{"id":65780,"date":"2003-10-28T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-10-28T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/10\/28\/les-mysteres-de-la-guerilla-en-irak\/"},"modified":"2003-10-28T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-10-28T00:00:00","slug":"les-mysteres-de-la-guerilla-en-irak","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/10\/28\/les-mysteres-de-la-guerilla-en-irak\/","title":{"rendered":"Les myst\u00e8res de la gu\u00e9rilla en Irak<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Les myst\u00e8res de la gu\u00e9rilla en Irak<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t28 octobre 2003 Apr\u00e8s les tr\u00e8s dures journ\u00e9es des 26 et 27 octobre en Irak, la question de la gu\u00e9rilla, de son action, de sa composition, etc, devient un probl\u00e8me majeur. Les \u00e9pisodes des 26-27 octobre ont ent\u00e9rin\u00e9 le fait d’une r\u00e9sistance organis\u00e9e, structur\u00e9e, face aux Am\u00e9ricains. La question de l’identification de ces groupes devient \u00e9galement un probl\u00e8me majeur.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tJim Lobe fait une analyse rapide de cette question<\/a> et observe que la composition de la gu\u00e9rilla est certainement plus complexe que ne veut le dire l’administration GW Bush.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Until now, U.S. officials have contended that resistance is confined to die-hard loyalists or what the Pentagon often refers to as dead-enders of ousted President Saddam Hussein, foreign jihadis inspired by or associated with the al-Qaeda terrorist group and common criminals, several thousand of whom were released from prison in a general amnesty just before the U.S.-led invasion.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Such a characterisation naturally suggests that the resistance lacks any legitimacy.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb But this description appears increasingly at odds with accounts by journalists who have interviewed men identified as resistance fighters, very few of whom have had good words to say about Saddam, as well as recent statements by U.S. military officers on the ground.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb They maintain that troops either do not really know who is behind the attacks or that they suspect resistance is much more broadly based than the official rhetoric suggests.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The attacks are being committed by three broad categories of guerrillas, none with close ties to Saddam, wrote Hassan Fattah, a Baghdad-based journalist, for The New Republic in July.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In addition to former lower-ranking Baathists, the two major groups, according to Fattah and other reporters, include conservative predominantly Sunni tribesmen, increasingly angry at disrespectful behaviour by U.S. troops, and an indigenous Islamist group, the best-known arm of which is Mohammed’s Army.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb All of them are opposed to U.S. occupation, and their ranks appear to be growing as the larger population becomes increasingly disaffected by the U.S. presence, according to recent reports.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tD’autres sources mettent l’accent sur l’\u00e9ventuelle pr\u00e9sence d’\u00e9trangers parmi les gu\u00e9rilleros. Pour ces sources, dont The Scotsman se fait l’\u00e9cho<\/a>, la qualit\u00e9 m\u00eame de l’organisation fait croire \u00e0 l’intervention de non-Irakiens dans ces attaques, y compris des terroristes d’Al Qa\u00efda. Le journal cite des sources proches des services de renseignement pour expliciter cette intervention \u00e9trang\u00e8re.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab A number of Palestinian fighters are known to have travelled to Iraq from refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria, while al-Qaeda terrorists, and others sympathetic to the organisation, have entered from Syria and Saudi Arabia.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Intelligence sources suggest that there is also strong evidence to support the belief that some Iranian groups are present in the country and have been involved in intelligence work, although there is no evidence yet to suggest that they have been directly involved in terrorist attacks.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Dr Magnus Ranstorp, the director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, said the level of expertise needed to co-ordinate attacks such as those which killed at least 35 people in Baghdad yesterday pointed to the involvement of outside professionals.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tUn point important pour ce qui concerne cette question de la pr\u00e9sence d’\u00e9trangers<\/a> a trait \u00e0 un homme bless\u00e9 captur\u00e9 au cours d’un des attentats, qui portait sur lui un passeport syrien. Cela semble confirmer la piste de la pr\u00e9sence d’\u00e9trangers parmi les gu\u00e9rilleros. (Mais on s’\u00e9tonnera aussi du comportement d’un homme d\u00e9crit comme un professionnel par les Occidentaux, qui effectue des attaques avec une marque d’identification aussi \u00e9vidente. On verra ce qu’il en sortira.) <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDans tous les cas, ces attentats et la situation pr\u00e9valant en Irak, ainsi que les r\u00e9flexions qui sont d\u00e9velopp\u00e9es \u00e0 cette occasion, tout cela m\u00e9rite quelques remarques, et en voici deux pour l’instant.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• La pr\u00e9sence \u00e9ventuelle d’\u00e9trangers en Irak, relev\u00e9e avec s\u00e9rieux et inqui\u00e9tude par les services de renseignement occidentaux comme s’il s’agissait d’un d\u00e9veloppement in\u00e9dit et remarquable, rel\u00e8ve d’autre part de l’\u00e9vidence la plus pesante. Il est \u00e9vident que la nouvelle situation install\u00e9e en Irak constitue rien de moins qu’une invitation<\/a> faite \u00e0 tous les groupes int\u00e9ress\u00e9s d’attaquer les Am\u00e9ricains et ceux qui travaillent avec eux. Il est probable que des th\u00e9ories nombreuses vont \u00eatre d\u00e9velopp\u00e9es \u00e0 partir de cette pr\u00e9sence d’\u00e9trangers, alors que le simple bon sens suffisait, d\u00e8s l’origine, \u00e0 anticiper une telle situation. Les r\u00e9flexions d’aujourd’hui auraient pu \u00eatre faites hier, pour tenter d’\u00e9carter une \u00e9volution vers la d\u00e9gradation actuelle.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Un point fondamental est l’absence compl\u00e8te, jusqu’\u00e0 ce jour et d’apr\u00e8s ce qu’on sait, de toute identification, de toute revendication de quelque groupe ou organisation que ce soit. C’est quelque chose de compl\u00e8tement in\u00e9dit dans une situation de guerre de gu\u00e9rilla, o\u00f9 l’aspect politique (revendication, but politique d\u00e9velopp\u00e9, identification pour acqu\u00e9rir une l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9, etc) a toujours \u00e9t\u00e9 consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme un point important de leur lutte par les gu\u00e9rilleros. Psychologiquement, cette situation in\u00e9dite contribue \u00e0 rendre la situation incertaine et insaisissable, autant qu’elle permet toutes les sp\u00e9culations du c\u00f4t\u00e9 am\u00e9ricain. Il n’est pas s\u00fbr que cette situation soit le r\u00e9sultat d’obligations (par exemple, si les gu\u00e9rilleros n’ont pas de base solide, ou s’ils sont d\u00e9sunis) : il est possible qu’il s’agisse d’une tactique d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9e et, dans ce cas, il reste \u00e0 consid\u00e9rer le but poursuivi par cette tactique.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Les myst\u00e8res de la gu\u00e9rilla en Irak 28 octobre 2003 Apr\u00e8s les tr\u00e8s dures journ\u00e9es des 26 et 27 octobre en Irak, la question de la gu\u00e9rilla, de son action, de sa composition, etc, devient un probl\u00e8me majeur. Les \u00e9pisodes des 26-27 octobre ont ent\u00e9rin\u00e9 le fait d’une r\u00e9sistance organis\u00e9e, structur\u00e9e, face aux Am\u00e9ricains. La… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65780","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65780","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65780"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65780\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65780"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65780"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65780"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}