{"id":65777,"date":"2003-10-23T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-10-23T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/10\/23\/desarroi-et-amertume-de-rumsfeld-deux-ans-plus-tard-apres-910\/"},"modified":"2003-10-23T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-10-23T00:00:00","slug":"desarroi-et-amertume-de-rumsfeld-deux-ans-plus-tard-apres-910","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/10\/23\/desarroi-et-amertume-de-rumsfeld-deux-ans-plus-tard-apres-910\/","title":{"rendered":"D\u00e9sarroi et amertume de Rumsfeld, deux ans plus tard (apr\u00e8s 9\/10&#8230;)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article\">D\u00e9sarroi et amertume de Rumsfeld, deux ans plus tard (apr\u00e8s 9\/10&#8230;)<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t23 octobre 2003  <em>USA Today<\/em> a publi\u00e9  le texte d&rsquo;un <a href=\"http:\/\/www.usatoday.com\/news\/washington\/executive\/rumsfeld-memo.htm\" class=\"gen\">memorandum<\/a> du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Rumsfeld, en date du 16 octobre, adress\u00e9 \u00e0 ses principaux collaborateurs (Wolfowitz et Feith, les g\u00e9n\u00e9raux Myers et Pace, successivement pr\u00e9sident et vice-pr\u00e9sident du Comit\u00e9 des Chefs d&rsquo;\u00e9tat-major). Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;un texte destin\u00e9 \u00e0 susciter la r\u00e9flexion avant une r\u00e9union (le 18 ou le 20 octobre) o\u00f9 l&rsquo;on en discuterait. <em>USA Today<\/em> publie \u00e9galement <a href=\"http:\/\/www.usatoday.com\/news\/washington\/2003-10-22-defense-memo-usat_x.htm#\" class=\"gen\">un commentaire<\/a> du memorandum.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCe texte est, dans sa s\u00e9cheresse, dans le style habituel de cette sorte de correspondance, tr\u00e8s r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur. Nous dirions m\u00eame qu&rsquo;il pourrait appara\u00eetre dans la perspective, par ce qu&rsquo;il nous dit qui ne nous est pas dit d&rsquo;habitude, comme un document historique. Ce jugement est justifi\u00e9, \u00e0 notre sens, par deux perspectives.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl y a d&rsquo;abord la plus \u00e9vidente, celle qui est apparue \u00e0 tous les commentateurs. Le m\u00e9mo Rumsfeld marque l&rsquo;amertume, voire le d\u00e9sarroi d&rsquo;une aventure lanc\u00e9e dans l&#8217;emphase et la conviction, l&rsquo;une des plus grandes guerres de l&rsquo;histoire, et qui s&rsquo;ab\u00eeme dans l&rsquo;impuissance et la paralysie. D&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on plus large et plus imag\u00e9e, nous dirions qu&rsquo;il marque le r\u00e9sultat de la confrontation de l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique avec le myst\u00e8re du monde,  confrontation qui ne s&rsquo;est faite qu&rsquo;\u00e0 de tr\u00e8s rares occasions, et jamais \u00e0 cette vitesse, ni sur de tels espaces, ni avec de telles ambitions. Plus qu&rsquo;une longue th\u00e9orie, c&rsquo;est l&rsquo;aveu d&rsquo;\u00e9chec d&rsquo;une ambition imp\u00e9riale sur le monde.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLes commentaires de <em>USA Today<\/em> sont eux-m\u00eames lugubres. Ils expriment le sentiment g\u00e9n\u00e9ral qu&rsquo;\u00e9prouveront les Am\u00e9ricains \u00e0 la lecture de ce texte, comme le sentiment g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de celui qui l&rsquo;a \u00e9crit. Ce n&rsquo;est pas la puissance de l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique qui est en cause ici, c&rsquo;est bien plus grave,  c&rsquo;est l&rsquo;utilit\u00e9 de cette puissance, l&rsquo;orientation qu&rsquo;on peut lui donner, l&rsquo;usage qu&rsquo;on en peut faire, la raison d&rsquo;\u00eatre m\u00eame de cette puissance,  la plus grave crise qu&rsquo;on puisse imaginer pour une nation comme l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em> The United States has no yardstick for measuring progress in the war on terrorism, has not yet made truly bold moves in fighting al-Qaeda and other terror groups, and is in for a long, hard slog in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to a memo that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld sent to top-ranking Defense officials last week.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Despite upbeat statements by the Bush administration, the memo to Rumsfeld&rsquo;s top staff reveals significant doubts about progress in the struggle against terrorists. Rumsfeld says that it is not possible to transform the Pentagon quickly enough to effectively fight the anti-terror war and that a new institution might be necessary to do that.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The memo, which diverges sharply from Rumsfeld&rsquo;s mostly positive public comments, offers one of the most candid and sobering assessments to date of how top administration officials view the 2-year-old war on terrorism. It suggests that significant work remains and raises a number of probing questions but few detailed proposals.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tC&rsquo;est un document infiniment pr\u00e9cieux parce qu&rsquo;il nous r\u00e9v\u00e8le une dimension qui avait compl\u00e8tement disparu de la sc\u00e8ne internationale et de cette fameuse guerre contre la Terreur : la r\u00e9alit\u00e9, c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire, du c\u00f4t\u00e9 des acteurs, et dans ce cas Rumsfeld, la simple v\u00e9rit\u00e9. Cela nous conduit \u00e0 la deuxi\u00e8me dimension de ce m\u00e9mo, \u00e0 notre sens la plus importante bien qu&rsquo;elle soit la moins spectaculaire. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;on observera que cette simple v\u00e9rit\u00e9 qui nous est restitu\u00e9e avec ce m\u00e9mo va en effet jusqu&rsquo;aux questions les plus fondamentales, pour l&rsquo;homme qu&rsquo;est le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense, tel que nous le connaissons en action depuis son arriv\u00e9e au Pentagone. (Nul ne peut nier, malgr\u00e9 les critiques tr\u00e8s fortes qu&rsquo;on peut lui adresser, que Rumsfeld est un homme d&rsquo;une personnalit\u00e9 peu commune, outre la position de pouvoir qu&rsquo;il occupe : de tels sentiments et de tels jugements ainsi manifest\u00e9s, \u00e0 ce niveau de pouvoir et de puissance, doivent \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9s comme tr\u00e8s importants.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tNous avons souvent rappel\u00e9 l&rsquo;extraordinaire discours de Rumsfeld du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=201\" class=\"gen\">10 septembre 2001<\/a>, o\u00f9 il d\u00e9non\u00e7ait le plus grave danger pour l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique,  et ce n&rsquo;\u00e9tait pas le terrorisme mais le cancer bureaucratique du Pentagone, cela dit la veille de l&rsquo;attaque. Pass\u00e9s trois ans de pouvoir absolu dans son domaine, de moyens budg\u00e9taires extraordinaires surtout depuis le 11 septembre 2001, d&rsquo;une action globale lui permettant de mettre en oeuvre indirectement les forces qu&rsquo;il jugeait essentielles pour briser ce monstre bureaucratique et l&rsquo;obliger \u00e0 se r\u00e9former dans l&rsquo;action, Rumsfeld pose <em>in fine<\/em> dans ce m\u00e9mo le constat de son \u00e9chec, et, par cons\u00e9quent, la question de savoir si l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique saura jamais dompter son v\u00e9ritable monstre, qui est cette bureaucratie qui prolif\u00e8re et r\u00e9duit \u00e0 la paralysie la puissance am\u00e9ricaine. Dans cette perspective historique des trois derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es, les questions que se pose Rumsfeld concernant la possible n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de mettre une nouvelle organisation en place (\u00e0 la place du DoD ?!) sont simplement path\u00e9tiques : \u00ab <em>Is DoD changing fast enough to deal with the new 21st century security environment? Can a big institution change fast enough?<\/em> \u00bb. Et, aussit\u00f4t apr\u00e8s (et ce sont l\u00e0 les deux paragraphes introductifs du m\u00e9mo) :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>DoD has been organized, trained and equipped to fight big armies, navies and air forces. It is not possible to change DoD fast enough to successfully fight the global war on terror; an alternative might be to try to fashion a new institution, either within DoD or elsewhere  one that seamlessly focuses the capabilities of several departments and agencies on this key problem.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCe n&rsquo;est qu&rsquo;une hypoth\u00e8se, mais, dans une \u00e9poque de complet virtualisme o\u00f9 la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 est impossible \u00e0 manifester, il ne nous \u00e9tonnerait pas que l&rsquo;auteur de la fuite soit, indirectement, Rumsfeld lui-m\u00eame  malgr\u00e9 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.foxnews.com\/story\/0,2933,100935,00.html\" class=\"gen\">les d\u00e9n\u00e9gations \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard<\/a>. Quoiqu&rsquo;il en soit, il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;un cri d&rsquo;alarme dont il y a peu de pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents dans cette sorte de situation. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCe texte m\u00e9rite sans aucun doute une publication. Le voici.<\/p>\n<h2 class=\"common-article\">Rumsfeld&rsquo;s war-on-terror memo<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tOctober 16, 2003<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tTO:  Gen. Dick Myers  Paul Wolfowitz  Gen. Pete Pace  Doug Feith <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tFROM: Donald Rumsfeld<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tSUBJECT: Global War on Terrorism<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThe questions I posed to combatant commanders this week were: Are we winning or losing the Global War on Terror? Is DoD changing fast enough to deal with the new 21st century security environment? Can a big institution change fast enough? Is the USG changing fast enough?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDoD has been organized, trained and equipped to fight big armies, navies and air forces. It is not possible to change DoD fast enough to successfully fight the global war on terror; an alternative might be to try to fashion a new institution, either within DoD or elsewhere  one that seamlessly focuses the capabilities of several departments and agencies on this key problem.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tWith respect to global terrorism, the record since Septermber 11th seems to be:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tWe are having mixed results with Al Qaida, although we have put considerable pressure on them  nonetheless, a great many remain at large.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tUSG has made reasonable progress in capturing or killing the top 55 Iraqis.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tUSG has made somewhat slower progress tracking down the Taliban  Omar, Hekmatyar, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tWith respect to the Ansar Al-Islam, we are just getting started.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tHave we fashioned the right mix of rewards, amnesty, protection and confidence in the US?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDoes DoD need to think through new ways to organize, train, equip and focus to deal with the global war on terror?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tAre the changes we have and are making too modest and incremental? My impression is that we have not yet made truly bold moves, although we have have made many sensible, logical moves in the right direction, but are they enough?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tToday, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDoes the US need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? The US is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists&rsquo; costs of millions.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDo we need a new organization?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tHow do we stop those who are financing the radical madrassa schools?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIs our current situation such that the harder we work, the behinder we get?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIt is pretty clear that the coalition can win in Afghanistan and Iraq in one way or another, but it will be a long, hard slog.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDoes CIA need a new finding?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tShould we create a private foundation to entice radical madradssas to a more moderate course?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tWhat else should we be considering?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tPlease be prepared to discuss this at our meeting on Saturday or Monday.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThanks.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong><em>[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l&rsquo;esprit,  Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>D\u00e9sarroi et amertume de Rumsfeld, deux ans plus tard (apr\u00e8s 9\/10&#8230;) 23 octobre 2003 USA Today a publi\u00e9 le texte d&rsquo;un memorandum du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Rumsfeld, en date du 16 octobre, adress\u00e9 \u00e0 ses principaux collaborateurs (Wolfowitz et Feith, les g\u00e9n\u00e9raux Myers et Pace, successivement pr\u00e9sident et vice-pr\u00e9sident du Comit\u00e9 des Chefs d&rsquo;\u00e9tat-major).&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[236,370,569,3321],"class_list":["post-65777","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-236","tag-370","tag-rumsfeld","tag-septembre"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65777","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65777"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65777\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65777"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65777"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65777"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}