{"id":65813,"date":"2003-12-08T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-12-08T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/12\/08\/retour-a-la-normale-cest-a-voir\/"},"modified":"2003-12-08T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-12-08T00:00:00","slug":"retour-a-la-normale-cest-a-voir","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/12\/08\/retour-a-la-normale-cest-a-voir\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201cRetour \u00e0 la normale\u201d ? C’est \u00e0 voir<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Retour \u00e0 la normale ? C’est \u00e0 voir<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

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\t8 d\u00e9cembre 2003 La signature fait valeur de test : quand il s’agit de signifier aux Europ\u00e9ens qu’il ne s’agit plus de plaisanter, l’International Herald Tribune<\/em> publie John Vinocur, auteur-maison, acari\u00e2tre et sp\u00e9cialiste du ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne de la d\u00e9sagr\u00e9gation europ\u00e9enne (\u00e0 commencer par la d\u00e9sagr\u00e9gation du couple franco-allemand recol\u00e9). Quand il s’agit de signifier aux Europ\u00e9ens qu’apr\u00e8s tout, tout ne va pas si mal, et que nous sommes faits pour nous entendre, l’IHT fait appel \u00e0 Elaine Sciolino, de la publication-m\u00e8re New York Times<\/em>, Sciolino sp\u00e9cialiste des tendresses adress\u00e9es aux Fran\u00e7ais. Aujourd’hui, c’est le cas, le ton est \u00e0 la diplomatie, \u00e0 la mod\u00e9ration, aux sourires fatigu\u00e9s de Colin Powell dont l’absence compl\u00e8te de substance, l’hyper-prudence bureaucratique et la gentillesse proverbiale font merveille. Sciolineo est sur le pont et nous livre ses consid\u00e9rations<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\t\u00ab After months of acrimony, Europe and the United States are modulating their tone and trying to work more cooperatively on the divisive issues of Iraq, Afghanistan and European defense cooperation.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The conciliatory stance on the U.S. side is motivated at least in part by the urgent need to have NATO countries contribute more troops and money to Iraq and to deliver promised and much-needed troops and equipment to Afghanistan. But there is a universal recognition among NATO members that the rift both within NATO and with the United States because of the Iraq war has to be repaired if the alliance is to remain viable.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb I won’t say everybody is pretending that everything is fine, but people are really trying to be more constructive, less emotional and, well, diplomatic, said a senior NATO military official who participated in meetings of its defense and foreign ministers in Brussels last week.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The most obvious evidence of the new tone was the public posture of the U.S. defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, at the NATO defense ministers’ meeting last week. Maybe we ought to try to do a better job of communicating, he said at one point, much to the surprise of European defense ministers and military officers.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tEffectivement, l’offensive d’apaisement a commenc\u00e9 avec Rumsfeld, dont on attendait des \u00e9clats et qui fut tout sourire avec ses coll\u00e8gues de l’OTAN, \u00e0 la r\u00e9union de la semaine derni\u00e8re. Ensuite, ce fut Powell, qui put tout \u00e0 son aise jouer au diplomate et au sage de l’\u00e9quipe GW, prof\u00e9rant ainsi avec solennit\u00e9 quelques \u00e9normit\u00e9s (l’engagement de l’OTAN en Afghanistan qualifi\u00e9 d’\u00e9v\u00e9nement historique). Derri\u00e8re tout cela, on voit les habituelles pressions US, d’une part pour que les Europ\u00e9ens viennent \u00e0 leur aide en Irak, d’autre part pour que l’OTAN prenne en charge la situation \u00e0 partir de juin prochain.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn observe donc un red\u00e9ploiement de la diplomatie US autour d’un seul but : faciliter de toutes les fa\u00e7ons possibles le retrait am\u00e9ricain d’Irak, dans le but de faciliter la r\u00e9\u00e9lection du pr\u00e9sident. Sur place, les soldats am\u00e9ricains limitent au maximum leurs sorties physiques, de fa\u00e7on \u00e0 r\u00e9duire leurs pertes. La strat\u00e9gie US de frappe massive par des moyens m\u00e9caniques (avions, blind\u00e9s, etc) lors d’une attaque rebelle est utilis\u00e9e \u00e0 fond. L\u00e0 aussi, elle permet de r\u00e9duire les pertes (US, s’entend, les Irakiens, surtout les civils comme d’habitude, essuyant les pl\u00e2tres)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tTout cela refl\u00e8te parfaitement le comportement d’une administration dont l’essentiel de l’\u00e9nergie, voire toute l’\u00e9nergie est orient\u00e9e vers le but politique de la r\u00e9\u00e9lection. Il s’agit effectivement d’une administration qui, comme le pr\u00e9cise Paul Krugman<\/a>, lorsqu’il s’agit des affaires publiques, \u00ab governs as if there’s no tomorrow<\/em> \u00bb. L’auteur Ben Rich exprime une analyse tr\u00e8s sp\u00e9cifique de l’administration GW Bush<\/a>, de cette fa\u00e7on qui d\u00e9couvre l’organisation structurelle de cette administration :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab This has been the most political White House in American history ( I should know, I’m writing a book of American History and I’ve had to research every last one of the sons of bitches-turns out there were about three good administrations since 1801). By ‘political’, cher lecteur, I don’t mean this White House contains an unusual proportion of politicians, although White Houses do contain on average more politicians than, say, a circus or a gynecologist’s convention (excluding Bill Frist). Rather I mean that the motivations of this White House are predicated entirely on political means and motives. It has no public policies except those based on political advantage. Crush opposition, ram through personal agenda, sodomize public, rinse and repeat. There is no legacy here, except the legacy of wealth the ultra-rich are accreting under cover of confusion. What we have is a machine entirely devoted to self-perpetuation. It cares nothing for cost. It cares nothing for environmental impact, workplace safety, or the common good. This here machine chugs night and day, spewing fetorous Hadean reeks, making more of itself. Dr. Seuss warned us this would happen, but we grew old and forgot.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\tCes pr\u00e9cisions ram\u00e8nent \u00e0 ses vraies dimensions l’offensive de s\u00e9duction de la diplomatie US. Elle ne correspond \u00e0 rien de diplomatique et n’implique aucun changement de politique que ce soit. Il s’agit d’une mesure de pure politique politicienne, prise sous l’impulsion des plans de campagne (de r\u00e9\u00e9lection) de Karl Rove, le conseiller du pr\u00e9sident pour les questions de communication.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa diplomatie US est entr\u00e9e en hibernation. Elle est devenue une affaire technique : comment faire pour \u00e9carter un impact d\u00e9favorable de l’Irak sur la campagne \u00e9lectorale ? Il s’agit \u00e9videmment de l’administration la plus nihiliste qu’aient jamais eue les \u00c9tats-Unis.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes Europ\u00e9ens doivent en profiter le plus cyniquement possible, s’ils sont capables d’un tel r\u00e9alisme : en acc\u00e9l\u00e9rant leur processus de formation d’une d\u00e9fense europ\u00e9enne. La bureaucratie am\u00e9ricaine de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale est furieuse et fait pression sur l’administration pour qu’elle bloque ce processus mais l’administration refuse parce qu’elle a besoin des Europ\u00e9ens pour l’Irak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Retour \u00e0 la normale ? C’est \u00e0 voir 8 d\u00e9cembre 2003 La signature fait valeur de test : quand il s’agit de signifier aux Europ\u00e9ens qu’il ne s’agit plus de plaisanter, l’International Herald Tribune publie John Vinocur, auteur-maison, acari\u00e2tre et sp\u00e9cialiste du ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne de la d\u00e9sagr\u00e9gation europ\u00e9enne (\u00e0 commencer par la d\u00e9sagr\u00e9gation du couple franco-allemand… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65813","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65813","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65813"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65813\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65813"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65813"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65813"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}