{"id":65781,"date":"2003-10-29T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-10-29T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/10\/29\/la-logique-de-la-raison-virtualiste-contre-la-realite-irakienne\/"},"modified":"2003-10-29T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-10-29T00:00:00","slug":"la-logique-de-la-raison-virtualiste-contre-la-realite-irakienne","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/10\/29\/la-logique-de-la-raison-virtualiste-contre-la-realite-irakienne\/","title":{"rendered":"La logique de la raison virtualiste contre la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 irakienne<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

La logique de la raison virtualiste contre la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 irakienne <\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

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\t29 octobre 2003 C’est un argument que l’administration GW ne cesse d’exposer de plus en plus souvent puisqu’il appara\u00eet chaque fois que les choses vont plus mal en Irak, ce qui est aujourd’hui monnaie courante. Il s’agit d’affirmer que cette aggravation est justement le signe que la gu\u00e9rilla, ou la r\u00e9sistance, est d\u00e9sesp\u00e9r\u00e9e, donc \u00e0 bout de souffle. On trouve cette argumentation principalement dans des confidences faites par GW \u00e0 des journalistes<\/a>, apr\u00e8s les attaques des 26-27 octobre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\t\u00ab Bush spoke only hours after bombings in postwar Baghdad killed dozens of people and after conferring at the White House with the top U.S. general and civilian official in Iraq.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The more progress we make on the ground, the more free the Iraqis become, the more electricity that’s available, the more jobs are available, the more kids that are going to school, the more desperate these killers become, Bush told reporters.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\tL’argument est d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 plus en d\u00e9tails par divers commentateurs, dont celui du Christian Science Monitor<\/a>, qu’on retient ici. La sophistication est plus grande que dans les d\u00e9clarations GW, on sent qu’on a pens\u00e9 un peu plus loin que le bout de son nez. Cela n’est pas rassurant pour autant.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe r\u00e9sultat est par cons\u00e9quent bien celui-ci : plus les terroristes tapent, plus la situation s’aggrave en Irak, plus ils (les terroristes) nous prouvent que tout va mieux en Irak. C’est la \u00ab desperation escalation<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVoici quelques strophes de l’\u00e9ditorial du Christian Science Monitor<\/em> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Call it desperation escalation. The more daily life in Iraq is stabilized and the country wins international support, the more terrorists desperately hit highly symbolic targets, trying to create an impression that Iraq’s not stable.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The latest bull’s-eye was the International Committee of the Red Cross. A suicide bomber in an ambulance struck the ICRC’s Baghdad office on Monday, one day after an attack on the city’s most heavily fortified hotel, where Paul Wolfowitz, US deputy defense secretary, was staying. The last big attack was on the United Nations offices.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Don’t be fooled.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb These dramatic hits are aimed at swaying world opinion (mainly American) and not Iraqis, who prefer to vote for a new government rather than revolt against the Iraqi Governing Council and the multinational force led by the United States.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Someone with a sense of history, either Saddam Hussein or terrorists connected to Al Qaeda, may think they can bring about in Iraq what the Tet Offensive did in South Vietnam in February 1968, when a desperate Hanoi ordered futile attacks on US positions, notably the embassy in Saigon. The attacks created an impression that the US was losing militarily. It wasn’t true, but the TV images helped turned American opinion against the war.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In Iraq, the desperate attackers show signs of losing the opinion war.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Over just the past two weeks, the \u00a0\u00bbdead-enders,\u00a0\u00bb as the Bush administration calls the terrorists, have seen the UN Security Council vote unanimously to endorse the US-led restoration of Iraq, while a 73-nation donors’ conference in Madrid came up with more than $33 billion in pledges twice the size of the Iraqi economy to aid Iraq’s rebuilding.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb And while President Bush and Congress argue over whether the US portion of that aid is a grant or partially a loan, the package will eventually pass, a reflection of the public’s willingness to slog it out (as Donald Rumsfeld might say).<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\tLa question qui se pose ne concerne pas l’urgence de juger d’une telle argumentation, \u00e9ventuellement d’y r\u00e9pondre. (Inutile de s’appesantir sur la validit\u00e9 d’arguments appuy\u00e9s sur le vote du Conseil de S\u00e9curit\u00e9 ou la Conf\u00e9rence des donneurs, \u00e0 Madrid, comme signe du renforcement du soutien de la communaut\u00e9 internationale.) La question concerne la forme du raisonnement, par cons\u00e9quent la psychologie qui pr\u00e9side \u00e0 l’appr\u00e9ciation qui est donn\u00e9e de la situation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes Am\u00e9ricains refusent d’aborder ce probl\u00e8me ou bien ils ne le peuvent pas, m\u00eame s’ils effleurent par moments son aspect le plus fondamental, sans doute d’une fa\u00e7on involontaire. Un article du New York Times sur Wolfowitz en Irak, publi\u00e9 hier<\/a>, pr\u00e9sente une analyse tr\u00e8s classique, ou, plut\u00f4t, tr\u00e8s classiquement am\u00e9ricaine, sur les difficult\u00e9s de la situation, les difficult\u00e9s de parvenir \u00e0 r\u00e9tablir la s\u00e9curit\u00e9, \u00e0 chasser les gu\u00e9rilleros, et faire \u00e9voluer une situation qu’on voudrait d\u00e9j\u00e0 s\u00e9curis\u00e9e et stabilis\u00e9e. (Tout cela \u00e0 propos de Wolfowitz, qui semble porter sur lui cette incapacit\u00e9 am\u00e9ricaine.) Tr\u00e8s curieusement, en page une, quelques mots r\u00e9sument l’article en disant quelque chose qu’on n’y trouve pas du tout et qui est pourtant l’essentiel du seul probl\u00e8me int\u00e9ressant : \u00ab The rocket attack on the Rashid Hotel emphasizes the gap between the Bush administration’s description of progress and actuality<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’administration GW, on pourrait m\u00eame dire la psychologie de cette administration et de l’essentiel du monde washingtonien, est compl\u00e8tement captive de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 virtualiste. C’est elle qui fait la pr\u00e9misse de toute appr\u00e9ciation de la situation. Cette pression insupportable conduit \u00e0 des sophismes aussi grands que celui qui nous est expos\u00e9 ici : plus nos adversaires attaquent, plus cela signifie qu’ils sont d\u00e9sesp\u00e9r\u00e9s (et qu’ils vont perdre, par cons\u00e9quent). Donc, plus nous reculons sous leurs coups, plus nous avan\u00e7ons puisqu’ils vont perdre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tA leur tour, ces sophismes interdisent compl\u00e8tement toute le\u00e7on utile d’\u00eatre tir\u00e9e, donc toute mesure constructive d’\u00eatre prise. On se demande m\u00eame si la psychologie GW\/washingtonienne est encore, aujourd’hui, capable d’accepter le fruit de l’exp\u00e9rience de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 pour parvenir \u00e0 appliquer des le\u00e7ons utiles. Cet ensemble de blocages psychologiques signifie, au moins, que, pour Washington, le drame irakien pourrait aller vraiment tr\u00e8s loin.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

La logique de la raison virtualiste contre la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 irakienne 29 octobre 2003 C’est un argument que l’administration GW ne cesse d’exposer de plus en plus souvent puisqu’il appara\u00eet chaque fois que les choses vont plus mal en Irak, ce qui est aujourd’hui monnaie courante. Il s’agit d’affirmer que cette aggravation est justement le signe… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65781","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65781","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65781"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65781\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65781"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65781"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65781"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}