{"id":65797,"date":"2003-11-16T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-11-16T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/11\/16\/un-monde-completement-etranger-au-monde-reel\/"},"modified":"2003-11-16T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-11-16T00:00:00","slug":"un-monde-completement-etranger-au-monde-reel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/11\/16\/un-monde-completement-etranger-au-monde-reel\/","title":{"rendered":"<strong><em>Un monde compl\u00e8tement \u00e9tranger au monde r\u00e9el<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article\">Un monde compl\u00e8tement \u00e9tranger au monde r\u00e9el<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t16 novembre 2003  Dans un excellent reportage, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.telegraph.co.uk\/news\/main.jhtml?xml=\/news\/2003\/11\/16\/wchop316.xml&#038;sSheet=\/news\/2003\/11\/16\/ixnewstop.html111\" class=\"gen\">le Daily Telegraph de Londres<\/a> rapporte les d\u00e9tails d&rsquo;une tr\u00e8s r\u00e9cente intervention am\u00e9ricaine en Irak, selon la doctrine nouvellement adopt\u00e9e de frapper plus durement (\u00ab <em>America&rsquo;s new get-tough policy against the Iraqi insurgency<\/em> \u00bb). Le r\u00e9sultat est un d\u00e9sastre ajout\u00e9 \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9chec qu&rsquo;avaient constitu\u00e9 jusqu&rsquo;alors les interventions am\u00e9ricaines en Irak, apr\u00e8s la victoire-\u00e9clair et aujourd&rsquo;hui sans plus la moindre signification d&rsquo;avril 2003.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tMais d&rsquo;abord, voici, en quelques paragraphes emprunt\u00e9s au quotidien britannique, la description de l&rsquo;op\u00e9ration am\u00e9ricaine.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>America&rsquo;s new get-tough policy against the Iraqi insurgency reached southern Baghdad last week. The military bore down on Al-Sadia district with an AC-130 warplane. Their target was a clothing factory that the Americans believed was a staging point for rocket attacks on their bases. A mortar bombardment the following night finished the task of destroying the building.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>This deployment  the first since the main combat ended  was a useless display of firepower, according to Karim Medhi, a nearby resident. We told the Americans days ago that this place was being used to attack them but they sent nobody. Then, yesterday morning, they sent patrols telling everybody to leave because the factory was going to be attacked. When they did attack, the resistance had fled. There was nobody there.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The delay may have left the local people unimpressed but with US resources stretched and troops facing an average of 25 attacks a day from guerrillas, it is little surprise.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Sgt Joe Justin of the 1st Armoured Division arrived at Al-Sadia to log satellite position points for the second hit on the textile factory.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Khalid Dholia, the owner, pleaded at the door of the sergeant&rsquo;s vehicle for information on compensation. But this is not a high priority for the Americans. They have taken heavy casualties in the past week and their aim is to track down the increasingly organised armed resistance.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The radio crackled. Sgt Justin looked over at his Iraqi interpreter and gave his orders: We&rsquo;re going to have to move quickly on this one. We&rsquo;re going to hit inwards from that red car. Clear the area.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>As a small crowd gathered at the crossroads scrambled to get away, the interpreter shouted through loudspeakers: This area is about to be targeted by missiles of the US Army. Please leave. Thirty minutes later eight mortar rounds hit the factory. Sgt Justin explained that the building was one of many good places in Al-Sadia from where Americans believe guerrillas have been attacking the US forces.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tOn a bien s\u00fbr peine \u00e0 en croire son esprit \u00e0 la lecture de cette description. Le comportement des militaires am\u00e9ricains est au-del\u00e0 de toute description caricaturale, de toutes les fa\u00e7ons qu&rsquo;on examine cette action,  jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 l&rsquo;annonce par haut-parleur de l&rsquo;attaque \u00ab <em>by missiles of the US Army<\/em> \u00bb. (On aurait pu nous donner le type de missiles, non ? &#8230;et annoncer, pour que chacun soit fix\u00e9, qu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agissait d&rsquo;une attaque par surprise,  pour convaincre les gu\u00e9rilleros de rester sur place, attendant les tirs de missiles.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tPlus s\u00e9rieusement observ\u00e9e, on dira que cette op\u00e9ration et les caract\u00e9ristiques qu&rsquo;elle r\u00e9v\u00e8le montrent une situation o\u00f9 les d\u00e9fauts des forces arm\u00e9es US, et de l&rsquo;esprit am\u00e9ricain en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, sont pouss\u00e9s \u00e0 l&rsquo;extr\u00eame. Cela est assez bien r\u00e9sum\u00e9 par cette remarque de Nouri Al-Badran, le nouveau ministre int\u00e9rieur du Conseil int\u00e9rimaire, qui s&rsquo;est plaint de \u00ab <em>l&rsquo;insistance des militaires am\u00e9ricains \u00e0 affirmer qu&rsquo;ils pourraient vaincre les gu\u00e9rilleros selon leurs propres conceptions.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tC&rsquo;est effectivement la signification de ces nouvelles op\u00e9rations : confront\u00e9s \u00e0 leur \u00e9chec dans l&rsquo;affrontement normal contre la gu\u00e9rilla, les militaires am\u00e9ricains voudraient imposer une guerre selon leurs conceptions et leurs moyens. Ils prouvent ainsi que la plus puissante machine militaire du monde est aussi la plus d\u00e9pass\u00e9e, la plus inadapt\u00e9e et la plus inefficace du monde. Les forces am\u00e9ricaines ne sont capables que de livrer des guerres \u00e0 leur \u00e9chelle, des guerres que plus personne ne veut livrer, donc des guerres qui n&rsquo;ont plus aucune r\u00e9alit\u00e9, des guerres totalement virtualistes qui d\u00e9bouchent sur d&rsquo;extraordinaires possibilit\u00e9s d&rsquo;\u00e9chec ; d&rsquo;o\u00f9 leur victoire-\u00e9clair de mars-avril, suivie de l&rsquo;enlisement, de la suite d&rsquo;\u00e9checs depuis avril, jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 cette situation catastrophique actuelle o\u00f9 un service tel que la CIA <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=925\" class=\"gen\">n&rsquo;h\u00e9site plus \u00e0 envisager une d\u00e9faite<\/a>. Une fois de plus, dans un autre domaine, confrontation du monde virtualiste avec le monde r\u00e9el ; le plus \u00e9tonnant et le plus r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur \u00e9tant l&rsquo;incapacit\u00e9 compl\u00e8te du monde virtualiste \u00e0 sortir de sa virtualit\u00e9 pour s&rsquo;adapter \u00e0 la r\u00e9alit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Un monde compl\u00e8tement \u00e9tranger au monde r\u00e9el 16 novembre 2003 Dans un excellent reportage, le Daily Telegraph de Londres rapporte les d\u00e9tails d&rsquo;une tr\u00e8s r\u00e9cente intervention am\u00e9ricaine en Irak, selon la doctrine nouvellement adopt\u00e9e de frapper plus durement (\u00ab America&rsquo;s new get-tough policy against the Iraqi insurgency \u00bb). Le r\u00e9sultat est un d\u00e9sastre ajout\u00e9 \u00e0&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[610],"class_list":["post-65797","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-virtualisme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65797","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65797"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65797\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65797"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65797"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65797"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}