u00ab Our forces operated at a new level of jointness forged through continuous operations, creating a new joint way of war that leverages knowledge, speed, precision and lethality.<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The Army study, led by Stephen Biddle, a professor of strategic studies at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pa., is not in final form. A senior Army officer warned against drawing firm conclusions yet.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In some important ways, the Army’s study appears at odds with the Pentagon’s broader study of lessons learned from the war, which found that the exceptional teamwork that officials say was displayed by the four military branches was the main reason for victory. The Army’s report played down the effects of interservice teamwork, known in the Pentagon as joint operations or jointness.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Titled Iraq and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy, the Army’s preliminary report found little evidence that the victory in Iraq is attributable to a significant increase in jointness.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Instead, the combined effect of advanced U.S. technology and Iraqi ineptitude was the key determinant, the report said. Had the Iraqis decided to mount a skilled defense in their cities, such action would have blunted the U.S. technological edge in weaponry and surveillance systems, the draft said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Without Iraqi ineptitude, even 2003 technology could not have enabled a force this size to prevail at this cost, the draft said. Against an adept enemy, the authors said, results could be very different.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’article se termine en citant \u00e9galement des sp\u00e9cialistes et des analystes de questions de d\u00e9fense (dont Thompson) allant dans le m\u00eame sens de rabaisser l’appr\u00e9ciation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de la victoire de mars-avril 2003. Un point int\u00e9ressant dans ces \u00e9valuations est l’absence de r\u00e9f\u00e9rence aux conditions de corruption de certains g\u00e9n\u00e9raux irakiens, comme cela fut signal\u00e9 \u00e0 l’\u00e9poque par le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Franks lui-m\u00eame<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Some independent analysts, without minimizing the importance of joint operations, say the key to toppling Hussein in three weeks was his ineffectual military and security forces.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The important lesson is, if you want to win quickly and decisively, go fight an incompetent enemy, said Loren Thompson, a defense analyst at the Lexington Institute. Inept adversaries do not teach very clear lessons, added Thompson, saying that such lessons might not work against China.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Andrew F. Krepinevich, a retired Army colonel and a defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, found in his study of the war, Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First Blush Assessment, released last month, that the U.S. military’s performance may have been surpassed by the stunning ineptitude of its Iraqi adversary. In an interview, Krepinevich said the real question [for the U.S. military] is what can this force do against North Korea?<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tD’une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, ce mouvement r\u00e9visionniste de la victoire de mars-avril 2003 est r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur du d\u00e9veloppement des \u00e9v\u00e9nements \u00e0 Washington. La situation actuelle en Irak et aussi la situation \u00e0 Washington poussent \u00e0 une remise en question de toutes les appr\u00e9ciations qui avaient \u00e9t\u00e9 offertes apr\u00e8s la victoire. Pour le cas qui nous occupe, la mise en cause de l’aspect jointness<\/em>, triomphe de la souplesse et de l’adaptabilit\u00e9 des forces selon les th\u00e8ses de Rumsfeld, est indirectement une mise en cause de Rumsfeld lui-m\u00eame (et que cela vienne notamment de l’U.S. Army ne peut surprendre). La publicit\u00e9 faite \u00e0 ces th\u00e8ses nouvelles qui relativisent la victoire en Irak accentuera l’affaiblissement de la position du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense, apr\u00e8s le coup port\u00e9 contre lui par le transfert d’autorit\u00e9 sur les affaires irakiennes du DoD vers la Maison-Blanche.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tD’une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, il s’agit d’un signe de plus de la d\u00e9saffection g\u00e9n\u00e9rale ressentie \u00e0 Washington pour l’aventure irakienne, apr\u00e8s les divers revers enregistr\u00e9s ces derniers mois.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Ils br\u00fblent ce qu’ils ont ador\u00e9 : la victoire de Bagdad mise en doute 15 octobre 2003 Toujours la rapidit\u00e9 des \u00e9v\u00e9nements, surtout dans le domaine de la perception. Un article bien document\u00e9 du Baltimore Sun met en cause la victoire-\u00e9clair am\u00e9ricaine en Irak, en mars-avril. L’id\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale qui appara\u00eet est celle-ci : il s’agit… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65768","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65768","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65768"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65768\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65768"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65768"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65768"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}